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Résumé
Traditionnellement, ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler le principe de l’action à double effet,
grâce à la distinction qu’il apporte entre l’intention et les effets prévus d’un acte, nous a
aidé à prendre des décisions morales dans des situations difficiles où la fin recherchée ne
pouvait être réalisée qu’en entraînant des effets secondaires non voulus ou non désirés. Au
cours des dernières années, une controverse importante a marqué l’utilisation de ce principe
dans la distinction apportée entre l’euthanasie et la «sédation terminale». On entend par
«sédation terminale» la pratique de rendre inconscient un patient en phase terminale comme
mesure de dernière instance visant à contrôler la douleur ou les autres symptômes devenus
intolérables. Cette thèse examine les aspects cliniques, légaux, philosophiques et
théologiques de la controverse dans un contexte (prioritairement) nord américain. Elle
illustre comment l’herméneutique de Paul Ricoeur peut améliorer notre réflexion basée sur
le principe de doubLe effet en établissant des distinctions significatives entre la «sédation
terminale» et l’euthanasie, l’emphase portant sur l’exploration des capacités humaines et
l’utilisation des cercles herméneutiques de Ricoeur.
Mots-clés : sédation terminale, sédation palliative, double effet, Ricoeur, herméneutique
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Abstract
Traditionally, the so-called principle of double effect with its distinction between intent and
foresiglit bas assisted us to make moral decisions in difficuit situations where our intended
end may only be accomplished by brïnging about additional unintended and undesired side
effects. In recent years, great controversy has surrounded the use of this principle to
distinguish between euthanasia and ‘terminal sedation’, the practice of rendering a
terminally iii patient unconscious as a ‘last resort’ measure to control their pain or other
intolerable symptoms. This thesis explores the clinical, legal, philosophical, and
theologïcal aspects of the controversy in the North American context (primarily) and
illustrates how the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur can improve our use of double effect
reasoning to effect meaningful distinctions between ‘terminal sedation’ and euthanasia.
Emphasis is placed on Ricoeur’s exploration of human capabilities and the use of his
hermeneutic circles.
Keywords: terminal sedation, palliative sedation, double effect, Ricoeur, hermeneutics
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whose 111e and teaching exemptfïedphronesis
with grace and wit.
Je me souviens
“Recaïl that, for Kant, the ‘sun ‘froi;i whose perspective progressive human
entightenment is visible as such is ‘simpiy the mode of thinking oJ the
spectators’ Enthusiasrn for the ideal, and the disinterested sympathy of
die spectator towards actual human violence (‘indeed toward human ‘misery
and atrocities ) -- botÏi acts which ‘onÏy reason can perform’ -- provide the
truly rational person with the ‘perspective of the sun’ vis-à-vis the messy
course of human history. Together they found the discourse of
enlightenment. The question with which I might open a conversation
concerning the violence of enÏightenment is therefore this: To what extent
do we still dwelÏ in this world by means ofsuch a discourse? Cun we stiit
dwetÏ in this world peaceably -- indeed even humanty -- once we have
become the sun?” (Schner 2002. 163)
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General Introduction
One philosopher lias claimed that the problem of universals “is a distinctively
philosophical problem” because “people other than philosophers are generally unaware that
the problem even exists” (Schoedinger 1992: ix). Although that may have been the case in
the past, it seems unlikely that the same situation exists today, ahhougli phulosophers may
stiil describe, analyze, and resolve the problem using terminology and methods partïcular to
philosophy, but unfamiliar to non-phulosophers. Nowadays, the frequent use of words like
‘pluralism’, ‘diversity’, ‘multi-culturalism’, ‘muÏti-religious reaÏity’, ‘secularism’,
‘tolerance’, ‘identity’, ‘recognition’, ‘equality’, ‘seif-determination’, convince this author
that at teast some awareness of the problem of universals has penetrated many spheres of
twenty-first century life, especially since the events of 9/11. Perhaps for the average
person, the problem of universals is experienced as a problem about meamng. In the midst
of the ‘pluralism’ of Canadian life, for example, what is the meamng of ‘justice’,
‘goodness’, ‘rightness’, ‘truth’, ‘beauty’, ‘respect’, ‘autonomy’, ‘evil’ and so on.
Particularists argue that characteristics such as these have only a particular meaning (i.e.,
meaning for a particular person or a specific community), and that a universally or
generally applicable meaning is no longer possible. Tragically, the events of 9/11
illustrated both the massive violence and destruction possible when particular meanings are
fanatically wielded by calculating martyrs, and the desperate need to reconcfle universals
and particulars peacefully for the benefit of ah citizens of the umverse. The need for
reconciliation is no less pressing on the philosophical level where we discover that the
aforementioned particularist argument only retums us to the central problem:
[The problem of universals] is a real problem because particulars are, and
can only be [emphasis mine] described by their characteristics. Sucli
charactenstics are qualities and qualities are what are generally understood
to be universals. Not withstanding that qualities determine particulars to be
the (types of) things that they are, it is indubitable that relations exist, e.g.,
that San Francisco is north of Los Angeles. Once it is understood that
qualities and realities are ontologically inescapable, it remains to determine
the nature of such beasts ... the views conceming the nature of universals
have differed widely. One runs the garnut from the position that universals
constitute a world unto themselves (e.g., Plato) to the position that there are
no unïversais at ail ... One thing seems clear: one cannot escape the
existence of universals. This, in mm, entails flot being able to escape an
analysis as to their nature ... There is another way of viewing the prirnacy of
universals. Without them there couid be no language as we understand it.
That is to say, without predicates we would have only subject-words within
our command. Ultimately, this reduces to proper nouns and the two
pronouns ‘this’ and ‘that’. These two pronouns are usefui only in
conjunction with pointing. Ostension, by itseif, does flot constitute
language. This observation has everything to say about human thinking.
Thinking and language go hand in hand. It is apparent that the recognition
of cliaracteristics and the formulation of nouns is symbiotic. Consequently,
the nature of universals is ultimately associated with human thinking
(Schoedinger 1992: ix-x).
Similar sentiments are expressed by Arnerican philosopher/bioethicist Daniel
Callalian. In an article entitied, Lfniversaiism & Part icuÏarism: Fighting to a Draw, he
argues that “No decisive choice should be made between umversalism and particularism.
Each wiil have its place in different situations ... The hard part is to devise a theory that can
readily join universality and the moral complexity of everyday life” (Cailahan 2000: 41).
“The hard part” lias been a daunting challenge for bioethics from its beginnings right up to
the present day. As technological advances began to revolutionize biomedicine in the
1960s, the need for discussion and resolution of the ethical issues associated with these
advances brought the disciplines of medicine, law, philosophy and theology into doser
contact. Thïs new relationship eventually brouglit to the fore the differences between these
disciplines, for instance, the fact that medicine is more focused on particular disease
processes and the divergent needs of particular types of patients, whereas law, philosophy
and theology are more concemed with the application of umversal principles. As Callahan
indicates in his definition of bioethics in the most recent EncycÏopedia of3ioethics, two
questions became urgent: “If the new bioethics was to be interdisciplinary, how would it
relate to the long-standing disciplines of moral theology and moral philosophy?
... [CouldJ
they, in their broad, abstract generality, do justice to the particularities of medicine or
environmental issues?” (Reich 1995: 250). Questions such as tliese have fostered a wide
ranging methodologicai debate within bioethics between so-called principalists (or
3universalists) and so-called contextualists (or particularists). How the debate will be
resolved is far from clear, and perhaps it will neyer be resolved to everyone’s satisfaction,
but the goal ofthis thesis will be to move beyond the debate and attempt a resolution ofthe
tension between universals and particulars within the context of a specific case study.
The task of reconciling universals and particulars is especially difficult within the
sphere of end-of-life issues, for example, palliative care and euthanasia. The English word
euthanasia derives from the Greek euthanatos, which means good or noble death. This
definition begs the obvious question of the meamng of “good or noble death,” and how we
miglit reconcile its meaning for particular individuals or communities (e.g., patients,
families, healthcare teams, professional healthcare associations) with universalistic
meanings found within philosophical, legal/public policy and theological discourse. This
tension can be exemplîfled in many ways, but as a starting place within the Canadian
context, we can study the influential 1995 Canadian Senate Report entitled, 0fLfe and
Death. In this document, we find that “good or noble death” is more likely to be associated
with palliative care, whereas euthanasia lias only pejorative meanings. The Report defines
palliative care as “care aimed at alleviating suffering -- physical, emotional, psychosocial,
or spiritual -- rather tlian curing. It is concemed with the cornfort of the suffering
individual” (Canada 1995: 14). As is the case in ah other Western countries, palliative care
is legally authorized in Canada. By contrast, eutlianasia is defined as “a deliberate act
undertaken by one person with the intention of ending the hife of another person to relieve
that person’s suffering where that act is the cause of death” (Canada 1995: 14). The
qualifiers voÏuntary, non-voÏuntary, and invoÏuntaîy distinguisli three different types of
euthanasia: voÏuntary “means done in accordance with the wishes of a competent
individual or a valid advance directive”; non-voÏuntary “means done without the knowtedge
of the wishes of a competent individuai or of an incompetent individual”; and involuntaiy
“means done against the wishes of a competent individual or a valid directive” (Canada
1995: 14). Ail three types of euthanasia are iliegal in Canada, although the Report
recommends that the Criminai Code be amended to provide in situations of nonvoluntary
4and voluntary euthanasia, “a iess severe penalty in cases where there is the essential
element of compassion or mercy” (Canada 1995: xi). This proposed reform is obviously
controversial, and sorne argue that if it was implemented, it would lead Canada down ‘the
shppery siope’ toward full legalization of euthanasia, a step already taken by Belgium,
Colombia, and the Netherlands. The question of whether euthanasia or even assisted
suicide should ever be legaiized in Canada is beyond the scope of this thesis. However,
even if euthanasia and assisted suicide were to be legaiized in Canada, ail available end-of
life practices would stili have to be distinguished from each other and from murder, and
toward that end, the tensions revealed here would stili have to be resolved.
If we consider the Report’s distinction between palliative care and euthanasia, we
find that it Tests Ofl the idea that although both palliative care and euthanasia aim to relieve
suffering, palliative care is directed solely toward that end, whereas euthanasia invoïves the
relief of suffenng “with the intention of ending the life of another person,” and “where that
act is the cause of death.” Several questions are in order here: What does it mean to
intend? Although ‘intention’ is a concept universally applicable to rnany acts and at the
centre of many interesting action theories, it is particular persons who possess and act on
particular intentions, and at this level, intentions are ofien enigrnatic. For example, one can
have multiple and contradictory intentions simultaneously, it is oflen problematic to convey
one’s intentions, there are ofien difficulties in understanding the intentions of another
person, and there can be a discrepancy between a person’s stated intentions and what their
observable actions might suggest regarding their intentions. Also, conceming “ending the
life of another,” what does ‘life’, ‘life of another’, and ‘ending life’ mean, and whose
definitions of these terms count
-- those of particular patients and families? doctors? legal
traditions? philosophically or theologically-trained theonsts? the general public?
Although the title ofthe Report contains the two nouns -- ‘life’ and ‘death’, they are neyer
defined as universals or particulars except that we are told that ‘life’ is now one of the
societal values protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Canada 1995:
4), “our current medical profession views death as an enemy” (Canada 1995: 6), “natural
5death has been removed from view into hospitals and institutions” (Canada 1995: 7), and
technological progress has made possible the prolonging of life and the postponing of death
(Canada 1995: 5). And how do we know that a particular act is the cause of death?
AÏthough the universally applicable concept of cause and effect is theoretically interesting
and useful, what do we do when causal connections are flot clear in particular cases and
especially, when both causes and intentions are ambiguous?
Ah of these questions are extremely important in relation to ‘terminal sedation’ or
‘total sedation’ as it called in the Report, “the practice of rendering a person totally
unconscious through the administration of drugs without potentially shortening life”
(Canada 1995: 14). This practice may be undertaken in cases of intractable pain and
suffering, or in preparation for such suffenng subsequent to ventilator withdrawal. As the
Report makes clear, there is great confusion about whether patients die because of the
sedation given to them, or because of their underlying disease processes. for example,
Allan Rock, former Mimster of Justice, is quoted as saying, “When is it permissible to keep
prescribing morphine where you know within the next six hours it will cause death? The
underlying disease wihl flot kili the patient, however the treatment for pain wihl. At present,
that is shrouded in obscurity” (Canada 1995: 27). And if a doctor does indeed foresee that
the sedation will hikely cause death within a few hours or days, is it stili credible for the
doctor to daim that he or she did flot intend the patient’s death? Aithougli the Report does
not discuss the problems conceming sedation and the complexity of both doctors’ and
patients’ intentions, these problems are clearly expressed by physicians in the Ainerican
literature on ‘terminal sedation’:
Medical ethicists place great weight on the intentions of chinical actions.
The religious principle of ‘double effect’, based on a distinction between
intentions and consequences, is an ethical comerstone in the medical
treatment of the terminally ili. Giving high doses of narcotic analgesics to a
dying patient to relieve pain and suffering is considered ethical even if it
inadvertently hastens death, provided the clinician did flot intend to help the
patient die. Death may be foreseen as a side effect of the intervention as
6long as it is flot intended. On the other hand, should a clinician remotely
intend to heip a patient die, even when death is desired by a terrninally iii
patient with irreversible suffering, that sarne act wouid be considered
unethicai
-- a form of medical killing. from this idealized ethical
perspective, intentions are clear and distinct. My training about intentions,
however, cornes from clinical medicine and psychodynamic psychiatry.
When probing intentions in these domains, one rapidly leams they may be
complex, ambiguous, and ofien contradictoiy. Ethical discourse about
intentions often appears ideaiized and superficial ... (QuilI 1993: 1039).
Where exactly are the boundaries that separate relief at the cessation of
suffering, the desire to hasten death, and euthanasia? While euthanasia does
raise grave concems, physicians are being less than honest if they don’t
admit that at times these boundaries are blurred for them. Increasingiy,
physicians, patients, and familles acknowledge that there are times when
death is welcorne. The principie of double effect is well known to ethicists,
but it does flot address a physician’s hope that the patient will die quickly.
Ethicists wouid do physicïans a service by ciarifying that while the intent of
opioid medication must be for the relief of pain and suffering, the physician
aiso may welcorne the patient’s death (Buchan and Toile 1995: 56).
Aithough the Senate Report’s distinction between palliative care and euthanasia rnakes no
explicit reference to the so-called principle of double effect, the distinction’s reliance on the
concepts of intention and causal coimections certainly mirrors that found within this
pnncipie. Since, as Quill makes clear above, “the religious principle of ‘double effect’
is an ethical comerstone in the medical treatment of the terminaily il!,” there is a need to
understand both the principie and its origins, and key problems associated with its use to
distinguish between terminai sedation and euthanasia.
The so-called pnnciple of double effect originates within the Roman Catholic
tradition in the work ofthe Dominican priest, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). The principle
is reaily a type of reasoning, more accurately calied ‘double effect reasoning’ (Cavanaugh
1995: 3-4), that has long been used in difficuit situations wherein one act has two possible
effects, for example, the act of sedating a patient wili likely have the desired effect of
controlling the patient’s pain, whiie at the same time, it could also have the undesired effect
7of shortening their life. As explained in the most welÏ-known and commonlv-used
bioethics textbook, Principles’ a/ Bioniedicul Ethics, “Classical formulations of the RDE
[mie of double effect] identify four conditions or elernents that must be satisfied for an act
with a double effect to be justified” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001: 129). The overali
purpose of these conditions is to reconcile universals and particulars. The first condition,
clarifying the nature of the act, requires that “the act must be good, or at lcast rnorally
neutrai (independent of ils consequencesï’ (Beauchamp and Chuldress 2001: 129). Is
‘terniinal sedation’ a good’ act or at least moralÏy ‘neutral’? There are no clear answers to
this question because as the physicians views make clear, there is tremendous ambiguitv
and lack of consensus surrounding the meanings of ‘terminal sedation’, euthanasia’, ‘life’,
death. and ‘good’ within our pluralistic society. The second condition. clarifying the
agent’s particular intention, requires that “the agent intend only the good effect. The bad
effect can be foreseen. tolerated, and pemiitted, but it must not be intended” (Beauchamp
and Chuidress 2001: 129). Again, as indicated in the physicians’ views, considerable
controversv surrounds the meanina of intention’, whose intention counts, how we know a
person’s intention, and whether the foresight!intention distinction stili cames moral weight
in particular cases of terrninaI sedation’. Thirdlv, means and effects are distinguished. In
other words, “The bad effect [e.g., shortened life or the death of the patient] must flot be a
means 10 the good effect [e.g., pain control]. If the good effect were the direct causal resuit
of the bad effect, the agent would intend the bad effect in pursuit of the good effect”
(Beauchamp and Childress 2001: 129). As already indicated, the causal connections
between particular instances of ‘terminal sedation’ and particular patients’ deaths may be
impossible to verify with any certainty. Finally, the fourth condition is concerned with
proportionalitv: “The good effect must outweigh the bad eflèct. That is, the bad effect is
pennissible only if a proportionate reason compensates for penTiitting the foreseen bad
effect” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001: 129). Certainly, as we will discovem, there is no
consensus regarding the meaning of proportionality within double effect reasoning, how
proportionality judgements should be made in cases of ‘terminal sedation’, and how much
8moral weight should be given to these judgernents. Moreover, the current tendency to view
this fourth condition as requinng a consequentialist caiculus completely distorts the original
intent of this condition, as we shah soon see. Needless to say, these problems significantly
diminish the present capacity of double effect reasoning to reconcile umversals and
particulars.
In the preceding discussion, the difficult question of how we distinguish ‘terminal
sedation’ from euthanasia lias been isoiated as a specific case study or example of the
problems invoÏved in reconciling universals and particulars. The discussion has revealed
that the tension between umversals and particulars is multi-layered. There is tension on the
epistemological level regarding how we know or understand universals, if they exist at ail,
and how we should respond to the widespread disagreements about their existence and
importance. Underlying this tension, there are the more imphicit, but equally important
ontological conflicts conceming the meamng of universals such as ‘good’, ‘evil’, ‘the self,
‘the other’, ‘life’, ‘death’ and so on. As Schoedinger indicated, ail universals and
particulars are communicated througli tlie vehicle of language. Unfortunately, the structure
and limitations of language inevitably ftames and ofien limits the extent of understanding
and consensus possible regarding important distinctions like that between ‘terminal
sedation’ and euthanasia. If we retum to Quill’s view, for example, there are significant
differences between the emotional charges and moral weight carried by the phrases
“inadvertently hastens death,” “help the patient die,” and “medical kiliing.” Differences
such as these often produce communication and understanding problems despite the
speaker’s intentions. Finally, there is the difficult question of how we relate universais
(however defined and expressed) witli particulars, in this case, the concrete reality of
‘terminal sedation’. As the physicians’ views indicate, aithough double effect reasoning
may be a powerful tool for philosophicaily inclined ethicists, it can be less useful in the
clinic where the hegemony of empiricism and the tragic realities of human suffenng have
the capacity to relegate even the most ‘tried and true’ theories to irrelevance.
9Obviously, any attempt to resolve the difficulties of distinguishing ‘tenitinal
sedation’ from euthanasia will be successful only to the degree that it incorporates helpful
ways of dealing with these problematic elements. With this in mmd, selections from the
work of the French philosopher, Paul Ricoeur (19 13-2005), will be used to attempt a
resolution of these difficuhies. Ricoeur’s work has been chosen because it permits
reflection on ail the levels from ontology and epistemology to clinical practice. Even more
importantly, Ricoeur’ s work allows us to face squarely two crucial points that are often
either entirely forgotten, or dismissed far too quickly in the debate about whether double
effect reasoning stili has the capacity to facilitate a distinction between ‘terminal sedation’
and euthanasia. Firstly, Ricoeur stresses that we have to choose between absolute
knowledge and hermeneutics (or interpretation), and that the impossibility of absolute
knowledge creates “insurmountable and inescapable” conflicts of interpretation (Ricoeur
1981: 193). In this sense, the current difficulties involved in distinguishing ‘terminal
sedation’ ftom euthanasia by means of double effect reasoning do flot constitute a shocking
crisïs, but rather, a more or less normal conflict of interpretations in response to which we
can hopefully leam to generate more consensus and less tension between universals and
particulars. Secondly, we cannot escape the fact that there will always be multiple readings
of a text. As Ricoeur says,
Whereas spoken discourse is addressed to someone who is determined in
advance by the dialogical situation ... a written text is addressed to an
unknown reader and potentially to whoever knows how to read ... A work
also creates its public. In this way it enlarges the circle of communication
and properly initiates new modes of communication ... It is part of the
meaning of a text to be open to an indefinite number of readers and,
therefore, of interpretations. This opportunity for multiple readings is the
dialectical counterpart of the semantic autonomy of the text. It follows that
the problem of the appropriation of the meaning of the text becomes as
paradoxical as that ofthe authorship. The nght ofthe reader and the right of
the text converge in an important struggie that generates the whole dynamic
of interpretation. Hermeneutics begins where dialogue ends (Ricoeur 1976:
31-32).
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It will be the task of this thesis to illustrate how Ricoeur’s hermeneutics can
improve our use of double effect reasoning to effect meaningful distinctions between
‘terminal sedation’ and euthanasia. Since any text is subject to multiple readings, and the
vast literature conceming double effect reasoning spans eight centuries and several
disciplines, there is no question that the hermeneutical challenge involved in the continued
use of this type of reasoning is quite daunting. However, this thesis will at least represent a
significant contribution to the work involved in meeting this challenge. Although this
thesis is flot the first to utilize the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur to facilitate ethical
reflection regarding terminal sedation (see Murphy 2001), it is seemingly the first thesis to
do so for the task stated above. The first two chapters will illustrate existing conflicts of
interpretation that surround the use of double effect reasoning to distinguish between
‘terminal sedation’ and euthanasia. The purpose of these two chapters is not to provide
exhaustive analyses of ah the existing conflicts of interpretation surrounding use of double
effect reasoning, but rather to provide enough illustrations to facihitate a robust utilization
of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. Chapter one will describe ‘terminal sedation’ fully, and depict
conflicts of interpretation as they are found in a fictionalized case, in the North American
clinical hiterature on ‘terminal sedation’, in North American legah/pubhic pohicy discourse
from within the Enghish common-law tradition, and within the domains of Philosophy and
Theology. The clinical and legal sources have been almost exclusively limited to the North
American context and the Enghish common-law context primarily because that is the
context out of which the flctionalized case arose. One important exception has been the
inclusion of the work of Dr. Tatsuya Monta from Japan because he is, to my knowledge,
the most prohific researcher and author of analyses of terminal sedation from a palliative
care perspective. In order to set the stage for chapter two, use of the works of philosophers
and theologians in the first chapter will be limited to that necessary for the provision of an
overview of the development and problematic use of double effect reasoning within the
context of Catholic moral theology, and pertinent parts of the larger history of philosophy
and philosophical perspectives on bioethics. Chapter two will provide a more in-depth
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discussion of the conflicts of interpretation surrounding the use of double effect reasoning
through an examination of selected works by British philosopher, Elizabeth Anscombe
(1919-2001); Canadian philosopher, Joseph Boyle (1942- ); American Jesuit theologian,
Richard McCormick (1922-2000); American philosopher and medievalist, Chnstopher
Kaczor (1969- ); and Arnerican Franciscan philosopher and physician, Daniel Sulmasy
(1956-). These authors have been chosen because they represent a continuum from veteran
scholars to younger scholars and from locations in academia predominantly to prominence
in the clinic and within healthcare joumats. Ail of these thinkers are Catholic, but most
have had significant expenence participating in dialogue about double effect reasoning
outside of the Catholic context. Most ïmportantly, it was Elizabeth Anscombe who
introduced double effect reasoning to so-called secular philosophy. Chapter three will
present the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur with a special focus on the way in which Ricoeur
reconciles universals and particulars through his hermeneutic circles. Finally, the fourth
chapter will demonstrate how Ricoeur’s hermeneutic reconciliation of universa{s and
particulars can improve our use of double effect reasoning to effect meaningful distinctions
between terminal sedation’ and euthanasia.
ive sa’ 10 ihe i,idecisn’e, Begin at the heginiiing as if heginning were hie clear5 i’isihie p01111 oJr loose/y
wound thread anti ciii we had 10 do itcrs ho keep pulling oubli iie reaclied the 01)1er eut!, citid as if hetwec’ii the
formei anti the latter, ive had hc’id ni 01(1 hands ci snwoih, COflti!1l(OUS thread iriili 110 knobs 10 ulule, no siuarls
10 uuutc,n’le, tu coniplete nupossuhiliR in flue hfe of tu skem, or undeed.
... in uhe skein o/ 111e
(Saramago 2002: 56)
Chapter 1. ‘Terminal Sedation’, Double Effect
Reasonîng and Conflicts of Interpretation
1.1. Introduction
Already, the multi-Iayered tension between universals and particulars related to use
of double effect reasoning bas heen identified as a tension between the universally
applicable concepts within the reasoning (e.g., good’, ‘bad’, intention’, ‘cause and effect’,
proportiona1itv’), and the particularities involved in specific instances where the reasoning
is used to distinguish between tenninaI sedation’ and euthanasia. in Ricoeurian terms, this
tension represents an example of the “insurmountable and inescapable” conflicts of
interpretation created by the impossibility of absolute knowledge (Ricoeur 1981: 193). In
this chapter, our goal will be to begin the task of illustrating this tension or this conflict of
interpretations as fulïy as possible, and to show that it is in fact. a complex.
interdisciplinarv problem that extends far beyond the discipline of Catholic theology
wherein double effect reasoning first originated. To meet this goal, the tension wiIl be
examined from four different perspectives. Initially, a fictionalized case will be presented
to illustrate the conflict of interpretations that is ofien manifested within ethics
consultations concerning ‘terminal sedation’. Secondly, we will examine primarilv the
North American clinical literature on ‘terminal sedation’ in order to reveal that the bedside
case is actually a microcosm of the larger clinical context. Thirdly, we will survey North
American legal/public policy discourse within the English common-taw tradition. Within
this survey, important foci tvill include the problematic relationship between mens rea and
actus reuts, and recent Canadian and American case Iaw (i.e., Rodriguez y. British
Columbia [Attorney General], Washington y. Glucksberg, and Vacco y. Quill) illustrative
of the universalist-particularist tensions surrounding use of double effect reasoning for the
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making of legal distinctions such as those between ‘terminal sedation’ and euthanasia.
Finally, in order to set the stage for the second chapter, we will provide an overview of the
development and problematic use of double effect reasoning within the context of Catholic
moral theology, and pertinent parts of the larger history of philosophy and philosophical
perspectives on bioethics.
1.2. Conflicts at the Bedside (A fictionalized composite of real
cases)
As a clinical ethicist, I was asked to participate in a meeting with the family of a
capable, elderly patient and a healthcare team. The question at issue vas whether this
terminally iii and imminently dying patient should be given ‘terminal sedation’. Since alI
attempts to control the patient’s obvious pain had been unsuccessful, the physician had
suggested ‘terminal sedation’ and after some discussion, the patient had agreed that it was a
good idea and had given consent. A meeting with my participation tvas suggested because
family members were flot totally in agreement with this plan. At the meeting, while some
family members and the healthcare team understood the plan and had accepted the patient’s
wishes, other family members were uncomfortable. They wondered whether ‘terminal
sedation’ was truly what the patient wanted, whether it was legitimate legally and morally,
and whether there were, indeed, no other available options. As the meeting unfolded, a
famity member who was a lawyer asked ati of us this question: If you sedate [the patient]
to unconsciousness and [the patient] dies fairly soon afler, what is the difference between
what you will have done and what Dr. Kevorkian does? The physician quickly outlined the
difference between the means used by Dr. Kevorkian and those being proposed by the
team; for example, whereas Dr. Kevorkian utilizes fatal doses of medication, the team
would only propose or use treatments or the withholding of treatrnents in keeping with
patient wishes and approved palliative care. Although the lawyer understood the doctor’s
explanation, the lawyer was flot entirely satisfied by it and ail eyes tumed toward me. I
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verified the physician’s response, but I also began to discuss the crucially important subject
ofthe vast difference between Dr. Kevorkian’s intention -- that ofassisting someone to take
tlieïr own life -- and the intention of the healthcare team -- that of achieving optimal pain
control in accordance with accepted regimens and patients’ wishes.
Afier my expianation, the lawyer seemed more satisfied, but added that flot ail
patients react the same to the same medication and that the possible side effects of the
proposed medications (e.g., respiratory depression) couid in fact, shorten the patient’s life.
Although the physician acknowledged that in the abstract, there is no maximum, safe dose
of morphine or the proposed sedatives, she stressed that the dosages of morphine and the
other medications would be titrated carefuily to achieve only the desired level of sedation,
and to avoid side effects like respiratory depression. Using double effect reasomng, the
traditional theoretical way to distinguish between pain controi and euthanasia, I stressed
that although possible side effects (i.e., the possibility of hastening death) could be
foreseen, they were certainly flot intended, and the only intention was pain control.
Aithough the lawyer was convinced in the end, I came away from the meeting with nagging
doubts about the foresight/intention distinction, and the physician re-affinned a previously
held conviction that cases sucli as this were among the most troubling in ber daily practice.
I also wondered if there was a way to strengthen the case I had made during the meeting in
preparation for possible future consultations. for exampie, I wondered if there was a way
to create a beffer connection between my own theoreticai approach to a distinction between
‘terminal sedation’ and euthanasia, and the physician’ s strictiy empincal approach reliant
upon connections between desired effects and dosages. After ail, I knew that double effect
reasoning combines an ernphasis on universals such as ‘good’ and ‘intention’, as weil as an
emphasis on the empincai particulars of actions (e.g., circumstances and consequences).
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1.3. Conflicts in the Clïnical Literature
Although consensus regarding a moral distinction between ‘terminal sedation’ and
euthanasia requires at the very least, consensus concerning the definition of ‘terminal
sedation’, no such consensus exists in the literature. In fact, liUle is known about this
practice, and what we do know derives mostly from quantitative analyses, the vast majoritv
of which are retrospective studies reliant upon more or less standardized chart notes, or the
memory of survey participants. Since the first appearance of ‘terminal sedation’ in the
Ïiterature (Enck 1991), ‘terminal sedation’ has been known by many different names and
definitions, and as one author suggests, this linguistic “ambiguity” or “quagmire” only
“discloses similar moral ambiguity (and lack of clarity) surrounding the clinical practice”
(Jackson 2002). Some terms stress only the empirical aspects of the practice, for example,
sedation in the management of refractory (or uncontrolled) symptoms (Chemy and
Poflenoy 1994; fainsinger 199$b; Chiu, Hu, Lue et al. 2001), sedation for refractory
symptoms at the end of life (Shaiova 199$), sedation for intractable distress in the
dying patient (SID Pat) (Krakauer, Penson, Truog et al. 2000), or sedation for the relief
of refractory symptoms in the imminently dying (Levy and Cohen 2005). Other terms
stress idealist or normative elements, for example, artificial sleep (Canada 1995: 34),
controlled sedation (Salacz and Weissman 2005), double effect euthanasia (Association
1992), slow euthanasia (Billings and Block 1996), and psychological euthanasia
(fondras 1996). Still others associate the sedation with a tevel of care, thereby giving the
sedation a mixture of empincal and normative, but stili ambiguous connotations, for
example, palliative sedation (Rousseau 2000; Gauthier 2001; Braun, Hagen, and Clark
2003; Cowan and Palmer 2002; Lo and Rubenfeld 2005; Rousseau 2005; Schuman, Lynch,
and Abrahm 2005), and palliative sedation therapy (Monta, Tsuneto, and Yasuo 2001;
Monta, Akechi, Sugawara et al. 2002; Monta, Hirai, and Okazaki 2002; Monta, Hirai,
Akechi et al. 2003; Monta, Bito, Kunhara et aI. 2005).
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A few authors (Hardy 2000; Monta, Akechi, Sugawara et al. 2002; QuilI 2000;
Levy and Cohen 2005; Monta, Bito, Kunihara et al. 2005; Muller-Busch, Andres, and
Jehser 2003), differentiate temporarv from continuous sedation, and terminal sedation from
sedation used in trauma, hum, or post-surgical care. In the context of palliative cane,
Morita’s classifications or categones of sedation are intended “to handie” the persistent
definitional inconsistencies (Monta, Tsuneto, and Shima 2002), and they are the most
comprehensive categories in the literature: “palliative care without intentional sedation,
psychiatric treatment without intentional sedation, mild sedation with opioids, mild
sedation with psychotropics, intermittent-deep sedation, continuous-deep sedation, and
PAS/euthanasia” (Monta, Akechi, Sugawara et al. 2002: 759). Published attempts to
achieve consensus within a group of caregivers and stakeholders regarding a definition of
‘terminal (or palliative’) sedation’ are rare, and thus far to my knowledge, there are only
six articles that descnibe the achievement of some consensus (Chater, Viola, Paterson et al.
1998, Hawryluck, Hanvey, Lemieux-Charles et al. 2002; Braun, Hagen, and Clark 2003;
Monta, Bito, Kurihara et al. 2005; Schuman, Lynch, and Abrahm 2005; Quill 2000). for
example, Chater et al. proposed the following definition to participants in their international
study (respondents included 51 physicians and 2 nurses), and 40% of respondents agreed to
it without reservations:
‘Terminal sedation’ is defined as the intention of deliberately inducing and
maintaining deep sleep, but not deliberately causing death in very specific
circumstances. These are: 1) for the relief of one or more intractable
symptoms when ail other possible interventions have failed and the patient is
perceived to be close to death, or 2) for the relief of profound anguish
(possibly spiritual) that is flot amenable to spiritual, psychological, or other
interventions, and the patient is perceived to be close to death (Chaten,
Viola, Paterson et al. 1998: 258).
The association of the word ‘terminal’ with ‘sedation’ has been problematic from
the beginning because it is difficult, if flot impossible to determine whether a patient has
died because of their illness or because of the sedation (Chater, Viola, Paterson et al. 1998;
Fainsinger 1 998b; Roy 1990). Also, as indicated in a recent article, “Terminai sedation
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vas one of the first labels for this intervention, but has been abandoned due to its lack of
clarity with respect to whether ‘terminal’ referred to the patient or to the goal of sedation”
(Levy and Cohen 2005; see also Cowan aiid Palmer 2002). The notion of ‘refractory’
symptoms also presents difficulties because what is ‘refractory’ or ‘intractabte’ to one
healthcare team working in one context may flot be ‘refractory’ to others. Important
variables in this regard include caregivers’ attitudes and skills (MacDonald, Ayoub, Farley
et al. 2002; MacDonald, Findlay, Bruera et al. 1997; Monta 2004a), the deletenous affects
of bumout on caregivers (Monta, Akechi, Sugawara et al. 2002), and most importantly, the
serious Iack of palliative care resources. In Canada, for example, “it is estimated that [only]
five per cent of dying Canadians receive integrated, interdisciplinary palliative care”
(Mount 2001: 74). Whether symptoms are ‘refractory’ is particularly difficult to assess
when they are existential rather than physical in nature (Cherny and Portenoy 1994; Cowan
and Walsh 2001; Monta, Tsunoda, moue et al. 2000; Rousseau 2000, 2001; Shaiova 1998;
Monta 2004b; Rousseau 2005; Lanuke, Fainsinger, deMoissac et al. 2003; Davis and ford
2005; Taylor and McCarm 2005). One author daims that “these cases really are among the
most difficuit and they skirt the distinction between assisted death (euthanasia and assisted
suicide) and appropriate sedation for refractoiy symptoms at the end of life” (Chemy 1998:
405). Referning to the difficulties surrounding both the proportionality requirement of
double effect reasoning and sedation for existential suffering, Jansen and Sulmasy say,
Reasonable cÏimcians will disagree about what constitutes a proportionate
reason, but the need to treat existential suffering clearly is flot sufficient. If
it were, then it would be ethically and medically appropriate to terminally
sedate a patient with no underlying physiologie condition (Jansen and
Sulmasy 2002e: 847).
On the other ‘side’, Monta, a cautious advocate of sedation for existential suffering, offers
the following argument based on the proportionality requirement of double effect
reasoning:
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The chief arguments [e.g., Sulmasy’s] against ethical appraisal of sedation
for psychological reasons is that intensity of psycho-existential suffering
does flot aiways mean patients are irnminently dying (i.e., patients are likely
to survive longer if sedation is not performed), and thus physicians cannot
maintain that patients’ shortened survival is only foreseen (flot intended).
On the other hand, some specialists [e.g., Monta and Rousseau] believe
sedation for intolerable and refractory psycho-existential suffenng could be
ethically approved in selected situations under the pninciple of
proportionality and autonomy. The pnnciple of proportionalitv requires the
appropriate balance between harmful and beneficial effects: the possibility
of shortening patients’ lives and decreased consciousness should be
proportional to the intensity of patient suffering, patients’ physicat condition
(low possibility of symptom relief due to inadequate tirne), and
refractoriness of the suffening. The pnnciple of autonomy requires patient
wish[es] for sedation. b justify sedation for psycho-existential suffering,
therefore, poor patient condition, refractory nature of suffenng, and explicit
wishes for sedation of patients is important (Monta 20045: 447).
Ambiguity and controversy has also surrounded the reported prevalence of ‘terminal
sedation’. If we isolate the peculianties of 1% (Fainsinger 1998b) and 89% (Thoms and
Sykes 2002), the bulk ofpublished reports indïcate that between 16% and 52.5% of patients
studied have received ‘terminal sedation’ (Chater, Viola, Paterson et al. 1998; Coyle,
Adelhardt, FoÏey et al. 1990; fainsinger 1998a; Fainsinger and Bniera 1992; fainsinger,
Miller, Bruera et al. 1991; fainsinger, Waller, Bercovici et al. 2000; Greene and Davis
1991; Lichter and Hunt 1990; Monta, moue, and Chihara 1996; Monta, Tsunoda, moue et
al. 1999, 2000; Monta, Akechi, Sugawara et al. 2002; Mclver, Walsh, and Nelson 1994;
Stone, Phillips, Spruyt et al. 1997; T’cross 1993; Ventafridda, Ripamonti, De Conno et
al. 1990; Cowari and Walsh 2001; Kohara, Ueoka, Takeyama et al. 2005; Lanuke,
Fainsinger, deMoissac et al. 2003; Monta, Bito, Kurihara et al. 2005; Muller-Busch,
Andres, and Jehser 2003; Rietjens, van der Heide, Vrakking et al. 2004; Sykes and Thorns
2003; Chiu, Hu, Lue et al. 2001). Several factors have been proposed to account for these
wide-ranging percentages. Most researchers discuss the fact that prevalence percentages
will remain wide-ranging until there is greaten consensus regarding pertinent definitions of
sedation. Also, researchers have divergent interests. for example, whule most researchers
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emphasize the percentage of patients receiving sedation, some are more interested in the
percentage of doctors ordering sedation (KaÏdj jan, Jekel, Bemene et al. 2004; Kaidjian,
Wu, Kirkpatrick et al. 2004; Rietjens, van der Heide, Vrakking et al. 2004). Regarding the
influence of differences between physicians, Craig suggests that “individual physicians are
likely 10 have dïfferent thresholds for intervention. Treatment may also be influenced by
factors such as ihe stoicism and wishes of the patient” (Craig 2002: 15). In a study
entitled, Dfferences in Physician-Reported Practice in Palliative Sedation Therapy, Monta
concluded that variance in sedation rates was
significantly associated with a physician-perceived necessity for clear
consciousness for a good death, [physicians’] belief that sedation ofien
shortens patient life, availability of a nurse specializing in cancer/palliative
care, methods for diagnosing refractory symptoms, priority of intermittent or
continuous sedation, and medication preference for phenobarbitones (Monta
2004a: 590).
Greater consensus exists regarding the symptoms for which ‘terminal sedation’ is
indicated and the most typical drugs. The most typical refractory or intractable symptoms
include pain, dyspnea (breathing difficulties), delirium, terminal restlessness or agitation,
nausealvomiting, and myoclonus/convulsion. The most commonly used drugs are
Midazolam (a Benzodiazepine), Methotnmeprazine (a Neuroleptic), and Lorazepam ta
Benzodiazepine), but other drugs include opioids (e.g., Morphine and Dilaudid), anti
psychotics, barbiturates (e.g., Phenobarbital), and general anaesthetic agents such as
Propofol and Ketamine (Chater, Viola, Paterson et al. 199$; Chemy and Portenoy 1994;
Cowan and Palmer 2002; Levy and Cohen 2005; Monta, Bib, Kunhara et al. 2005).
Among these drugs, the barbiturates and general anaesthetic agents are the most
controversial because they are not analgesics. Barbiturates ment special attention because
they have been used to achieve capital punishment, “they are the dmgs of choice in Holland
for performing euthanasia” (Krakauer, Penson, Truog et al. 2000: 57), they have been
recommended in books such as final Exit, and they have been used in reported cases of
assisted suicide in North America (Truog, Berde, Mitcheil et al. 1992). Great controversy
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also surrounds the use ofneuromuscular blockers (e.g.. Pancuronium or SuccinyÏcholine) to
achieve respiratory muscle paralysis in cases of ‘terminal sedation’ accompanying
ventilator withdrawal. The problem in these cases is that drugs typically used to achieve
‘terminal sedation’ do flot usuaily reduce the ‘gasping respirations’ that ofien follow
ventilator withdrawal. Here again, double effect reasoning has been used with
contradictory resuits: for example, two authors use it to support the use of neuromuscular
blockers (Perkin and Resnik 2002); another uses it to argue that the use of neuromuscular
biockers is flot ethically permissible (Hawrytuck 2002).
There are several ethical problems associated with ‘terminal sedation’ apart from,
but pertinent to the issue of whether this sedation can be distinguished ftom euthanasia.
Two studies (Chater, Viola, Paterson et al. 199$; Monta, moue, and Chihara 1996) describe
problems related to insufficient consent, for example, Chater et al. report that only “50% of
patients had a major involvement in the decision process, 27°/ had a minor involvement
and 22% had flot involvement at ail. [Also, onlyj 69% of families had a major involvement
in the decision process” (Chater, Viola, Paterson et al. 1998: 260). Substitute decision
making can also present serious difficulties in cases of sedation. Not unlike substitute
decision-making conceming other kinds of treatments, ‘terminal sedation’ decisions ofien
involve the reaÏity that “it is the family, the team, the institution, risk management, or the
Iaw that is, by administenng it to the patient, in fact, ‘being treated” (Loewy 2001: 331).
Furthermore, in cases where ‘terminal sedation’ is indicated for chiidren, substitute
decision-making can be even more difficuit. As Collins explains, “It is known ... that there
is ftequently discordance between chiid and observer reports of pain, with parents
frequently underestimating pain severity” (Collins 1998: 259). In addition, “caught up in
their own grief and fear of ioss, parents may be iimited in the freedom with which they can
make these decisions. The need to do everything to prolong the life of the child is a
powerful force” (Kenny and frager 1996: 40). Substitute decision-making can be
especially difficult when the question arises as to whether a sedated dying patient should be
awakened for purposes of communication with significant others in cases of intermittent
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sedation, or post-operatively when an unsuccessful operation necessitates a withdrawal of
treatment decision (Batchelor, Jenal, Kapadia et al. 2003). The ethics of communication in
this type of situation is complicated by the fact that “this
.. is a potentially unstable
situation, and the possibility that lucidity may flot be promptly restored or that death may
ensue as doses are again escalated should be explained to both the patient [if possibleJ and
family” (Chemy and Portenoy 1994: 36).
Professional bum-out can have senous implications for patients, especially those
who present difficuit challenges for caregivers who might be tempted to view ‘terminal
sedation’ as an easy solution. For example, in bis nationtvide survey of 697 physicians in
Japan, Monta et al. found “that those physicians who were less confident with psychologic
care and demonstrated higher levels of emotional exhaustion were more likely to choose
continuous-deep sedation for patients with refractory physical and psychologic distress”
(Monta, Akechi, Sugawara et al. 2002: 763). Needless to say, if ‘terminal sedation’ is
being given in situations where other options exist and should be tried, than it becomes
more difficult to distinguish that sedation ftom euthanasia by means of double effect
reasoning or any other kind. Physicians’ fears comprise another important professional
problem that can preclude helpful discussion regarding this distinction. For example, in a
1994 issue of the Journal of FaïliatÉve Care, a Canadian physician described a troubling
case of ‘terminal sedation’ and its justification by means of double effect reasoning (Mount
and Hamilton 1994). Two years later in the same journal, an article appeared in which two
American physicians, who found double effect reasoning unconvincing, defined the 1994
case and others like it as slow euthanasia (Billings and Block 1996).
Although debate was certainly fostered by the publication of the Americans’ article
along with others that defended the position taken by the original 1994 article (Brody 1996;
Dickens 1996; Mount 1996; Portenoy 1996), the main point for our purposes is that Slow
Euthanasia might neyer have been published at all were it not for the tenacity of the
Journal ‘s editor, Dr. David Roy. As Roy explains in bis editonal, “I was advised ... quite
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outside the peer-review process, flot to publish this article ... with or without
commentaries” (Roy 1996: 3). And why was this ‘advice’ given? Roy says, “the
physician’s ‘give others a chance to talk’ can be quite exacting, particularly when these
others want to say publicÎy what some other people do not want to hear said at ail” (Roy
1996: 3). In the paragraphs that follow, Roy counters physicians’ fears by outiining the
basic framework of “the ethics of euthanasia discourse,” the logic of which involves open,
public discussion of “matters of fact,” “matters of meaning,” and “matters of belief’ (Roy
1996: 4-5). It was the need to reconcile these “maffers” that prompted the development of
double effect reasoning in the first place, but the degree to which that recondiliation can
happen today is a debatable question as the subsequent discussion wiIl reveal.
In the clinical literature, discussions of the actual conditions of double effect
reasoning can be dïvided into two types: articles featuring more or less theoreticaï
discussion of the conditions, and in more recent years, clinical practice guidelines that
emphasize practical dimensions of the conditions and their fuiffilment within professional
practice. We will survey the more theoretical articles first and subsequently, the clinical
practice guideiines. The first condition of double effect reasoning, requiring that the act be
good or neutral, presumes universally applicable notions of ‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘neutial’. In
the case of end-of-life issues, the first condition requires that the proposed act flot involve
‘murder’. Since there is neither widespread agreement about the definition of such
universals today, nor much awareness of what they have meant throughout the history of
double effect reasoning, controversy reigns within the few articles in which this condition is
actually discussed. For example, Gauthier explains correctly that “the first condition
cannot be detennined by the pnnciple of double effect [i.e., by the pnncipie alone as it is
typically articulated today]” (Gauthier 2001: 45). But in an effort “to avoid importing a
bias in favor of or against an act at the outset,” Gauthier recommends that we “begin with a
simple physical description, without reference to intention or effects” (Gauthier 2001: 45).
One could ask whether it is even possible to achieve “a simple physical description” of an
act without the influence of some prior definitions of ‘good’, ‘bad’ and ‘neutral’, and
Ucerta;nly, the first condition of double effect reasoning requires the use of prior definitions
of this kind. In fact, Gauthier herseif defines “a morally neutral act” as one that “can be
either good or bad, depending upon its context” (Gauthier 2001: 45). For example, the
context of “lingenng in pain, particularly if death is sought by the patient him- or herseif,”
is “exactly what makes the effect, the relief of suffenng, good [e.g., in cases of ‘terminal
sedation’ or active vo!untary euthanasial” (Gauthier 2001: 46). From this perspective
wherein the context determines the content of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, Gauthier questions
“whether the effect [i.e., the death ofthe patienti initially identified as ‘bad’ [i.e., in theory
as defined by the first conditioni really is a bad effect” (Gauthier 2001: 46).
In a similar vein, Quil! argues that “the absolute prohibition agaïnst deliberately
taking human life” is problematic because it “originated in the context of a particular
religious tradition” (Qui!! 1997: 1770). In Quill’s view, American society now
incorporates many different traditions, and medicine “must accommodate” them, even
those “persons and groups [whol reject the position that death should neyer be intentionally
hastened when unrelievable suffering is extreme and death is desired by the patient” (Quill
1997: 1770). For Qui!l and his like-minded colleagues, double effect reasoning is not
credible because “sucli religious beliefs should flot determine public policy in a pluralistic
society like our own” (Qui!!, Lo, and Brock 1998: 1066). In addition, “there is enormous
subjectivity, variation, and controversy in how the doctrine is used and understood, making
it ill-suited as a basis for public policy in a secular society” (QuiIl, Lo, and Brock 1998:
1067). In what follows, Sulmasy and Pellegrino vigorously respond to these criticisms:
Quili et al suggest that among the ‘shortcomings’ ofthe rule of double effect
as a guideline for medical morality in a pluralistic society is the fact that ‘the
rule onginated in the context of a particular religious tradition’. This is a
very odd position. Should the commonly held position that stealing is
morally wrong be rejected simply because it can be found (Exodus 20: 15)
in the commandments of a particular religious tradition? The religious
origins of a mora! pnnciple or mie shou!d not preclude its discussion in civil
society ... An exhortation to exciude such mies and principles in the name
of tolerance seems itself highly intolerant. There is nothing about the rule of
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double effect that is inherently religious. The fact that it was developed by
theologians does flot vitiate the fact that it might be morally true. Nothing
about the rule presumes any knowledge of scripture or the teachings of any
religion. Ail that is required is a belief that certain actions are absolutely
rnorally prohibited, or, more controversially, at least a belief that
consequences are flot the sole determinants of the morality of an action ... A
logically rigorous argument against the rule of double effect would deal with
the mie on its own terms (Sulmasy and Pellegrino 1999: 548-549).
Sulmasy’s view is problematic for at least three reasons. It begs the episternological
question of whether we can and how we should decide that anything is “morally true” and
“that certain actions are absolutely morally prohibited.” Secondly, it leaves unanswered the
urgent question of how matters of particular belief, pluralism and public policy should be
related. Finally, Sulmasy’s daim that “nothing about the rule presurnes any knowledge of
scripture or the teachings of any religion” is disingenuous; it is only mie if we completely
ignore the original context of this reasoning, the conflict of interpretations within which it
has become embroiled, and the stand that Sulmasy has taken within this conflict. The latter
will be examined in-depth in the second chapter.
The second condition, requiring that the agent intend only the good effect, has
provoked great controversy in the literature because there is tension between ‘intention’ as
a universally applicable concept, and intentions as held by particular persons within
particular contexts. For example, as indicated in the Introduction, Quili has challenged the
adequacy of a theoretical or universally applicable notion of “clear and distinct” intentions
in the face of clinical realities wherein particular physicians may have more than one
intention at any given time, and where “the difference between terminal sedation and
euthanasia ... is paper thin, requiring a highly intellectualized analysis and presentation of
the physician’s intentions” (Quill 1996: 210-211). Similarly, another author says, “The
area is probiematic because our intent may certainly be largely opaque to ail except
ourselves (and perhaps even to ourselves)” (Dunphy 1998: 211). Even in situations where
health care professionals understand the concept of intent, one author emphasizes that
“comprehension of the intent of sedation in advanced illness by patients and families [i.e.,
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typica!ly under significant ernotional stress] may be difficuit” (Barreth, Fainsinger,
Oneschuk et al. 2003: 217). Some authors ask why we would focus on intent ratherthan on
outcorne: “Why flot accept the patient’s requesi to die comfortably, and prescribe a
regimen ... that assures this outcome in a hurnane fashion and according to the patient’s
wishes?” (Billings and Block 1996: 25). From a lega] perspective, this focus on outcornes
is quitc problematic as the following response from a legal expert makes clear: “They [i.e.,
Billings and Block] apply an outcorne-oriented test that sirnply links a physician’s use of
medications with their inevitable effect ‘regardless of immediate intent’. However, intent is
at the centre of ethical and legal judgments in this area” (Dickens 1996: 43). Several
writers have indïcated the dilemma in which they perceive themseives to be when on the
one hand, death is not unwelcorne in situations of great suffering, but on the other hand,
death caimot be intended within the confines of double effect reasoning (Buchan and Toile
1995, Chemy 199$; Hunt 1998: Qui!] 1996; Quill, Lo, and Brock 1997; Shaiova 199$;
Monta, Tei, moue et al. 2003). Sorne physicians believe that there are fundarnentai
incompatibilities between the concept of intention and the practice of medicine. For
example, one group of authors ask “whether intentions or desires matter morally if the
physician is practising good palliative care with compassion and ernpathy for the patient”
(Sawyer, Williarns, and Lowy 1993: 1464). Another physician goes further and critiques
the “cross-cultural dissonance” created by “applying a legal and ethical principle to a
medical practice”:
The problem is flot with the pnncipie itself but with its varied and unequal
application, which in turn depends on the different perspectives,
interpretations, and language of patients and physicians. By training,
physicians are concemed with causation and consequence. Ahhough intent
is important in law, in medïcine we assume our intent is to benefit patients,
and it is otherwise of penipheral relevance in a scientific endeavour.
Applying a legal and ethical principle to a medical practice produces cross
cultural dissonance. Physicians who think in terms of the pharmacologic
effects of a drug view as hypocritical those who judge medical use on the
basis of stated intent rather than consequence, whereas physicians
philosophically steeped in the pnnciple of double effect view as immoral
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those who would give a drug for the purpose of its likely consequence
(Preston 1998).
Given these problems regarding intention, it is flot surprising that much confusion
and many difficulties also surround the intention’foresight distinction. One author daims
“that there is littie intuitive moral difference between indirect killing, permitted by the
doctrine, and direct killing forbidden by it” (Shaw 2002: 103). Another has the following
worry: “In relation to sedation at the end of life, the descriptions ‘killing’,
... or ‘making
comfortable’ may ail be appended to exactly the same treatment decision. The danger is
that the description becomes a samtized euphemism omitting information of moral
relevance” (Dunphy 1998: 210). Loewy daims that it “is, to say the least, disingenuous” to
say that “the death of the patient is ‘flot intended” when “patients are intentionally kept
asleep, their vital functions are deliberately flot artificially supported, and they are allowed
to die in comfort” (Loewy 2001: 331; see also Loewy 2004). He also argues that “at least
in law, and I would reasonably hold the same true for ethics, one is responsible flot only for
what one has clearly intended, but also for what one could reasonably foresee” (Loewy
2001: 331). Although double effect reasoning “does not seek to evade” responsibilitv for
both intention and foresight (Dunphy 1998: 211), there is confusion about this aspect in the
literature as Loewy’s point illustrates. The possibility of seif-deception is frequently cited
as another serious problem surrounding the intentionlforesight distinction. For example,
“A law based on intention will influence clinicians so that they express their intentions in
carefully-chosen terms, and maybe cause them to be less than honest” (Hunt 1998: 214).
Similarly, Quili argues that when actions are justified by means of the intentionlforesight
distinction, “the potential for seif-deception ... is substantiai” (Quitl 1996: 211). In other
words, “doctors who refuse to abandon their patients must now act in secret or else leam
how to hide their actions within the confines ofthe ‘double effect,” (QuilI 1996: 215).
In the clinical literature, the vast majority of clinicians supportive of the concept of
intention and the intentionlforesight distinction give the impression that if they state these
concepts simply and emphatically enough, there should be no problems distinguishing
between euthanasia and terminal sedation. for exampie, “Treatment of pain is neyer a form
of euthanasia. Its intent, its goal, and the conditions in which physicians and patients
interact are directed to the management of symptoms” (Foiey 1991: 291). Or, “We believe
the distinction [between euthanasia and terminal sedation based on double effect reasoningi
is critically important, ethically clear, and flot at ail subtie” (Mount 1996: 33). Sirnilarly,
“The provision of palliative care is truly guided by the principle of double effect, which is
flot sorne fabrication to shield the truth, but rather a highly useful ethical construct that can
guide practice ... and reduce
... uncomfortable ambiguity in end-of-life care” (Portenoy
1996: 45). Integrity and sincerity are important in this view: “It is clear that the jutent is to
relieve symptoms
... the pnncipie’s application relies on the integrity ofthe person and the
sincerity of lis or lier intention. This last point is crucial to the distinction from assisted
suicide or euthanasia” (Lesage and Latimer 1998: 263). And finally, “the invocation of
[double effect reasoning] allows the patient and treating clinician to maintain an ethical
equilibnum in this difficuit situation,” the absence of which “may resuit in either the
undertreatrnent of catastrophic symptoms or subsequent guilt and its morbid psydhological
sequelae” (Chemy and Portenoy 1994: 36).
A growing number of authors acknowiedge and try to resolve the difficulties
involved in the tension between intention as a universally applicable theoretical concept,
and the assessment and understanding of particular intentions in particular situations. In the
context of empirical research, for example, Monta attempts “to clarify the nature of
terminai sedation compared to euthanasia by measunng patients’ status and medical
interventions [e.g., volume of artificial hydration, doses and route of sedativesi before and
after sedation rather than physician intent itself’ (Monta, Tsunoda, moue et al. 1999: 22).
In the ICU context, Hawryluck et al. propose careful documentation of the Intensivist’s
intention in the chart, which would include “the patient’s medical condition and reasons
leading to the initiation of palliative care, the goal, which is to relieve pain and suffening
the way pain and suffenng will be evaluated; and the way in which dmgs will be increased
and why” (Hawryluck, Harvey, Lemieux-Charles et al. 2002). Perkin and Resnik suggest
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165). In other words, intending involves both the creation of a plan of action, and the
existence ofappropriate feelings or concems if the plan does flot unfold according to one’s
intentions. For example, the intention to bnng about the death of a patient would involve
the “[determination ofl the dosage of morphine necessary to cause death, [deliberationj
about [only thati action, and [admimstrationl of that [lethali dose” (Perkin and Resnik
2002: 165). Subsequent failure would invoke feelings and concems non-existent in the
situation wherein one only intends sedation. In other words, “if, for some reason, the
patient does not die, the physician has some regret and takes sorne steps to rernedy the
situation” (e.g., smothering the patient) (Perkin and Resnik 2002: 165-166). In terms of
atternpts to resolve the dïfflculties associated with intention and the intentionlforesight
distinction considered from a clinical perspective, but outside of the genre of clinical
practice guidelines, Sulrnasy’s work is the most extensive, and it will be discussed in the
second chapter.
The third and fourth conditions of double effect reasoning engage particularity to an
even greater extent than the other conditions. The third condition requires that in cases of
terminal sedation, the bad effect (i.e., shortened life or the death of the patient) not be the
means to the good effect (i.e., pain control). Fulfilling this requirement presents difficulties
in the context of terminal sedation because, as explained earlier, precise cause and effect
determinations are flot aiways possible in particular cases. One author interprets this
condition as follows: “A further distinction lies in the fact that with sedation the untoward
outcome is not necessary to achieve the desired beneficial outcome” (Mount 1996: 34). As
several authors have argued (e.g., Craig 2002; Loewy 2001; Emanuel 2001), it is difficuit to
argue that death is not the means if sedation is accompanied by the withdrawal or
withholding of nutrition and hydration. On the other hand, patients for whom terminal
sedation is indicated have already in many cases, had nutrition and hydration withdrawn or
withheld because it has been judged to be completely futile (e.g., in cases where no
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hydration has become impossible). For one author, this situation has several implications:
This point, serves to raise the fact that approaches involving withdrawai or
withholding of life support should all be considered before and probably
used in preference to terminal sedation. This in tum makes terminal
sedation a rare necessity and of shorter duration. The person who has
intractable suffenng due to terminal illness is oflen no longer eating or
drinking. Pushing fluids may only increase extravasation of fluids and
worsen dyspnea or other suffering due to fluid overload at this point ... If
withdrawal of life-sustaining interventions is inappropriate, terminal
sedation is probably also inappropriate. If ail these are already withheld,
with due ethical reason, it will flot be long before the condition ends the
patient’s life with or without terminal sedation (Ernanuel 2001: 114-1 15).
As indicated in the Introduction, there is no consensus regarding the meamng ofthe
fourth condition that requires proportionality between the proposed good and potential bad
effects. Some authors define proportionality in terms of the rationale used toi ustify the nsk
to be taken for the proposed good (Beauchamp and Childress 2001; Chemy and Portenoy
1994; Dunphy 199$; Hawryluck and Harvey 2000; Mount 1996; Perkin and Resnik 2002;
Quill 1997; Shaw 2002). For example, “The bad effect can be permitted only when there is
‘proportionally grave reason’ for it” (QuilI 1997: 176$), or “There is a proportionately good
reason for allowing the harmful effect” (Perkin and Resnik 2002: 166). Others define
proportionality as a comparison of outcomes (Hawryluck and Harvey 2000; Kendali 2000;
Lesage and Latimer 1998; Nuccetelli and Seay 2000; QuilI 1997; Rousseau 2000, 2001).
For example, “The good resuit (relief of suffering) must outweigh the untoward outcome
(hastening death)” (Lesage and Latimer 199$: 263), or “the good effect must exceed or
balance the bad effect” (Rousseau 2000: 1065). Ironically, the frequent emphasis on the
titration of analgesics and sedatives to achieve only the desired effect best expresses the
original meamng of proportionality within double effect reasoning, although it is neyer
expressed as such in the literature.
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As already indicated, in the climcal literature in recent years, articulation and
discussion of the actual conditions of double effect reasoning has occurred predominantly
within the context of clinical practice guidelines for ‘terminal sedation’ or ‘palliative
sedation’. If we take as a generic example, the American Instïtute of Medicine’s deftnïtion
of a clinical practice guideline, we discover that “clinical practice guïdelines are
systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient decisions about
appropriate health care for specific climcal circumstances” (field and Lohr 1990: 38). To
my knowledge, and fitting more or less within the aforementioned definition of a clinical
practice guideline, there are ten clinical practice guidelines for ‘terminal sedation’ or
‘palliative sedation’ within, or closely associated with the palliative care context (Braun,
Hagen, and Clark 2003; Chemy and Portenoy 1994; Cowan and Palmer 2002; Hawryluck,
Hawey, Lemieux-Charles et al. 2002; Levy and Cohen 2005; Lo and Rubenfeld 2005;
Monta, Bito, Kurihara et al. 2005; Quili 2000; Rousseau 2001; Schuman, Lynch, and
Abrahm 2005; Authority 1999). five out of the ten documents (Braun, Hagen, and Clark
2003; Hawryluck, Harvey, Lemieux-Charles et al. 2002; Monta, Bito, Kurihara et al. 2005;
Quili 2000; Schuman, Lynch, and Abrahm 2005; Authonty 1999) are consensus statements
that have evolved out of consultation with a group of caregivers and in some cases,
stakeholders of vanous kinds. Two of the consensus statements are Canadian efforts that
onginated in Calgary and Toronto respectively (Authonity 1999; Braun, Hagen, and Clark
2003; Hawryluck, Harvey, Lemieux-Charles et al. 2002).
Apart from their use of double effect reasoning, ail of these practice guidelines
include several basic elements: recommended use of ‘terminal (or palliative) sedation’ only
for refractory symptoms and the inclusion of critena for distinguishing between difficuit
and refractory or intolerable symptoms, the vast majority ofthe critena having been denved
and evolved from Chemy & Portenoy’ s seminal work (Chemy and Portenoy 1994); the
requirement that patients have a terminal illness and be imminently dying,
recommendations for suitable drugs, appropriate loading doses and titration monitoring;
and an emphasis on and in many cases, suggestions for the optimal provision of informed
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consent. Most of the guidelines include the need to have a clear do-not-resuscitate (DNR)
order in place before ‘terminaL sedation’ is initiated. Most of the guidelines also stress the
need to have a discussion regarding the provision or non-provision of artificial nutrition and
hydiatïon while the patient is being sedated. Most of the guidelines emphasize the need to
support patients’ signïficant others and involved staff members before, duning, and afier the
use of ‘terminal sedation’. This emphasis is most pronounced and substantial in Monta’s
guideline (Monta, Bito, Kurihara et al. 2005), perhaps because the guideline is preceded by
two unique and valuable studies: Familv Experience With Palliative Sedation Therapy for
Terrninallv 11/ Cancer Patients (Monta, Ikenaga, Adachi et al. 2004), and E,notionaÏ
Burden ofNurses in Palliative Sedation Therapy (Monta, Miyashita, Kimura et ai. 2004).
four of the guidelines sanction ‘terminal sedation’ for existential suffening (Chemy and
Portenoy 1994; Rousseau 2001, 2003; Levy and Cohen 2005; Monta, Bito, Kunihara et al.
2005). One guideline fails short of sanctioning it fully, but includes the idea that ‘terminal
sedation’ for existential suffenng is “compelling” (Lo and Rubenfeld 2005). One guideline
states explicitly that “These guidelines are most applicable for physical symptoms. The
establishment of refractonness and the noie of palliative sedation for existential suffenng is
less clear and deserves further smdy” (Braun, Hagen, and Clank 2003: 347). Three ofthe
guidelines do flot explicitiy address the suitability of ‘terminal sedation’ for existential
symptoms (Cowan and Palmer 2002; Hawryluck, Harvey, Lemieux-Chanles et al. 2002;
Schuman, Lynch, and Abrahm 2005).
Explicit reference to, and use of double effect reasoning is present in six of the
guidelines (Chemy and Portenoy 1994; Rousseau 2001; Cowan and Palmer 2002; Levy and
Cohen 2005; Lo and Rubenfeld 2005; Hawryluck, Harvey, Lemieux-Charles et al. 2002).
In one guideline, double effect neasoning is flot used (Quill 2000). Although double effect
reasoning is flot referred to directly in three guideiines (Bnaun, Hagen, and Clank 2003;
Monta, Bito, Kunihara et al. 2005; Schuman, Lynch, and Abrahm 2005), they in fact, rely
heavily on the concepts of intention and proportionality within double effect reasoning. In
two guidelines, double effect reasoning provides the “ethical validity” of ‘terminal
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sedation’ (Chemy and Portenoy 1994; Rousseau 2001). in one guidelme, double effect
reasoning is “used for ethical support” (Cowan and Palmer 2002). Double effect reasoning
provides the “ethical and legal basis” for ‘terminal sedation’ in one guideline (Levy and
Cohen 2005). In another, double effect reasoning is the “traditional justification for
palliative sedation” (Lo and Rubenfeld 2005). Finally, the crucial importance of double
effect reasoning is associated with its use to differentiate ‘terminal sedation’ and euthanasia
in several guidelines (Rousseau 2001; Hawryluck, Hawey, Lernieux-Charles et al. 2002;
Cowan and Palmer 2002; Lo and Rubenfeld 2005).
Not unlike the more theoretical discussion of double effect reasoning in the clinical
literature, the clinical practice guidelines place less emphasis on the first and third
conditions of double effect reasoning, and more emphasis on the second and fourth
conditions conceming intention and proportionality. As we recail, the first condition of
double effect reasoning, requiring that the act be good or neutral, presumes universally
applicable notions of ‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘neutral’. From the more theoretical discussions,
we recali that the problem with this condition is that the content of these universally
applicable notions is so ideal, unknown, controversial, or so remote for people today that
writers largely ignore this condition, or they provide their own content, typically by
suggesting that context or outcomes determine the meaning of ‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘neutral.
We find more evidence of this problem within the clinical practice guidelines. In two
guidelines, although the first condition is explicitly included, it is applied minimally and
ambiguously to ‘terminal sedation’. For example, although Rousseau states the first
condition (“the nature of the act must be good or morally neutral and not intrmsically
wrong” (Rousseau 2001: 152)), he does flot define ‘good’, ‘morally neutral’, or
‘intrinsically wrong’, and he gives no application of this condition in the case of ‘terminal
sedation’. Similarly, although Cowan and Palmer teli us that “PS [palliative sedationJ is
feit by many to meet the requirements of the pnnciple of double effect because 1) sedation
even to unconsciousness is flot immoral (morally neutral)” (Cowan and Palmer 2002), they
do flot define ‘morally neutral’. In two guidelines, ‘good’, ‘morally neutral’, and ‘bad’ are
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defined and apphed in tenns of positive or negative consequences or outcomes: for
example, ‘the treatment is at Ieast neutral (if flot beneficial), but may have untoward as weIl
as beneficial consequences [i.e., reliefofsuffering]” (Chemy and Portenoy 1994; 36), and
“the treatment is positive in that it relieves the patient of refractory symptoms with the risk
of hastening death ... [whereas] PAS and euthanasia are negative acts of harrn that kiil the
patient as the only way to relieve refractory symptoms (Levy and Cohen 2005: 240). In
another guideline, ‘morally wrong’ is determined by the context of intention: “First, the
action itself (in this case administering opioids and sedatives), must not be morally wrong,
independent of its consequences
... intentionally causing death is wrong” (Lo and
Rubenfeld 2005: 1812).
As we recali, the third condition requires that in cases of ctenninal sedation’, the bad
effect (i.e., shortened life or the death of the patient) flot be the means to the good effect
(i.e., pain control). From the more theoretical discussions, we recali that the predorninate
approach to this condition was to assert that bad effects of ‘tenriinal sedation’ are flot
necessary to achieve the desired pain control. Likewise, in two clinical practice guidelines
(Chemy and Portenoy 1994; Levy and Cohen 2005) the sarne assertion is made, for
example, “death is flot necessary to relieve the patient’s symptoms” (Levy and Cohen
2005). Both Rousseau and Lo and Rubenfeld (Lo and Rubenfeld 2005; Rousseau 2001)
link the non-necessity of the bad effects with control of sedation through proper titration,
and they further assert that this control differentiates ‘terminal sedation’ from euthanasia.
For example, “the dose of sedative should be the lowest dose that achieves the goal of
symptom relief The initial dose should not be expected to suppress respiration to the point
of carbon dioxide retention ... A lethal dose at the onset, which allows no possibility for
symptoms to be relieved wïthout the patient’s death, constitutes active euthanasia.
Increases in dosage are permissible only if lower doses have been ineffective” (Lo and
Rubenfeld 2005: 1812). In another guideline, the bad effect (i.e., shortened life orthe death
of the patient) is flot the means to the good effect (i.e., pain control) insofar as the bad
effect -- “death [--j ensues from the underlying illness” and therefore, sedation as a forni of
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palliative care is differentiated from euthanasia where death ensues from the pain control
measures (Hawryluck, Hawey, Lemieux-Charles et aI. 2002: 6). Similarily, Cowan and
Palmer say, “As opposed to palliative sedation, euthanasia does flot rneet criteria for the
principle of double effect because the intended effect (death), is a bad effect, and a bad
effect (death) is the means for a good effect (symptom relief’) ... [By contrast,] the means
(use of a sedating medication [in palliative sedation]) to achieve the good is flot bad”
(Cowan and Palmer 2002: 244-245).
As we recail from the more theoretical discussion of intention and the
intent/foresight distinction, the authors focused on the importance of documentation of
intent in light of the potential for deception, and the tension between intention as a
universally applicable theoretical concept, and the assessment and understanding of
particular intentions in particular situations. Likewise, in the climcal practice guidelines,
comprehensive documentation of intention in patients’ charts is heavily stressed. Overali,
there is an emphasis on the documentation of a plan of action before and dunng use of
‘terminal sedation’, including documentation of discussion of the plan of action with
patients anWor substitute decision makers, and their consent for implementation of the plan.
For example, in the Toronto guidelines, we find the following:
The intent of the physician admimstering narcotics and sedatives to the
dying patient is the most crucial distinction between palliative care and
assisted death (euthanasialassisted suicide). In order to avoid any
misinterpretations, Intensivists must clearly document, in the patient’ s chart,
their intentions and justify their actions ... The intention of the Intensivist
administenng narcotics/sedatives to palliate dying patients can be assessed
by careful documentation in the chart of: 1) the patient’ s medical condition
and reasons leading to the initiation of palliative care, 2) the goal, which is
to relieve pain and suffering, 3) the way pain and suffering wiIl be
evaluated, and 4) the way in which drugs will be increased and why ... The
administration of drugs without any palliative benefit, e.g. lethal doses of
potassium chlonde or neuromuscular blockers, suggests an intent to
euthanize/assist in the suicide of an individual patient (Hawryluck, Harvey,
Lemieux-Charles et al. 2002: 6).
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Shuman et al. include many ofthe above elernents, but concerning the drugs used, they also
suggest that “the physician’s orders must specify the: indication, loading dose, initial
infusion rate, [and theJ infusion rate range (mg/hr) and tirne interval for boluses and
infusion rate adjustments” (Schuman, Lynch, and Abrahm 2005: 674). In ail the
guidelines, the authors stress the need to document intention via specification of the
titration ofthe sedation. For example,
The ethicist’s bright une between relieving symptoms and hastening death
can become blurred at the bedside. An important way to keep the une clear
is to document the specific clinical signs that justify increases in sedative
medication. In conscious patients, the dosage may be increased if the patient
reports unacceptable symptoms. If patients are unconscious or otherwise
unable to report pain, physicians and nurses must assess whether patients are
comfortable. The dosage should be increased if the patient appears restless
or grimaces, withdraws ftom painful stimuli, has a furrowed brow, or
develops hypertension [i.e., high blood pressure], tachycardia [i.e., a fast
heart rate], tachypnea [i.e., high respiratory rate], or any other findings that
could reasonably be interpreted as suffenng (Lo and Rubenfeld 2005: 1813).
Similarly, Rousseau asserts that “increasing sedation without an overt clinical indication
might imply the clinician is intending to hasten death and would ostensibly cross the une
between [palliative sedationi and physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia” (Rousseau 2001:
153).
As an example of the guidelines’ stress on documenting informed decision making,
Schuman et al. emphasize that “the implementing physician must document the discussion
of nsks and benefits of palliative sedation with the patient or ... with a surrogate decision
maker. The discussion should include the option ofbeing awakened from the sedation at a
future time, if possible ... However, the patient andlor surrogate should be informed that
the effort to awaken the patient may flot be successful” (Schuman, Lynch, and Abrahm
2005: 673). b ensure the inclusion of ail the aforementioned elements of intent and its
documentation, Monta et al. provides comprehensive flow charts conceming medical
indications, confirmation of patient and surrogates’ wishes, and the initiation of sedation
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(Monta, Bito, Kurihara et al. 2005: 721, 723, 725). Unique among the guidelines is Cowan
and Palmer’s “Palliative Sedation Checklisf’ which includes elernents necessaty before
sedation is initiated (e.g., that the patient meets the selection cnitenia as confinned by peer
consultation), and elements that are necessary as the treatment plan is implemented (e.g.,
associated comfort cane measures, drug selection and aspects of proper titration) (Cowan
and Palmer 2002: 247).
Not unlike the more theoretical discussion of the fourth condition of double effect
reasoning concermng proportionality, there is no consensus in the practice guidelines
regarding the meaning of proportionality between the proposed good and potential bad
effects. Sorne authors define proportionality in terms of proportionate reason or the
rationale used to justify the nisk to be taken for the proposed good. For example,
“Adequate relief of unendurable symptoms is an appropriately compelling reason to place
the patient at risk of the untotvard outcome” (Cherny and Portenoy 1994: 36), or “relief of
refractory symptoms is an appropnateiy compelling reason to put the patient at nisk for
hastened death. The fourth condition is also known as the concept of degree of
proportionate worth” (Levy and Cohen 2005: 240), or “proportionality is established by the
terminal condition of the patient, the urgent need to relieve suffering, and the consent of the
patient or proxy” (Lo and Rubenfeld 2005: 1812). Others define proportionality as a
comparison of outcomes. For example, “the intended good effects (relief of suffering) are
proportionally greater than the bad effects (respiratory depression, hypotension, and death)”
(Cowan and Palmer 2002: 244), or “Considering the patient conditions (intensity of
suffering, lack of other methods for palliation, and expected survival), expected benefits
(palliation of suffering), and expected harms (effects on the consciousness and survival),
sedation should be the most proportional action among ail possible choices” (Monta, Bito,
Kunihara et al. 2005: 719). Again, the frequent emphasis on the titration of analgesics and
sedatives to achieve only the desired effect best expresses the original meaning of
proportionality (i.e., means/end proportion) within double effect reasoning, although it is
not expressed as such within the practice guidelines. As we will see, the question of
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effects, 0F means/ertd proportion, is not of importance to climcians aÏone.
1.4. Conflicts in the LegalJPubIic Policy Literature
In the English common law tradition, double effect reasoning “was first recognized
in a 1957 English case. R. y. Adams” in which “the jury deliberated for less than an hour
before acquitting Dr. John Bodkin Adams ... of the murder of bis 81-year-old dying
patient” (Sneiderman 2002: 518). During his famous four-hour summation for the jury in
this case, Mr Justice Deviin stated: “If the first purpose of medicine, the restoration of
health, can no longer be achieved there is stiil much for a doctor to do, and he is entitled to
do ail that is proper and necessary to relieve pain and suffering, even if the measures he
takes may incidentally shorten life” (Huxtable 2004: 63). As Sneiderman explains, “the
law set forth in the Adams case provides the sole avenue of defence to the physician or
nurse whose patient dies from a drug overdose” (Sneiderman 2002: 518). Ibis defence bas
been extremely important in Canadian case taw because the Cnminai Code does not
distinguish between culpable homicide (i.e., murder, manslaughter or infanticide) and
palliative care pain controi measures such as ‘terminai sedation’. Since the earÏy 1 9$Os,
several Canadian law reform commission reports (Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide and
Cessation ofTreatment 1983; Some Aspects ofMedical Treatment and Cnminal Law 1986;
Recodifying Cnminal Law 1987; Gilmour 1996) have recommended that the Criminal
Code be revised to ensure that palliative care pain control is explicitly exempted from the
definition of culpable homicide. For example, a 1987 report recommends the inclusion of
the following clause that would specify that the types of culpable homicide “do flot appiy to
the administration of palliative care appropriate in the circurnstances for the control or
elimination of a person’s pain and suffering even if such care shortens his life expectancy,
unless the patient refuses such care” (Recodifying Cnminal Law 1987: 60). Unfortunately,
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although 0f Life and Death recommended the development of national guidelines and
standards for the provision of palliative care pain control, the resuit lias been “egregious
inaction” (Downie 2000). As a resuit, patients face the significant risk of undertreatment of
their pain to the extent that caregivers hesïtate to use sedation in response to the legal
uncertainties.
In Assisted Suicide: Canadian Perspectives, Canadian lawyer Russeli Savage
explains that “for an act [or failure to actJ to be cnminal, it must have two components,”
actus reus and mens rea: “the actus reus [i.e., the prohibited act] is the physical aspect of
the action and the mens rea is the so-caÏled ‘mental element’ ... sometirnes referred to as
the intentional aspect of the action” (Savage 2000: 76). Included in the actus reus is “ail
the extemal circumstances and consequences specifled in the rule of law as constituting the
forbidden situation”; if we consider murder, for example, “the actus reus of murder
includes not only D’s killing of P, but also the fact that P is under the Queen’s peace, that P
has flot been sentenced to be hanged by D, that the killing is within English temtonal (or
otherjurisdictions,” and so on (Williams 1961: 20).
By contrast, mens rea or the intentional aspect has both subjective and objective
fault elernents, both 0f which are defined by degrees (Roach 2000: 137-145). Included in
the subjective element of mens rea, we find from the minimum to the maximal level, wilful
bÏindness, recklessness, knowledge, and at the highest or maximal level -- intent, purpose
of wilfulness. Recklessness “is found in the attitude of one who, aware that there is danger
[or having the foresightJ that bis conduct could bring about the resuit prohibited by the
cnminal law, nevertheless persists, despite the risk” (Roach 2000: 143). There is an
element of probability related to this concept of recklessness. In other words, “foresight
merely of probability does flot amount to intention,” however, “there is one situation where
a consequence is deemed to be intended though it is flot desired: this is where it is foreseen
as substantially certain” (Williams 1961: 38,44). If we retum to the example of pain
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control, the relation between intent and recklessness can be described in this way: “if it is
foreseen that the dosage is relatively certain to kil!, then the mens rea requirement for
murder has been met. It is, however, a different matter if the foreseeability is that the
amount given, which is considered necessary ... might (but is flot relatively certain to) kili.
In that case, no crime is commifted when the drug does in fact stop the patient’s breathing”
(Sneiderman 2002: 519). Seemingly in cases such as this, double effect reasoning can
provide a way to justify knowledgeable or informed risk-taking and to differentiate that
from the higher level of intended murder. However, the use of double effect reasoning in
law is just as controversial as it is in the clinical context and in law, the controversy over its
use is situated within a larger debate about mens rea and its complex relationship to a
p!ethora of prohibited actions. Although this larger debate is well beyond the scope of this
thesis, two types of examples wil! be provided here, one from the classroom setting and
others from recent Canadian and American case law.
In 1965, American law professor and then Director ofthe American Law Institute,
Herbert Wechsler, gave a lecture at the University of Toronto entitled, The Mode! Penal
Code, the name ofthe code prepared by his Institute for state legislatures to use in updating
their criminal codes. Afier giving a general description of the Code, he proceeded to
illustrate problematic issues, principally, mens rea. This discussion illustrates that the
tension between intention as a universally applicable concept and as related to particular
actions is not a new tension emanating from current discussions about issues such as
euthanasia, and it is a tension that has provoked considerable angst and efforts to effect
clarification within the legal community itself:
I tum first to the problem of mens rea, which in our jurisdictions, as in
yours, is such a steady stream of litigation. The law upon thïs subject is
chaotic [emphasis mine], as Mr. Justice Jackson of our Supreme court
observed ..., when, ... he referred to ‘the variety, disparity and confusion’
of judicial definitions of ‘the requisite but elusive mental element’ in
crimes [emphasis mine] ... The Code attempts to clarify this cloudy area
[emphasis mine] by using four familiar concepts to define the mental
-tu
elements of culpability
... Those concepts are: purpose, knowledge,
recklessness and negligence. In a statement of the minimum requirements of
culpability, the Code provïdes that one may not be convicted of a crime
‘unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law
may require, with respect to each material element of the offence’. This
formulation recognïzes, as you see, that the kind of culpability required for
conviction may flot only vary from crime to crime within these limits but
also from one to another matenal element of a single offence -- meaning by
matenal element an attribute of conduct that gives it its offensive quality
Recklessness
... involves conscious risk creation. It resembles acting
knowingly in that a state of awareness is involved, but the awareness is of
risk, that is, of probability rather than certainty ... Since risk is
indeterminate, however, it would norrnally be oppressive to hold an actor
criminally hable whenever he knew that there was some risk that lis conduct
might prove to be of the kind forbidden.. Hence the Code requires that the
nsk thus consciously disregarded be ‘substantial’ and, moreover, that it be
‘unjustifiabie’
... A surgeon is flot reckless in performing an operation
mereiy for the reason that he knows it is very Ïikely to be fatal: it may
afford the patient’s only chance (friediand and Roach 1997: 510-511).
Apart ftom this classroom discussion of the problematic relationship between mens
rea and actus reus, recent Canadian and Arnerican case law ihlustrates graphically the
chaotic and conflicting approaches to intention, and the controversial use of double effect
reasoning to relate action and intention meaningfully. In the Canadian Rodrigue_- case, Sue
Rodriguez, who was suffenng from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig’ s Disease),
sought court sanction for a physician’s assistance in ending lier life at the tirne of lier
choosing, when the ravages of her disease had become or would soon become unbearable.
Taking lier request ail the way to the Suprerne Court of Canada, she specffically asked tliat
Section 241(b) of the Cnminal Code, which prohibits the giving of assistance to commit
suicide, be declared invalid under three sections of the Canadian Charter of Riglits and
freedoms: Section 7 concerning the nght to hife, Section 12 concerning the nght flot to be
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, and Section 15(1) regarding equality of
treatment under the law (see the Appendix for full citations of relevant sections of the
Charter). On September 30, 1993, the Supreme Court denied her request in a close 5-4
miing (Rodnguez y. Bntish Columbia (Attorney General) 1993). The views of Justices La
,1 1
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forest, Sopinka, Gontheir, lacobucci and Major coinprised the majority with Sopinka
speaking for them. Justices Lamer (the Chief Justice), L’Heureux-Dubé, Cory and
McLachuin dissented.
The majority view (Rodriguez y. British Columbia (Attorney General) 1993: 520-
523, 581-615) consisted of several key elernents. Firstly, the liberty interests in s.7 of the
Charter cannot be divorced from the concept of the sanctity of life (another ‘universal’).
Secondly, any deprivation of Sue Rodriguez’s autonorny is flot contrary to principles of
fundamental justice because that justice requires the balancing of state and individual
interests. Thirdly, Section 241(b) of the Criminal Code upholds State interests in protecting
life and vuinerable persons. Fourthly, there is a societal consensus concerrnng respecting
human life but not regarding decriminalizing physician-assisted suicide. Finally, the
State’s decriminalization of suicide was flot an acceptance of suicide, but rather,
recognition that the cnrninal law was not the appropriate tool for dealing with the reality of
suicide attempts. Regarding s.12 of the Charter, the view of the majority was that
Rodriguez was not being subject to any form of cruel and unusual pumshment. Concerning
the right to “equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination” in s. 15,
Sopinka said that any infringernent of this section is clearly justifled under s. 1, which
stipulates that the State can set “reasonable limits” on rights and freedoms. He also said
that attempts to create exceptions to Section 24 1(b) had been “unsatisfactory”, thus the
Court was not willing to create exceptions for Rodriguez.
The dissenting judges’ disagreements regarding the majority position were quite
substantial. The longest dissent, given by Lamer (Rodnguez y. British Columbia (Attorney
General) 1993: 524-526, 530-580) focused essentially on two issues. Firstly, Section
241(b) is over-inclusive in protecting the vuinerable; in other words, it protects even those
who do flot wish to be protected. Secondly, Section 241(b) impairs Rodriguez’s equality
nghts unjustifiably. Justices L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin, dissenting together in one
judgement (Rodnguez y. British Columbia (Attorney General) 1993: 523-524, 616-629),
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dismissed the active/passive or act/omission distinction. In other words, regarding the
distinction between allowing a ventilator to be withdrawn or withheld (legal) and actively
taking someone’s life or assisting someone to take their life (both illegal), Justice
McLachlin (speaking for herselfand L’fleureux-Dubé) said, “I cannot accept that it matters
whether the act is ‘passive’
... or ‘active’ ... The distinction, to borrow the language ofthe
Law Reform Commission of Canada, ‘is difficuit to justify on grounds of logic ajonc’
... In
short, it is arbitrary” (Rodriguez y. British Columbia (Attorney General) 1993: 624).
In the words spoken by Sopinka, the majority defended the active/passive
distinction, flot so much on the grounds of logic per se, but because in the flouse of Lords’
decision in Airedale N.H.S. Trust y. Bland, Lord Goff said, “ ‘So to act is to cross the
Rubicon which runs between on the one hand the care of the living patient and on the other
hand euthanasia -- actively causing his death to avoid or to end bis suffenng ... It is tme
that the drawing of this distinction may lead to a charge of hypocrisy ... But the Ïaw does
not feel able to authonse euthanasia ... for once euthanasia is recognised as lawful in
[certainJ circurnstances, it is difficuit to see any logical basis for exciuding it in others’
(Rodnguez y. Bntish Columbia (Attorney General) 1993: 599). from this defence of the
distinction between ‘passive’ withdrawal of treatment and ‘active’ euthanasia, Sopinka
proceeds to bis explanation of the distinction between palliative care pain control and
euthanasia/assisted suicide:
The administration of drugs designed for pain control in dosages which the
physician knows will hasten death constitutes active contribution to death by
any standard. However, the distinction drawn here is one based upon
intention
-- in the case of palliative care the intention is to ease pain, which
has the effect of hastening death, while ni the case of assisted suicide, the
intention is undeniably to cause death ... In my view, distinctions based
upon intent are important, and in fact, form the basis of oui- criminal law.
While factually, the distinction may, at times, be difficuit to draw,
legally it is clear [emphasis mine]. The fact that in some cases, the third
party will, under the guise of palliative care, commit euthanasia or assist in
suicide and go unsanctioned due to the difficulty of proof cannot be said to
-t-J
render the existence of the prohibition fundarnentally unjust (Rodriguez y.
British Columbia (Attorney General) 1993: 607).
Barely four rnonths after the Rodrtgtte: decision, in January. 1994 (Dying 1997).
Compassion in Dving et al. y. Washington Siate (called Washington y. GÏucksberg at the
Suprerne Court) was filed in the US District Court for Western Washington by four doctors
and three tenninally iii patients. This suit challenged the constitutionality of the State ban
on “prornoting a suicide attempt” by arguing that the ban did flot honour the liberty and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment (see the Appendix for the full
citation of this Arnendment). In May, 1994, the District Court decided that the ban was
unconstitutional and it also dismissed the active/passive distinction. Washington State
apoealed the decision to the US Court of Appeals for the 9 Circuit (i.e. coverin nine
states inciuding Washington). in March. i995, the Appeais Court ovenurned the District
Court’s decision, citing no historical protection for a right to commit suicide. However, flot
quite five months later, a majoritv of the Appeals Court judges voted to reconsider the
decision, and in March, 1996, they uphetd the original District Court decision in a 5-3
decision. In their judgement, they upheld the libert daim to assisted suicide, disrnissed
the active/passive distinction, and rejected double effect reasoning.
While this process was unfolding in Washington, Dr. Timothy Quili with two other
physicians and sorne terminally il! patients, supported by Compassion in Dying, fiÏed (July,
1994) a similar challenge to the constitutionality of the New York State ban on assisting
suicide. Untike the Washington District Court, the District Court for the Southem district
of New York uphetd the constitutionality of the state ban. However, the plaintiffs appealed
and the 2d Circuit Court of Appeals (i.e., covering three states including New York) ruled
that the New York law violated the equal protection clauses ofthe Fourteenth Ainendrnent.
In October, 1996, The US Suprerne Court amiounced that it would review both the
Washington and New York cases, and in June, 1997, the Court ruled unanirnously that the
state bans were constitutional. Despite their unanimity on the absence of a constitutional
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riglit to assisted suicide, the judges were divided 5/4 (like their Canadian counterparts) in
their actual j udgements.
In the bnef presented by the Glucksberg plaintiffs (Dying I 996b), the Supreme
Court was encouraged to respond positively to two main questions: firstly, whether the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty protected the decision of a competent,
terminally iii patient to bring about their death in a “certain, humane and dignified manner,”
and secondly, whether the ban resulted in a double standard, i.e., permitting those on life
support to discontinue it, but forbidding those not on any life support from receiving aid to
end their life. Unlike the Rodnguez case, therefore, these plaintiffs were asking that ail
persons flot on life support, flot merely those physicaliy disabled, be able to receive
assistance in dying. Citing the Casey decision (i.e., which upheld the nght to abortion as
one of the personal decision nghts protected by the Iiberty daim of the Fourteenth
Amendment), the Glucksberg group argued that if abortion received this protection, so too
should the right to die be protected as one of a person’s most basic, personal decisions.
They cited the Cruzan case also, claiming that the nght won there (i.e., the nght to have a
feeding tube withdrawn) tvas flot just the right to be free of battery, but also the nght to
avoid futile, prolonged, and degrading bodily disintegration; hence, that sanie freedom
should be guaranteed for those wanting assisted suicide.
The Glucksberg plaintiffs argued that terminai sedation is “monstrous” because it
constitutes “voluntaiy [submissionÏ to a drug-induced coma while one’s body disintegrates
and loved ones stand vigil.” In fact, they argued that tenninal sedation “[serves] only to
make the death less excruciating to observers.” The group also claimed that there is no
distinction between withdrawal of treatment, terminai sedation and euthanasia. This
assertion was supported by a dernolition of the active/passive distinction. They argued that
having a distinction does flot make it justified, that the end is the same in both cases, and
that the distinction only “[preserves] the appearance that one is flot participating in
hastening death.” Regarding possible abuse of assisted suicide legislation, the plaintifs
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ciaimed that this type of assistance is already going on without regulation and that, like
abortion, only the affluent have access to assisted suicide. Not unlike Lamer’s dissent in
Rodrigue-, the group ciaimed that existing protection of the vulnerable is over-inclusive.
They also argued that proper regulations would avoid the ‘slippery siope’. Finally, they
insisted that the State must flot serve the rights of a moral majority conveyed in abstract,
philosophicai or theological language.
The Qui!! bnef (Dying 1 996a) was a frontal attack on double effect reasoning. Like
the Glucksberg brief, the hypocrisy of “appearances” was condemned: “Surely the
Constitution does not permit the State to sacrifice the rights of the dying on the altar of
appearances.” The group reminded the Court that “our nation is built upon the mie of law,
not winks and nods,” refemng to the concrete non-enforcement of assisted suicide
provisions supported by dishonesty in the physician-patient relationship (e.g., aliowing
patients to stockpile barbiturates for ‘insomnia’). The “legal fiction” of intent was attacked,
e.g., the ‘fiction’ that patients requesting ventilator withdrawai are only asking to be rid of
bodily intrusions when in fact, they are asking to die, and the opposite ‘fiction’, the notion
that ail persons asking for assisted suicide are intending suicide when in fact, they merely
want their pain alleviated. The group claimed that “if there is a s!ippery siope to fear,” it is
death by ‘double effect’ and terminal sedation, and the nation lias already sud significantiy
down that siope. The ‘fiction’ in double effect reasoning is the notion that “c!ear!y
foreseeabie consequences of an act are flot intended.” On the basis of this ‘fiction’, the
group argued that a distinction between terminal sedation and euthanasia is irrational.
Moreover, iike the Giucksberg brief, the Quili brief aiso characterized terminal sedation as
a “monstrous” process, whereby patients are “chemically shut down,” “imprisoned in their
decaying bodies,” and “deliberate!y stawed to death, whiie ioved ones keep a gruesome
vigi!.”
The Supreme Court responded to both cases at the same time, and most judges gave
one judgement covenng both cases. Regarding WasÏzington V. GÏucksberg, there were
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basically three parts to the majority judgement given by Chief Justice Relmquist (Battin,
Rhodes, and Silvers 1998: 377-422). f irstly. he noted that there was no foundation for a
constitutional right to assisted suicide because history and tradition have rejected nearly ail
attempts to have it sanctioned. Here he was relying on the history of American
jurisprudence regarding constitutional rights, as well as the fact that euthanasialassisted
suicide is prohibited everywhere in the Western world with only a few exceptions.
Secondly, he emphasized the legitimate state interests in banning assisted suicide, for
example, protecting ail human life, preventing suicides, protecting the integrity and ethics
ofthe medical profession, protecting vuinerable groups, and preventing the ‘slippery slope’,
the best example of which is discernable in the Netherlands. Regarding the plaintiffs’ hope
that the Casey and Cruzan decisions would provide a precedent for a liberty-based daim to
assisted suicide, Relmquist stressed that the due process clause of the fourteenth
Amendment does flot protect “any and ail important, intirnate, and personal decisions.” He
ended his judgement by voicing support for the continuance of Americans’ “earnest and
profound debate” about ail aspects ofassisted suicide.
In his decision regarding Vacco y. Qui!!, Justice Rehnquist explained that the equal
protection clause within the Fourteenth Amendment does flot create any “substantive
rights”; by contrast, it embodies a “general rule” that states must treat like cases alike. This
obviously begs the question of which cases are alike, and in response to this question,
Rehnquist upheld both the active/passive distinction and double effect reasoning.
Concerning the former distinction, he argued that whereas the patient who refuses life
support dies from their disease, the patient who is given a lethal dose is killed by the drug.
Also, whereas doctors abiding by their patients’ refusais of life support and giving
“aggressive palliative care,” intend only the avoidance of futile means in the first case, and
pain relief in the second case, doctors assisting in suicide “must, necessariiy and
indubitably, intend primarily” the death of their patients. Rehnquist’s support of double
effect reasoning was expressed in these words: “The law bas long used actors’ intent or
purpose to distinguish between two acts that may have the same resuit ... Put differently,
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the law distinguïshes actions taken ‘because of a given end from actions taken ‘in spite of
their unintended but foreseen consequences” (Baffin, Rhodes, and Silvers 199$: 425). Not
unlike Sopinka’s acknowledgement of the difficulty of drawing the une in this way,
Rehnquist concludes: “Granted, in some cases, the une between the two may not be clear,
but certainty is flot required, even were it possible (in a footnote here, he adds that “in the
absence of omniscience, the State is entitled to act on the reasonableness of the
distinction”). Logic and contemporaiy practice support New York’s judgment that the two
acts are different, and New York may therefore ... treat them differently” (Baffin, Rhodes,
and Silvers 1998: 427, 430).
Justice O’Connor explained that she joined the majorfty because she agreed that
“there is no generalized nght ‘to commit suicide” (Battin, Rhodes, and Silvers 1998: 389).
She did flot address the distinctions in question, ostensibly because in her view, the risk of
the ‘slippeiy siope’ and the difficulty in defining terminal illness were sufficient to justify
continued prohibition of assisted suicide. She also argued that the availability of palliative
care justifies the bans, especially because there are no legal barriers to sedation “even to the
point of causing unconsciousness and hastening death” (Baffin, Rhodes, and Silvers 1998:
389). Justice Stevens acknowledged the “significant tension” between physicians’
traditional roles “and the actual practice in a growing number of cases” (Battin, Rhodes,
and Silvers 199$: 394). He also argued that the distinctions pertaining to intention and
causation expressed in the mai onty view “may be inapplicable to particular terminally iii
patients and their doctors” (Battin, Rhodes, and Silvers 1998: 395). In sum, lis judgement
was a clarion cal] for further debate and future challenges at the level of particular cases.
Justice Souter, who gave the most detailed histoiy of judicial review of substantive state
law, emphasized that” ‘tradition is a living thing’, albeit one that moves by moderate steps
carefully taken” (Battin, Rhodes, and Silvers 1998: 403). Accordingly, “novel daims,”
such as a liberty nght to assisted suicide, must show evidence of both continuïty with the
past, and a well-accepted, pnncipled vision for the future. Although in Souter’s opinion,
such evidence does flot yet exist, it could exist in the future, but that requires further debate
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and above ail, experirnentation best undertaken by state legislatures. Justice Brever agreed
with O’Connor that existing palliative care options do flot justify decriminalization of
assisted suicide, but he added that the situation would be different if states were to “prevent
the provision of palliative care, including the administration of drugs as needed to avoid
pain at the end of life” (Battin, Rhodes, and Silvers 1998: 413).
The most predominant sentiment expressed by legal commentators who assessed the
Court’s judgements is that although the constitutional issues have been more or less
conclusively resolved, the questions conceming meaningful distinctions between end-of
life treatments remain cornpleteiy unresolved, and wilÏ likely prompt future legal
clarification in the context of particular cases. Among the most prominent commentators,
David Orentiicher, law professor and physician, suggests (Orentlicher 1997, 1998, 2001)
that the Court’s decision is problematic because although the Court placed the withdrawal
oftreatment in the same category as terminal sedation, the distinctions between end-of-life
treatments (i.e., terminal sedation, euthanasia, assisted suicide and withdrawal of treatment)
are now blurred. for example, tenTiinal sedation is indistinguishable from euthanasia
insofar as “it is the combination of a physician-induced coma and the withholding or
withdrawal of food and water that constitutes euthanasia” (Orentiicher 1998: 855-856).
Also, terminal sedation cannot be distinguished from euthanasia and justified on the basis
of double effect reasoning or intent alone because intent can be identical in ail four
aforementioned end-of-iife treatments, and in the case of terminal sedation, “the physician
is intentionally engaging in action that wilI inevitably resuit in the patient’s death”
(Orentlicher 1998: 856). Orentlicher holds that the use of double effect reasoning is quite
problematic because it justifies only the sedation part of terminal sedation. We cannot
justify the withdrawal offood and water part of terminal sedation, for that step does nothing
to relieve the patient’s suffering” (Orentlicher 1998: 856-857). for Orentiicher, physicians’
cuipability is much more of an issue in terminal sedation and euthanasia because unlike
cases of treatment withdrawal andlor physician assisted suicide, which require a consenting
patient, physicians can easily sedate or euthanize vulnerable, incompetent patients. Rather
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than resolve these types of problems associated with existing distinctions, Orentiicher
believes that the Court decided as it did largely for symbolic reasons, for example, because
decnminalizing physician-assisted suicide “would have meant overtuming bans of that
practice in more than forty states” and “pre-empting state expenmentation” (Orentiicher
1997: 950).
Law professors Norman Cantor and George Thomas, who have written extensively
about the legality of current pain control practices, argue that the active/passive and
intentlforesight distinctions are too “subtie,” “debatable,” “fragile,” and “ephemeral” to
prevail in the current “momentum of people’s veaming for death with a modicum of
dignity” (Cantor and Thomas 2000: 87). Cantor’s most recent cnticism of the use of
double effect reasoning lias a twofold focus. firstly, lie holds that there is an inconsistency
between what is permÏtted by this reasoning and the traditional English common-law
approach to criminal homicide:
The effort to use the doctrine of double effect, with its focus on a
physician’s intention, seems inconsistent with traditional legal doctrine,
which establishes that it is cnminal homicide to knowingly cause death,
even if the actor’ s motive or intention is to relieve suffenng. Mercy killing
has aiways been prohibited in the Anglo-American system. Thus, at least if
an analgesic dosage is certain or practically certain to hasten death, the
physician’s knowing conduct constitutes an unlawful killing closely akin to
active euthanasia (Cantor 200 lb: 186; 2004: 1837-1838). (from England see
also Huxtable 2004: 66). [AgainJ I have argued that the various opinions
[i.e., in relation to Washington y. G/ucksberg and Vacco y. Quill] depart
from traditional legal bounds of available pain relief Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion endorses the (misguided) conventional wisdom of
medico-legal commentators hinging the legality of pain relief upon the
provider’s intent to relieve suffering. The concurring Justices go further and
assume pain relief may Iawfully be administered ‘as needed’ even if the
dosage is certain to cause death. While both of these positions are probably
wrong as a matter of traditional criminal law doctrine, I suspect that they
will serve as seif-fulfihling prophecies shaping legal doctrine in the new
millennium (Cantor 2001a: 313; 2004: 1837-1838).
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SecondÏy, Cantor focuses on what he perceives to be the indeterminacy of intent. in
cases where “the attending physician may share the patient’s assessment that death wilI be a
benefit,” Cantor argues that “at the very least, the physician’s intent may be so
indetemiinate
... that even the physician may flot fully understand the impetus for the pain
relief’ (Cantor 2001a: 311). Not only is intent indeterrninate in Cantor’s view, but this
indeterrninacy can Iead to “perverse practical consequences” (Cantor 2001 a: 311). In other
words, while it is natural for physicians caring for patients suffering terribly, “flot onïy to
welcorne, but also to want to bring about the patient’s death” (Cantor 2001a: 311), “simply
desiring to bring about dcath in order to relieve suffering, a naturat state ofrnind under the
circumstances, disqualifies the conscientious provider from giving needed pain relief’
(Cantor 2001a: 312). Hereafter, as several physicians have indïcated and Cantor seerns 10
concur, the temptation to C direct intentions’ becomes hard to resist:
The conventional wisdorn’s fixation on state of mmd [or elsewhere in this
article, “a pure state of mind”l provides a strong incentive for dissembling.
The troubled physician can furnish the risky pain relief to the distressed
patient by pretending that her pnmary intention is to relieve suffering,
regardless of ber actual state of mmd. Only rarely can a prosecutor (or
anyone else) disprove the physician’s assertion that ber intention is
palliative. The current popular wisdorn about the legal bounds of riskv pain
relief may have encouraged a medical charade (Cantor 200 la: 312).
Cantor and Thomas’ (Cantor and Thornas 2000: 172-173) and Cantor’s most recent
opinions (Cantor 2001b, 2001a, 2004) express the view that the most adequate solution to
this problem is to draw the une between legal termina] sedation and illegal euthanasia bv
means of the application of principles of criminal recklessness, that is, by means of an
assessment of anticipated risks rather than of intent. From this perspective, “the risk of
death is justified, flot because it is unintended but because there is no alternative approach
that makes the risk of death less likely and the alleviation of suffering possible” (Cantor
2001a: 312). In ternis of liability, “no liability is incurred unless the palliative care
physician is reckless, i.e., if the physician departs grossly from professional standards”
(Cantor200la: 312).
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The centrai focus of some commentaries bas been the divisions between the
Justices. For example, taw professor Robert Burt says, “There was, in short, something
disordered about each of the Justices’ opinions -- and something equallv disordered about
the isolation ofeach ofthem from one another, about their inability or unwillingness to find
a common approach or vocabulary ... [and] with the signal exception of Souter, they could
flot forthrightly admit their inesolution” (Burt 1998: 976). Burt explains the disorder by
drawing parallels between the Court’s treatment of physician-assisted suicide and its
treatrnent of capital punishment. In both cases, Burt argues, the path chosen by the Court
has been “the construction of a patina of rationaiity and faimess, a pretense rnaintained by
an adamant refusai to attend to actual practices in impiementation,” thus Jappeasing] vocal
public concems” and shrouding death “in a kind of covertly acknowledged but resolutely
unexamined secrecy” (Burt 1998: 981).
Professor Susan Wolf agrees with Burt that the judges left unresolved issues rooted
in the actual implementation of end-of-life practices, but she goes further than Burt in her
analysis of the causes of this problem. On the surface, she thinks that “for rnany of the
Justices. the facts or sheer factuai uncertainty drove them to send the assisted suicide
question back to the legislatures” (Wolf 1998: 1066). But below the surface, she argues
that there is a ‘ghost in the machine” which is “rarely named and openly confronted” (Wolf
1998: 1070). The “ghost” is a struggie between universalism and particulansm or “between
abstract argument that largely avoids the data on end-of-life practices and presents future
assisted suicide in idealized tenns, and argument that places assisted suicide in the context
of data, tethering daims to the realities ofthe clinic” (Wolf 199$: 1067). Certainly, factual
data are ignored, Woif thinks, because of some of the more obvious barriers to end-of-life
care, for example, the myths about opioids and the general inability to discuss openly the
realities of death and dying. However, the “ghost in the machine” must be acknowledged,
Wolf stresses in these words:
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We are on the cusp, moving ftom one way of thinking to another. The
debate on assisted suicide cornes to the fore just as bioethics and health law
struggie through what I have argued elsewhere is a paradigm shifi from an
old deductivism that largely ignored empiricism to a new pragmatism that
extols it. The debate on assisted suicide rnanifests the conflict or, more
optimistically, the transition between these Pvo approaches (Wolf 199$:
1101).
The original denvation ofthe phrase ‘ghost in the machine’ cornes from Gilbert Ryle’s, Tt2e
Concept ofMind (Ryle 1949) in which lie sharply criticizes “the dogma of the ghost in the
machine,” a reference to the dualistic, Cartesian concept of the human person and human
knowledge. To what degree the “paradigm shifi” to which Wolf refers is underway is an
open question, but since this shifi has certainly affected use of double effect reasoning,
there is a need to continue our exploration of the problems surrounding this reasoning
within Catholic moral theology and philosophy/philosophical bioethics.
1.5. Conflicts Within Theology ami Phulosophy
Contrai-y to popular opinion, Thomas Aquinas did not create ‘the pnnciple of double
effect’ (Kennan 1993; Berkman 1997). At most, as indicated in the Introduction, Aquinas
created a type of double effect reasoning that enabled him to reconcile empincism and
idealism -- particulansm and universalism in order to resolve a specific problem. As
Christian and civil society became more integrated and Christians took part in military
service, Aquinas needed a way to restrict the scope of universal Christian prohibitions
against killing in order to justify killing in self defence and for the defence of one’s country
(Jonsen 1996: 43). Consequently, Aquinas outlined a way to integrate the empincal and
particular requirements of military service with the idealist and universalist reality of
Christian meaning and beliefs. It is intention which mediates or negotiates these two
realities -- intention understood in a psychological and spiritual sense within the larger
context of Aquinas’ treatment of theological anthropology and the virtues, especially the
vii-tue of justice. Within this context, intention is “defined as an act of the wiII [emphasis
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mine] conceming a goal for the sake of which something is done”; for exampie, if a person
wants sedation to relieve suffering, “the end [pain control] is wanted, the means are chosen,
[and] what is intended is neither the end in itseif nor the means in themselves, but the end
through the means” (Kenny 1973 t 138). In the following passage, Aquinas uses this type of
reasoning to explain how the killing of an attacker can be the foreseen but not the intended
effect of an act of seif-defence:
A single act may have two effects, of which one alone is intended, whilst the
other is incidentai to that intention. But the way a moral act is to be
classified depends on what is intended, flot on what goes beyond such an
intention, since this is mereiy incidentai thereof ... In the light of this
distinction we can see that an act of seif-defence may have two effects: the
saving of one’s own life, and the killing of the attacker. Now such an act of
seif-defence is flot illegitimate just because the agent intends to save his own
life, because it is natural for anything to want to preserve itself in being as
far as it can. An act that is properly motivated may, nevertheless, become
vitiated if ït is flot proportionate to the end intended. And this is why
somebody who uses more violence than is necessary to defend himself will
be doing sornething wrong. On the other hand, the controlÏed use of
counter-violence constitutes legitimate seif-defence ... It remains
nevertheless that it is not legitimate for a man actually to intend to kiil
another in seif-defence, since the taking of life is reserved to the public
authonties acting for the common good ... (Aquinas 1975: 2a2ae. 64,7).
In this passage, Aquinas has outlined a way to integrate the particular requirements
of military service with the idealist and universalist reality of Christian meamng and
beliefs. However, the path from this passage to what has become known as the principÏe of
double eflect is quite complicated and fihled with controversies. For example, in his 1949
seminal article, Joseph Mangan said that despite opposing views, he believed that the
principle of double effect onginated in the above passage (Mangan 1949: 51). In 1951,
Josef Ghoos disproved Mangan’s view by illustrating that although Aquinas initiated
double effect reasoning, the principÏe of double effect was formulated much later on the
basis of its usefulness in practical experience (Ghoos 1951). Specifically, in the sixteenth
century as Dominican and Jesuit pnests were trying to resolve difficult moral cases, they
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began “to narne the common factors among the paradigm cases” (Keenan 1993: 299).
Eventually, the Iberian philosopher Jean Poinsot, sometimes known as John of St. Thomas
(1589-1644), articulated the factors into the conditions of the pnnciple as such. However,
it was flot widely used as o principle until the nineteenth century (Keenan 1993:299).
Before the nineteenth century, double effect reasoning was used informally by
Dominican and Jesuit priests in their efforts to resolve difficuit moral cases, and in the
process of iively debate, Aquinas’ reflections were often combined with other theological
paradigms. In the nineteenth century, however, Aquinas’ double effect reasoning became
mstitutionahzed as a universal, idealist system -- a form of “ecclesiastical positivism”
(KelIy 1979: 230), which pennitted the Catholic Church to compete with the positivism of
modem science. During this authoritarian process of institutionalization, double effect
reasoning was transformed into the fundamental principÏe ofdouble effect, which was to be
applied mechanically by confessors in ail cases where acts had two possible effects, flot just
in situations of self-defence. In the manuals of moral theology, certain paradigm cases
emerged, for example, the excision of a cancerous, pregnant wornb. the treatment of ectopic
pregnancies, stenlization, and cooperation in the sin of another. Quite unlike Aquinas’
development of double effect reasoning as one application of his larger treatment of
theological anthropology and the virtues, the mneteenth-century manuals featured a
“generalized and stereotyped” principle of double effect, typically presented without
justification, and with an application that “had taken on a seif-evident character” (Gallagher
1990: 40). in these manuals, the pnnciple of double effect was applied with a physicalist
emphasis, which reduced intention to physical terms. In other words, stress was “placed on
the physical finis operas, objectum, or actual physical properties, motions, and goals of the
action under consideration” (KeIly 1979: 231).
Two important nineteenth-century developments fostered this physicalism: the
work of the french Jesuit Jean Pierre Gury (1801-1866), and the influence of neo
Thomism. From lis Jesuit predecessors, Gury inhented the use of double effect reasoning
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far rernoved from Aquinas’ original discussion of killing in seif-defence, and extended into
the analysis of many other issues, for exampi e, “indirect killing of the innocent, especially
in time of war; exposing oneseif to mortal danger for a good cause; perfonring some act
which one foresees vill result in the passive scandai of others ... and cooperating
matenally in another’s evil action” (Mangan 1949: 54-55). from lis study of double effect
reasoning as it was transmitted to him, Gury was eventualiy inspired to initiate three of his
own changes that moved double effect reasoning even further from its original context.
Firstly, whereas for Aquinas, double effect reasoning was merely one particular application
of lis primary moral principles, double effect becarne for Gury, “a fundamental moral
principle” (Kaczor 1998: 308), “indispensable to the proper understanding of the human
act” (Kaczor 1998: 307). Secondly, whereas Aquinas “spoke ofintending ends [i.e., good,
bad, or indifferent within the larger context of his theological understanding of the moral
life], Gury [spoke] of positing causes” or “[setting] in motion a cause either intentionally or
unintentionally” (Kaczor 199$: 308-309). In other words, Gury “[boundJ intention or will
to the causal sequence” (Aulisio 1996: 64). Thirdly, whereas Aquinas emphasized act!end
proportion, i.e., “the means used in seif-defence must be proportioned to the end of self
defence” (Kaczor 199$: 310), Gury emphasized effect/effect proportion, i.e., “one must
balance the possible harm to oneseif [effect A] against the possible harm coming to one’s
neighbour [effect B]” (Kaczor 199$: 311). By shifting the emphasis away from the
meaning that Aquinas gave to ends, intention and proportion, and by introducing a new
emphasis on the concepts of cause and effect, Gury gave double effect reasoning a
physicalist emphasis that departed radïcally from Aquinas’ approach. In this use of double
effect reasoning, or more accurately at this point, in this use of the principle o/ double
e/jèct, “ethical judgments anived at [were] considered to be universally applicable to ail
situations involving the same physical act” (Kelly 1979: 231). A paralieiism had thus been
achieved between concepts of physical and ethicai necessity.
A second transformative influence on the manuals was that of neo-Thomisrn. The
sixteenth-century Catholic Counter-Reformation was not only a reaction against
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Protestantism, but it was a reaction against the modem world, panicularly Enlightenment
science and philosophy. As part of this reaction, the Catholic Church countered the
systems of Enhightemnent rationalism with ïts own rationalist system created by means of a
systematization of Aquinas’ work. Accordingly, the confessors’ manuals became vehicles
for the expression of this reaction and those “published afier 1879 were presented as
summaries of the moral theology of [Aquinasj” (Gallagher 1990: 37). Ibis transition
changed the manuals dramatically. for example, whereas the earlier manuals incorporated
divergent theological paradigms, those after 1879 could only incorporate accepted
interpretations of Aquinas (Gallagher 1990: 37). Since these manuals comprised a system
for use throughout European seminaries, the manuals “were culturally invariant texts”
(Gallagher 1990: 40). Finally, the reactionaiy nature of this transition resulted in an
excessively legalistic and authontanan approach to moral questions. As already indicated,
the label “ecclesiastical positivism” was attached to this approach. In other words,
physicalism and the conclusions generated in accordance with it was reinforced by
ecclesiastical approbation, a defence “that paraÏleled the authoritative defense by the
medical profession of the scientific conclusions reached in the development of their
profession” (Kelly 1979).
Afier the Second Vatican Council (1963-1965), the interpretation and use of double
effect reasoning went through another radical transition from an emphasis on physicalism
and Iegalism to a stress on personalism, that is, “a modaÏity of application ... whereby an
emphasis is placed on the entire complexus of the act in its human [as opposed to its purely
physicalJ dimensions, circumstances, and consequences” (Kelly 1979: 419). In other
words, personalism represents yet another attempt to reconcile universals and particulars,
but this reconciliation attempts to break through the confines of, and remedy the problems
created by the physicalist approach to double effect reasoning found in the manuals and in
Church teaching. Although the label ‘personalism’ can be attached to the work of many
theologians, the work of the German Jesuit, Peter Knauer, represents the most
groundbreaking use ofthis modality. In 1967, Knauer asserted that double effect reasoning
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vas “in reality, the fundamentai principle of ail moraiity” (Knauer 1979 [ong. 1967]: 1).
He also reduced the four conditions of double effect reasoning to one single condition:
“One may permit the evil effect of [an] act only if [it] is flot intended in itself but is indirect
and justified by a commensurate reason” (Knauer 1979 [ong. 1967]: 5). In this
interpretation, Aquinas’ notion that an act in itself could be morally good, bad, or
indifferent, was gone. In its place, Knauer substituted the idea of pre-morat goodness,
badness, or indifference. In other words, although “every human act brings evil effects
with it” (Kriauer 1979 [ong. 19671: 16) insofar as the choice of one value denies others, the
moral aspect of an act is embodied only in the particular choice an individual makes to act
in a specific way. A moral evaluation of acts thus depended flot on the physicahst notion of
intention as conceived by Gury, but rather, upon the assessment of both empincal and non
empincal aspects involved in a particular person’s choice, aspects which, in Kriauer’s view,
were processed through the use of commensurate (or proportionate) reason
-- a revised
understanding of the fourth condition of double effect reasoning. By ‘commensurate
reason’, Knauer meant, “1f, in the given circumstances, the act is the best possible solution
of the problem in tenus of the horizon given by the whole of reality, it may be said that the
act is morally good” (Knauer 1979 [ong. 1967]: 22). Knauer’s innovation was the start of
the movement and method called ‘proportionalism’. The person who contnbuted most to
its development in North Amenica is Richard McCormick, whose work will be discussed in
the second chapten.
What is flot recognized in the clinical or legallpublic pohcy sources, but what
should be obvious afler this histoncal survey is that thene is not one ‘face’ of double effect
reasoning but many, and each must be understood within its particular context. As we will
see in more detail in the second chapter, competing contexts continue to fuel current
disagreements about the use of double effect reasoning. In fact, American theologian John
Benkman says, “Neyer lias the pnnciple attracted more attention from philosophers and
theologians [and] neyer lias there been less agreement” (Berkman 1997: 90). His thesis is
also “that far from being healthy, the pnnciple of double effect (and ... the discipline of
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moral theology more generally] is in a state of epistemological crisis, and that the
resolution of the cnsis will require changes in conception and practice of the discipline
inconceivable to many if not rnost moral theologians” (Berkman 1997: 90). Not uniike the
views of Christopher Kaczor whose work we will examine in the second chapter, Berkman
hoids that Knauer’s work actually represents more of a continuation of the manualist
tradition than a departure ftom it. for Knauer, like his predecessor Gury, gave double
effect reasoning a central place within moral theology:
Knauer’s fundamental error (leaving interpretative questions aside) was to
try to make the pnnciple of double effect too central, to invest it with a
conceptual weight which it was neyer meant to bear. It should be no
surprise that it is precisely when the principle of double effect became
understood as methodologically central in the discipline of moral theology
that it undenvent an internai collapse, throwing aIl aspects of it into an
uproar, with wildly diverging viewpoints on the pnnciple. Whereas
Knauer’s thesis might legitimately be viewed as an attempt to resolve the
epistemological crisis of moral theology, it proved rather to be a profound
example ofit (Berkman 1997: 95). Less than a generation removed from the
manual tradition, cunent moral theology continues to be profoundly
influenced by many of the assumptions and conceptual categories embodïed
in the manuals, and more problematically, largely unaware of this influence
(Berkman 1997: 99).
The epistemological crisis surrounding double effect reasoning is not peculiar to
theoiogy, but pervades philosophy as weil, and this situation threatens the present and
future viability of this reasoning as a way of distinguishing between terminal sedation and
euthanasia. Before the twentieth-centuiy, there was no distinction between metaethics and
normative ethics, i.e., between ideahst consideration of conceptual and methodological
issues, and responses to particular ethical dilemmas. The work of Thomas Aquinas is a
good example. His development of double effect reasoning in response to the problem of
self defence cannot be separated from lis metaethics, i.e., lis consideration of issues such
as theological anthropology, the nature of ‘the good’, virtues and vices, etc. However, as
the Encyclopedia of Bioethics indicates, metaethics became separated from normative
ethics at the tum of the twentieth-century in response to positivism, i.e., the idea of
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“experïmentally verifiable science as the paradigm of cognitively meaningful discourse”
(Reich 1995: 2: 723,737). In the wake of this division, metaethics became the reaim of
philosophers and normative ethics became the domain of “preachers, novelists, and other
nonphilosophers” (Reich 1995: 2: 737). Ihis onset of fragmentation did not bode well for
double effect reasoning.
In the wake of a critique of positivism in the I 950s, philosophers re-entered the
reaim of normative ethics in the 60s and 70s, and this penod was characterized “by new
attempts to reformulate and defend classical ethical views” (Reich 1995: 2: 737). Classical
Kantian theory was reformulated by philosophers such as John Rawis and his student
Thomas Nagel, as well as Alan Donagan, Alan Gewirth, and others (Reich 1995: 2: 737).
Classic utilitananism vas reformulated by philosophers such as Richard Haïe and his
students Derek Parfit and Peter Singer (Reicli 1995: 2: 737). Classical AristotelianlThomist
philosophy was refonnulated by Elizabeth Anscombe, Peter Geach, Alasdair Maclntyre,
and others (Reich 1995: 2: 737). In this context, it was Elizabeth Anscombe who
introduced double effect reasoning into secular moral phulosophy.
At this point, normative ethics itself became a ftagmented field as it divided along
the unes of what distinguished the normative theories from each other, i.e., “the three
universal [and idealizedi features of human action” -- agency, action, and consequences
(Reich 1995: 2: 738). Kantian deontologists focused on duties orienting right and wrong
actions. Utilitarians in their corner emphasized the analysis of consequences and ways to
maximize desired outcomes. Virtue theonsts like Anscombe and Maclntyre analyzed
issues sucli as the role of virtues in ethics, and what it means to know ami to intend, both in
general terms (Maclntrye), and in the context of double effect reasoning (Anscombe).
Debates about the use of double effect reasomng (e.g., between Anscombe and
consequentialists) only mirrored the larger divisions that plagued the field. In other words,
double effect reasomng became a lightening rod because it combined in one ‘principle’
approach tÔ ics that had become radically polanzed. The notion of intention was
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particularly contested because aithougli virtue theonsts and deontologists could conceive of
intention as an idea or representation in the mmd with or without particular, extemal
manifestations. consequentialists were bound by the notion that the only mental state
primarily relevant to the morality of a voluntary act is the cognitive state with regard to
consequences” (Kemiy 1973: 143).
Overail, the division within normative ethics produced three major problems. The
isolation of the theorïes from their particular theoretical and historical contexts made it
difficuit for “any of them to be adequately defended, or successfulfy cnticized” (Reich
1995: 2: 744). Secondly, there has been significant “general disagreernent about exactly
how these normative theories are to relate to the resolution of particular normative
problems” (Reicli 1995: 2: 744). finally. the second difficulty seems 10 lie rooted in the
additional fact that “there is no theory-independent criterion of how normative theories are
to guide action, since each theory embodies a view about ils own application’ (Reich 1995:
2: 744). On account of these problems, particularly the difficult theory-practice
relationship, the field of applied ethics has arisen, i.e., “a general fleld of study that includes
ail systematic efforts to understand and to resolve moral problems that anse in some
domain ofpractical life” (Chadwick 1998: 1: 192). There are now three major divisions of
applied ethics: bioethïcs, business ethics, and environmentai ethics (Chadwick 1 998: 1:
192).
In order to illustrate the fragmentation of ethics within bioethics and its relationship
10 portrayals of double effect reasoning, we can use Beaucliamp and Chuldress’ classic text,
PrÉnciptes ofBiomedicat Ethics, as a good starting place. If we survey the five editions of
this text, we find evidence of the problernalic relationship between metaethics and
normative ethics, the contestation surrounding ail ethical theones and their relationship to
practices in particular contexts, and the fact that double effect reasoning has been affected
by these larger methodological controversies. Throughout the five editions, the conditions
of double effect reasoning remain essentially unchanged, and they are as indicated in the
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Generni Introduction (see p7). The only significant change is the development and
clarification ofthe notion ofproportionality. From the beginning, it was defined as endlend
proportionality, but in the fourth and fifth editions, the need for “a proportionate reason that
compensates for permitting the foreseen bad effect” is added (Beauchamp and Childress
1994: 207; 2001: 129).
In the first two editions of this text, the presentations of double effect reasoning are
virtually identical. Placed within the chapters concerning Beauchamp and Childress’
principle of nonmaleficence, double effect reasoning is portrayed as a Roman Catholïc
entity, located “primarily but flot exclusively in the Roman Catholic tradition” (Beauchamp
and Childress 1979: 102; 1983: 113). The reasomng is defined as a means to narrow the
scope of moral prohibitions against acts “such as murder, suicide and abortion”
(Beauchamp and Childress 1983: 113). The importance of double effect reasoning within
conflict situations is underlined: “Appeals to the principle of double effect are especially
prominent when there is conflict between obligations or values, and it is flot possible to
meet or realize ail of them simultaneously” (Beauchamp and Chuldress 1983: 114).
Examples of such conffict situations include the one at the heart of this thesis: “Sucli a
situation may occur in the care of tenninally iii patients when there is a duty of
nonmaleficence, including a duty flot to kil!, and there is a duty to make the patient
comfortable by inducing sleep and alleviating pain” (Beauchamp and Childress 1983: 114).
Severat cnticisms of double effect reasoning are identified. Utilitanans fault this reasoning
because it can lead to different moral judgments in situations where the consequences are
identical (Beauchamp and Childress 1983: 105). Similanly, deontologists cnticize this
reasoning because it can lead to different moral judgments in situations where identical
duties are being fulfihled through identical wants, desires and intentions (Beauchamp and
Childress 1983: 105). Most importantly conceming end-of-life issues, some daim that
double effect reasoning is too restrictive:
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[For example,] there are instances of morally justified fetal deaths in
addition to those admitted by the restrictive principle of double effect.
[AndJ regarding death and dying in general, few would dispute the moral
justification for the cases of hastening death by relieving pain and inducing
sleep that can be brought under the principle of double effect, but the
principle simply fails to resolve most of the difficuit cases ... (Beaucharnp
and Chuldress 1983: 104).
Although in the first two editions, no connections are made between double effect
reasoning and Beauchamp and Childress’ principle of nonmalificence, we can speculate
that perhaps the uneasy juxtaposition of the two entities constitutes an example of their
initial stnct division between metaethical and normative ethical approaches (Beaucharnp
and Childress 1983: 8-9), but at the same time, an example ofthe growing conflict between
methodologies that becomes more explicit and gains momentum as we progress ftom the
third edition to the fiflh. In the third edition, Beauchamp and Childress acknowÏedge that
the methodological conilict itself underlies many moral dilemmas: “Many situations
invoive moral dilemmas created by conflicting moral principles that generate conflicring
demands” (Beauchamp and Childress 1929: 5). Also in the third edition, we find the
authors’ scepticism regarding both the ability of theories to justify moral judgments and the
superiority of any one theory. For example, “whether ethical theory can supply the needed
forms of justification is a difficuit problem that we will need to investigate” (Beauchamp
and Childress 1989: 9). Although the universalizability of theones is usually invoked to
supply justifications, even the notion of universalizability cornes under lire:
“Umversalizability makes a formai point about the iogic of moral j udgment: A moral
judgmenf must, for any person who accepts the judgment, apply to ah relevantly similar
circumstances. The pnncipie itself does flot say, however, what is to count as a relevantly
similar circumstance (or whether there are reievantly similar circumstances)” (Beauchamp
and Childress 1989: 19). Finally, Beauchamp and Childress corne to these conclusions:
“Each of our most celebrated types of ethical theory lias made a substantial contribution to
our understanding of ethics, but none has successfully shown that it alone presents a valid
and complete system ... Each type of theory offers an important moral perspective from
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which we stand to leam, and there is no reason why only one type of theory must be
selected as pre-eminent” (Beauchamp and Childress 1989: 46-47).
In light of these conclusions, we are flot surprised to discover that in the fourth and
fifth editions, Beauchamp and Childress ultimately recommend “convergence across
theories” (Beauchamp and Childress 1994: 109 ff.), and their own “coherence theorv”
(Beauchamp and Childress 2001: 397 ff), inspired by Rawis’ reflective equilibrium, and
operationalized pnmarily by means of the notion of specification, that is, “a process of
reducing the indeterminateness of abstract norms and providing them with action-guiding
content” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001: 16). In this model of coherence theory, “no
level or type of moral reasoning
... has priority ... Moral justification proceeds from an
expansive coherentist ftamwork of norms that originate at ail ‘levels’
... In everyday
moral reasoning, we effortlessly blend appeals to principles, rules, rights, virtues, passions,
analogies, paradigms, narratives, and parables. We should be able to do the same in
biomedical ethics ... The more general (principles, mies, theones, etc.) and the more
particular (case judgments, feelings, perceptions,
... parables, etc.) are integrally linked in
our moral thinking, and neither shouid have pride of place” (Beauchamp and Childress
2001: 408). For our purposes, what is important is flot so much the details ofthis model of
coherence, but how double effect reasomng has been interpreted within the context of this
model.
Most importantly, we discover that in the fourth and fiflh editions, double effect
reasoning is explicitly defined as one specification of Beauchamp and Childress’ principle
of nonmalificence (Beauchamp and Childress 1994: 206; 2001: 128). As they explain in
the fifth edition, “without further specification, ‘do not harm’ is an all-too-bare starting
point for thinking through problems, such as assisted suicide and euthanasia. It will flot
adequately guide action when norms conflict” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001: 16).
Interestingly enough, insofar as it specifies ‘do flot harm’, Beauchamp and Childress’
portraya fdouble effect reasoning from the third to the fifth edition includes an emergent
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ernphasis on the importance of motivation, character and virtues, elements that are also part
of an ethical theory (i.e., Character Ethics) that makes its own contribution to the coherence
approacli to biomedical ethics represented in the fourth and fifth editions. In the third,
fourth and fifih editions, the presentations of double effect reasoning are essentially the
same. Two types of problems are identified related to the reasoning’s connection with
action: “conceptual and theoretical issues about the nature of acting (or omitting)
intentionally and about what counts as an intended effect, and [secondly] moral problems
about whether the principle of double effect correctly locates a morally relevant difference
between actions or effects of actions” (Beauchamp and Childress 1989: 130). Because of
these types of problems, Beauchamp and Childress suggest that double effect reasoning
should be transformed into a framework that emphasizes the character and motives of
agents rather than actions and effects of actions. They also persist in their view that the
intentional causing of death is sometimes justified:
Although the pnnciple of double effect is fashioned for the discussion of
actions and the effects of actions, it would perhaps be a better pnnciple if it
were reconstructed as an account of the motives of agents. We would, on
this account, rightly evaluate the following two physicians quite differently.
(1) Physician A lets a chronically ili, debilitated patient die out of frustration
with the patient and the patient’s family. (2) Physician B lets an identically
situated chromcally il!, debilitated patient die out of mercy and at the request
of the patient and family. Both physician A and physician B intend to let the
patient die and use the same merciful means. Stiil, the different desires,
goals, and motives of the two agents entai! different evaluations of them. In
the final analysis, the moral theory proposed by adherents of double effect
seems to us sound in spint but misplaced. One’s motives in bnnging about a
consequence do make a significant difference in moral evaluation, but this is
not because one either intends or does flot intend the outcome. Regarding
the care of patients, few would dispute the conclusions reached by adherents
of double effect about the justifiability of hastening death by relieving pain
and inducing sleep in some circumstances. But the pnnciple fails to resolve
many of the difficuit cases and cannot do a!l the moral work that must be
done. As we argue below, some actions that intentionally and directly result
in death are justifiable ... In many cases, especially those of patients who
wish to die, the proper moral question is flot whether a patient’s death is
intended as an end or as a means but whether the conditions are sufficient to
65
justify an intentional act of causing death -- an answer that cannot be
forthcorning from the principle of double effect (Beauchamp and Childress
1989: 133-134) (Beauchampand Childress 1994: 210 2001: 132).
fi-om their maintenance in the first two editions of a strict division between metaethics and
noniiative ethics, and a clear preference for normative ethics. Beaucharnp and Childress
increasingly corne fuil-circle in the third, fourth and fifih editions, to advocate a coherence
between approaches, including those focused on character, vii-tues and motivation.
Ironically, insofar as their interpretation of double effect reasoning also incorporates this
ernphasis in the sarne three editions, their interpretatïon cornes doser to the original virtues
based context of double effect reasoning. However, as we shah discover in the second
chapter, the relationship between double effect reasoning and elements such as character,
virtues and motivation is subject to significant conflicts of interpretation.
1.6. Conclusion: The Manv ‘Faces’ of Double Effect Reasoning
If we review what has been leamed up to this point, we recali that the opening case
study reveals the difficulty of distinguishing between ‘terniinal sedation’ and euthanasia
insofar as there is a tension between reliance on double effect reasoning and the physician’s
empirical approach reliant upon connections between desired effects and dosages. This
tension is, in fact, a microcosm of the conflicts found in the clinical literature. In that
literature, we find that there is no consensus about the definition of ‘terminal sedation’.
Some definitions stress the empincal aspects of the practice, whereas others emphasize
idealist/universali st/norrnative aspects. As Jackson indicated, the linguistic ambiguity
surrounding the definitions is only a symptom of the underlying moral ambiguity (Jackson
2002). ‘TerminaI sedation’ for existential suffenng presents special definitional problems
because even the establishment of existential suffenng as a refractory symptom presents a
significant challenge, flot to mention the greater challenge of coming to some consensus
about idealist or normative aspects ofthis use of ‘terminal sedation’. Regarding the use of
double effect reasoning to distinguish between terrnina1 sedation’ and euthanasia, the first
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condition is extremely problematic because it presumes universally applicable notions of
‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘neutral’, and there is no consensus regarding the existence of such
universals, their defrnition if they do exjst, and the idea that priority should be given to
universals over the particularities of specific cases. The fact that the universals within
double effect reasoning have their origin in a religious tradition raises the urgent question
of how matters of particular belief, pluralism and public policy should be related.
Intention is another thorny issue. As the clinical literature revealed, there is no
consensus regarding a defimtion of intention, and there is significant tension between
‘intention’ as a universally applicable concept (i.e., ‘intention’ as a ‘clear and distinct’
idea), and the muddy reality of intentions as held by particular persons within particular
situations. for many physicians, the application of ‘intention’ within double effect
reasoning into medical practice creates “cross-culturaÏ dissonance,” which divides
physicians along the lines of those who accept the philosophical notion of ‘intention’ and
those who think in ternis of measurable cause and effect relationships. These difficulties
make the possibility of distinguishing between what is foreseen and what is intended an
even greater challenge, and the likelihood of deception (i.e., self deception and decepflon of
others) is a central worry. The third and fourth conditions create similar problems in the
climcal context. Regarding the third condition, there is a conflict between the
conceptualization of means and ends, and the fact that in many cases of ‘terminal sedation’,
it is impossible to verify that the end (i.e., the patient’s death) was not the means to the
good effect (i.e., pain relief). Moreover, for some, the intentional withdrawal/withholding
of artificial nutrition and hydration makes the assertion of this venfication disingenuous to
say the least. finally, the fourth condition concerning proportionality creates many
problems. Although it is increasingly relied upon because of the difficulties involved in the
first three conditions, there is no consensus about a definition of proportionality, and the
sources reveal a division between the notion of proportionate reason, the comparison of
outcomes or effects, and means/end proportion, or the titration of dosages to achieve
desired effects.
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The use of double effect reasoning is just as controversial in the legal/public policy
context. Quite apart from the use of double effect reasoning, although the concept of intent
or mens rea is a central pillar ofthe English common-law tradition, it is a pillar surrounded
by chaos and ‘the variety, disparity and confusion’ ofjudicial definitions of ‘the requisite
but elusive mental element’. In case law, reliance on double effect reasoning lias been
important because in Canada, for example, the Crïminal Code does not distinguish between
culpable homicide and palliative care pain control measures such as ‘terminal sedation’.
However, as illustrated by the Canadian Rodrigue: case, and the American Gtucksberg and
Vacco y. QuiÏÏ cases, aithougli the mai ority positions relied upon the foresight/intention
distinction contained within double effect reasoning, the majority judges themselves
acknowledged that there are difficulties associated with this distinction on the empirical or
factual level. In particular, Justice Rehnquist seemingly acknowledged the intractability of
this idealist/empincist conflict in his assertion that ‘in the absence of omniscience, the State
is entitled to act on the reasonableness of the distinction’. In the US context, although the
Constitutional issues trumped the need for the judges to reach consensus regarding use of
double effect reasomng and in particular, the foresight/intention distinction, legal
commentators agree that this distinction is quite controversial and will require resolution.
On the one hand, we have the judges’ reliance on double effect reasoning, supported largely
by the weight ofprecedents and fear of ‘the slippery siope’. On the other hand, we have the
commentators’ view that intent and the foresightlintention distinction is too ‘fictitious’,
‘subtie’, ‘debatable’, ‘fragile’, ‘ephemeral’ and ‘indeterminate’ to prevail. Not unlike the
situation descnbed in the clinical literature, the legal/public policy literature reveals a
tendency to decrease reliance upon the problematic notion of intent and the
foresight!intention distinction, ami to increase reliance upon the recklessness calculus or the
proportionality between anticipated risks and their justification. However, flot unlike the
situation in the clinical context, there is no consensus regarding the definition of
proportionality among legal commentators.
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Law professors Burt and Wolf were disturbed by the extent of the judges’
disagreement and by their inability to discuss that disagreement openly. Professor Wolf s
analysis suggested an important reason for both the judges’ disagreements and their
communication problems, namely, the underlying influence of a difficuit paradigm shift
between two vastly different epistemologies
-- the Cartesian ghost in the machine’ and
pragmatism. As revealed in section 1.5., the struggie between these paradigms has also
affected the use of double effect reasoning within Catholic moral theology and within
philosophy/philosophical bioethics. Within Catholic moral theology, doubLe effect
reasoning has been used within competing contexts, most importantly, forms of
physicalism that have bound the elements of double effect reasoning (e.g., intention) to
universalized and mechanized physical sequences, and types of personaÏism that have freed
elements of double effect reasoning (e.g., proportionality and notions of ‘good’ and ‘evil’)
to operate in tandem with a more contemporary theological anthropologv that honours the
human, acting person subject to constant change and contestations. Within ail of these
competing contexts, the contemporary relevance of, and if relevant, the appropriate
articulation ofthe virtues-based context of double effect reasoning is stili an open question,
and a major source of disagreernent. Within phulosophy and philosophical bioethics, the
paradigm struggie has taken the form of an uneasy relationship between rnetaethics and
normative ethics. Within the five editions of Beaucharnp and Chuldress’, Principles of
Biornedical Ethics, we find evidence of this uneasy relationship within their changing
interpretations of double effect reasoning. In the early editions, this reasoning is sidelined
and isolated as a primarily Catholic and largely metaethical principle. Within the last three
editions, double effect reasoning is increasingly incorporated within the authors’ attempt to
achieve coherence between ail ethical theories, and to emphasize metaethical dimensions
such as character, virtues and motivation.
Although, as Berkman has correctly suggested, the current controversy surrounding
double effect reasoning represents an “epistemological crisis,” there is need for caution
conceming the terni crisis’ lest anyone read into it any kind of negative coimotation, and
69
lest its ongoing inevitability is flot made clear. In the absence of omniscience, to use the
words of Justice Rehnquist, or in the absence of absolute knowledge, to use the words of
Paul Ricoeur, the literature surveyed in this chapter presents us with an opportunity
-- the
opportunity of interpreting the vanous ‘faces’ of double effect reasomng to effect in this
case, better distinctions between ‘terminal sedation’ and euthanasia. To make this
opporturnty even more specific, and to reveal the scope of the cnsis within the Catholic
tradition itself, we will in the next chapter, examine in-depth five different ‘faces’ of double
effect reasoning, which reflect both the full spectrum of competing epistemologies, and
more examples of ail the problems that have been discussed in this chapter.
fhornas A qunias hirnse/jwrote this !erribly Iogicat, ,-aiional 5’,,mma Theologica, anti al ihe eiicÏ of lus Iife tic
said, Ei’eiythiig lie written seeins Ic) me like emptv ,rlrrnr compared 10 whal I ‘ie seen. Then hisfi)tloweI5
lake tip ihe system, repeat the whole ralionahzaiio,, anti conception, anti lose this undersianding ‘(Grifiïths
1986: 169).
Chipter 2. Confticts oflnterpretation in the Catholic
Context
2.1. Introduction
Outside of the Cathotic context, double effect reasoning is often portrayed as a
Catholic principle, as though there was only one interpretation of it within Catholicism.
However, as indicated in the previous chapter, there are many ‘faces’ of double effect
reasoning even within the Catholic tradition. In other words, the conflicts of interpretation
surrounding use of double effect reasoning within Catholicism are just as vast, if flot more
immense, than those found outside of Catholicism. In order to achieve the goal of
revealing the scope of these conflicts among Catholic scholars, we witl in this chapter,
survey the work offive scholars in this order: Canadian philosopher, Joseph Boyle (1942-
), American franciscan philosopher and physician, Daniel Sulmasy (1956-), Arnerican
Jesuit theologian, Richard McConTlick (1922-2000); British philosopher Elizabeth
Anscombe (1919-2001); and American philosopher and medievalist, Christopher Kaczor
(1969-). As we will discover, there is an intimate reiationship between these thinkers’
interpretations of double effect reasoning and their primary contexts
-- Boyle as a logician,
Sulmasy as a medical doctor, McCormick as a personalist moral theologian, Anscombe as
an Aristotelian, deeply rooted in Aristotle’s account of practical reason, and Kaczor as a
Thomist, steeped in Thomistic metaphysics. As already indicated, most of these thinkers
have had significant experience paflicipating in dialogue about double effect reasoning
outside of the Catholic context, and as we will discover, their work is clearÏy marked by
this dialogue. Although only three of these thinkers, Sulmasy, Kaczor, and Boyle, have
used double effect reasoning in the specific case of ‘terminal sedation’, we can in relation
to the other thinkers, extrapolate how they might make the ‘tenTiinal sedation’ versus
euthanasia distinction on the basis of their use of double effect reasoning to distinguish
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between euthanasia and pain control in general. Although a thesis could be written on the
work of each of these thinkers, only their analyses of double effect reasoning will be used
along with the materials that are necessary to provide an adequate context for their
analyses. These authors’ analyses of double effect reasoning in the ‘just war’ context will
flot be used with the exception of Anscombe’s work because World War II provided the
primary impetus for her analyses of intention and other aspects of double effect reasomng.
2.2. The Interpretation of Josepli M. Boyle
In his Ph.D. thesis entitled, The Argument From Seif-Referential Consistency: The
Current Discussion (Boyle 1969), Boyle demonstrates the way in which seif-referential or
seif-refuting arguments “can terminate philosophical disagreements because {they] can
show definitively that certain staternents are false” (Boyle 1969: 4). In a subsequent article,
Determinism, Freedom, and Self-ReferentiaÏ Arguments, Boyle, his thesis director,
Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen critique several deficient seif-referential arguments
against determinism in an effort to articulate a more cogent argument and thus, to
demonstrate that “determinism is untenable” (Boyle 1972: 4). Since use of double effect
reasomng presumes that human beings have free choice and are flot determined, Boyle’s
subsequent work on double effect reasoning constitutes wittingly or unwittingly a sustained
effort to defend many implications of his and bis colleagues’ work on free choice.
However, the grave dilemmas unfolding within the clinical context would expand and
challenge Boyle’s thinking on free choice and its expression in the use of double effect
reasoning.
Approximately one year after Boyle completed bis doctoral thesis, “some Down
Syndrome babies were boni [at Johns Hopkins Hospital in BaltimoreJ with defects
incompatible with life” (Pence 1990: 137). In one case involving a child boni with Down
Syndrome as well as a surgically correctable defect (i.e., “duodenal atresia - a blockage
between the higher duodenum and the lower stomach - which prevented passage of food
72
and water” (Pence 1990: 137)), the parents refused to consent to the proposed surgery and
elected instead to allow the child to die of starvation. Although the parents’ wishes were
honoured without any court action, thïs apparent case of ‘letting die’ as opposed to ‘killing’
provoked widespread debate regarding the question of whether the parents’ refusai of
treatment should have been honoured, and the issue of whether the ‘letting die’ versus
‘killing’ distinction camed any moral weight. Regarding the latter issue, several prominent
American philosophers (e.g., Jonathan Bennett, Judfth Jarvis Thomson, Michael Tooley
and James Rachels) argued that the distinction did not carry any moral weight. Responding
to these philosophers’ critique, Boyle held that although the Johns Hopkins case was a clear
example of “cases of letting die in which the death ought to have been prevented” (Boyle
1 977b: 437), the moral significance of the ‘letting die’ versus ‘killing’ distinction was
equally clear. Boyle’s “moral significance thesis” (Boyle 1977b: 433) includes two central
elernents. Firstly, lie says: “I take the distinction between killing and letting die to be
roughly a difference in causal structure. One kilis another if lie [deliberatelyJ does
something which [directly in a causal senseJ brings about the death of another. One lets
another die when he does not do something which, if done, would have prevented the
other’s death” (Boyle 1977b: 433). The second essential part ofBoyle’s thesis involves the
important role of intention. In other words, “Deciding to kïll someone involves intending
the person’s death. Some cases of letting die also involved this intention” (Boyle 1 977b:
439). At this early stage in the development of Boyle’s thought, he more or less simply
asserts that there is a distinction between foresight and intention, and he associates intention
with the concept of a plan of action. In other words, regarding the Johns Hopkins case,
Boyle says, “whatever the motives and ends of the agents were, the plan of action set forth
by them involved the state of affairs of the child’s being dead as an essential ingredient”
(Boyle 1977b: 439) (see also finnis, Grisez, and Boyle 2001: 37).
Boyle’s focus on intention expanded and deepened in lis responses to positions
taken by American philosopher, Rodenck Chisholm, and Bntish philosopher H.LA. Hart.
As recorded in chapter one, we may recail that the foresight/intention distinction is
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sometimes countered by the idea that we intend every consequence that we foresee. As
Boyle and Sullivan explain, this idea was first held by the British utilitanan, Henry
Sidgwick (1838-1900), and later expressed as, “the diffusiveness of intention pnnciple” by
Chishoim (Boyle and Sullivan 1977: 357). Although this principle holds in many cases,
Boyle and Sullivan argue that there are situations when it does flot, for example, when one
foresees a consequence opposed to one’s intention or purpose, and one struggies actively
and forcefully against that consequence. In this case, Boyle and Sullivan conclude that
“that consequence can hardly be construed as a part of one’s intention,” and “therefore, that
major emendations of the diffusivesness principle are in order” (Boyle and Sullivan 1977:
359).
In DoubÏe-Effect and a Certain Type of fmbiyotomy (Boyle 1977a), Boyle’s
development of his notion of intention occurs specifically within the context of double
effect reasoning, and his position is a reaction to Hart’s daim that this reasomng lias been
used inconsistently, i.e., that in relation to flvo cases considered by Hart to be analogous
(the classic hysterectomy case and tlie embryotomy/cramotomy case), double effect
reasomng has been used in Catholic teaching to justify the first but flot the second. Boyle
notes tliat the second case involves the rare obstetrical situation “which arises if a woman is
in labor but cannot deliver the child because it cannot pass through her pelvic cavity. If the
labor is flot terminated the woman will surely die” (Boyle 1977a: 304). Boyle is
considering only an embryotomy/craniotomy whereby tlie fetus’ “skull is perforated [and]
its contents [are] emptied” before delivery (Boyle 1977a: footnote #6: 316), as opposed to a
“case in which the skull of the fetus is crushed or its body dismembered” (Boyle 1 977a:
304). Regarding double effect reasomng, Boyle’s point of departure is his own translation
of Gury’s 1869 version: “It is licit to posit a cause which is either good or indifferent from
whicli there follows a twofold effect -- one good [which must follow immediately ftom the
cause], tlie other evil
-- if a proportionately grave reason is present, and if the end of the
agent is upnght -- that is, if he does not intend the evil effect” (Boyle 1977a: 303).
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Although Hart supposes that the two cases have been judged differently because of
an assumptÏon that the death of the fetus is inevitably connected with the
embiyotomy/craniotomy case, Boyle argues that the inevitability of the fetus’ death is flot
the determining factor in either the hysterectomy or the embryotomy!craniotomy case, and
that both cases can in fact, be justified by double effect reasoning. Instead of inevitability,
Boyle daims that “what counts is [the place of effects] in the means/end sequence and
[theirj relation to the intention ofthe agent” (Boyle 1977a: 305). Boyle also adopts Hart’s
own suggestion of a foresightlintention distinction wherein intention is defined in purely
conceptual or logical terms. In Hart’s words, “a foreseen but unwanted outcome will be
taken to be intended if it is of a kind so immediately and ïnvariably connected with action
of the kind done that the connexion is regarded as conceptual rather than contingent”
(Boyle I 977a: 305). Boyle’ s argument for the justification of the embryotomy/craniotomy
case in terms of double effect reasoning is ultimately his “reconstruction” of Hart’s
argument as follows (Boyle 1977a: 306) (see also Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle 2001: 27):
(1) ta) If an effect [e.g., death of a fetusJ of one’s intended act
[embryotomy/craniotomy] is related to this act in a non-conceptual [or
contingent] way, and (b) if this effect is flot the means to one’s end [saving
the mother’s life] or itself the end of one’s act, then (c) one need flot intend
this effect and the bnnging about ofthis effect ïs indirect.
(2) The death of the fetus in the craniotomy case is not conceptually related
to the crushing of the fetus’s skull [i.e., “it seems to be ÏogicaÏlv possible
that the craniotomy be performed and the fetus flot be killed” (Boyle 1977a:
30$)].
(3) The death of the fetus in the craniotomy case is flot the means to the
agent’s end of saving the mother’s life nor is it the agent’s end [i.e., the
lethal effect of the craniotomy follows indirectly in a causal sense ftom the
minimum required to save the woman’s life (Boyle 1977a: 311)].
(4) The killing of the fetus in the cramotomy case is not a case of direct
killing.
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Among the three articles examined thus far, only the embryotomy/craniotomy
article includes a reference to the Thomistic ongin of double effect reasoning. By contrast,
Prueter Intentionem in Aquinas (Boyle 1978) and the works that follow it exemplify
Boyle’s study of Aquinas’s work and increasingly explicit elements of what Boyle will
eventually cali “the broadly Thomist theory I prefer” (Boyle 1991a: 565). In Praeter
Intentionem, Boyle considers two pnmary questions: “1) Is it possible to distinguish
between what the agent intends in acting and what he foresees will follow from lis acting
but does flot intend? And 2) If we can make such a distinction, where is it to be drawn?
What components ... are such that they can be outside [i.e., praeter] one’s intention?”
(Boyle 1978: 650). Based on his study of Aquinas’ work, Boyle concludes that it is indeed
possible to distinguish between foresight and intention, and that this distinction should be
made as follows:
In short what is neither ordered [i.e., as a means] to the intended end nor a
part of the good which specifies this order does flot fa!! within the intention.
The causal consequences, like many other properties [i.e., “concomitants
and non-essential properties” (Boyle 1978: 665)] do flot meet either ofthese
conditions (Boyle 1978: 664).
In the above citation, “the good which specifies” needs further specification, and
this Boyle begins in Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect (Boyle 1980)
and The Principle of Double Effect: Good Actions Entangled in Evit (Boyle I 9$4b). In
these two articles, Boyle distances himself from what he defines as the weaker, causal sense
of “voluntary” (e.g., as upheld by Alan Donagan whose work has influenced Sulmasy). For
example, Boyle says that “it is flot the performance as a willing causal initiative, together
with some set of the effects ... which is primarÏly voluntary or the primaiy subject of moral
evaluation” (Boyle 1980: 535). Accordingly, although “the bnnging about ofthe foreseen
effects of one’s performances” is voluntaiy, it is to be distinguished from “the way in which
the execution of choices -- regarded as such -- are voluntary” (Boyle 1980: 535). Wbat is
the basis for this distinction? Boyle says that aÏthough “the foreseen consequences of one’s
bringing about an intended state of affairs are ofien considered in deliberating, ... they are
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sometimes conditions in spite of which one acts ... it is flot these effects to which one is
committed in acting” (Boyle 1980: 535). In addition, Boyle argues that one has an
“entirely different” attitude toward foreseen consequences: “These consequences need not
be seen as good or as desirable; ... in many cases the agent would avoid them if he could.
They are not a part ofwhat one chooses to bring about” (Boyle 1980: 535-536).
The choices with which Boyle is primarily concemed are the “seif-constituting” or
“soul-making choices” of the heart by which one contributes to the “personal and
interpersonal fabric” of the kingdom of God (Boyle 1984b: 248-251). from this
perspective, “voluntarily accepting side effects is not self constituting in the way that
intending and choosing are ... In freely choosing to do something a person determines
himself or herseif to be a certain kind of person” (Boyle 1 984b: 251) (see also finni s,
Grisez, and Boyle 2001: 1-2). for Boyle, double effect reasoning is thus a means whereby
one can align oneself through one’s actions with absolute goods constitutive of the
kingdom. In this sense, the conditions of double effect reasomng “constitute a basis for the
justification of actions having evil effects: such actions are flot themselves evil in kind
[emphasis mine] and there is grave reason for performing them” (Boyle 1980: 531). From
Boyle’s perspective, double effect reasoning is also a way “to separate the morally
significant features of human actions from common sense descriptions of actions --
descriptions which ofien obscure and fail to reveal what one chooses and intends” (Boyle
1984b: 253). Thus, for Boyle, the flrst and second conditions of the so-called pnnciple of
double effect (i.e., that the proposed act be good or neutral in kind, and that one intend only
the good) are the most important conditions. The third condition regarding causality is of
less importance because “the causal sequence of the effects is [flot] itself morally
significant” (Boyle 1980). Likewise, the fourth condition regarding proportionality “is
brought into play only after the other conditions by which we have clarified the essential
moral nature of the act in question and determÏned that the intentions involved are flot set
on evil” (Boyle 1984b: 257). In taking this stand on proportionality, Boyle places himself
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in stark opposition to the proportionalist approach to double effect reasoning (e.g., the work
of Richard McCormick). Boyle expresses his opposition as follows:
Proportionalist reinterpretations
... propose as a reinterpretation or
replacement of double effect, [an approach thatj is, in fact, contraiy to its
spirit and specific provisions. Proportionalism is an approach to moral
decision-making according to which one’s moral obligation is to choose the
greater good, or the lesser evil. The judgments which determine moral
obligation are comparative value judgments
-- that is, they are judgments
which state that doing A is the lesser evil rather than doïng B. Such
judgments suppose that the values at stake can be ascertained and compared
or weighed against one another
... It is possible, of course, simply to replace
double effect with proportionalism. And I think it is flot a falsification ofthe
issue to say that this is what the proportionalist reinterpretations amount to
The double effect approach [i.e., Boyle’s approach] does flot compromise
the moral absolutes which form the bedrock of Catholic moral teaching.
Rather, it helps us to grasp, and precisely apply the relevant absolute norm.
This contrasts with the proportionalist approach which allows exceptions to
traditional moral absolutes ... if making the exception should prove the
lesser evil ... The proportionalist notion of lesser evil, however, is beset
with analytical difficulties. Ever since the time of Jeremy Bentham,
philosophers have been asking: where is the scale of values needed to make
the companson of values we must make to determine the greater good or
lesser evil? Neither human expenence nor philosophical construction have
provided one (Boyle 1984b: 255-257).
Boyle’s stance also places him pnmanly in opposition to the use of double effect
reasoning within the broader community of philosophers outside of the Catholic tradition.
In Who is EntitÏed to Double Effect?, Boyle re-iterates that “double effect is justified and
necessary” in association with “the traditïonal Catholic conviction that there are
exceptionless norms prohibiting inflicting some kinds of hanns on people” (Boyle 199 lb:
475). In Further Thoughts on Double Effect: Some Pretiminary Responses, Boyle
emphasizes that double effect reasoning “Jimits [the extent of such prohibitionsJ to
intentional harming” (Boyle 199 la: 567). Regarding those who reject his absolutist
interpretation of double effect reasoning, he says that “those who reject it as superfluous
have no specific objection to [double effect reasoning] but a normative disagreement with
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the absolutism ofthe Catholic tradition” (Boyle 1991b: 477). For Boyle, the main problem
with non-absolutist versions of double effect reasoning is that although they “[captureJ pre
philosophical intuitions which are shared by many people” (Boyle 1991b: 480), their
justifications “do no more than elaborate the intuitive appeal which striking examples
illustrate” (Boyle 1991b: 481). Boyle cites the work of American philosopher Thomas
Nagel as an example of an interpretation of double effect reasomng that lacks justification
or authority. The problem is that althougli Nagel assumes that double effect reasoning is
justified “from the agent relative perspective,” Nage! “provides no argument for that
assumption, beyond the phenomenology [emphasis mine] which elaborates common
intuitions about the difference between harms one intends and harms one bnngs about as
side effects” (Boyle 1991b: 482) (Boyle 1991a: 567).
Boyle is not a fan of common intuitions, and herein lies the key to his framing of the
relationship between ‘universals’ and ‘particu!ars’ in general, and in the context of double
effect reasoning. One of the constant themes in his work is the debate concerrnng non
cognitivism or voluntarism (originating in Hume’s work) versus Boyle’s own view
-- a type
ofcognitivism or non-voluntarism (e.g., Boy!e 1975, 1982, 1989, 199$b, 2001). If we take
Boyle’s encounter with R. M. Hare’s non-cognitivism as an examp!e of the !arger debate,
whereas “the establishing of moral standards is, according to Hare, a function of ouï
freedom; [i.e.,] we choose [emphasis mine] to make certain standards the basis for guiding
our actions” (Boyle 1975: 84), the estab!ishing of moral standards is, according to Boyle, a
function of”a kind ofobjectivity”; i.e., “eva!uativejudgments can be true or false; they do
not depend on choices for their meamng or truth” (Boyle 1975: 92). In two key articles on
moral reasoning (Boyle 1984a, 1986), we find the central elements ofBoyle’s cognitivism.
For Boyle, “moral reasomng seems to be pnmanly a cognitive activity”; “it is possible to
identify moral reasoning that is correct and mature”; and “it is possible to disengage an
objective cognitive procedure from one’s pnvate moral convictions” (Boy!e 1986: 165-
177).
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What is this “objective cognitive procedure”? Boyle reminds us that for both
Aquinas and Kant, “rationality was of the very essence of morality” (Boyle 1986: 185).
Accordingly, Boyie’s “objective cognitive procedure” is aligned with Aquinas’ “[beliel]
that an act is moral if it is in accord with human nature, and it is in accord with human
nature if and only if it is in accord with nght reason ... [and] reason operating on the basis
of thoroughly intelligible principles” (Boyle 1986: 185). For Boyle and his coileagues
Germain Grisez and John Finnis, the first principie of morality is thus as foliows: “In
voluntanly acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to
choose and otherwise wilÏ those and onÏy those possibilities whose wiÏÏing is compatible
with integral human fufiÏment” (Finnis, Boyle, and Grisez 1999: 207) (sec also Grisez,
Boyle, and Finnis 1987: 128; Grisez 1997: 853-854)
. For these authors, basic moral
pnnciples such as this are seif-evident truths. As Boyle explains, “in saying that a
fundamental pnncipie is seif-evident, one is flot thereby saying that everyone knows it, or
wouid accept it, or even that ail those who do accept it understand it equaily weli. For the
daim of self- evidence is a daim about the logical connection [i.e., necessary and
immediateJ between the subject and predicate of a proposition” (Boyle 1984a: 41-42).
From the first pnnciple of morality, these authors have derived and developed their well
known theoiy of basic human goods, a theory that is far beyond the scope of this thesis.
More germane to this thesis is their procedure for reconciling universals and particulars, a
procedure which in the view of this author, is explained with the greatest clanty and
specificity in Boyie’s work.
As Boyle explains, “moral norms
... are universal propositions
... umversal in
logical form” (Boyle 1984a: 37). “Clearly,” Boyle says, “the iogical reiationship is one of
instantiation. for the norm indicates that an action of a certain descnbable kind [or typeJ
should or shouid flot be donc” (Boyie 1984a: 38). In the case of norms that are moral
absolutes (e.g., the absolute prohibition against intentionaily kiiling the innocent, against
aduitery, or against intercourse using artificial contraception (Boyle 1998a: 72) ), “then the
move ftom norm to judgment is straighfforward
... [i.e.,J if a concrete action is known to
80
have whatever features are needed to make it an act of a kind aiways prohibited, mie knows
one may flot morally undertake the action” (Boyle 1984a: 38). By contrast, when one
attempts to apply absolute norms in new, ambiguous situations, or in the case of non
absolute norms (i.e., many, if flot most norms), the relationship between the norm, as a
universai proposition, and “the [singular or particular] judgment of what one ought
concretely to do” (Boyle 1986: 169) in a given situation is extremely complex and often
probiematic. In order “to close the gap between norm and singular judgment one must
determine that ail the moratly relevant features of the proposed act have been considered”
(Boyle 1986: 169) (see also Boyle 1984a: 39-40). Along with the virtue of prudence,
specificatoiy premises are necessary to achieve this closure. As Boyle explains:
Specificatory premises are universal propositions in which a kind of act is
judged to have or to lack some feature which, according to the normative
premise in the argument, is morally relevant. Specificatoiy premises seem
to be necessary truths; the daim they make is that the kind of act in
question, as a kind of act, lias or does flot have the morally relevant feature.
This kind of connection seems to be a conceptuai one: there is something
about the act in question which requires that it have or not have the feature
in question. And, as Donagan suggests, this connection is established by
informal conceptuai clarification, which seems to be like the procedures
used in traditional casuistry (Boyle 1984a: 43).
Exampies of specificatory premises include the Golden Rule (Boyle 1986: 186-
187), the modes of responsibility that specify the basic human goods (Boyle 1986: 186)
(see also Grisez 1983: 225-226), and most important for our purposes
-- double effect
reasoning. As Boyle explains, specificatory premises such as these permit us to go beyond
ifie Kantian concem for non-contradiction and explore important “non-Kantian questions,”
for instance, “are the values that are ordinaniy at stake in, for example, a decision to lie,
aiways at stake in such decisions? If not, then there will be cases when the moral meaning
ofthe act wiil be different. In these cases, one need not be ‘piaying favorites’ or making an
unjustified exception in one’s favor” (Boyle 1986: 187). These “non-Kantian questions”
are extremely important because they facilitate comprehensive moral reflection, even in the
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face of the most difficuit cases, or what Boyle cails, situations of” ‘moral impossibility’,
that is, [situations] in which one lacks the capacity to prevent the harmful side effect from
occumng” (Boyle 1991b: 489). Boyle organizes situations of moral impossibility into
three types: (1) deflection cases wherein one can deflect the hanu, but flot prevent it (e.g.,
the craniotomy case); (2) cases wherein one can save some from harm at the pnce of lening
harm fail on others (e.g., allocation of scarce medical resources); and (3) ‘no-win’
situations (e.g., building highways and pain control situations in which the required
analgesics “will probably shorten the patient’s life”) (Boyle 199 lb: 489-491). Regarding
‘no-win’ situations, such as building highways and difficuh pain control cases, Boyle says:
In both cases the side effects oftaking the action will include the probability
of death, but the side effects of the alternatives are also bad, and indeed
include some which it is plausible to think would be absolutely
impennissible to inflict intentionally. So there remains here a situation in
which, whatever one does, harms will occur which it would be absolutely
wrong to bnng about intentionally, and so a pair of norms [e.g., ‘do not kiil’
and ‘control pain’] each of which excluded absolutely bnnging about the
side effects ofeach alternative would be impossible to follow (Boyle 199 lb:
491-492).
from Boyle’s perspective, double effect reasoning represents a mechamsm whereby
basic normative principles (e.g., the prohibition against intentionally killing innocent
persons) can be specified non-arbitranly vis-à-vis “the morally relevant features of a
proposed human act -- namely, the goods at stake in the act and the voluntary relationship a
person establishes toward them” (Boyle 1986: 189). Most importantly, “unless the
voluntary character of the acts in question and the goods at stake in decisions involving
such acts are clarified, there wilI be no way to distinguish [emphasis mineJ, for example,
between suicide and martyrdom, or between passive euthanasia and reasonable withholding
of life saving treatment” (Boyle 1986: 190), or (by extrapolation) between euthanasia and
terminal sedation. “for in both of these pairs of acts, there is no necessaiy difference in the
behavior involved, but only a difference in the way death is willed” (Boyle 1986: 190-191).
The difference in the way death is willed also has a beanng on one’s moral self As Boyle
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explains, “The point is that the voluntariness of accepting consequences is flot
determinative ofone’s moral self in the way one’s ftee choices are” (Boyle 1986: 192).
Boyle does flot underestimate the problems involved in the use of double effect
reasoning as an ensemble of specificatory premises. for example, use of double effect
reasoning sometimes prevents the clanty that its use is designed to provide conceming
morally relevant features. “In particular,” Boyle says, “there is a tendency to regard human
actions too behavioristically, and to ignore the kind of voluntariness that is involved in the
action [with the resuit that] it ïs often very difficuit to discem a rationai connection between
action so charactenzed and any morally relevant predicate” (Boyle I 984a: 48). In addition,
Boyle cites Donagan’s point that” ‘different thinkers do flot agree about what is seriousiy
disputable” (Boyle 1984a: 42), or what needs to be specified more precisely. At one level,
attempts to make what is perceived to be exceptions to general prohibitions, for instance,
against kiiling, can quickly polanze and alienate people. At another level, there are
“substantive questions about the justification and priority of general moral norms”
themselves (Boyle 1986: 170).
Regarding these substantive questions, there is a need to re-visit Boyle’s framing of
the question of ‘universals’ and ‘particulars’ in terms of his version of the debate between
cognitivism and non-cognitivism or voluntansm. In Boyle’s, Natural Law and the Ethics
of Traditions (Boyle 1992), we discover the larger context ofthe ‘nature’ of the act that the
first condition of the so-called pnnciple of double effect requires one to specify. The larger
context is obviously ‘natural law’
-- “a set of universal prescriptions whose prescriptive
force is a function ofthe rationality which ail human beings share in virtue oftheir common
humanity” (Boyle 1992). Not unlike the contents of Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle’s theoiy of
basic human goods, the contents of ‘natural law’ are far beyond the scope of this thesis.
Again, however, what is most germane is the way in which ‘natural law’ as a set of
‘universais’ is understood to be connected or unconnected to ‘particuiars’, especially the
particular choices of particular persons within particular cultures and particular traditions of
Ô-3
enquiry. In Naturul Lui’ anti tÏze Ethics of Traditions. Boyle distinguishes three ways in
which traditions of enquiry are tradition-dependent, and he uses this typology to draw
conclusions about the tradition-dependence of natural law. Firstly, traditions of enquin’ are
tradition-dependent insofar as they are necessarily rooted in “elements of contingency and
partïcularity within which ail enquiry seems to take place,” for example, “language,” cthe
current state of knowledge,” and “particular questions posed by people in defimte cultural
circumstances” (Boyle 1992 5). Secondly, traditions of enquiry are tradition-dependent in
a “much stronger sense” insofar as they comprise “those engaged in an enquiry and who
recognize themselves to be developing a body of thought which pnor thinkers have
originated and developed but left incomplete, at least as far as its application to the
problems and challenges, both internaI and extemal, which the theory must deal with at any
given time” (Boyle 1992: 7). Finally, traditions of enquiry are tradition-dependent in a
“stiil stronger sense” insofar as they are “rooted in the lived ethical experience of people
who share a common way of life” (Boyle 1992: 9).
Boyle says that natural law is obviously and undeniably tradition-dependent in the
first sense of tradition-dependence on the level of language and cultural contingencies.
Certainly, tradition-dependence on this level presents problems for natural iaw because ils
“daim that its most basic prescriptions are accessible to ail (more precisely, to ail capable
of understanding their terms) may seem more difficuit to accommodate within a view in
which the cuttural contingency and particularity ofenquiry is acknowledged” (Boyle 1992:
6). Stiil, Boyle asks, “why should it be impossible that the same proposition or prescription
can be expressed in different languages or arrived at by enquiries with very different
starting-points and presuppositions” (Boyle 1992: 7)? Similarly, “why shou]d it be
impossible that two distinct propositions or prescriptions should make reference to the
same moral reality, or to realities which are integrally related and more or less weII
expressed in the distinct propositions or prescriptions” (Bovle 1992: 7)? Regarding this
type of tradition-dependence and natural Iaw, Boyle makes the following conclusion:
“Natural law theorists have surely nol developed an account for this kind of tradition
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dependence, but equally surely, they have not denied it. So, if natural law theory cannot
account for its being dependent ... [in this way], that must be because of implications of
sorne ofits key assertions which its proponents have flot drawn” (Boyle 1992: 6).
Not surprisingly, Boyle says that natural law is flot tradition-dependent in the third
sense of being rooted in the lived experience of persons sharing a common life. There are
three main premises that contribute to Boyle’s view. Firstly, he re-iterates “the daim of
natural law theory that [itsl pnnciples are known or at least [are] knowabÏe by anyone,
independently of whether one is part ofa vital moral community” (Boyle 1992: 11). Thus,
for example, one can know and uphold the principle of the sanctity of human life even if
one does flot live in a community wherein that value is upheld. Secondly, natural law has
functioned primarily withi the “largely analytical” context of casuistry, and “as such the
tradition it presupposes is the tradition of intellectual enquiry, flot a community of shared
values” (Boyle 1992: 12). Finally, virtues (especially practical wisdom or phronesis) play
an important role in natural law, but virtues are “dispositions of character” or “intrinsic
principles which give shape to moral life” (Boyle 1992: 14). Hence, the most that can be
said is that “the importance ofthe virtues within the natural law account of moral life does
not irnmediately settle the extent to which, on natural law grounds, virtuous living
presupposes a comrnunity of shared values” (Boyle 1992: 14). What is settled for Boyle is
that “access to hurnan goods and other basic moral considerations cannot, on natural law
grounds, be simply a matter of expenencing them in so far as they are Iived within a
particular community and embodied in the character traits of a community’s members”
(Boyle 1992: 15). In fact, for Boyle, “the actuality of a set of values is [flot] a necessary
condition for moral knowledge” because “the actual Iived values of a given society are
frequently more or less distorted and perverse” (Boyle 1992: 16).
Paradoxically, the strongest sense in which natural law is tradition-dependent is
insofar as it is a tradition of enquiry and as such, “natural law theory is commifted to the
significant tradition independence of moral knowledge” (Boyle 1992: 15). Boyle explains
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this paradox by distinguishing the non-cognitivist or voluntanst view of practical reason
from his own cognitïvist view. Non-cognitivists or voluntansts “conceive practical reason
as based on and iimited by the values lived within a community. The grounds for moral
judgement, therefore, are flot accessible to those who do flot share the life of a community.
In a community of shared values the operative values are actual; they are flot abstract or
ideal values ...“ (Boyle 1992: 16). By contrast, Boyle’s cogrntivist view ofpractical reason
“is based on the conviction that moral norms are found among the pnnciples of practical
reasofling, and that these pnnciples are goods which ail humans know and are interested in
[According to this view,j moral norms are intelligible; they make sense and provide
reasons for action and rational motives for acting morally ...“ (Boyle 1992: 15-16).
Boyle’s view is stiil plagued by a serious credibility problem in light ofthe fact that,
as he himself acknowledges, many do flot know, are flot interested in, or are flot convinced
by the ‘universal’ goods and corresponding norms that Boyle upholds. Part of Boyle’s
uitimate response to this problem can be found in the following daim: “Recogrntion that
normative daims are based upon analyses developed from within a particular tradition of
enquiiy does flot provide a reason for thinking that these daims are not cntically
vindicated, whether or flot these daims are universal” (Boyle 1992: 9). In addition, Boyle
attempts to “account for moral diversity and disagreement” by means of three elements:
ignorance, the reality of hard cases (of which terminal sedation would presumably be a
good example), and the reality of divergent responsibilities. Regarding ignorance, Boyle
says, “natural law theory recognizes that people can be ignorant even of very basic moral
truths because ofmistakes in reasoning” (Boyle 1992: 19). Conceming hard cases that can
make application of principles extremeiy difficuit, especialiy within complex institutional
sefiings, Boyle says, “moral agreement at this level, even among those who share a
tradition of moral enquiry or a common set of values, is a considerable achievement”
(Boyle 1992: 19). Finally, there are inevitable variations “in people’s actual responsibilities
due to different vocations and opportunities, and due to the possibilities for action created
and blocked by differences in cultural and social context ... Stealing is aiways wrong [for
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exampIe, but what makes something the legitimate property of some person or group is
variable ...“ (Boyle 1992: 19). Boyle acknowledges that a more adequate response is stiil
needed concerning what ïs probably the most senous credibility problem -- the “deep
semantic and epistemological objections to the entire conception of seif-evidence which
Aquinas takes over from Aristotie, and to the foundationalist understanding of human
knowledge ofwhich this conception is a part” (Boyle 1992: 26). In recent years, some have
sought to replace foundationalism with coherentism, for example, Rawis’ use of reflective
equilibrium. However, Boyle ends the article with the following critique of coherentism:
The underlying foundationalist theoiy of knowledge, whatever its merits in
epistemology generally, has considerable power in the area of moral
knowledge. For moral judgements appear to be justified by reasoning, and
reasoning from more general moral considerations. Thus, moral judgements
will be correct only if these more general moral considerations are correct.
How can these general moral considerations be known to be correct? There
are surely alternatives to thinking that they are basic trnth (truths, that is, of a
special, normative kind). One could maintain that they are necessary but not
basic ... And one might provide a coherentist account of their special status
as the basis of moral thinking. But what would be the elements whose
coherence would constitute grounds for thinking certain pnnciples basic?
Reflexive equilibrium between pnnciples and moral judgements appears to
deny the dependence of the latter on the former. Coherence between moral
pnnciples themselves appears to suppose that there are enough elements to
relate so that a plausible, and non-question-begging picture will emerge.
The implications of both these forms of coherentism are troubling, and
indeed incompatible with the way people actuatly think about moral
questions. The more natural way to think of these matters is that suggested
by natural law’s (and perhaps ethical theory’s) foundationalism: there are
moral pnnciples which are known to be in the appropnate way true (Boyle
1992: 27).
lii 1997, Boyle edited an issue of Christian Bioethics entitled, Intentions, Christian
Morality and Bioethics: Puzzles of Double Effect. Boyle introduces the issue by saying,
“The discussion of double effect in this issue ... shows at the very Ïeast that the topic of
double effect continues to fascinate, perplex and infunate moralists” (Boyle 1997: 87).
According to Boyle, the issue includes the work of “a new generation of Roman Catholic
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ethicists each of whom seeks to find a coherent, defensible place within the Catholic moral
tradition for double effect or a remnant of it” (Boyle 1997: 87). The central focus of ail the
articles is their quest “for the authority by which [the foresight/intention distinction] lias its
unique prescriptive force” (Boyie 1997: 8$). Ail of the authors share the view that the
distinction has morai authority, and “they explain this more in philosophical than in
confessional or theoiogical terms. That is the Catholic way” (Boyie 1997: 88). However,
Boyle responds, “But I think there is a more overtly Christian answer to the question ofthe
source of authority of double effect than my younger colleagues provide. Christianity is a
religion of the heart: one’s choices, intentions and the character they establish are a lot
more sigrnficant morally than behavior, or success, or conformity to norms” (Boyle 1997:
88). Given the fact that Boyle’s work expiains the moral authority of double effect
reasoning in almost exclusïvely phiiosophical rather than confessional or theological ternis,
his response to the work ofhis younger coileagues is somewhat surprising. However, there
is a need to recali that Boyle’s career work on double effect followed his initiai critique of
determinism and in particular, his and his colleagues’ zeaious defence of ftee choice. If we
retum to the Introduction to Boyle, Grisez and Tollefsen’s, free Choice: A Seif-Referential
Argument (Boyle, Griser, and ToÏÏefsen 1976,), we discover that the theologicai
underpinnÏngs of their defence of ftee choice are associated wÏth their defence of theism
and their reaction against naturalïsm:
The issue with which we are concerned in this work emerged most clearly in
early modem philosophy. Jewisli and Christian religious beliefs about man
and moral obligation had shaped an interpretation of the common human
experience of making choices. Wïthin the theistic perspective, it seemed
evident that whenever a person makes a choice he could equally weil chose
an alternative other than the one lie does. Many early modem phulosophers,
such as Hobbes and Spinoza, repiaced traditional theism with a naturalistic
conception of the world and of man. This naturalistic conception became
part of the worldview of science
... Within the naturaiistic perspective, it
seems evident that whenever anything happens, however contingent it might
be, what does happen is the only possibie outcome of conditions given pnor
to the event. The state of the world at a given time and the way the world
works setties whatever is going to happen in the world at any later time. As
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soon as the naturalistic view was applied to human choice the
incompatibility between the modem view and the traditional one became
evident
... The heretical thesis of Hobbes is the orthodox position today
However, we are as dissatisfied with the position prevalent today as Hobbes
and others were with the position prevalent in their day. Thus, in this work
we attempt to establish a thesis which few contemporary philosophers regard
as defensible: that human persons can make free choices
-- choices such
that only the act of choosing [emphasis mine] itself setties which alternative
a person will choose (Boyle, Grisez, and Tollefsen 1976: 1-2).
Boyle’s emphasis on free choice continues up to the present day in an article
entitled, MedicaÏ Ethics and Double Effect: The Case of Terminal Sedation (Boyle 2004).
in this piece, Boyle’s concem is flot so much the use of double effect reasoning to
distinguish terminal sedation from euthanasia, but rather, emerging medical-legal
consensus that uses the reasomng in the case of terminal sedation (Hawryluck 1999) and
the question of “how much of this distinctive moral view [i.e., double effect reasoning in
the context of Roman Catholic casuistryJ does the medical profession and the law implicitly
accept by accepting this application of double effect?” (Boyle 2004: 52). Boyle explains
that the absolutism connected to double effect reasoning does not forbid terminal sedation
because “a physician’s prescribing analgesics, descnbed in just that way, is morally
indifferent; therefore, the results, intentions and other circumstances of this chosen
behavior will determine its permissibility or impermissibility” (Boyle 2004: 54). Although
Boyle admits that intention can be problematic insofar as “a person’ s intentions are at least
in part inaccessible to others” (Boyle 2004: 5$), important parts of a physician’s intention
are publicly accessible (e.g., “notations on the patient’s chart and in the recorded dosages
and titration of analgesics” (Boyle 2004: 5 1-52)), and insofar as these intentions have been
publicly clanfied, terminal or palliative sedation can be distinguished from euthanasia.
“The requirement ofa proportionately grave reason” (Boyle 2004: 54) is also flot a problem
from Boyle’s perspective. He says, “In the case of terminal sedation, this condition of
proportionality seems to be easily met, and the existing consensus assumes that. The need
for palliaflon of some dying patients is substantial and is assumed generally to justify
89
terminal sedation if moral and legal womes about euthanasia are satisfactorily addressed”
(Boyle 2004: 55). Regarding the use of double effect reasoning to distinguisli terminal
sedation from euthanasia in the medical-legal context, Boyle stresses the fact that this
reasoning comprises a specificatory premise, i.e., that “although double effect presupposes
the truth of some ... indefeasible norms, its function in moral thought is flot to justify them
but rather to limit their application to intentionally harming the goods of human beings”
(Boyle 2004: 57). Hence, in whatever context “such noniis are taken as true or appropriate,
whether as moral norms or social regulations” (Boyle 2004: 59), double effect reasoning
can be legitimately used. In other words, the application of double effect reasoning “in law
and [public] morality need flot depend on the particular framework in which it was
developed” (Boyle 2004: 51).
However, here again, Boyle’ s interpretation of the use of double effect reasoning
depends largely on his particular understanding of free choice. Regardïng the
intentionlforesight distinction, or what Boyle refers to as “the distinction between what a
person intends in acting and accepts as a side effect (hereafler the intendedlaccepted
distinction),” Boyle says: “It seems that Aquinas and the theological tradition regarded the
ethicai significance of the intended/accepted distinction ... as simply obvious” (Boyle
2004: 55). What seemed obvious was the analogy between divine and human action. In
other words, “Just as God creates only what is good, humans should voluntarily pursue in
their actions only what is humanly good. And just as God permits the evils flawing bis
creation, so humans must accept some evil consequences they should flot intend” (Boyle
2004: 56). The necessity to accept some evil consequences stems from “a limitation on the
human capacity to pursue the good,” in other words, “in ail situations calling for human
choice, no matter what a person chooses to do, some instance of a human good will be
harmed, destroyed or at least knowingly neglected” (Boyle 2004: 56). Boyle emphasizes
that “this limitation is essentially a limitation on the human capacity to avoid some bad side
effects of good choices, and not a limitation on the human capacity to avoid choosing
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precisely for the sake ofbad goal”; on the contrary, ‘choosing to pursue resuits that involve
harming a good is aiways avoidable -- though ofien at a high price” (Boyle 2004: 56-57).
2.3. The Interoretation of Daniel Sulmasv
In his doctoral dissertation, KiÏÏing ana’ Atiowing to Die (Sulmasy 1995), Sulmasy
defends a distinction between killing and allowing to die in the context of widespread
public demand for assisted suicide and euthanasia. As he explains, “Some have argued that
since allowing patients to die is widely socially sanctioned, and there is no coherent moral
difference between killing and allowing to die, then euthanasia and assisted suicide ought to
be considered rnorally peniiissible. 1f the thesis of this dissertation is correct, however,
then ail such arguments must be rejected” (Sulmasy 1995: 10-11). In explicit agreement
with Boyle’s basic position in On Killing ana’ AlÏowing ta Die, Sulmasy argues “that
requiring a distinction to be decisive [in itseif] in order for it to be meaningfui [e.g., ‘Every
x is w [i.e., wrongJ and every y is not w’] is far too restrictive” (Sulmasy 1995: 236). By
contrast, “particularly in medicine, distinctions ofthe form, ‘Every x is w. Some y is w and
sorne y is flot w’ are meaningful and of immense practical importance” (Sulmasy 1995:
236). Hence, one of Sulmasy’s central arguments “is that the killing and allowing to die
distinction assumes this form [i.e., it signais a moral differencej, and that once stated in this
form it can be defended as meaningful and moraiÏy important” (Sulmasy 1995: 236). Not
unlike the evolution of Boyle’s work, the development of Sulmasy’s interpretation of
double effect reasoning takes shape initially in the context of a killing and allowing to die
distinction, and then moves into the broader context of other moral distinctions made
possible by double effect reasoning, particularly a distinction between terminal sedation
and euthanasia. As Sulmasy explains in his thesis, “the PDE [principle of double effectj, a
very general and purely formai moral principle, is not equivalent to the [killing] and
[allowing to diel distinction, nor can [that distinction] be deduced ftom the PDE without
additional infonTiation” (Sulmasy 1995: 157). Sulrnasy’s thesis and subsequent work can
be viewed as a sustained attempt to provide the “additional information” or the “moral
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context that can supply the machinery for ail the missing premÏses” (Sulmasy 1995: 157)
required for more effective use of double effect reasoning. The resuit of this effort is a
practical distinction between terminal sedation and euthanasia that combines descriptive,
medical elements and moral elements.
In his thesis, Sulmasy pays special attention to the additional information and moral
context provided by Aquinas’ structure of human (i.e., voluntary, moral) action (Aquinas
1975: I-11. Q.6-21). As indicated in the flrst chapter, this structure is extremeiy important
because double effect reasoning is essentially an application of this larger framework by
means of which Aquinas reconciles ‘universals’ and ‘particulars’ in the reaim of human
action. Sulmasy’s interpretation of Aquinas’ theory is heavily indebted to the work of
Australian-American phihsopher, Alan Donagan (1925-1991). Sulmasy describes an
eight-part structure wherein “each of [theJ attitudinal fiinctions plays a role in the process of
making an intention determinate” (Sulmasy 1995: 360). ft is important to note that “the
psychological reality is ofien more complex than even this elaborate scheme can capture.
The scheme ïs not meant, for instance, to suggest a necessary ordering of mental events
preceding an act” (Sulmasy 1995: 360). Sulmasy’s portrayal of Aquinas’ framework is
overlaid with “the three Aristotelian mental fiinctions highlighted by Donagan -- desire,
deliberafion, and decision -- [correspondingj to three distinct propositional attitudes [or
functions] (Sulmasy 1995: 356), namely, “the doxastic (belief’), orectic (desire), and
prohairetic (choosing) functions (Sulmasy 1995: 357). The eight-part structure is divided
into two parts, the first, concemed with ends as universals, and the second, concemed with
particular means and the reconciliation of ends and means:
Conceming the end, Aquinas called the doxastic function the agent’s
‘apprehension’ of the end as good (apprehensam); the orectic function the
agent’s ‘desire’ for the end (velle or simplex voluntas), and the prohairetic
function the agent’s ‘intention’ (intentio
-- in bis resmcted use ofthe term as
a commitment to the end). Conceming the means, Aquinas suggested that
ail three basic mental functions also played a role. He named the doxastic
function the agent’s ‘counsel’ or deliberation regarding the means
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(consilium); the orectic function the agent’s ‘consent’ to the means as
desirable (consensus); and the prohairetic function the agent’s ‘choice’ of a
particular means of achieving the end (electione). Ail these together form
what I have been calling, in keeping with the contemporaiy philosophical
discussion, a mature prior intention [emphasis mine]
... Another doxastic
function and another prohairetic function each plays a role in Aquinas’ much
less well deveÏoped account of how a prior intention gives nse to an
intention in acting [emphasis mineJ. The doxastic function he cails
command (imperium). The prohairetic function lie calis application or use
(usus). He only considers these latter attitudinal refinements in relation to
the translation of a prior intention info an intention in acting. This is flot the
strength ofthe Thomistic contribution (Sulmasy 1995: 358-359).
As the above citation ïndicates, Sulmasy believes that there is a weakness in
Aquinas’ ftamework. In other words, Sulmasy says, “Aristotie and Aquinas really only
address what I am cailing pnor intentions, and not intentions in acting” (Sulmasy 1995:
316). As Sulmasy explains, “There are two types of prior intention. A simple prior
intention only regards the goal or the end of a possible act. A mature prior intention is
roughly synonymous with the agent’s chosen plan, including both means and end. It is the
intentionaÏ propositional attitude an agent takes towards an act that is to be undertaken in
the future” [emphasis mine] (Sulmasy 1995: 313). Although Sulmasy’s mature prior
intention coincides roughly with the cumulative integrafion of ail the functions before
‘usus’, or the application of an entity to the purpose or operation ofthe will tAquinas 1975:
I-II. Q. 16. a. 1), Sulmasy’s problem is that Aquinas’ structure does flot sufficiently account
for the fact that “when an agent is acting or has acted [emphasis mine] [...,] one can
ascribe to the agent’s act a choice ofa complete act -- both an end and a means ofachieving
that end” (Sulmasy 1995: 307). In other words, “an intention in acting is more or less an
ascription of an acting agent’s choice of means and ends in bnnging about a particular
event, whether or not this act was the result of a pre-conceived deliberate plan and
regardless of what further intentions [i.e., finis operantis in more traditional terminology
(Sulmasy 1995: 308)] the agent might have in bringing the event about” (Sulmasy 1995:
314).
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In lis thesis, Sulmasy is attempting “to traverse a via media between those who
would propose that an agent intends everything that he or she foresees following upon his
or her act, and those who might suggest a specious strategy of intention re-direction such as
that satinzed by Pascal” (Sulmasy 1995: 476). Accordingly, Sulmasy shuns the extreme
position of Peter Abelard wherein “the morality of human acts is solely a function of
underlying intention” (Sulmasy 1995: 288), and he constructs a theory of intention that
emphasizes intention in acting and “[imposesi limits that will disallow such moral abuses
as justification by directed intention” (Sulmasy 1995: 290). Underlying this view of
intention within limits is Donagan’s definition of a human act. According to Donagan,
“human acts are ‘human doings that can be explained by their doers’ propositional
attitudes” (Sulmasy 1995: 293). Examples of propositional attitudes include “desinng,
wishing, believing, doubting, accepting, and hoping” (Sulmasy 1995: 301). In Sulmasy’s
Donaganian view, intention itself is a propositional attitude: “An intention is an irreducibly
simple attitude [e.g., desinngl, ascnbable to an agent [e.g., hel that takes as its object a
proposition about an event [e.g., he desires that x should be deadi that the agent hirnself
chooses to bnng about under a defimte description [e.g., lie is ‘killing’ or has ‘killed’ x with
a knifel. If the event occurs in the way the agent has chosen, this attitude will explain the
event” (Sulmasy 1995: 302). As Sulmasy explains, Donagan has a causal view of agency:
“Human beings ... are accountable for what they cause by their agency. Agency is the
power of intention to cause events in the world” (Sulmasy 1995: 349). Regarding the term
“event,” “Donagan holds that voluntary human doings constitute the class of things that are
known as acts, and that acts are ‘a species of event’. He holds further that ail ‘events are
genuine individuals [or concrete particularsi’, [andi he defines events as ‘changes or
persistences in states of continuing individual objects’ ... represented linguistically
... by
ïndividual names or defimte descriptions, flot by sentences’ “ (Sulmasy 1995: 293-294).
Sulmasy reports that Donagan’s view of acts as events has been supported by many
philosophers, especially the American philosopher Donaid Davidson (1917
- ) in his Essays
on Actions and Events. In keeping with this causal understanding of agency, Sulmasy
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adopts John Searle’s notion that intentions “have ‘conditions of fulfihiment’ rather than
truth conditions per se” (Sulmasy 1995: 303). Accordingly, Sulmasy believes that the
credibility or fuWillment of a stated intention (i.e., as distinct from foresight) vis-à-vis
individual events rest on three criteria: logical implication or coherence (i.e., “what an
agent believes is logically implied by the propositional content of her intention”;
plausibility (i.e., “what an agent believes to be an alternative true definite description of
the conditions of fiulfiilment of her intention”); and cause and effect relationships (i.e.,
“what the agent believes will be caused by the conditions of fulfiulment of her intention”)
(Sulmasy 1995: 369-370). Sulmasy boisters these criteria with an elaborate testing scheme
consisting of an abundance of formai logic and three different causality scenarios (Sulmasy
1995: 370-400).
In order to situate this view of intention and act description within the medical
context, Sulmasy utilizes “the ordinary linguistic intuitions of medicai practitioners as a
gold standard” (Sulmasy 1995: 472). Generally speaking, he suggests that the killing and
allowing to die distinction is one that “does not explain the difference between two classes
of acts, but rather points to one class [i.e., ‘killing’J where what is most important [i.e.,
intention and causal description] can be known rather easily, whuie in the other class [i.e.,
‘aliowing to die’], what is most important [i.e., intention and causal description] will
require more work to uncover” (Sulmasy 1995: 473). Seeking an analogy within medical
practice, Sulmasy concludes that the pathognomonic sign represents the same type of
distinction. As he explains, “the presence of a pathognomomc sign [e.g., an abnormal
finding on physical examination or in the resuits of diagnostic tests] assures one that the
disease is present (i.e., the sign is specific for the disease). If the pathognomonic sign is flot
there [e.g., if ail you have are symptoms reported by a patient], the disease may or may not
be present” (Sulmasy 1995: 237) and you would need to search further for any
pathognomonic sign(s). In the same way, ‘killing’ “is a sign, like a pathognomonic sign
[‘Killing’J denotes a class of actions that are always immoral ... because of a complex of
the [agent’s] intentions and causal reiationship to the death” (Sulmasy 1995: 255-256). By
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contrast, ‘allowing to die’ is a sign that denotes a class of actions which are flot necessanly
immoral because they may or may flot involve the presence of pathognomonic sign(s)
indicative of ‘killing’. One would need to explore carefufly the intention and causal
description involved in particular instances. Using philosophical language to describe the
same distinction, Sulmasy says, “In [‘killing’l, the doctor’s act will aiways be necessary,
and will usually, but flot aiways be sufficient for the death ofthe patient to have corne about
in the way that it did. In [‘allowing to die’l, however, the doctor’s causal role is different
the doctor’s act is neyer sufficient, even though it is usually necessary for the death to
have corne about in the way that it did” (Sulmasv 1995: 256).
Although Sulmasy does flot explicitly articulate a distinction between terminal
sedation and euthanasia in his thesis, lie does explore briefly whether a distinction can be
made between the achievement of pain relief from morphine and the hastening of
sorneone’s deatli (i.e., from the respiratory depression ofien associated with morphine). In
this instance, although he does flot use the pathognomonic sign terminology, his process for
making a distinction is the sarne. In other words, he subjects the daim or the signal of
intending only pain relief and flot the hastening of death to his credibility analysis: “Is such
a combination of intentions coherent, plausible, and [morallyl justifiable” (Sulrnasy 1995:
413) ? He concludes that the daim is coherent because on the molecular level in time,
“there are, in fact, two separable events, distinct in time and space” in other words, “pain
relief occurs at lower doses and more rapidly than respiratory depression” (Sulmasy 1995:
413-414). The daim is plausible for two main reasons: “The Event of the death of the
patient is certainly not a necessary causal condition for the Event of pain relief. 1f it is not
the doctor’s further intention that the patient should die and it is flot the case that he intends
analgesia by way ofthe patient’s death, then the daim is at least plausible” (Sulrnasy 1995:
414). In this example, Sulmasy relates moral justifiability to a proportionality analysis that
leads him to this conclusion: “If the circumstances are such that the patient’s death is
inevitable and the pain is great, then fears of the chance of hastening the patient’s death
seem overwhelmingly out of proportion compared to the benefits of pain relief The act is
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then rnorally justified as well” ($ulmasy 1995: 415). This conclusion is in accordance with
the way he has explicitly defined proportionality in bis thesis: “My use of the terrn
proportionahty is intended to describe the weighing of the good and evil involved in a case,
and ought flot to be confused with the school of Roman Catholic moral thought known as
proportionalism” (Sulrnasy 1995: 176). Regarding the first condition of the principle of
double effect and its specification that a proposed act must be ‘good’ or ‘neutral’ before the
rest ofthe conditions corne into play, Sulmasy says only this:
My entire analysis is based on the premise that it is moraily wrong to act
with the specific intention in acting that a human being should die by way of
one’ s act ... I have not provided aj ustification for this moral premise ... this
task is beyond the scope of [this thesis]. However, 1 should point out that
one might hold such a moral premise to be tme for a variety of reasons. One
might hold this premise on the basis of deep moral intuitions. Or ... for
religious reasons. Or one might be a Kantian and hold this premise because
of a belief that the humanity in another or in oneself can neyer be used as a
means to any end. Or one might be a mie Utilitarian and hold that a mle
based upon this premise will generate the best consequences in the long term
(Sulmasy 1995: 477).
Within Sulrnasy’s publication of key aspects ofhis thesis in Killing andAttowing to
Die: Anotiier Look (Sulmasy 1998), he acknowledges that the killing and allowing to die
distinction is at the centre of great public controversy. He notes, for example, that the
Arnerican Supreme Court decisions regarding physician-assisted suicide/euthanasia iefl this
distinction and double effect reasoning in its entirety in urgent need of clarification.
Reviewing the views of Dr. Timothy Quill and several prominent philosophers who
supported Quili in The Philosophers’ Brief(Dworkin, Nagel, Nozick et al. 1998), Sulmasy
concludes that “they ah seem to share a common view that the distinction is ‘confused and
mistaken” (Sulmasy 1998: 55). In response to bis own question, “Why another paper on
killing and allowing to die?” (Sulmasy 1998: 56), Sulmasy takes up Tom Beauchamp’s
challenge in Intending Death: “If we are to retain the distinction between killing and
letting die, we need to provide clearer, more precise meanings that are useful for medical
ethics. for example, kilhing could be resewed for circumstances in which one person
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inteniionuÏÏy uncÏ unfustifiable causes the death of another human being ...“ (Beauchamp
1996: 7). In bis thesis, of course. Sulmasy reserved ‘killing’ for these exact circumstances
within the context of double effect reasoning. and in Another Look, he summarizes the
larger theory of intention and act description that bas already been presented here.
Another Look also contains several new elements that extend and deepen Sulrnasy’s
interpretation of double effect reasoning. In response to QuiIl’s prioritization of patient
autonorny over and above any killing and allowing to die distinction, Sulmasy says,
“proponents ofthe traditional view [i.e., bis viewi do not discount autonomy and the role of
patients in making end-of-life decisions ... However, proponents of the distinction also
argue that the patient’s autonomous authorization is flot the only condition that needs to be
met for a clinician to make morally justifiable end-of-life decisions” (Sulmasv 199$: 58-
59). QuiIl’s emphasis on patient autonomy forces Sulmasy to be more transparent about bis
own interpretation ofthe first condition ofthe principle of double effect, that is, the basis of
his “deontological view that some acts ought flot be done, no matter what the consequences
or the preferences of another person” (Sulmasy 199$: 59). Building upon the foundations
of this view given in his thesis, Sulmasy emphasizes four more: that his view of the
relational value of human life “proscribe[sl euthanasia and assisted suicide as violent acts
rejecting the value of relationship”, that the Kantian emphasis upon ‘humanity itself is a
dignity’ compels him to honour each person’s life even if an individual is flot able or does
flot necessarily wish to honour their humanity in the same way that “life is flot of infinite
value” and “this is why ‘Allowing to die’ can be appropnate”, and finally, that a “slippery
slope” exists, that is, “even if one does flot believe that human life bas any intrinsic value,
worries about the consequences of deciding that there is no moral difference between
killing and allowing to die lead many to consider it important to retain this distinction”
(Sulmasy 199$: 62).
Sulmasy also links intention and commitment more explicitly by giving more
explanation of the conditions of fuffillment: “intention seems to involve something over
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and above belief and desire. It involves cornmitment. As propositions have truth
conditions, so intentions have conditions of fulfiilment -- that is, what the agent is
committed to accomplishing; aiming at” (Sulmasy 1998: 59). FinaÏly, Sulmasy includes a
cursory explanation of what lie calis “the ethics of cooperation,” or the use of double effect
reasoning in “cases invoiving multiple agents” (Sulmasy 199$: 61). As Boyle explains,
“the morality of cooperation
... is most reasonably understood as a specification of double
effect, which clarifies when cooperation with others does and does flot count morally as
doing the bad act oneseif’ (Boyle 1994: 197). According to the classic definition of moral
theologian, Aiphonsus Liguon (1696-1787), “That (cooperation) is formai which concurs in
the bad will ofthe other and cannot be [permissiblel; that (cooperation) indeed is matenal
which concurs only in the bad action of another, outside the intention of the cooperator”
(Boyle 1999: 191). In Another Look, Sulmasy says, “To provide fteely the immediate
matenal means [i.e., material cooperationJ by which a patient cames out an act one
considers morally inappropnate is neyer morally permissible, even if one daims not to
share in the intention” (Sulmasy 1998: 61).
As already indicated, throughout the 1990s, Quili and his colleagues conducted a
sustained attack against eveiy aspect of double effect reasoning (Quili 1993, 1996, 1997,
1998; QuilI, Lo, and Brock 1997). The central tenets ofthe attack included the fact that the
pnnciple of double effect was a religious rule, that it was used inconsistently, that ‘clear
and distinct’ intentions were actually quite ambiguous and the foresightlintention
distinction was ‘fiction’, that there was a substantial potential for seif-deception and abuse,
and that patient autonomy should have pnority over any use of double effect reasoning to
distinguish between terminal sedation and euthanasia. In The Rule of Double Effect:
Clearing Up the Double TaÏk (Sulmasy and Pellegrino 1999), Sulmasy and lis thesis
director, Edmund Pellegrino, provide an extensive rejoinder. Their response begins with
their application of double effect reasornng to facilitate a distinction between the use of
morphine for pain control and euthanasia:
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Treating dying patients in pain with appropriate doses of morphine is
generally done in a manner that satisfles the cnteria for double effect. The
use of morphine (1) is flot in itself immoral; (2) it is undertaken only with
the intention of relieving pain, flot of causing death through respiratoiy
depression; (3) morphine does flot relieve pain only if it first kiils the
patient; and (4) the relief of pain is a proportionately grave reason for
accepting the nsk of hastening death ... Ihis rule allows physicians opposed
to euthanasia and assisted suicide to treat pain adequately ... with a clear
conscience (Sulmasy and Pellegrino 1999: 545).
Sulmasy and Pellegrino emphasize what double effect reasoning is NOT, that is, it
is “not simply an instrument of consequentialist reasoning” (Sulmasy and Pellegrino 1999:
546), il is flot euthanasia under legal cover (Sulmasy and Pellegnno 1999: 547), and it is
not equivalent to the killing and allowing to die distinction (Sulmasy and Pellegrino 1999:
547). As already indicated, Sulmasy and Pellegrino argue that the religious origins of
double effect reason “should flot preclude its discussion in civil society” (Sulmasy and
Pellegnno 1999: 54$), and that patient autonomy is not a moral absolute (Sulmasy and
Pellegrino 1999: 549). In support of “the disambiguation of clinical intentions,” they argue
that the notion of a side effect in medicine is totally dependent on the concept of intention
within double effect reasoning, and that “common sense and the law place important weight
on intentions in evaluating the morality of human actions, and properly so” (Sulmasy and
Pellegrino 1999: 54$). In lieu of explaining how contemporary action theory supports a
distinction between desires and intentions and between foresight and intention, Sulmasy
and Pellegrino refer readers to Sulmasy’s previous article, Another Look. Finally, they re
iterate that in cases of physician-assisted suicide, “the proper moral category” for
physicians is not double effect but cooperation (i.e., whether the physician is an accomplice
and therefore morally culpable)” (Sulmasy and Pellegrino 1999: 546).
As already indicated, the notion that one is culpable for everything that one foresees
has caused disagreements and confusion in the use of double effect reasoning. In Relieving
Pain and Foreseeing Death. A Paradox About Accountabilitv and Blame (Nuccetelli and
Seay 2000), the authors argue that although in certain cases, “an action may be justified
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when its intended good resuit outweighs its foreseen but unintended harm ..., in other,
equally compelling cases, [double effect reasoning] fails to show that agents are exempt
from blame for foreseen, adverse, direct resuits of their actions, whether or flot they have
intended them” (NuccetelÏi and Seay 2000: 19). Examples of such unconvincing cases
include that of the strategic bomber who, “in a just war causes the deaths of non
combatants when he bombs a munitions plant in a heavily populated civilian
neighborhood,” and the case of the Irish Fenian who was found guiity of murder by an
English court in 186$, “for the foreseeable deaths of some inmates killed when he
dynamited a prison wall he mistakenly believed to be that of the exercise yard where his
comrades would be waiting to escape” (Nuccetelli and Seay 2000: 20). On account ofthese
sorts of cases, and their belief that there is no univocal notion of intention, Nuccetelli and
Seay assert that it would be better to distinguish between types of duties rather than
between foresight and intention. Conceming duties, they distinguish between cases
involving general moral duties and those involving special duties,
which could be defined as those generated by specific relationships or
transactions between individuals, such as the duties arising among members
of an organization, or when one makes a promise, or signs a contract. In
cases involving any of these duties, agents may rïghtly be held
accountable even when tliey are unable to fulfi] them [emphasis mine) --
as some phulosophers have argued for legal, epistemic, or academic grounds
Arguably, doctors have certain duties just because they are doctors: some
owed to society, others to the profession, but the most important of them
owed to patients ... Foremost among these, however, are the duties to
conserve and extend life whenever possible, and to relieve physical
suffering. It is these that are in conflict in the case where palliation causes a
depression of respiratory function that leads to a foreseeable death since
ail such duties arise out of some fundamental purposes of medicine, they
could be regarded as special duties binding the agent even where she cannot
fulfil them (Nuccetelli and Seay 2000: 22-23).
Despite their duty-based, “conservative view of what physicians may legitimately do in the
care of the dying,” Nuccetelli and Seay acknowledge that “duties might sometimes be
overridden” in the pursuit of “humane and compassionate care,” and they conclude with the
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following recommendation: “the climcian must take irito account ail of her relevant
professional obligations ... and weigh them in deciding how to do what is best for that
patient, ail things considered, given his values and beliefs, with a reasonable assessrnent of
what the quality of bis remaining life is likely to be” (Nuccetelh and Seay 2000: 24).
In Commentai-v: Double Effect --Intention is the Solution, Not the Probiem (Sulmasy
2000), Sulmasy dismisses Nuccetelli and Seay’s notion of conflicting duties with a counter
example that their argument would permit illogically, and he dismisses their concluding
recommendation by saying, “Advice so vague is of limited usefulness to a clinician”
(Sulmasy 2000): 28. Regarding the confusion associated with the foresight/intention
distinction and culpability, he argues “that one’s responsibihty covers the whole ‘package
deal’ of what one freely chooses to bnng about, but that under certain circumstances sucli
as those specified by RDE [i.e., rule of double effect], cuÏpabihty (that for which one can be
blamed) only covers what one intends” (Sulmasy 2000: 27). Not unlike his position in The
Rule of Double Effect, although Sulmasy cails attention to the fact that there are exciting
developments conceming intention underway in the reaim of phulosophy of action, he
simply refers readers to pertinent sources via his foomotes. However, he acknowledges
that some “descry [intentionJ as unknowable,” and as a rebuttal, lie cites Elizabetli
Anscombe’s assertion of the absurdity of the idea that” ‘intention can’t be known because
it is something private ... [In other words,J it is often, nay usualÏy quite apparent that
someone is doing such-and-such on purpose. It is no objection to this that error on this
point is possible” (Sulmasy 2000: 28). Interestingly enough in view of this emphasis on
the public realm, this article also includes a discussion of proportionality within double
effect reasoning, and here Sulmasy’ s emphasis is on “the publicly defensible character of
the proportionality condition of the RDE [i.e., rule of double effectJ” (Sulmasy 2000: 27).
In other words, the proportionality condition “includes weighing the consequences of the
action ... in a publicly defensible manner. One is not free to decide idiosyncratically that
the good outweighs the bad ... The proportionality condition of the RDE is not completely
subjective” (Sulmasy 2000: 27). Seemingly, this article represents an important tuming
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point in Sulmasy’s work because aithough he has consistently emphasized the publicly or
obectively defensibie character of ail the conditions of the pnnciple of double effect, he
will from this point onward, concentrate almost exclusively on a publicly defensible
proportionality calculus.
Thus far, there are two main parts of this calcutus, one involving a distinction
between different types of suffering, and the other conceming the corresponding
appropnate ciinical responses vis-à-vis sedation. In a position paper entitled, Physician
Assisted Suicide, co-authored by Snyder and Sulmasy on behaif of the Ethics and Hurnan
Rights Committee of the Amerïcan Coilege of Physicians-American Society of Internai
Medicine (Snyder and Sulmasy 2001), we find the beginnings of the proportionality
calculus. Noting the ongoing significant public support for physician-assisted
suicide/euthanasia, Snyder and Sulmasy explain that even if physician-assisted suicide
becomes legal for terminally iii, consenting adults, critena will be needed to avoid arbitrary
discrimination between terminaliy iii and non-terminally iII persons, and between patients
with different levels of functional capacity (e.g., those who can and cannot “take puis or
push buttons”) (Snyder and Suimasy 2001: 213). Repeating Sulmasy’s ongoing theme
regarding the non-absolute nature of patient autonomy, the authors emphasize that patients
expenence many different types of pain and suffenng, and that “one can raise serious
questions about whether medicine should arrogate to itself the task of relieving ail human
suffering, even near the end of life” (Snyder and Sulmasy 2001: 212). These questions lead
the authors to the drawing of a sharp distinction between “physical symptoms or psychiatric
syndromes,” the alleviation of which “physicians should vigorously pursue ... even at the
risk of unintentionally hastening death,” and “interpersonal, existential, or spiritual”
suffering, the alleviation of which physicians should primanly delegate to “clergy, social
workers, family and friends” (Snyder and Sulmasy 2001: 212).
More of the proportionatity calculus is revealed in a subsequent article co-authored
by Jansen and Sulmasy entitled, Sedatïon, Alimentation, Hydration, and Equivocation:
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Careful Conversation About Care at the End of Life ‘Jansen and SuÏrnasy 2002c,). Ihe
antagonistic context is, yet again, the work of Qui!! and bis colleagues. Jansen and
Su!masy now focus on three papers (Quil! 2000; Qui!!, Lee, and Nunn 2000; Qui!!, Lo, and
Brock 1997) in which Qui!l et a!. “recommended terminal sedation and refusai of hydration
and nutrition as mora!iy acceptab!e and relatively uncontroversial options for end-of-life
suffering” (Jansen and Sulmasy 2002e: 845). In response, Jansen and Sulmasy distinguisli
between two types of refusa! of nutrition and hydration. and two types of sedation. They
distinguish between “refusai of hydration and nutrition,” by which they mean a situation
where a patient has irreversibly lost the capacity to metabolize nutrition and hydration. and
“has determined that the benefits of artificial nutrition are not proportionate to the
burdens [emphasis mine], and “voiuntary stopping eating and drinking,” by which they
mean a situation where a patient has no underlying metabolic problem, but “neverthe!ess
intends to end his or her own !ife by not eating or drinking” (Jansen and Suimasy 2002c:
$45-$46). Whereas the first situation is mora!ly justifiable and can be supported by
physicians, the second situation is unjustifiable and it wou!d be impermissib!e for
physicians to cooperate or co!!aborate in it (i.e., it would be impermissib!e for a physician
even to present to a patient voluntary stopping eating and drinking as an acceptable option)
(Jansen and Su!masy 2002e: 848). Proportionality is the key to their distinction between
the first and second situations, and we discover precisely what type of proportiona!ity
calcu!us Jansen and Su!rnasy have in mmd when they use double effect reasoning to
distinguish between two types of sedation, sedation of the irnrninentiy dying and sedation
toward death:
The nile of doub!e effect, when appiied to the issue of termina! sedation,
maintains that it is flot immoral to render a patient unconscious as a side
effect of treating specific symptoms if !) one does flot aim at
unconsciousness directly, 2) unconsciousness is flot the means by wbich one
intends to re!ieve symptoms, and 3) one bas a proportionate reason’ for
taking such action. These conditions are fulfi!!ed in the type of termina!
sedation we have called sedation of the irnminentiy dying. By contrast, in
sedation toward death, the c!inician aims at rendering the patient
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unconscious, flot to serve future consciousness but to shorten life .. The
condition in the rule of double effect that holds that a physician must
have a proportionate reason turns out, on reflection, to be important in
evaluating terminal sedation [emphasis mine]. In [the first situationJ, what
makes the sedation permissible is that it ïs a rational response to a specific
physiological condition that the physician is attempting to treat. [In the
second situation], by contrast, the patient is suffenng [e.g., J because of her
belief that she will soon become debilitated. Although certainly grave, this
kind of suffering does flot justify terminal sedation. For terminal sedation to
be a proportionate response to suffering, the good effects must outweigh the
bad and it must ‘fit’ the situation. Like the existential suffering of patients
who are flot terminally iii, [the existential suffering of those who are
tenninally iii] is appropriately managed flot by aggressive sedation but by
other specialized interventions, such as appropnate nonsedating medication,
psychological counselling, or spiritual guidance. Physicians who cannot
adequately provide these interventions should enlist the help of those who
can (Jansen and Sulmasy 2002c: 847).
The above article resulted in several letters to the editor. Charles Sasser, MD,
questioned what he perceived to be the reduction of double effect reasoning “to a simple
distinction between physical and existential suffering” and he said, “To argue that physical
pain can be teased out of the multidimensional suffering of terminal illness and then used as
sole basis for the application of appropriate palliative options, to the disregard of the whole
person, is archaic mind-body dualism” (Sasser 2002). Quili stressed what has become his
typical themes, for instance, the contToversy surrounding general acceptance of double
effect reasoning, “the potential for self-deception and oversimplification,” the notion that
physicians are responsible for both their foreseen and intended consequences, the priority
of patients’ informed choices, and the need to consider “proportionate presence of
suffering, and absence of less harmful alternatives” (Quili 2002). Paul Rousseau, MD,
writer of several articles regarding existential suffering and sedation, said, “I understand
their argument but believe they tnvialize the significance of existential distress. By
restricting palliative sedation to physical suffenng, they disregard the anguish of existential
suffenng and, more important, may precipitate further suffering” (Rousseau 2002).
Tatsuya Monta, MD, pointed out that “symptom relief sometimes requires sedatives not
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proven pharmacologically effective for the underlying symptom,” and he gave the example
ofagitated delirium (Monta, Tsuneto, and Yasuo 2002). In response to these letters, Jansen
and Sulmasy ernphasized prirnarily that double effect reasoning could justify sedation in
complex cases such as agitated delirium, and that they were neither reducing double effect
reasoning “to the distinction between physical and existential suffering,” nor to “the
proportionality clause” (Jansen and Sulmasy 2002a). In addition, they stressed that “the
distinction between physical and existential suffening does not rest on any mind-body
dualism, archaic or otherwise,” and that they were trying to reduce “a tendency in the
medical literature on tenTiinal sedation to view terminal suffering as sui generis” (Jansen
and Sulmasy 2002a).
Jansen and Sulmasy extend and deepen their responses to their readers’ concems in
Proportionalitv, Terminal Suffring and the I?estorat ive Goals of Medicine (Jansen and
Sulmasy 2002b). They re-iterate that “different types of suffering require different
responses,” and that “lack of cf anty on this matter can lead to ethical uncertainty” (Jansen
and Sulmasy 2002b: 321). Presumably in an effort to rneet the charge of rnind-body
dualism more defimtively, they now differentiate between neuro-cognitive and agent-
narrative suffering. They expÏain that “neuro-cognitive suffering is suffering that has a
direct causal relationship to the patient’s underlying medical condition” (Jansen and
Sulmasy 2002b: 324). By contrast, agent-narrative suffering is “suffering that is belief
dependent, beanng, at most, an indirect relationship [i.e., causal relationship] to the
patient’s underlying medical condition” (Jansen and Sulmasy 2002b: 322). In this case, “it
is flot the medical condition as such that causes the patient to suffer. Nonetheless, [agent-
narrative suffering] may arise from the patient’s beliefs about what the condition means or
will mean to bis or her life. So characterized, agent-narrative suffering depends on factors
that are (largely) particular to the person expeniencing the suffering” (Jansen and Surnasy
2002b: 325). In making this distinction, Jansen and Sulmasy stress that they are not
“[discrirninating] more important from less important types of suffering” (Jansen and
Sulmasy 2002b: 329). By contrast, they are attempting to lessen ethical uncertainty by
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characterizing suffering more precisely, and linking that charactenzation with their notion
of proportionality.
Again, the impetus is largely Quill’s work, specifically, what Jansen and Sulmasy
cali bis pnnciple of proportionality: “The greater the patient’s suffering, the greater risk the
physician can take of potentialÏy contnbuting to the patient’s death, so long as the patient
understands and accepts the risk” (Quili, Lo, and Brock 1997: 2102). This pnnciple is
problematic for Jansen and Sulmasy because it “does flot specify which type (or types) of
terminal suffering miglit justify a physician in using aggressive pharmacological
interventions” (Jansen and Sulmasy 2002b: 323). Consequently, they formulate their own
“principle of therapeutic responsiveness”:
A physician’s therapeutic response to terminal suffenng is justified, even if
it imposes a high risk of hastening the patient’s death, if and only if (j) the
measures implemented are directly proportionate to the intensity of the
patient’ s suffering (ii) the measures implemented are appropriate for the
type of suffering the patient is expenencing and, therefore, are properly
responsive to the patient’ s restorative interests; and (iii) the patient or the
patient’s legal surrogate understands and accepts the risks associated with
the measures (Jansen and Sulmasy 2002b: 329-330).
Jansen and Sulmasy add three “clarificatory comments” to their principle. firstly, “the
requirement that the therapeutic measure be appropriate to the kind of suffering the patient
is experiencing cails for greater discrimination on the part of the physician in diagnosing
suffering” (Jansen and Sulmasy 2002b: 330). Secondly, their pnnciple “requires physicians
to recognize the limits of their medical authority” and to refer patients to those who can
relieve agent-narrative terminal suffenng if physicians themselves are unable to reheve it
(Jansen and Sulmasy 2002b: 331). Finally, “a physician should flot honor a patient’s
request that her agent-narrative terminal suffering be treated with high dose opioids
[and] physicians should flot participate for cooperateJ in medicaÏÏy inappropriate
interventions, even when their patients request them to do so (Jansen and Sulmasy 2002b:
331). Regarding hard cases (e.g., a patient with end-stage amyotrophic lateral scierosis
107
who suffers no physical pain, but finds isolation and increasing dependence unbearable),
Jansen and Sulmasy recommend supporting this patient’ s restorative interests j ust as
physicians would in the case of non-terminally-ill patients (Jansen and Sulmasy 2002b:
332), acknowledging the fact that sedatives could mask agent-narrative suffenng (Jansen
and Suimasy 2002b: 333), and giving high-dose sedatives only “afler every possible effort
has been made to restore the patient to a state of psychosocial health” (Jansen and Sulmasy
2002b: 334). Interestingly enough, afier sharpiy dissociating himself from Roman Catholic
proportionalists in his thesis, Sulmasy and Jansen justify their new emphasis on
proportionality by means ofthe following footnote:
The concept of proportionality first emerged as an explicit pnnciple in
ethical theory in connection with the mie of double effect. Yet while the
principle of proportionality has traditionaliy been associated with the mie of
double effect, it can be affirmed without accepting this mie. This is evident
from the fact that physicians who formed part of the so-called conservative
professionaiism movement in the mid-nineteenth century routineiy appealed
to a fteestanding formulation of the pnnciple to justify certain forms of nsk
taking, particulariy those surrounding the relief of pain. And in recent years,
a number of prominent medical ethicists who reject the rule of double effect
have also invoked the pnncipie while insisting that it can be put to many
uses in biomedical ethics beyond those permitted by the full mie of double
effect (Jansen and Sulmasy 2002b: footnote #2: 336).
2.4. The Interpretation of Richard McCormick
In his doctoral thesis (McCormick 1957), McCormick considered an issue germane
to current ethicai dilemmas surrounding ‘terminai sedation’, nameiy, “when a state of facts
[e.g., cause and effect] can be established only to a certain degree of probability, what is
one allowed to do?” (Odozor 1995: 15). Within this broader ethical question,
McCormick’s specific obstetrical concem was the following: “‘When [a] mother is faced
with a likeiihood of almost certain death ... and her only hope lies in the removal from the
utems of a non-viable fetus probably but not certainly dead, is such a removal permissibie’
“(Odozor 1995: 15)? McCormick decided that it was permissible on the basis of a
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proportionate reason which was in this case, the idea that” ‘it is flot against the exigencies
of justice to remove a fetus in which the presence of life is positively and invincibly
doubtful to save the mother’ “(Odozor 1995: 17). Although this was seemingly a quaridary
for which double effect reasoning would have been relevant because the situation mvolved
two possible effects (i.e., the positive effect of saving the mother’s life and the negative
effect of certain death of the fetus), McCormick claimed that this reasomng had no role:
‘The application of the principle of the twofold effect lias no place in the problem
... There
is no question of two effects, one bad, one good, but of an action which may be either
(objectively and disjunctively) good or bad’ “(Odozor 1995: 19). As Odozor says, “it is
difficuit to see why this was not a case of double effect,” and whether or flot McCormick
was consciously aware of it, “he [was] already engaged in the reinterpretation of the
pnnciple of double effect” (Odozor 1995: 19-20). In this way, McCormick’s work
anticipated that of Peter Knauer wlio “in the more tolerant climate of the post-Vatican II
era,” explicitly connected double effect reasomng and proportionalism (Odozor 1995: 20).
As we recail from the first chapter, Knauer’s revision of the fourth condition of
double effect reasomng stressed the use of commensurate or proportionate reason, in other
words, “If, in the given circumstances, the act is the best possible solution ofthe problem in
terms of the horizon given by the whole of reality, it may be said that the act is morally
good” (Knauer 1979 [ong. 19671: 22). Again, “the wliole of reality” is important insofar as
it represents a reaction against the physicalism of the past whereby the elements of double
effect reasoning were tied closely to physical causality. As we also recail from the first
chapter, proportionality can mean different things to different people, for example, the
existence of proportionate reason, end!end proportion or the companson of potential
outcomes, and means/end proportion. Likewise in the theological context, significant
confusion associated with conflicting meanings of proportionality made it necessary for
Knauer, McConnick and other proportionalists to expend considerable energy in aftempts
to increase clarity and decrease confusion. In 1972 through intense dialogue with other
theologians, McCormick defines and defends bis emerging understanding of
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proportionality against the charges of consequentialism, relativism, and extrinsicism. In
response to Connery’s position that the work of proportionalists represents a form of
consequentialism or” ‘a moral system that makes the judgment of an act depend solely on
its consequences’ “(McCormick 1979 [ong. 19721: 301), McCormick argues that “it is no
longer a matter of ‘consequences alone’, but of the proportion between the evil involved
and the good sought” (McCormick 1979 [ong. 1972]: 306). He also emphasizes (in
agreement with Scht’iller, a fellow proportionalist) that vastly different works are being
unhelpfully grouped under both of the tities ‘deontology’ and ‘consequentialism’, and that
pmdential judgment is more important than absolute clarity in the use of moral norms
(McCormick 1979 [ong. 1972]: 301-303, 308-309). In response to Quay’s daim that
McCormick and other proportionalists are proposing a ‘theology of values’ wherein
absolute prohibitions are being relativized (McCormick 1979 [ong. 1972]: 309),
McCormick stresses that there is a fundamental “confusion between fact-descnption ... and
value-description ... (McCormick 1979 [ong. 1972]: 311). In other words, whereas
‘Defrauding laborers’, like adultery, murder, theft, is a value-description [and aJ pejorative
one [at that,] ... the issue is: What concrete conduct [or fact description] is to count for
murder, for ‘defrauding laborers’, etc.” (McCormick 1979 [ong. 19721: 311)? Similanly,
in response to May’s accusation that proportionalism is” ‘at root a form of extninsicism in
ethics’ {thatJ denves the meaning or intelligibility of human acts from their consequences
or resuits [i.e., from extnnsic factors as opposed to inherent or intrinsic factors of acts]’
(McCormick 1979 [ong. 1972]: 320), McCormick argues that proportionalism “denies only
that this [or that] inherent good and meamng is an absolute value” (McCormick 1979 [ong.
1972]: 321).
By the same token, even at this early stage, McCormick’s emerging proportionalism
also includes a cautious denial of the absolute status of inherent or intnnsic evils. As
McCormick recalis, the Catholic tradition has defined two categones of actions as absolute,
intnnsic evils: “(1) actions against nature (certain sexual actions, e.g., contraception,
masturbation); [andJ (2) actions wrong because of a lack of right (direct killing of the
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innocent, dissolution of a sacramental and consummated marnage)” (McCormick 1979
[ong. 1972]: 315). However, as we recail from the first chapter, Knauer substituted for the
traditional idea that an act could be evil in itself the quite different notion of pre-rnoraÏ [or
non-moralJ cvii. In other words, although “every human act bnngs evil effects with it”
insofar as the choice of one value denies others, the moral aspect of an act is embodied only
in the particular choice an individual makes to act in a specific way (Knauer 1979 [ong.
1967]: 16). In dialogue with Knauer’s perspective and those ofhis fellow proportionalists,
McConnick says, “that when an action is aiways morally wrong, it is so not because of
unnaturalness or defect of nght
..., but because when taken as a whoÏe, the nonmoral evil
outweighs the nonmoral good, and therefore the action is disproportionate. One can
legitimately continue to cal! such an action intnnsically evil, but I see no great gain in
doing so” (McCormick 1979 [ong. 19721: 322). In fact, by the end of this discussion,
McCormick isolates lis own and his fellow proportionalists’ weak sense of intrinsic cvii
(i.e., intninsic cvii only in a pre-moral or non-moral sense) from the strong sense of intnnsic
evil (i.e., intrinsic cvii as an absolute unaffected by particular circumstances and choices)
held by other theologians (McCormick 1979 [ong. 1972]: 329). By contrast with Knauer’s
position, however, the question of what it would mean to intend pre-moral good or cvii was
stili an important question for McCormick (McCormick 1979 [ong. 19721: 296-297).
Moreover, regarding the shifi to a weak sense of intnnsic evil, McCormick says, “the
theological problem only begins here” (McCormick 1979 [ong. 1972]: 300). In other
words, “where exceptions are concemed the real problem is to show that there are higher
values involved, and what they might be ... [Othenvise] are we flot inviting people to
except themselves without providing any hienarchy which would make such a decision
rational, and therefore promotive of greater humanization” (McCormick 1979 [ong.
1972])?
In his 1973 lecture, Ambiguiiy in Moral Choice, we find a full articulation of
McCormick’ s version of the pnnciple of double effect. It includes several striking features,
for instance, the substitution of the directÏy voluntary/indirectly voluntaiy distinction for
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the foresight/intention distinction, the specification of conflict situations as the context for
the reasoning, the linkage between a “more or less necessary good” and “reluctantly caused
evil,” and the presence of “a proportionately grave reason” for “allowing” evil:
The distinction between what is directly voluntary and indirectly voluntary
has been a staple of Catholic moral thought for centuries. It bas been used to
face rnany practical conflict-situations where an evil can be avoided or a
more or less necessary good achieved only when another evil is reluctantly
caused. In such situations the evil caused as one goes about doing good bas
been viewed as justified or tolerable under a fourfold condition. (1) The
action is good or indifferent in itself, it is not morally evil. (2) The intention
of the agent is upnght, that is, the evil effect is sincerely flot intended. (3)
The evil effect must be equally immediate causally with the good effect, for
otherwise it would be a means to the good effect and would be intended. (4)
There must be a proportionately grave reason for allowing the evil to occur.
If these conditions are fuÏfilled, the resultant evil was referred to as an
‘unintended byproduct’ of the action, only indirectly voluntary and justifled
by the presence of a proportionately grave reason (McConnick 1985 [ong.
19731: 7).
Although McCormick indicates that he bas accepted “the substance” of Knauer’s
innovations at thïs point, McConnick identifies two problems, the fact that “the notions of
direct and indirect intention have become so utterly identifled with the existence of a
commensurate reason ... [that nol meaning [remains associated with] psychological intent,”
and that “Knauer does flot satisfactorily indicate the limitations of intention in determining
the meaning of concrete human actions” (McConTlick 1985 [ong. 1973]: 11-12). In
addition to bis desire to keep sorne forrn of direct and indirect intentionality and
proportionality together, McCormick also re-iterates bis reluctance to dismiss completely
any sense of intrinsic evil. Ris reluctance is expressed in his reservation of the term
“virtually exceptionless norrns,” for instance, the prohibition against killing (McCorrnick
1985 [ong. 19731: 50). He says, “Cleanly we have more to leam, but by that same token we
have leanned sornething already. We know, for instance, that killing of others is, except in
the most extreme and tragic circumstances, destructive of the humanum in every way, and
is therefore destructive of community. And there are other things that we know before the
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event ...“ (McCormick 1985 [ong. 19731: 17). In this lecture, McCormick gives content to
his insistence that direct and indirect intent stiil has meamng through bis distinction
between an intending and a permitting will. In other words, “the intending will (hence the
person) is more closely associated with the existence of evil than the merely permitting
will. Furthermore, I believe we must say that an intending will is more willing that the evil
be than is a permitting will” (McCormick 1985 [ong. 19731: 35-36). In order to distinguish
his perspective more precisely from Knauer’s, McCormick says that aÏthough “[KnauerJ
maintains that when the reason is proportionate ..., the evil caused or permitted is indirect,”
“I would prefer to say that the evil is direct or indirect depending on the basic posture ofthe
wiil, but that it is justified in either case if a genuinely proportionate reason ... is present”
(McCormick 1985 [ong. 1973]: 45).
McCormick also gives a preliminary definition of proportionate reason: “[ItJ means
three things: ta) a value at least equal to that sacrificed is at stake; (b) there is no iess
hannfui way of protecting the value here and now, [and] (c) the manner of its protection
here and now will flot undermine it in the long run” (McCormick 1985 [ong. 1973]: 45).
Inversely or negatively, McCormick says that “an action is disproportionate in any of the
foliowing circumstances: if a lesser value is preferred to a more important one; if evil is
unnecessarily caused in the protection of a greater good; [and] if, in the circumstances
[emphasis mine], the manner of protecting the good wiil undermine it in the long run”
(McCormick 1985 [ong. 1973]: 45). Once again, McCormick differentiates his notion of
proportionate reason from a simple utilitanan calculus, and this time, the crux of the
differentiation is bis defimtion of ‘in the circumstances’. In othen words,
a truly adequate account of the circumstances wiil read them to mean not
just how much quantitative good can be salvaged from an individual conflict
of values, but it will also weigbt the social implications and reverberating
aftereffects insofar as they can be foneseen. It wiil put the choice to the test
of generalizabiiity (‘Wbat if ail pensons in similar circumstances were to act
in this way’?). It will consider the cultural ciimate ... It will draw whatever
wisdom it can from past expenence and neflection, particuiarly as embodied
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in the rules peoples of the past have found a useful guide in difficuit times.
It will seek the guidance of others whose maturity, experience, reflection,
and distance from the situation offer a counterbalance to the self-interested
tendencies we ail expenence. It will allow the full force of one’s own
religious faith and its intentionalities to interpret the meamng and enlighten
the options of the situation. This is what an adequate and responsible
account of the circumstances must mean (McCormick 1985 [ong. 1973]:
46).
McCormick ends the lecture by concluding that the direct!indirect distinction “as
descriptive of the posture of the will [i.e., intending or permitting] toward a particular evil
only aids us in understanding what we are doing” (McConnick 1985 [ong. 19731: 50).
However, there is another consideration: “Whether the action so described represents
integral intentionality more generally and overali depends on whether it is, or is flot, ail
things considered, the lesser evil in the circumstances” (McCormick 1985 [ong. 19731: 50).
And what comprises ‘ail things considered’? Two central categories are included:
McCormick’s anthropology or his overali perspective on the human person, and his view of
the state of the world or the broader context within which ail human beings live and act. In
McCormick’s, Notes on Moral TheoÏogy. 1981 (McCormïck 1984b), McCormick explains
that bis anthropology denves ftom the teachings of Vatican II, specifically, the idea “that
‘human activity must be judged insofar as it refers to the human person integrally and
adequately considered’ “ (McCormick 19$4b: 49). For the content of ‘integrally and
adequately considered’, McCormick relies on the work of bis feliow proportionalist,
Belgian theologian Louis Janssens (1908 - 2002). Specifically, McCormick upholds the
eight aspects that comprise, for Janssens, “the human person in ail his/her essential aspects”
and correspondingly, the heart ofmorally right action:
The human person is (1) a subject (normally called to consciousness, to act
according to conscience, in freedom and in a responsible way). (2) A
subject in corporeality. (3) A corporeal subject that is part of the matenal
world. (4) Persons are essentially directed toward one another (only in
relation to a Thou do we become I). (5) Persons need to live in social
groups, with structures and institutions worthy of persons. (6) The human
person is caiied to know and worship God. (7) The human person is a
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historical being, with successive life stages and continuing new possibilities.
(8) Ail persons are ufferly original but fundamentally equal. Janssens then
formulates from these characteristics a general cnterion of the rightness or
wrongness of human actions. An act is morally right if, according to reason
enlightened by faith, it is beneficial to the human person ‘adequately
considered in himself (nn. I and 2) and in bis relations (nn. 3,4,5,6)’
(McCormick 1984b: 49-50).
McCormick’ s reflections in the general area specified by aspects 3-6 give us more
insight into his understanding of the functioning of double effect reasoning. Regarding a
person’s relation to God, McCormick explains in Notes on Moral Theology: 1980, that “the
nght end [of action] is communion with God,” and “that actions which unsuit us for
communion with God are morally wrong” (McCormick 1984a: 3). However, he asks this
key question: “how does one get from these very general assertions to the conclusion that
direct killing of the innocent aiways unsuits us for communion with God” (McCormick
1984a)? One way to reconcile the universals and particulars in this instance is what
McCormick calis “ecclesiastical positivism,” or the linking of universals and particulars on
the basis of “the Church says so” (McCormick 19$4a: 5). Not being in favour of this
option, McConnick suggests instead that we use double effect reasoning as he understands
it. Regarding the world at large, our relationships with each other and the
structures!institutions within which we live and act, he proposes that we have an
“understanding [ofi moral norms within the conflict model of human reality” (McCormick
1984a: 2). hi other words, “con±licted values mean that occasionally our choices (actions
or omissions) are inextricably associated with evil” (McCormick 1984a: 2). Within this
context, norms are more realistically envisioned as having “the provisional character of our
joumey into the future. They are an orienting force in a history which is both fulfilment
and promise” (McCormick 1984a: 2). Through this Yens, McCormick understands double
effect reasoning as “a set of exception-making categories” with which we face the conflicts
inherent in our human reality (McConnick 1984a: 10). Accordingly, the first condition of
double effect reasoning -- the notion that the proposed action flot be morally evil -- is also
viewed through the conflict mode! of human rea!ity, and the resu!t is an equivocal notion of
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evil, namely, pre-moral or non-moral evil. As explained by proportionalist Lisa Cahiil and
emphasized by McCormick in Notes on Moral TheoÏogy: 1980, evils of tbis type “ ‘are
“premoral” evils in that their sheer presence does flot necessarily make the total act or
relation of which they are a part “morally” evil or sinful’. There can be sufficient reason
for causing such premoral evil” (McCormick 1 984a: 11). Regarding the question of how
we know we are encountenng moral as opposed to premoral evil, McCormick proposes
three categories of knowledge and action: firstly, “we kiow from experience that certain
actions are counterproductive [e.g., robbery, violence, adultery}”; secondly, “there is a
second category of actions where we sense very strongly (sense of profanation, outrage,
intuition) that the actions are counterproductive”; and finally, “there are actions or
procedures where we know very liffle and must proceed to normative statements graduafly
by trial and error [e.g., DNA recombinant research and many technological maftersJ”
(McCormïck 1984a: 16).
In bis essay, The Principte of the Double Effect in How Brave a New World?,
McCormick identifies the principle as “a kind of code name to summanze the distinction
between what is said to be directly willed and what is said to be indirectly willed”
(McCormick 1981: 431). McCormick’s statement of the conditions of the pnnciple is
unchanged from his earlier articulation, and again, he perceives the context of the pnnciple
to be “many practical conflict situations where an evil can be avoided or a more or less
necessary good achieved only when another evil is reluctantly caused” (McCormick 1981:
431). In McCormick’s view, the problem of physicalism consists in the fact that whereas
“histoncally the terms ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ referred to the relationship of the will to the
evil inextncably associated with the agent’s action [, . . .1 as tïme passed, the ternis became
attached to certain physical actions
... In other words, the visible procedure began to define
the intentionality, rather than the over-afl intentionality defining the procedure”
(McCormick 1981: 433). Proportionalism is viewed by McCormick as a way of correcting
this problem insofar as proportionate reason is a means to express “the over-ali
intentionalïty” that has been minimalized by physicalism. The opponents of
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proportionalism (e.g., Boyle’s colleague, Grisez and Paul Ramsey) see it quite differently,
however. from their perspective, “the basic goods are incommensurable. Those who shifi
the major emphasis ... to proportionate reason are measuring the incommensurable. If one
aftempts to do that, he is unavoidably involved in a forrn of consequentialisrn” (McCormick
1981: 442). In this essay, McCormick has two responses to this charge. The first is a
question: If basic goods are incommensurable, why and for what role was proportionality
included in double effect reasoning in the first place? (McCorrnick 1981: 443). Secondly,
“while the basic goods are flot commensurable (one against the other), they are clearly
associated goods ... [For instance, regarding maniage and birth control,1 it is precisely
concem for the procreative good, but as related to and supported by [ernphasis mineJ the
communicative good that could lead to the conclusion that interference with fertility is
morally nght when necessary” (McCormick 1981: 445). Correspondingly, it is the
intending will that has the capacity to clanfy associations or relationships such as this:
where nonrnoral evils are concerned, the essential une of demarcation to be drawn ... is flot
between intending and permitting, as tradition understood these terms, but between
intending as an end on the one hand, and mtending as a means and permitting on the other”
(McCormick 1981: 446).
In A Comrnentaty on the Commentaries (McCormick 1985), McCormick reviews
and responds to commentanes on his earlier lecture, Ambiguity in Moral Choice. In this
essay, he re-states the problem. In response to the question, “how do we corne to tenns
with unavoidable evil?” (McCormick 1985: 195), the Catholic tradition has used the
directlindirect distinction to “[distinguishJ evil that is merely permitted from that which is
intended [and is thus morally illicitJ” (McCormick 1985: 195). The moral relevance ofthat
distinction has becorne a source of great disagreernent, and the problem is further
complicated because if we consider the two main moral systems in use, “flot only are the
terms deontological and teteotogicai (consequential) ... such huge umbrellas as to be
almost useless ..., but approaching the problem in this way leaves the problem of prime
concem ... incompletely or poorly analyzed” (McCormick 1985: 197). Within
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Catholicism, McCormick notes the histoncal inconsistency: “the understanding of moral
norms and exception making has been along teleological unes
... except in two instances:
killing of innocents and sexual conduct. In these two instances, there tvas appeal to a
special characteristic [i.e., lack of nght in the case of killing and unnaturalness in the case
of sexual conduct] that made doing these things evil in se” (McCormick 1985: 198). from
McCormick’s perspective, “if il can be shown or at least argued that doing the actions in
question is flot intrinsically evil, or, what is the same, that the special characteristics
appealed to are flot valid, the need to redouble the intention disappears -- or at least ... [it
disappears] as this need was understood in the tradition” (McCormick 1985: 198).
As already indicated, in dialogue with bis fellow proportionalists, McCormick has
been developing a replacement for the notion of intnnsic evil and the development
continues in this essay. The problem, as he re-states it, is that “an action invoïving evil is
too quickly classified as a moral evil” (McConnick 1985: 202). Classifying ‘intrinsic
evils’ as ‘pre-moral evils’ would solve the problem by clarifying that the moral evaluation
begins with the agent’s act, and flot with a pre-act classification of evil that may or may flot
be borne out in the actual act. Whether the pre-moral evil becomes moral evil depends on a
complex proportionality analysis and in this essay, McCormick sheds more light on that
analysis. Again, he differentiates it from consequentialism: “The phrase ‘proportionate
reason’ is not convertible with the notion of ‘better resuits’ or ‘net good’. Rather it means
that the value being sought will flot be undenuined by the contemplated action ... [e.g.,]
where there is a question of taking life, such taking is proportionate only if it is, ah things
considered, the better service of life irseif in the tragic circumstances” (McConriick 1985:
201). This is another example of McCormick’s notion of the association of, or the
interrelationship ofgoods, rather than a simple consequentiahist calculus.
The direct/indirect distinction stiil bas descriptive sigrnficance for McCormick: “It
describes what one is aiming at, with what means or with what collateral harm. That in
tum reveals to us the meaning of the action ... [whichj suggests to us which values (goods)
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are involved ... and how they are involved,” and that in tum leads us “to develop a
judgment of proportion” (McCormick 1985: 263). In addition, the moral relevance of the
distinction stili has a psychological component. As McCormick argued in Ambiguity in
Moral Choice, “the will relates differently to what it intends and permits” (McCormick
1985: 262). But now in agreement with Schûller, McCormick holds that “the moral
difference is located in the attitudes of approval or disapproval that are revealed in one or
the other [i.e., the intended or the permittedJ” (McCormick 1985: 263). furthermore,
necessity is an extremely important dimension of proportionate reason as McCormick
explains using the example of ‘killing’:
The sole remaining question (and the key question) is: when and on what
grounds must a killing action, for example, be said to be necesswy (namely,
if omitted, more harm to life wiIl be inevitable)? Obviously, life itself or a
value quite as urgent (adoption of a hierarchy) must be at stake. Killing for
lesser reasons is unnecessary and disproportionate. This is flot an object of
dispute ... My own suggestion, and hence my explication of a key aspect of
proportionate reason, is: when the killing is the only way imaginable to
prevent greater loss of life. When it is not the only way available, and the
evil could be avoided, even improbably, without causing the hann
(especially by a cessation from wrongdoing or the threat thereof on the part
of others); then causing the harm is unnecessaiy. Because there is not a
necessaiy connection between avoiding the evil or achieving the good and
intending harm as a means, other basic goods (for example, liberty) are
brought into play in using the harmful means. Because of the association of
basic goods, undermining one undermines others, and thus, the very value at
stake, for example, life, will suifer more if the killing is done. That is, the
action is disproportionate. Thus, whether or not the evil (nonmoral)
intended as a means is proportionate is determined flot quantitatively, but ah
things considered, by carefully weighing the association of basic goods
(McCormick 1985: 262).
Although McConnick did not publish specific reflections regarding a distinction
between ‘terminal sedation’ and euthanasia (i.e., to my knowledge), he did refer to
“omission vs. commission” and “killing vs. administenng pain-killers that could hasten
death” as “rather standard distinctions” (Cobb and McCormick 1997: 121). In the 1990s,
he published several works regarding euthanasialphysician-assisted suicide (McCormick
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1991; Cobb and McCormick 1997; McCormick 1997), and again, although these works do
not specify his proportionalist articulation of a distinction between pain control and lcilling,
they provide an illuminating starting point from which we can extrapolate how he might
have made such a distinction. We recail McCormick’s stress on ‘in the circumstances’, and
in these works, he gives an extensive presentation of contextual elements, particularly, the
cultural climate, the social implications, and the reverberating aftereffects surrounding the
public demand for physician-assisted suicide. In the background, of course, is his own
religious faith and its intentionalities that have undoubtedly alerted him to certain
circumstances and allowed others to remain less important. In all of these works, he
emphasizes “the absolutization of autonomy” and he says, for example, that “the symbolic
cheerleader for this absolutization is Dr. Jack Kevorkian” (Cobb and McCormick 1997:
114). In McCormick’s view, there are “two noxious offshoots” of this absolutization: “an
intolerance of dependence on others” (McConnick 1991: 1132) or “dignity as
independence” (Cobb and McConnick 1997: 115), and the fact that “very liftle thought is
given to the values that ought to inform and guide the use of autonomy” (McCormick 1991:
1132). Another important factor is “the seculanzation of medicine” (McCormick 1991:
1133), or “the divorce of the profession from those values that make of it a profession of
human service to others [rather than a businessJ” (McCormick 1997). Particularly relevant
to the issue of ‘terminal sedation’ is McCormick’ s stress on “the inadequate management of
pain”; “unfortunately,” he says, “just about everything about physicians’ treatment of pain
is, well, painful” (McCormick 1991: 1133). In this regard, he cites dismal statistics from a
1989 study regarding physicians’ lack of training in pain management and the high
percentage of undermedicated cancer patients.
Within the context of these circumstances (at the very least), and given what we
know about his proportionalism, it is possible to extrapolate how he might have
distinguïshed bePveen ‘ferhiinal sedation’ and euthanasia. Given his stress on the
confusion between fact-description and ‘alue-description, he may have tried to clarify both
the empirical facts and the values ifivo1d in vanous definitïons of ‘terminal sedation’ and
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‘euthanasia’, particularly, the association of both terms with ‘killing’. Regarding his view
“that killing of others is, except in the most extreme and tragic circumstances, destructive
of the hurnanum in every way and ïs therefore destructive of community” (McCormick
1985 [ong. 1973]: 17), he may have considered the tragic dimensions of ‘terminal sedation’
and pondered whether such sedation is destructive of the humanum in any ways and
therefore, destructive of community (e.g., the community closest to a particular patient, the
medical community, the larger public community). In view of his direct1indirect
distinction, he might have asked regarding particular cases of ‘terminal sedation’, what is
being aimed at and with what means and tvith what coilateral harm? What is being
approved of and disapproved of? Does the action so described represent integral
intentionality? Given ail of these considerations, he might then have been in a position to
articulate the meaning of such action(s) in terms of the values or goods involved and the
specific ways in which they were involved. Moving on to lis judgment of proportion,
McCormick might have asked whether ‘terminal sedation’ is truly necessary? Also, is life
itself or a value quite as urgent at stake and what precisely is at stake in these cases?
finally, is ‘terminal sedation’ the only way imaginable to prevent greater loss of life
(however defined and to whatever extent) in both the short term and the long term?
2.5. The Internretation of Elizabeth Anscombe
Although Professor Anscombe wrote a doctoral thesis when she was a postgraduate
philosophy student at Cambridge in the early 1940s, she declined to submit it because she
was flot satisfied wÏth it (Gormally 2002). Whether this decision reflected a streak of
perfectionism, a common female response within academia, or some other factors, we may
neyer know. However, il is clear that even without a submitted thesis, she became one of
the greatest British philosophers of the twentieth century. Although a complete
bibliography of her published work is flot yet available, it appears that she wrote her first
piece on double effect reasoning in 1939 and her last in 1982. As the Second World War
was just beginning, she co-authored, The Justice of the Fresent War Examined with
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Norman Daniel (Ariscombe and Daniel 1981 (ong. 1939)). In the introduction, we find
these words: “a war is flot made just by the fact that one’s enernies’ deeds are hateful.
Therefore it is our duty to resist passion and to consider carefulÏy whether ail the conditions
of a just war are satisfied in this present war, lest we sin against the natural law by
participating in it” (Anscombe and Daniel 1981 (ong. 1939): 72). In the view of these
authors, three conditions of a just war rernained to be fulfihled: “the intentions of our
govemment must be upright, both (1) as to means, and (2) as to ends, and (3) the probable
good effects of the war must outweigh the probable evil. If these conditions are flot
fulfihled, this war is rendered wrong” (Anscombe and Daniel 1981 (ong. 1939): 73).
Regarding the need for an “upright intention,” Anscombe and Daniel say, “the truth is that
the govemrnent’s professed intentions are not merely vague, but unlimited ... For
example,J they have talked about ‘sweeping away everything that Hitlerism stands for’ and
about ‘building a new order in Europe” (Anscombe and Daniel 1981 (ong. 1939): 75).
This focus on intention in the context of war seemingly precipitates a goal that would pre
occupy Anscombe for many years to corne: “we must try to elucidate, in however crude a
fashion, the doctrine of intention in hurnan acts” (Anscombe and Daniel 1981 (ong. 1939):
75).
Regarding means, although President Rooseveit had asked the Bnitish for a promise
not to attack civilians, the British response xvas basically: “We said that we should adhere
to international law on the matter, but that we reserved the right ‘to adopt appropriate
measures’ if the Germans should break it” (Anscombe and Daniel 1981 (ong. 1939): 76).
Since this response “[couldJ only mean that, given certain cincumstances, we should attack
civilians” (Anscombe and Daniel 1981 (ong. 1939): 76), the response was flot indicative of
a just war. Indeed, although “it has been argued that it is justifiable to attack civilians
because their death is an example of ‘double effect’, ... this is no example of double effect,
which is exemplified when an action designed to produce one effect produces another ... by
accident” (Anscombe and Damel 1981 (ong. 1939): 78). Another problem was the Bnitish
blockade that prevented the delivery of food to Gerrnany: “As we have seen, our
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govemment does intend to do that which ïs unlawfuÏ, and it is already blockading Gennany
with intent to starve the national life. The present war is therefore wrong on account of
means” (Anscombe and Daniel 1981 (ong. 1939): 79). Regarding the requirernent that the
probable good effects of a war must outweigh its probable evil ones, the article ends with
the following indictment:
There is a widespread tendency to make what our countl-y chooses to do, the
critenon of what may be done, and to call this patriotism. So a war against
totalitananism produces a totalitanan tendency; flot only are morals lowered,
but the very theory of morals is corrupted
... Already men are taiking of
Gennany as a pariah nation; they are already saying that she must
henceforward be kept down and neyer allowed to becorne powerful again.
Then after the war, what prospects have we, but of greater poverty,
greater difficulties, greater rnisery than ever, for a space; until just another
such war will break out. Such are the probable evil effects; and they greatly
outweigh the good effects of putting an end to the injustices of Germany at
the present day, since we have so littie hope of substituting anything for
them but other injustices (Anscombe and Daniel 1981 (ong. 1939): 81).
Between works wherein Anscombe analyzes and applies double effect reasoning in
its entirety more or less, we find pieces in which she focuses on individual elements of, or
issues pertinent to double effect reasoning, for example, the complex relationship between
acts and their descriptions, intention, causality and deterrnination, and the influence of
consequentialism. In her classic text, Intention, she differentiates three distinct senses of
intention: “Very ofien, when a man says ‘1 am going to do such-and-such’, we should say
that this was an expression of intention [i.e., an intention of acting, emphasis mine]. We
also sometimes speak of an action as intentional [emphasis mine], and we may also ask
with what intention the thing was donc [i.e., an intention in acting, emphasis mine]
(Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 1). Action can be intentional “without any intention in it”
and “without being concemed with the future in any way” (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957):
1). By contrast, “an expression of intention is a description of something future in which
the speaker is sorne sort of agent, which description he justifies (if he does justify it) by
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reasons for acting, sc. reasons why it would be useful or attractive if the description came
true, flot by evidence that it is true” (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 6).
One of the most important and most frequently quoted aspects of Anscombe’s view
of intention is that intentional actions are those “to which a certain sense of the question
‘Why?’ is given application; the sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive,
gives a reason for acting” (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 9). Anscombe vehemently asserts
that it is flot the physical causal sense of the question ‘Why?’ that interests her: “the
question lias flot [the pertinent meamng] if the answer is evidence or states a cause,
including a mental cause” (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 24) (see also Anscombe 1969
(ong. 1957): 15, 34-35). Anscombe also differentiates between motives and intentions: “A
man’s intention is what lie aims at or chooses; lis motive is what determines the aim or
choice [but again, not in a physical causal sense]” (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 18-20).
As Anscombe explains in her later work, “To regard ... any case of choice as a
predetermimng causal event now appears as a naïve mistake in the philosophy of mmd”
(Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1971): 145). The error of regarding anything as a predetermining
causal event involves the mistaken identification of necessitation with causation. In other
words, “through [the necessity of laws of nature] we shah be able to derive knowledge of
the effect from knowledge of the cause, or vice versa, but that does not show us the cause
as source of the effect. Causation, then, is flot to be identified with necessitation”
(Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1971): 136). Regarding “the explanation of action by intention,”
Anscombe says that “it does flot propenly corne under my titie, ‘the causation of action’ --
at any rate as modems, rather than Anstotelians, understand the term ‘causation’
(Anscombe 1983: 189-190). Rather, it cornes under the consideration of “causalities
especially involved in a history of people’s deahings with one another ... The first thing to
note is: these causalities are rnostly to be understood derivatively [ernphasis mine]
from the understanding of action as intentional, calculated, voluntaiy, impulsive,
involuntary, reluctant, .. . etc. ... [in other words,] we apply such conceptions of what
people are engaged in” (Anscombe 1983: 190).
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The relationship between act-descriptions, intentions and truth is extremely
compiex, as is illustrated by Anscombe’s example ofthe “man [whoJ is pumping water into
the cistem which supplies the drinking water of a house” (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957):
37). The man’s action could be represented by four completely different descriptions: (a)
lie is moving his arm up and down; (b) he is operating the pump; (c) he is replenishing the
water supply and (d) he is poisoning the inhabitants of the house (Anscombe 1969 (ong.
1957): 40). Anscombe asks: “What is the man doing? What is the description of his
action” (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 37)? The description is in fact, “alzy description of
what is going on, with him as subject, which is true” (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 37).
However, flot ail true descriptions describe intentional actions: “ ‘He is X-ing’ is a
description of an intentional action if ta) it is true and (b) there is such a thing as an answer
in the range I have defined to the question ‘Why are you X-ing?’ “(Anscombe 1969 (ong.
1957): 38). By “in the range I have defined,” Anscombe means certain cntena, for
exampie, “in order for it to be possible to say that an agent does P in order that Q, 17e must
treat an acknowledgement of ‘But if P, Q won’t happen’ as incompatible with his having
that intention in acting” (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): vi).
Even if ‘He is X-ing’ is a true description of intentional action, we can stili ask, as
Anscombe does, “Are there as many actions and as many intentions as there are such
descriptions” (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): vi)? In the case of the man pumping water
where we can ask whether there are four intentions or only one (e.g., the poisomng),
Anscombe says that the intentions are related as means to an end: “When we speak of four
intentions, we are speaking of the character of being intentionai that beiongs to the act in
each of the four descriptions; but when we speak of one intention, we are speaking of
intention with which; the Iast term we give [emphasis mineJ in such a series gives the
intention with which the act in each of its other descriptions was done, and this intention so
to speak swaliows up ail the preceding intentions with which eariier members of the series
were done ... When terms are related in this fashion, they constitute a series of means, the
last term of which is, just by being given as the last, so far treated as end” (Anscombe 1969
125
(ong. 1957): 46-47). Regarding truth daims and how they relate to complex act
descriptions and intentions, Anscombe says that although “we can find cases where only
the man himself can say whether he had a certain intention or flot, they are further limited
by this: he cannot profess flot to have had the intention of doing the thing that was a means
to an end of bis” (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 44). Moreover, “the idea that one can
determine one’s intentions by making ... a littie speech to oneseif is obvious bosh”
(Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 42). For example, even if the man pumping water told
himself that lie was only doing bis job when in fact, he was poisoning the inhabitants ofthe
house, the truth of bis daim would stiil be subject to extemal tests such as the relationship
between the publicly defined (or definable) elements of bis job and empinca! observations
of what he was doing (or had done) (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 47). Regarding the
empincal dimension of intention, Anscombe answers the question, “how do we tel!
someone’s intentions?” by saying, “if you want to say at least some true things about a
man’s intentions, you will have a strong chance of success if you mention what he actually
did or is doing. For whatever else lie may intend, or wliatever may be his intentions in
doing what he does, the greater number of the tbings which you would say straight off a
man did or was doing, will be things he intends” (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 7-8).
The linkage between act-descnptions, intentions and truth is defimtely not the same
type of linkage as that associated with premises and conclusions of logical arguments. In
fact, Anscombe complains that modem philosophy has “blankly misunderstood ... what
ancient and medieval philosophers meant by practical knowledge[.J Certainly in modem
philosophy we have an incornigibly contemplative conception of knowledge. Knowledge
must be something that is judged as such by being in accordance with the facts. The facts,
reality, are prior, and dictate what is to be said, if it is knowledge” (Anscombe 1969 (ong.
1957): 57). Anscombe expresses the same problem in other words when she says, “There
is a difference of form between reasoning leading to action [i.e., practical reasonJ and
reasoning for the truth of a conclusion [i.e., speculatïve reason] (Anscombe 1969 (ong.
1957): 60). Whereas speculative reasoning is essentially concemed with universals,
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“practical reasoning [i.e., in Aristotle’s viewj is essentially concemed with ‘what is capable
of tuming out variously’ “or what is “the form of a calculation [of] what to do” (Anscombe
1969 (ong. 1957): 60). Using one of Aristotle’s examples in the context of healthy eating,
Anscombe says that there is a difference between the speculative recognition that “here is a
type of food that is good for me,” and the practical decision “so I’ll have some” or “so I’d
better have some” (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 61). Moreover, “the role of ‘wanting’ in
the practical syllogism is quite different from that of a premise. It is that whatever is
descnibed in the proposition that is the starting-point of the argument must be wanted [my
emphasisJ in order for the reasoning to lead to any action” (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957):
66). In other words, it is one thing for a conclusion to be shown to be true, but it is quite
another thing for a person to want the true thing. Furthermore, Anscombe says that “a
chief mark of an idie wish is that a man does nothing -- whether he could or no -- towards
the fulfilment ofthe wish” (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 67).
There is an important connection between wishing/wanting and knowledge.
Essentially, a concept lias to be formed or envisaged before it can be made the object of a
wish. In Hamlet’s case, for example, Anscombe says, “once the concept ‘revenge’ exists it
can be made the object, as with Hamlet. We must aiways remember that an object is flot
what what is aimed at is; [ratherj the description under which it is aimed at is that under
which is is caÏled the object” (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 66). From these sorts of
reflections, Anscombe concludes that “there are two features present in wanting; movement
towards a thing and knowledge (or at least opinion) that the thing is there” (Anscombe
1969 (ong. 1957): 6$). Anscombe also discusses the relationship between wanting and
goodness: “Goodness is ascribed to wanting in virtue of the goodness (flot the
actualization) of what is wanted; whereas fruth is ascnbed immediately to judgments, and
in virtue of what actually is the case. But again, the notion of ‘good’ that has to be
intnoduced in an account of wanting is flot that of what is really good but of what the agent
conceives to be good ...“ (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 76). Anscombe’s views regarding
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the reiationship between wanting, knowledge and goodness have profound implications for
ethics:
So what can the practical syllogism have to do with ethics? It can only
corne into ethical studies if a correct philosophical psychology is requisite
for a phulosophïcal system of ethics: a view which I believe I should
maintain if I thought of tlying to construct such a system, but which I
believe is flot generally current. I am flot saying that there cannot be any
such thing as moral general premises, such as ‘People have a duty of paying
their employees promptly’,
...; obviously there can, but it is clear that such
general premises will only occur as premises of practical reasoning in people
who want to do their duty.1 The point is very obvious, but lias been obscured
by the conception of the practical syllogism as of its nature ethical, and thus
as a proof about what one ought to do, which somehow naturally culminates
in action. [Re:] ‘ It is worth remarking that the concepts of ‘duty’ and
‘obligation’, and what is now called the ‘moral’ sense of ‘ought’, are
survivais from a law conception of ethics. The modem sense of ‘moral’ is
itself a tate denvative ftom these survivais. None of these notions occur in
Aristotie. The idea that actions which are necessary if one is to conform to
justice and the other virtues are requirements of divine law was found
among the Stoics, and became generaiiy current through Christianity, whose
ethical notions corne from the Torah (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 78).
In Modem Moral fhilosophy, Anscombe re-iterates her cali for an up-to-date
phulosophy of psychology, and she states lier conviction that “the concepts of obligation
and duty ... ought to be jeffisoned” because they denve from a Judeo-Christian conception
of ethics “which no longer generally survives” (Anscombe 1958: 1). She also asserts that
English philosophers from Sidgwick to her day ail share in common the denial of the
Judeo-Christian view of ethics, especialiy the notion “that there are certain things forbidden
whatever consequences threaten, such as: choosing to kili the innocent for any purpose,
however good; vicanous punishment; treacheiy
...; idolatry; sodomy; adultery ... [in other
words,J the prohibition of certain things simply in virtue of their description as such-and
sucli identifiable kinds of action ...“ (Anscombe 1958: 10). Anscombe introduces and
attaches the label, consequentiaÏism, to this demal of Judeo-Christian ethics, and she attacks
what she considers to be “the most important thing about Sidgwick [i.e.,] his definition of
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intention [namely, the ideaJ that one must be said to intend any foreseen consequences of
one’s voiuntary action” (Anscombe 1958: 11).
Anscombe identifies many problems with this view. It is a denial of personal moral
responsibility insofar as one considers oneself responsible only for the consequences that
one foresees, and not for “the actuaÏ consequences of the most disgraceful actions”
(Anscombe 195$: 12). “It is a shallow philosophy” because there are no foundational
criteria for permissibility or impermissibility other than foreseen consequences (Anscombe
1958: 12-13). The foreseen consequences are typically evaluated on the basis of
conventional societal standards, and this is problematic because “the chance that a whole
range of conventional standards will be decent is small” (Anscombe 1958: 13). Moreover,
consequentialism leads to seif-legislation or seif-determination, and although “whatever
you do ‘for yourself may be admirable[j it is not legislating”; in other words, “the search
for ‘norms’ might lead ... one to eat the weaker according to the laws of nature, but would
hardly lead anyone nowadays to notions ofjustice” (Anscombe 1958: 13-14). Anscombe’s
empliasis on justice here is flot coincidental, but is an integral part of lier proposai for a new
philosophy of psychology that takes shape in this article. One central required element is
“an account of what type of characteristic a virtue is -- a problem, flot of ethics, but of
conceptual analysis -- and how it relates to the actions in which it is instanced: a matter
which I think Aristotie did flot succeed in really making clear” (Anscombe 1958: 5). Other
important elements include an account of “action,” “intention,” “pleasure,” “wanting,”
“human nature,” and “the concept of virtue [itself]” (Anscombe 1958: 14-15). If these
fundamentals were to be developed, it would lead to a “great improvement,” specifically,
the transition ftom naming something “morally wrong” to the practice of using terms such
as “untruthful,” “unchaste,” and “unjust” (Anscombe 195$: 9). What Anscombe is
suggesting here is that we “look for ‘norms’ in human virtues,” and just as a complete set of
teeth is the norm for teeth, a complete set of virtues is the norm constitutive of overali
human flourishing (Anscombe 1958: 14).
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In War and Murder (Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1961)), Anscombe retums to her
analysis of the use of double effect reasoning. In the face of the perpetual need to exercise
force to combat violence and crime within and between societies, Anscombe asks: “what is
a just attitude to this exercise of violent coercive power on the part of rulers and their
subordinate officers” (Anscombe 1981 (ong. 196f))? She considers three possible
responses: first, the idea that “the world is an absolute jungle” and that the force used to
combat violence and crime is rnerely an integral part of the jungle; secondly, the pacifist
idea that such violence is objectionable; and finally, “that it is both necessary and nght that
there should be this exercise of power, that through it the world is much less of a jungle
than it could possibly be without it, so that one should in pnnciple be glad of the existence
of such power, and only take exception to its unjust exercise” (Anscombe 1981 (ong.
1961): 51). Anscombe holds that pacifism “is an illusion, which would be fantastic if it
were flot so familiar” (Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1961): 51). By the same token, “society is
essential to human good; and society without coercive power is generally impossible”
(Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1961): 52). For these reasons, Anscombe concludes that the
problem is flot the exercise of force in itself, but rather, “the principal wickedness” of
“killing the innocent” (Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1961): 53).
In the context of war, “the innocent” usually comprise “people whose mere
existence and activity supporting existence by growing crops, making clothes, etc.,
constitute an impediment to [combatants]” (Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1961): 53). By contrast,
“what is required, for the people aftacked to be non-innocent in the relevant sense, is that
they should themselves be engaged in an objectively unjust proceeding which the attacker
has the right to make his concern” (Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1961): 53). “The attacker”
Anscombe has in mmd here is a mien or his delegate, and it is only to such a person that
“the nght to attack with a view to killing normally belongs” (Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1961):
53). The general immorality of murder is flot at issue here, that is, murder defined as “the
deliberate killing of the innocent, whether for its own sake or as a means to some fuflher
end” (Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1961): 53). What Anscombe critiques are the attempts oflen
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made to defend the moral pennissibility of murder so defined, when it is carried out in the
specific context of self defence. From Anscombe’s double effect reasoning-based
perspective, “the plea of seif-defence (or the defence of someone else) ... must in
conscience -- even if flot in law -- be a plea that the death ofthe other was flot intended, but
was a side effect of the measures taken to ward off the attack” and again, “the deliberate
choice of inflicting death in a struggie is the nght only of ruling authonties and their
subordinates” (Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1961): 54). In response to those who might have
opposing points of view and dismiss the use of double effect reasoning in this way,
Anscombe says, “the denial of [double effect reasoning] has been the corruption of non
Catholic thought, and its abuse the corruption of Catholic thought” (Anscombe 1981 (ong.
1961): 54).
Anscombe recogrnzes the potential for controversy and abuse insofar as the
foresight/intention distinction is problematic: “The distinction is evidently a fine one in
some cases ... yet in other cases the distinction is very clear” (Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1961):
54). One of the “very clear” cases is in fact, pain control: “In the case of the
administration of a pain-relieving drug in mortal illness, where the doctor knows the drug
may very well kiil the patient if the illness does flot do so first, the distinction is evident
eveiyone understands that it is a veiy different thing so to admimster a drug, and to
administer it with the intention of killing” (Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1961): 54-55). Within
the Christian and Catholic context, Anscombe argues that “double-think about double
effect” is tied to the lack of recognition regarding the necessity of double effect reasoning
in relation to absolute norms. In other words, “Christiamty forbids a number of things as
being bad in themselves. But if I am answerable for the foreseen consequences of an action
or refusai, as much as for the action itself, then these prohibitions wiIl break down [i.e.,
become senseless and unwieldy]” (Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1961): 58). In addition, “without
understanding of this principie, anything can be -- and is wont to be -- justified and the
[absolute prohibitions go] by the board” (Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1961): 58). In
Anscombe’s view, double effect reasoning “has been repeatedly abused from the
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seventeenth centuiy up tili now” (Anscombe 1981 (ong. 196f): 58). Again, the problem is
“Cartesian psychology” according to which, “an intention was an intenor act of the mmd
which could be produced at wiil ... You only had to ‘direct your intention’ in a suitable
way. In practice, this means making a littie speech to yourself’ (Anscombe 1981 (ong.
1961): 58-59). Particularly heinous examples include “the devout Catholic bomber [whoJ
secures by a ‘direction of intention’ that any shedding of innocent biood ... is ‘accidentai’,
and the idea “that it was an accident that the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were there
to be kilied” (Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1961): 59). Furthermore, although there will be
borderline cases in which it is difficuit to discern whether some effect is truly incidentai,
“the obliteration bombing of a city is not a bordenline case” (Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1961):
59).
In subsequent publications, Anscombe adds more clarity to her view of the compiex
relationship between the mmd, intentions, acts and act-descriptions. In Events in die Mmd,
she explains that the problematic Cartesian view of intention can be summed up as follows:
“[Descartes] calied volitions and intentions ‘ideas’ -- thus assimilating ‘I have an idea’ to ‘I
have a cogitatio’ and treating ail as if they were contents of expenencing, as if ‘I intend’
were the report of an experience-content called an ‘intention’, [and as if] ‘I see blue’ [were]
a report of an experience-content called a ‘sensation’ “(Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1963): 61).
Anscombe’s solution of this assimilation problem involves the conclusion that it would be
better to differentiate “three different kinds of mental report[sJ”:
first, there are reports of expenences -- sensations and images -- which may
be called occurrences and which have contents. Second, there are reports of
intention, understanding, knowledge and belief; it is characteristic of these
that though one may have intended, etc., something at a certain time, that
does flot require that what one intended, etc. at that time be before one’s
mmd at that time. Here intention, understanding, knowledge and belief are
flot events [emphasis mine]; nor need they be started off by a forming of
intention, an occurrence of insight, an occasion of ieaming or an initiai
judgement. finally, there is thought of or that, such and such. This is an
event [emphasis mine], but not an expenience; what we call its content is
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given by words which do flot describe an inner experience (unless that is
what the thought was about) but which have their pnmary application
(Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1963): 63).
Not only is intention not an event in the mmd for Anscombe, but acts are not events.
In “Under a Description “, she explains that “if one says that one and the same action
may have many descriptions [e.g., the man pumping watenl, it is sometimes supposed that
this must be said in the light of a theory of event-identity [e.g., that of Davidson or
DonaganJ. Now this appears to me no more true than that one can say one and the same
man may satisfy many different definite descriptions in the light of a theory of human
identity. There may be different theories of human identity, yielding different resuits in
curious describable cases” (Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1979): 210). Similanly, conceming
action, Anscombe says:
I may seem to have let myseif off too easy, not giving any account of the
‘individuation’ of actions or events. But it is not possible to do that, if it
means fixing cntenia for what is a single action or event. This is a natural
consequence of the uncountability which is characteristic of the concept of
action or event. On the other hand, suppose we take a countable concept of
an action or event like, say, administenng poison. Such an event will spiit
up into a lot of sub-events or sub-actions; there might even be a gap in the
process, which yet counts as one administration of poison -- the
administration being interrupted, say, by a fit of coughing on the part of the
administerer. However, we are willing to count the whole episode as just
one time that person administered poison, one administration. So here we
have one action, and if what happons in consequence of it without any
further contribution from the administerer yieÏds reports using active verbs,
‘poisoned NN’, ‘killed NN’, which are true of him, the latter at least will
yield a defimte description of an action on bis part, which is satisfied by that
one original act of administenng poison. There is here no promise of a
theory of what is absolutely one and what are many actions and events;
rather it appears that there is no such thing (Anscombe 1981 (ong. 1979):
216).
In 1982, The American Catholic Philosophical Association awarded Anscombe its
twenty-sixth Aquinas Medal. Upon receiving the award, she gave a speech that was later
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published under the titie, MedaÏist ‘s Address. Action, Intention and ‘Double EJfect’
(Anscombe 1982). In this address, she reminds her readers that “some scholastics”
distinguished “between ‘human action’ -- actus hurnanus
-- and ‘act of a human being’ --
actus hominis,” the latter covenng examples such as “idly stroking one’s beard, or idly
scratching one’s head tboth of whichJ may be an ‘act of a human being’ without being a
‘human act’ “(Anscombe 1982: 12). Her main point is that this distinction does not mean
“that ‘moral’ [stands] for an extra ingredient which some human actions have and some do
not”; on the contrary, her thesis is that “ail human action is moral action. It is ail either
good or bad. (It may be both) ... [In other words,] it may be good only in a certain respect
[e.g., genericallyj, and bad in others” (Anscombe 1982: 13, 15). Stili, she says that “flot ah
human-action descriptions are moral action-descriptions [i.e., descriptions “at least
suggesting some specific goodness or badness about an act that fails under it”J” (Anscombe
1982: 14). In other words, there are neutral or “indfferent human-action descriptions,” for
example, “ ‘Chucking a pebble into the sea’, ‘Picking a flower’ [or] ‘wahking’ “(Anscombe
1982: 14).
In making these distinctions and especiahly stressing the point that ‘moral’ is flot an
‘add-on’ to human actions, Anscombe is critiquing two specific restrictive trends. Her first
example is the work of Donald Davidson that “suggests that we have an action (in the
restricted sense) if what is donc (no restriction on the ordinary sense here) is intentional
under some description” (Anscombe 1982: 12). Anscombe’s critique is as foilows: “I am
inclined to think that the aflempt, brave as it was, was misconceived anyway. There is a
goal in view when people want to introduce a restricted sense of ‘action’, but I don’t think
it can be attained by trying to find a charactenzation of a sub-class of events” (Anscombe
1982: 12). Her second critique is aimed at those who would distinguish between ‘cvii’ and
‘pre-moral evil’, or evil in a restricted sense. She says, “The idea that a human action could
be called a ‘pre-moral evil’, or evil in a pre-moral sense, is extremely confused ... [e.g.,]
Death is an cvii, and a kiiling (of a human by a human) may flot be a wicked action. for it
may be blamelessly accidentai and so, it is suggested, a ‘pre-moral cvii’. The amount of
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truth there is in this conclusion consists in this: the description ‘killing someone’ niay be
the description of an aci ofa human being (actus hominis) without descnbing a hunzan act
(actus humanus)
-- as when I was a parcel rolling down the hill. [ButJ note that when it is
the description of an act of a human being, even though flot of a human act, it is stili a
moral action-description” (Anscombe 1982: 17). In other words, “indeterminateness of
description does flot signify an indeterminateness in the quality ofthe human act ... Murder
ïs a complex concept with many disparate elements in it. But you don’t have 10 know what
some pnvate person killed his uncie for [emphasis mine] in order to know he commiffed
murder, so long as he was awake, compos mentis and was doing the killing on purpose”
(Anscombe 1982: 18). Similarly, “there are several kinds of action which, if they are done
intentionally, are evidently evil actions, no matter what they are done for” (Anscombe
1982: 20).
Nonetheiess, some distinctions need to be made and for this reason, double effect
reasoning is Ïmportant. In other words, “One cannot say that no action may be done which
foreseeably or probably leads to some death, or that ail such actions are murderous. Why,
the very begetting of a child would be murder at that rate ... And much that is done in
medicine and surgery is done knowing it involves the nsk of death -- pain-killing dmgs
which may kili the patient before his disease does, and high risk surgery” (Anscombe 1982:
20). In cases of this type, Anscombe suggests that “what we are taiking about is death as a
side-effect which is brought about as well as the effect being aimed at. I will eau it the
‘pnnciple of side-effects’ that the prohibition on murder does flot cover ail bnnging about
of deaths which are flot intended. Not that such death aren’t often murder. But the quite
clear and certain prohibition on intentional killings
... does not catch you when your action
brings about an unintended death” (Anscombe 1982: 21).
Again, Anscombe repeats her dismissal ofthe abuse of ‘directing intentions’ and the
idea that “the intentionalness of an action can’t be known to anyone but the agent”
(Anscombe 1982: 18): “M act does not merely have many descriptions, under some of
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which it is indeed flot intentional: it has several under which it is intentional. So you
cannot choose just one of these, and daim to have excluded others by that. Nor can you
simply bring it about that you intend tÏzis and flot that by an inner act of ‘directing your
intention’. Circumstances, and the immediate facts about the means you are choosing to
your ends, dictate what descriptions of your intention [i.e., regarding the means you are
performing] you must admit” (Anscombe 1982: 23). In this address, Anscombe stresses the
modesty or the limitations of the ‘principle of side effects’. For example, “it says ‘where
you must flot aim at someone’s death[,J causing it does flot necessariÏy incur guilt”
(Anscombe 1982: 21); in addition, “it does flot say when you may foreseeably cause death”
(Anscombe 1982: 22); and “this principle telis you rather what you can’t do than what you
can” (Anscombe 1982: 24). Notions of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ only add to these problems:
‘Direct’ and ‘indirect’ are dodgy terms; somefimes they relate to offshoots, as it were,
from a given sequence of causes, and sometimes to immediacy or remoteness, and
sometimes to what is intended or flot” (Anscombe 1982: 22). For ail these reasons,
Anscombe concludes that the pnnciple of side effects is flot sufficient for the task with
which it is usualÏy associated, and she adds what she thinks is needed: “Having accepted
the pnnciple of side effects, we need some further principle or principles on which to judge
the unintended causing of death. There is one which both seems obvious and covers a good
many cases[:] The intrinsic certainty ofthe death ofthe victim, or its great likelihood from
the nature ofthe case ...“ (Anscombe 1982: 24). By contrast, what she cannot accept is the
proportionalists’ “principle of the balance of good over evil in the expected upshot”
(Anscombe 1982: 24).
From 1978-1981, Professor Anscombe was a member of the Working Party
assembled by the Linacre Centre for Health Care Ethics to study ethical issues surrounding
euthanasia. Within Book One ofthe group’s final report, Euthanasia, Clinical Practice and
the Law (Gormally 1994 (ong. Book One: 1982): 3-108), Anscombe (in conversation with
other group members) wrote most of the third chapter, Murder and the Moralzty of
Euthanasia: Some Philosophical Considerations (i.e., sections 5 and 6 of this chapter were
n
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written largely by John Finnis) (Gormally 2002). Anscombe indicates that although
“murder is a complex of disparate elements,” “the intentionul kitÏing ofthe innocent ... [isj
the hard core ofthe concept” (Gormally 1994 (or. Book One: 1982): 37-38). Regarding
“murder where the death of the victim is a side-effect,” she recognizes that “these cases
constitute a penumbra or fuzzy area surrounding the central areas of murder, intentional
killing” (Gormally 1994 (or. Book One: 1982): 48). A central issue in these cases is risk
management, and as Anscombe indicated in the previous Address, “flot ail deliberate action
involving risk can be prohibited. So it must be possible to have sufficient excuse for
risking or accepting death as a side-effect. This is readily grasped in the case of doctors
giving pain-killing drugs” (Gormally 1994 (ong. Book One: 1982): 48). Again, Anscombe
explains that the ‘principle of double effect’ is limited as a tool for discerning and
negotiating risks: “The pninciple of the side effect merely states a possibility: where you
may flot aim at sorneone’s death, causing it does flot necessarily incur guiÏt -- it can be that
there are necessities which in the circumstances are great enough ... to provide a valid
excuse for nsking or accepting that you cause death. Without such excuse, foreseeable
killing is either murder or manslaughter” (GormaÏly 1994 (ong. Book One: 1982): 48).
Not unlike ber previous Address, this chapter includes further pninciples or cntena
which could be used to differentiate murder from the unintended causing of death. One
proposed criterion is “the immediacy and intrinsic certainty of the death of the victim”
(Gormally 1994 (ong. Book One: 1982): 49). Another proposai is the notion ofnecessity
as an exonerating plea, but use of this cnterion is flot without problems. For example,
although necessity may justify a State’s killing of a person who poses a danger to the
common good, “civil authority cannot make it policy to decide on or license the killing of
innocent people without losing the character of civil authonity” (Gormally 1994 (ong. Book
One: 1982): 40). Moreover, even if ail could agree concerning the inclusion of a critenon
of necessity, the ‘principle of double effect’ “does flot say what necessities excuse
foreseeably causing death” (Gormally 1994 (ong. Book One: 1982): 49). Finally, in the
medical context, flot unlike other contexts, “necessity is a highly relative term”: -
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We invoke the necessity of relieving pain when we accept the risk of giving
pain-killing drugs, but where the risk is considerable we shah allow it only
in cases of terminal illness. It is appropnate to recali here that it is an axiom
of medical practice that even in the most extreme situations, the least drastic
remedy should be employed. There are graduations and shadings when
there is a companson to be made bePveen the importance of ends being
sought and the risks to life, as also in the circumstances which affect the
companson, and there are also graduations of uncertainty and remoteness
(Gormally 1994 (ong. Book One: 1982): 50).
2.6. The Interpretation of Christopher Kaczor
Kaczor’s doctoral thesis, Thomas Aquinas and ProportionaÏism: An Evaluation of
Their Compatibitity (Kaczor 1996), appears to be the first book-length work to examine
proportionalism in relation to Aquinas’ thouglit. In Kaczor’s explanation ofthe onginality
of his thesis, he says that although “[hisJ dissertation could flot encompass the whole of St.
Thomas’s thought in depth, it will touch upon and synthesize elements that oflen are either
ignored or treated separately, such as his account of the final end, intention, law, and
charactenzation of action. The virtues in particular have been marginalized ... in the
contemporary discussion of proportionalism and St. Thomas ...“ (Kaczor 1996: 11).
Kaczor’s study of Aquinas’, De MaÏo (On Evil), plays a particulanly important role in
Kaczor’s companison of Aquinas’ treatment of evil with that of proportionalists. Since
there are significant differences among proportionalists and proportionalism is not
generahly considered to be a unified system, Kaczor takes as his reference point, lames J.
Walter’s definition of proportionalism in Richard McBnien’s, Encyctopedia ofCathoÏicisrn
(Walter 1995). Kaczor sets out this definition “so that the individual versions of the theory
may be made more intelligible in light ofthis general undenstanding”:
[Proportionalism is] a type of analysis for detenmimng the objective moral
nghtness and wrongness of actions in conflict situations and procedure for
establishing exceptions to behavioural norms ... The proponents make a
distinction between moral and premoral values/disvalues. Moral values and
disvalues describe the qualities of persons as they confiont situations
Premoral evils or disvalues refer to the harms, lacks, depnvations, etc., that
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occur in, or as a result of, human agency, e.g., death. Premoral values refer
to those conditïoned goods that we pursue for human and non-human well
being, e.g., life, health, etc. This distinction is used by proportionalists in
their application of the principle of proportionate reason ... First, the word
‘reason’ means a premoral, i.e., a condïtioned, and thus flot absolute, value
that an agent seeks to promote in the whole act. Second, the tenn
‘proportionate’ refers to a proper relation that must exist between the
premoral disvalues(s) contained in, or caused by, the means and the end or a
proper relation between the end and the premoral disvalue(s) in the
consequences of the act. In making exceptions to negative behavioural
norms, e.g., no killing, proportionate reason is used to discern if the
premoral disvalue contained in, or caused by, the means (killing) stands in
due proportion to the premoral value in the act (seif-defense). If a
proportionate reason is present, the norm as stated does flot apply to this act
under its terms of reference. Exceptions to behavioural norms that prohibit
premoral evil, then, are made on the basis of the presence of a proportionate
reason (Kaczor 1996: 1-2).
For Kaczor, what is problematic in proportionalism so defined is the fact that for
both Aristotie and Aquinas, “flot only does man act for an end, but man lias a final end”
(Kaczor 1996: 24). In other words, Aristotie holds that “happiness consists in activity in
accord with virtue,” and for Aquinas, “happiness is operation in accord with perfect virtue”
(Kaczor 1996: 28). Foltowing Aquinas, Kaczor differentiates two spheres of human
activity, intransitive and transitive. Intransitive activity or actio in Aquinas’ terminology, is
“activity that does flot bring about change in extemal affairs”; by contrast, transitive
activity or factio in Aquinas’ Latin, is “the introduction of change into extemal states of
affairs” (Kaczor 1996: 59). For Aquinas, “not any actio ïs our happiness, but knowing
[emphasis mine], and not knowing any object, but the highest object
-- God” (Kaczor 1996:
29). Accordingly, “each human act is ... pnmarily in terms of its evaluation, an intransitive
act, and human acts “precisely as moral, should be considered as actio notfactio, i.e., doing
considered precisely as seif-determining activity, rather than as making that is the shaping
of what is outside the person’s will and mmd” (Kaczor 1996: 59). Kaczor’s major
complaint against proportionalism is “that the mai ority of [proportionalistJ authors either do
flot explicitly raise the question of the ultimate basis of moral judgment or write
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ambiguously on the matter” (Kaczor 1996: 38). For Kaczor, the work of Richard
McCormick and Louis Janssens provides rnany examples of this type of ambiguity, the
origins of which can be found in the work of Jean Pierre Gury.
As we recail ftom our discussion of Sulmasy’s work, Aquinas’ structure of human
action includes a sophisticated progression through several interlocking aspects that
facilitate the seif-determining integration of internai and extemal acts. Kaczor reminds us
that the whole process begins with intellectus, or the understanding of universals such as
“the universal good of God” (Kaczor 1996: 46). This understanding becomes crucial in the
second step - voluntas or willing - because “one cannot choose what one does not know
the will moves only when presented some object by which what is potential can become
actual” (Kaczor 1996: 44-45). The third dimension, frui or enjoyment, refers “to enjoyment
of an object as a possible end for an agent” (Kaczor 1996: 49). If we take health as another
exampie of an end, having understood health as a universal good, having desired or willed
it, and having enjoyed or rested in it as a potential object, health can be “finally [pursuedi
as an end to be sought by means” (Kaczor 1996: 50). In other words, health is now
intended -- the fourth dimension. As the intended end, health is a remote end (i.e., finis
operantis) in relation to a proximate end or object (i.e., finis opens), for instance, taking
medication. The fifih aspect - consilium or deliberation - concems the intellectual
discernrnent necessary “ ‘ in doubtful and uncertain matters’ “ (Kaczor 1996: 55), or in
situations where the appropniate means is flot immediately obvious. Consensus or consent
follows deliberation in these situations, and in this sixth dimension, the will applies itself”
‘to the determination ofdeliberation’ “(Kaczor 1996: 55). The deliberation itselfmay have
surfaced “a plurality of options” regarding acceptable means, and the seventh aspect -
electio or choice - involves “the favouring of one thing over another” (Kaczor 1996: 56).
The eighth dimension - command or impenium -“ ‘is an act of reason’ “(Kaczor 1996: 57)
whereby the intellect takes command of the choice made in the previous stage. The final
aspect - usus or use - is between command and the actual execution of an external act. As
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Aquinas explains, usus is” ‘the motion, by which the will moves to execution’ “(Kaczor
1996: 5$).
In Kaczor’ s perspective, what is extremely important about the entire structure from
intellectus to extemally observable action is that “human action
... is flot primarily effects
brought about by the agent in the world, but an ordenng ofthe agent’s intellect and will” in
relation to a fina] end (Kaczor 1996: 58). From this Thomistic viewpoint, Kaczor
emphasizes that the physicalism against which the entire proportionalist project is aimed, is
a problem located in the manuals and not in Aquinas’ own work. At the heart of the
problem is the meamng of the object of an act, the pnmary basis for moral evaluation of
acts. Kaczor recalis “the charge from proportionalists that the object of the act was
previously understood in aphysical sense, that is, as merely the extemally visible state of
affairs able to be captured by a third person observer” (Kaczor 1996: 83-84). However, for
Aquinas,
objects of acts are not mere states of affairs existing in the world
independent of agents. The object of the act is often equated wfth the finis
opens and the intention with the finis operantis. Thomas, it should be
noted, seems to avoid this usage afler his commentary on the Sentences of
Peter Lombard wntten early in his career, but even here Thomas clearly
does not evaluate the finis opens without reference to the agent, since the
finis opens is defined in relation to the agent. ‘The finis opens is that to
which the work is ordained by the agent, and this is called the meamng of
the work; the end of the agent (finis operantis) however is what the one
acting pnncipally intends.’ Further, the structure of the Summa theologiae
with its early and goveming distinction between acts of a man and human
acts makes clear that physical occurrences, considered only as such, do not
concem the theologian whose subject is the actus humanus not the actus
hominis (Kaczor 1996: 90).
At issue here is notjust Aquinas’ definition of objectum, but the fact that “Thomas’s
account requires ail relevant aspects to be good, since a lack of any relevant perfection
indicates the act is malum simpliciter [i.e., evil in itselfj, aîthough it may be good in other
respects (bonum secundum quid)” (Kaczor 1996: $1-82). Accordingly,
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the proportionalist account, on Thomistic grounds, faces the following
difficulty. Evil aspects of a human action are either relevant to the moral
evaluation of the act or flot. If the aspects are relevant, they ail must be
good, or the action is defective in some important way, bonum secundum
quid sed malum simpiiciter. If the aspects are flot relevant, then their evil
need flot be part of the moral evaluation. The ‘premorally’ evil simply does
flot enter the analysis (Kaczor 1996: 82).
In other words, the proportionalist idea that “consequences can render a premorally evii act
good” (Kaczor 1996: 121) is incompatible with Aquinas’ thought. The most serious
problem is that this idea represents a “third party view” of the evaluation of action: “The
distinction between good and nght as used by [proportionalist] authors envisions a
judgment upon acts as nght or wrong independently of the character of the agents
performing them. Clearly, this shifi in moral theology, with its accompanying silence
about the virtues, marks a clear departure from Thomas” (Kaczor 1996: 144). The problem
here is not only the iack of emphasis on the virtues, but the corresponding non-Thomistic
emphasis on skilÏs (techne) and production (Kaczor 1996: 196-197).
b illustrate the probiem presented by the notion of pre-moral or ontic evil within
proportionalism, Kaczor compares Janssens’ notion of ontic evil with Aquinas’ definition
of moral evii. “ ‘Ontic evii,’ says Janssens, ‘is a iack of perfection, a deficiency which
frustrates our inclinations’ “ (Kaczor 1996: 152). However, “moral evil, according to
Aquinas, is a lack of perfection in a human agent” (Kaczor 1996: 152). Sureiy one would
have to agree with Kaczor that “thus far, it is hard to see how the moral evil would be
different than ontic evil” (Kaczor 1996: 152). For this reason, Kaczor asserts that it wouid
be more helpful to use the distinctions that Aquinas himself makes concerning evil -- the
distinction between malum simpflciter and malum secundum quid, and the distinction
between pena (punishment) and culpa (fault or blame). In the first question of Aquinas’,
De Malo, where lie deals with the issue of whether evil is something, “Thomas makes a
distinction between ‘That is called simply evil [i.e., malum simpliciterJ which with respect
to itself (secundum se) is evil’ and ‘that in one respect (secundum quid) is called evil which
142
is flot evil with respect to itself, but of another . .‘ [e.g.,] just as a flame is an evil to water”
(Kaczor 1996: 153-154). Acknowledging that this distinction does flot cover the element of
suffering evil that proportionalists like Janssens were trying to capture, Kaczor suggests
that Aquinas’ distinction betweenpena and culpa could be more helpful because both terms
“involve the frustration of the human person but in different ways” (Kaczor 1996: 154).
Also “this distinction may capture better the distinctly hurnan suffenng involved in ontic
and moral evil: ‘[culpa] and [penaJ pertain to a rational nature’ “(Kaczor 1996: 155). In
De Mato, Aquinas articulates this distinction as a distinct reconciliation of umversals and
particulars woven into lis structure of human action:
A rational or intellectual nature in companson with other creatures is related
in a special way to good and evil because every other creature is naturally
ordered to some particular good, but only an intellectual nature, by means of
the intellect, grasps the universal nature of good and is moved to good
universally by the appetite of the will. And therefore evil in the rational
creature is divided by a special division into fault and punishment
[emphasis mine] ... it is of the nature of fault [emphasis mine] to be
according to the will, but of the nature of punishment [emphasis mine] to
be contrary to the will, and the will is found only in an intellectual nature.
The distinction ofthese two (fault and punishment) can be understood in this
way .... Now good designates a certain perfection. And perfection is
twofold: namely, the first, which is form or habit [i.e., virtuel, and the
second, which is operation. But everything we use in operating can be
referred to the first perfection, the use of which is operation [emphasis
mine]. Consequently, and conversely, a twofold evil is found: one in the
agent himself, according as he is depnved either of form or of habit or of
whatever else is necessary for operation, thus blindness or crookedness of
the Ieg is an evil; but the other evil is in the defective act itself, for instance
if we should say that limping ïs an evil. And just as these two evils may be
found in other creatures, so also in an intellectual nature, which operates by
the agency ofthe will. In which it is clear that a disordered act of the wilI
has the nature of fault [emphasis mine], for a person is blamed and
rendered culpable inasmuch as lie voluntarily does a disordered act. But
evil is also found in an intellectual creature according to a privation
[emphasis mine] of form or habit or of any other thing whatsoever that may
be necessary to operate rightly, whether it pertains to the sou! or to the body
or to exterior things; and it is incontrovertibte that sucli evi] is
punïshment [emphasis mine]. For three charactenstics belong to the nature
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of punishment. One of which is that it bas regard to fauft, for someone is
properly said to be punished when he suffers evil for some act he lias
committed
... The second charactenstic of the nature of punishment is that it
is contrary to the will ... The third characteristic seems to belong to the
nature of punishment as it consists in a kind of suffering or undergoing, for
those things which happen contrary to the will are flot from an intrinsic
pnnciple, i.e., the wili, but from an extrinsic pnnciple, the effect of which is
called a suffenng or undergoing tAquinas 1995: 1,4: 28-29).
One of the key points in the above passage is that “everything we use in operating
can be referred to the first perfection [i.e., habit or virtuel, the use of which is operation.”
In other words, operations specify virtues, and in fact, double effect reasoning facilitates the
specification of the vii-tue ofjustice -- “the chief of the moral virtues” for Aquinas (Kaczor
1996: 252-253). Aquinas differentiates two types of justice -- distributive and
commutative. Distributive justice “ ‘is distributive of common goods according to a
proportion’,” thus relating parts to a whole or indïviduals to an entire community (Kaczor
1996: 253 ). By contrast, commutative justice “pertains to the relationship of individuals”
to each other, and it is this type ofjustice that is specffied through double effect reasoning
(Kaczor 1996: 254). Not surprisingly, homicide is the first vice or sin opposed to
commutative justice; but for Aquinas, flot ah sins and correspondingly, not ail homicides
are equal. As Kaczor explains, “the 5m is more or less grave in species depending on how
far the evil takes away the good of human persons” (Kaczor 1996: 71). In “the iocus
classicus of double effect reasoning” (Kaczor 1996: 254), ST II-II, 64, Aquinas considers
how far the evil takes away the good of human persons in several different instances of
homicide. In ST II-II, 64,7, as translated by Kaczor, Aquinas explores the situation “where
one effect of the action is seif-defense and the other is the death of the one threatening the
hife of the innocent person”:
Nothing prevents that there be two effects of one act: of which the one is in
the intention, but the other is outside the intention (praeter intentionem).
However, moral acts take their species from that which is intended, flot
however from that which is outside the intention, since it is per accidens, as
is clear from things said before. Therefore, for the act of one defending
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himself a two-fold effect is able to foÏlow: one the preservation of bis own
life, the other however the death ofthe aggressor (invadentis). Therefore, an
act of this type, from the fact that the preservation of his own life is
intended, does flot have the character of the illicit (rationem illiciti), since it
is natural to anyone to preserve hirnself in his being insofar as he is able.
Nevertheless, it can happen that some act proceeding from a good intention,
be rendered illicit, if it is flot proportioned to the end (proportionatus fini).
Therefore. if someone for the sake of defending his life uses more force than
is necessary it will be illicit. If however he repels the violence rnoderately, it
will be a licit defense. For according to the rights (secundum iura), it is licit
to repel force with force with the moderation of the blameless defense
[Decretal. Gregory IX
...]. Nor is it necessary for salvation, that a man
forego an act of moderate defense so that he might avoid the death of
another, since man is bound more to provide for lis own life tIan for tIc
]ife of another [emphasis mine]. But since it is flot licit to kiil a man,
except for the public authority acting for the common good, as is clear from
what was said above, it is illicit that a man intend to kili the man, so that he
might defend himself, save for him who has public authority, who intends to
kili a man for bis own defense referring this to the public good, as is clear in
the case of a soldier fighting against the enemy, and in minister of the judge
fighting against thieves. Aithougli even these two would sin. if they were
moved by private animosity (privata libidine) (Kaczor 1996: 255-256).
Jean Pierre Gury’s version (1874), as translated by Kaczor, is formulated as
follows:
It is permitted (1) to posit [ponere] a good or indifferent cause, from which a
two-fold effect follows, one good, but the other bad, if (2) there is present a
proportionately grave reason, (3) the end of the agent is honest, and (4) the
good effect follows from that cause flot from a mediating bad one (Kaczor
1996: 259).
Kaczor explains that ‘ponere can also be translated ... as to place, put, or set down”
(Kaczor 1996: 259). In the rest of Gury’s text (i.e., Compendium theoÏogiae moraÏis), the
meaning of “a proportionately grave reason” is flot specifled (Kaczor 1996: 259). By “the
end” to which Gury refers in (3), Kaczor understands “that the agent must have as bis end
not the evil effect but the good effect that follows from bis action” (Kaczor 1996: 260).
finally, regarding “cause,” “the physical structure of the act’s causal relation is key”
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(Kaczor 1996: 260). For Kaczor, Gury’s version of double effect reasoning represents
three major deviations from Aquinas’ formulation, and insofar as proportionalists have
continued and developed these deviations, their work constitutes an extension of Gury’s
work much more than that of Aquinas (see also Kaczor 1998). The first deviation is that
whereas Aquinas’ “analysis of double effect reasoning cornes midway through the Secunda
Seeundae at question 64” and is “almost as an aside,” Gury’s version appears “at the very
beginning of his work in bis account De actibus humanis ... [leadingJ one to believe that
Gury believes double effect reasoning to be so indispensable to the proper understanding of
the human act that its role must be made clear at the outset of the discussion” (Kaczor
1996: 261-262). Secondly, “Thomas’s intending-of-a-good end is altered to positing a
good or indifferent cause”; the problem here is that “ponere is ambiguous as to the
intentional status ofthe agent ... [andJ while Gury merely did flot higfflight the importance
of [the foresightlintention] distinction, [proportionalists] positively undermine it” (Kaczor
1996: 263). Finally, whereas Aquinas stressed means-end proportionality as an expression
of “agent-relative responsibility,” Gury’s [end-end] proportionality “[referred] to the
justfication ofthe foreseen evil effect” (Kaczor 1996: 267).
Kaczor explains that proportionalists’ continuation of the centrality of double effect
reasoning rests on the notion of ontic or pre-moral evil, and insofar as Kaczor has already
illustrated the problems associated with this framing of evil in relation to Aquinas’ thought,
proportionalists’ emphasis on the centrality of double effect reasoning is unjustiflable,
especially insofar as it leads to a downplaying of the foresight/intention distinction (Kaczor
1996: 269-270). Kaczor re-iterates that proportionalists’ emphasis on commensurate
reason is also unjustifiable in relation to Aquinas’ work because “what justifies seif-defense
is flot that one good (defender’s life) is a commensurate reason for sacrificing (or nsking)
another good (attacker’s life), but that the defender has more responsibility to defend his
own life than to defend the life of another”; in other words, “there is no weighing of goods
involved unless responsibitity itself be determined by the goods or evils resulting from
action” (Kaczor 1996: 309). Furthermore, Kaczor argues that proportionalists’
146
interpretation of the foresight!intention distinction as being merely descriptive rather than
morally significant requires a renewed understanding of Aquinas’ articulation of the
distinction in the contexi of bis structure of action. In an effort to promote such a renewed
understanding, Kaczor highuights three crucial aspects of Aquinas’ foresight!intention
distinction. firstly, “foreseen consequences differ from intended, as an act of
understanding differs from volitional commitment” (Kaczor 1996: 280). Secondly, “for
Thomas, the greater the motion of the will, the greater the engagement or identification of
the person with the action, both for good and for iii” (Kaczor 1996: 280). Thirdly, “the
foreseen pertains to the understanding of the person (intellecius) but not to the will of the
person (voluntas, fruitio
..). The foreseen, in fact, does flot engage the wiÏl properly at ati,
but only the intellect” (Kaczor 1996: 282). To reinforce these aspects, Kaczor includes “at
least six salient features” by which bis fellow student from Notre Dame, Thomas
Cavanaugh, distinguishes intention from foresight in bis doctoral thesis entitled, Double
Effect Reasoning: A Critique and Defense (Cavanaugh 1995: 147-l 48):
First, an intention lias as its object what the agent apprehends as 1)
rationally motivating, 2) flot yet achieved by the agent, and as 3) able-to-be
achieved-by-the-agent. Belief, such as foresight, has as its object what the
one who believes grasps as what was, is, or will be. Second, an agent’s
intention reveals the agent’s volitional commitment to acting to effect the
object apprehended as good and realizable. Foresight reveals an agent’s
intellectual apprehension of what will be. Thus, intention differs from
foresight as volitional commitment differs from intellectual apprehension.
Third, an intention characteristically issues in deliberation whule foresight
does flot. fourth, when an intention issues in deliberation and deliberation
is successful, then the agent forms further intentions conceming means.
Foresight does not charactenstically issue in further intentions conceming
means. Fifth, an intention is a knowing [practical knowledgeJ which causes
the object intended, whule foresight is a knowing [theoretical knowledgeï
caused by the object known. Sixth, the object of an intention is knowri by
the agent without observation while the object of foresight is flot known
without observation. [A]n agent can be ignorant of [theJ foreseen, whule she
cannot be ignorant of what she intends (Kaczor 1996: 277-278).
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In I)istinguishing Intention from fores ight: What Is incÏuded in u Meuns b an
End? (Kaczor 2001), Kaczor uses some of the features above aliied with inspiration from
Michael Bratman’s, intention, Plans, and Practical Reuson (Bratrnan 1987), to distinguish
terminal sedation from physician-assisted suicide (PAS). lnitially, Kaczor discusses two
intentionlforesight distinctions that fail to provide a viable distinction between terminal
sedation and PAS. Kaczor recalis Boyle’s, Double EJject und u Certain Type of
Embrvoborny, in whïch Boyle uses what Kaczor calis, “the criterion of causal contribution
to the agent’s goals” to facilitate an intentionlforesight distinction (Kaczor 2001: $2).
Kaczor reminds us of Boyle’s conclusion, namely, “that neither in the hysterectomy case
nor in the craniotomy case is the negative effect of death a means to the end of saving the
mother’s life”; in other words, “the death of the child does flot contnbute [causally] to the
preserving of maternai life in either case” (Kaczor 2001: 81). Aithough Kaczor finds this
conclusion convincing, he argues that the criterion of causal contribution “leads to the
conclusion that PAS to relieve pain and terminal sedation should flot be distinguished but
rather should be placed in the same category as intentional killing” (Kaczor 2001: 81). His
argument is as follows:
Although there is no agreement as to whether such cases actually exist,
assume for the sake of argument that, in certain cases of PAS, the doctor
kiils the patient as the only way to end pain. In the case of terminal
sedation, morphine is adminïstered. itself a licit act, and this morphine
suppresses the function of the nervous system, which both relieves pain and
can cause respiratory failure leading to death. The death in this case
contributes to the goal of ending pain by ensuring that pain neyer again can
arise. In both cases the death contnbutes to the end sought by the agent,
namely, the ending of pain (Kaczor 2001: 81).
Kaczor describes a similar problem in the use of a suggestion from Wanen Quinn
and Kevin Flannery “that the criterion should be whether or flot the agent seeks to affect the
victim” (Kaczor 2001: 82). If we consider the classic companson between the tenor
bomber and the strategic bomber, Quinn and Flannery’s intentionlforesight distinction
works as follows: “In the case ofthe terror bomber, the bomber seeks to affect the civilians
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by dropping bombs in their vicinity, [whereas] the strategic bomber does flot seek to affect
civilians in one way or another” (Kaczor 2001: 82). Similarly, “in the craniotomy case, the
object ofthe operation ïs the chuld, and the operation lias a negative effect UPOfi the child,
[whereasJ in the hysterectomy case, the surgeon has the uterus and flot the child as the
object ofhis or lier activity” (Kaczor 2001: 82). However, in tlie case of terminal sedation
and PAS, this “affect critenon” does flot permit us to di stinguish one from the other. In
other words, “in both PAS and terminal sedation, the subject of the operation is the same.
Physicians in both cases seek to have an effect on the patient” (Kaczor 2001: 82).
In an effort to create a better distinction between terminal sedation and PAS, Kaczor
then utilizes a combination of CavanaughlBratman critena or conditions. Linked with
Aquinas’ notion of consilium or deliberation, the flrst condition is that “it is intention, and
flot foresight, which charactenstically gives rise to deliberation about means to be taken in
order to achieve the end” (Kaczor 2001: 83). Linked with Aquinas’ notion of consensus or
consent whereby the will is constrained by the resuits of deliberation, Kaczor articulates the
constraining condition, the idea that “an evil effect is intended if bnnging about the evil
effect constrains one’s other intentions, limiting those options for which the agent can give
consent” (Kaczor 2001: 83). Linked with Aquinas’ notion of electio or choice, the third
condition is “the endeavouring condition” whereby a person sffives to achieve the intention
by the chosen means (Kaczor 2001: 83-84). Linked with Aquinas’ notion of frui or
enjoyment of the act, the fourth condition relates to success in other words, “the mtended
can be distinguished from the foreseen according to the cntena by which success is
reckoned ... {i.e.,J whether one’s plan [to achieve certain effects] has been realized”
(Kaczor 2001: 83-84). If we take the strategic and terror bombers as an example, “if the
strategic bomber were to leam, contrary to his expectations, that no children were killed,
this news wouÏd flot indicate any failure whatsoever in his planned attack. On the other
hand, the terror bomber, having heard the news, would have failed in his mission ...“
(Kaczor 2001: 83-84). By applying these four conditions, Kaczor makes the following
distinction between terminal sedation and PAS:
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First, the achievernent of the evil effect presents a problem in PAS, but flot
in terminal sedation, that occasions deliberation [emphasis mine] about
what sort of dosage b give and perhaps even about the choice flot to use
morphine but a dmg that bnngs about death more efficientiy. Second, the
achievement of the effect constrains [empliasis mine] the other intentions of
the agent. If, for instance, euthanasia [or PAS] is iliegai or frowned upon in
certain contexts, the physician may choose to kil the patient in a way or at a
time that will be conducive to the act being seen as accidentai in order to
mask the killing. Terminal sedation requires no such further planning
Third, the physician assisting the suicide of another endeavors [emphasis
mine] to achieve the effect of death. perhaps being forced to retum to
deliberation if circumstances change or if the first attempt faiis.
Endeavoring to achieve death does flot interest the doctor whatsoever in
terminai sedation. finaily, a failure [emphasis mine] of death to be reaiized
is to be accounted as a failure ofthe first physician [assisting the suicide] but
flot of the second [giving terminal sedation], though both may share the
same remote end ofrelieving pain (Kaczor 2001: 84-85) (see also Kaczor
2002: 109-111), (Kaczor 2005: 79).
In ProportionaÏisl7l and the Nuiurul Law Tradition, Kaczor retums to lis evaluation
of proportionalism in relation to his understanding of Aquinas’ thought (Kaczor 2002). In
the early chapters, lie reviews the changes proportionalists have effected, especially their
separation of the rightness and wrongness of acts from the goodness and badness of
persons. Underiying this separation is proportionalists’ focus on normative ethics and
“end” detached from Aquinas’ anthropology, but attached instead to “end” as understood
by analytic phïiosophy (Kaczor 2002: 9-10). Accordingiy, absolutes exist only in a virtual
sense, and they are connected with a teleology or an “obïective” weighing of values “more
in accord with common sense” (Kaczor 2002: 21). In other words, “proportionalism
consistently affirms norms forbidding murder, lying. and other terms for action that contain
both [ai factual element (killing, falsehood) and an element of negative moral description
(without a proportionate reason, unjustly)” (Kaczor 2002: 20). Intention lias been spiit in
this normative focus with psychological intention downgraded on the one hand, and moral
or factual elements of intention prioritized on the other hand (i.e., intention based on
proportionate reason, attitudes of approval, physical causatity, etc.) (Kaczor 2002: 68-75).
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From Kaczor’s perspective, what has been iost through proportionalism is above ail,
Aquinas’ emphasis on action as seif-determining or a subject-centered morality (Kaczor
2002: 52,54). In John Mahoney’s view from The Making of Moral Theolo (Mahoney
1990), this is a contrast between “Thomas’ s approach” and “the tendency to begin with the
exterior effects and work back toward the agent” (Kaczor 2002: 53). Again,
proportionalism defines human action as the production of effects or outcomes (Kaczor
2002: 78), and the Thomistic relationship between moral and metaphysical goodness is iost
(Kaczor 2002: 80). Additionally, one of the key problems with a focus on outcomes is that
we canriot aiways predict them in “the vast majority of moral decisions facing agents”
(Kaczor 2002: 85).
The demise of a Thomistic understanding of virtue in proportionalism is a major
problem for Kaczor. In Gury’s work, there was at least some reference to virtues: “For
Gury, ... proportionate reason is in part the justification for allowing the foreseen evil
effect and obtains only when one is flot obliged from justice or charity to avoid the evil
effect” (Kaczor 2002: 120). However, “in the manuais following Gury, this connection to
virtue was lost and replaced with a weighing or balancing of goods” (Kaczor 2002: 120).
In Knauer’s work and in that of his proportionalist coileagues, this weighing and balancing
translates into the entrance of proportionate reason “into the very object of the act” (Kaczor
2002: 121). Thus, Kaczor concludes: “We have in proportionate reason a rival first
principie to Aquinas’s that good is to be done and evil to be avoided” (Kaczor 2002: 124).
Moreover, “what may be operatÏve here is some form of mie teleoiogy or more accurately
consequentialism” (Kaczor 2002: 131). In response to this possibiiity, Kaczor asks: “Can
we know however that foliowing these conditions or mies wiii aiways and in every case
iead to better outcomes?” (Kaczor 2002: 131). Kaczor answers his own question in this
way: “It is surely unsound to believe that the beffer the crafisman [i.e., the person
producing effects observable in the world] the better the person morally. The good
craftsman may be a good person, but the good crafisman may aiso be an evil person.
Crafismanship and virtue are flot co-extensive ...“ (Kaczor 2002: 134-135).
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There is another crucial difference between Aquinas’ thought and that of Gury that
his proportionalist successors have deveioped further. In a nutshell, “Gury orders his
exposition around iaw; Thomas orders his around the human person and the human act
In [Aquinas’] Summa, the Decalogue is God’s gifi to wayward humanldnd ... In the later
tradition, law operates ofien as a suppression of human liberty
... An act came to be
understood as wrong because prohibited by laws or norms, rather than iaws and norms
arising from the wickedness or the goodness of an act [i.e., norms ansing from practices
(see also Kaczor 1996:215-21$)]. In contrast to Thomas’s conception, law and freedom are
pitted against one another” (Kaczor 2002: 173). On the subject of intrinsically good or evil
acts, Kaczor also stresses that the proportionaiist daim that absolutes are oniy virtual or
formai (i.e., tautologicai) norms which require matenai clarification in each context,
ignores the fact that both Aristotie and Aquinas emphasized non-tautological, exceptionless
norms; if we take, for example, the exceptioniess prohibition of aduitery, both Aristotie and
Aquinas defined “adultery” non-tautologically as” ‘having intercourse with another’s wife’
(Kaczor 2002: 178). Concerning what Kaczor perceives to be “the [proportionalists’]
daim that the Catholic tradition is overwhelmingly teleological,” Kaczor argues that this
“is overstating the case considerably” (Kaczor 2002: 186,188).
If we take the case of iying, for example, “Augustine and Thomas do indeed suggest
that lying is wrong because it pewerts the faculty of speech and as such is activity contrary
to nature. However, they also both suggest that iying is wrong because contraly to the
virtue oftruthfulness and contrary to Scripture. As the devetopment ofmoml thought in the
Cathoiic tradition became systematically divorced botli from a conception of virtues and
ftom its relationship to Scnpture, these arguments were left behind” (Kaczor 2002: 192).
Again, the concept of intention has also been caught up in this deveiopment with
deletenous resuits. The foresight!intention distinction cjS flot simply a contrivance that is
useful for limiting the scope of norms ... rather the distinction is that which defines a
performed act as this or that kind of act ... [For example,] the specification that the
innocent should flot be killed arises flot from a desire to narrow the application of a norm
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but rather from an account of the virtue ofjustice” (Kaczor 2002: 195-196). On the basis of
reflections such as these, Kaczor cornes to bis major conclusion:
Proportionalism cannot daim to be grounded in the tradition, save in the
most superficial sense, for what was marginal and denvative in this
tradition, like double-effect reasoning, replaced what was central and
primary, like the biblical tenet that one must flot do evil that good may
corne, a tenet adhered to unto death by the martyrs. Doubtless, a continuity
was maintained and indeed sought as much as possible with as mucli of the
natural law tradition as possible. But like a seamless garment, the
unravelling of one aspect of this tradition led to the significant changes in
the whole. Proportionalism tumed out to be much more revolution than
evolution (Kaczor 2002: 207).
2.7. Conclusion: Five Different Distinctions
This chapter has revealed five different ways of distinguishing pain control (and
terminal sedation explicitly in some cases) from euthanasia, and underlying these ways,
five distinct perspectives on universals and how they can be reconciled with the
contingencies or particulanties of action. Boyle’ s interpretation focuses on universals
understood pnmanly within the context of logic. bi his “broadty Thomist theory,” double
effect reasoning specifies the relationship between morally significant features of acts and
seif-evident moral norms, in particular, those belonging to Grisez’s theory of basic human
goods. from this perspective, double effect reasomng is ajustification rnechamsm whereby
one aligns oneseif with absolute goods, the scope of which has been limited by the
conditions of the reasoning. In this way, one is also rnaking “seif-constituting” or “sou!
making” choices in relation to goods constitutive of the kingdom of God. for Boyle, the
relationship between moral norms as universal propositions and particular acts is
understood in terms of the logical relationship of instantiation. In some cases, this
relationship and the move from norm to judgment is as straightforward as a syllogism
because the norm itself is clear and the features of the concrete act in question correspond
straightforwardly to the type of act prohibited by the norm. However, in cases of
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ambiguous action where there is no clear-cut relationship between the proposed relevant
Ç norm and the morally significant feati.ires of the act, double effect reasoning is a necessary
and important tool because it facilitates instantiation in a non-arbitraiy manner. Seemingly
because Boyle’s priority is logical instantiation, the flrst and second conditions of double
effect reasoning are ofparamount importance whereas the third and fourth conditions are of
lesser importance and apply oniy after the first two have been fulfilled. Not surprisingly,
intention is understood pnmarily as an internai phenomenon, and as an expression of the
logicai actualities and possibilities that comprise one’s fteely chosen means/end
combination as opposed to those that only comprise one’s foresight. In “no-win” situations
of moral impossibility like pain control and by extrapolation, terminal sedation, intention
understood as above is the only mechanism for separating actions from euthanasia because
on the level of outward behaviour and effects, terminal sedation and euthanasia may be
indistinguishable.
The benefits of Boyle’s approach to double effect reasoning include the fact that he
presents this reasoning as an efficient, logical system working in tandem with Grisez’s list
of basic human goods. Insofar as intention is an internai phenomenon for Boyle, lie avoids
the behavïourismthat he condemns, and he maintains a connection between intention and
the Thomist notion of aligrnng oneseif wÏth goods constitutive of the kingdom of God. The
problems in Boyle’s approach inciude the fact that the connection between double effect
reasoning and the virtues is only of minor importance although as Kaczor indicates, double
effect reasoning is a specification of the virtue of commutative justice. Boyle’s emphasis
on logic is also problematic in many ways. For exampte, although Boyle dismisses
determinism by means of his self-referential argument, the fact remains that although we
humans can act heroically in spite of many kinds of adverse conditions and foreseen
consequences, there are iimits to our freedom and fragilities of the human condition that
defy logic and extend far beyond the bounds of ignorance, “hard cases” and divergent
responsibiiities, the only limits that Boyle takes into consideration. In other words, there is
more to die self than the Iogical, intending self portrayed in Boyle’s account. And on the
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level of the larger cornmunity of selves and its relationship to the natural law tradition that
forms the context for double effect reasoning, there is, as Boyle admits, no accounting for
the acknowledged dependence of this tradition on language and cultural contingencies.
Moreover, Boyle’s insistence on the tradition independence of moral knowledge makes one
wonder if Boyle’s approach to double effect reasoning is merely an elitist system for
logicians. Also, he has seemingly replaced the necessity involved in the naturalism he
dismisses with the necessity involved in logic.
Kaczor’s interpretation focuses on universals understood exclusively within the
context ofAquinas’ metaphysics, and it is this focus that distinguishes Kaczor’s work from
all the other interpretations in this chapter. From this perspective, double effect reasoning
does flot specify the relationship between action and moral norms but rather, the
relationship between self-determimng persons and their final end -- happiness in God.
Insofar as the virtues facilitate one’s movernent toward this universal end, double effect
specifies the virtue of commutative justice in action in relation to the opposite vice of
homicide. By stressing the importance of intransitive activity, movement toward one’s
final end and the role of the virtues in action, Kaczor is emphasizing his understanding of
the Thomistic connection between metaphysical and moral goodness. Similarly, by
stressing the relationship between punishment, fault, and action, Kaczor is underlining his
interpretation of the Thomistic connection between metaphysical and moral evil. In
keeping with his overali commitment to Aquinas’ metaphysical schema and its fulfilment
in action, Kaczor retains double effect reasoning as a code or short-form for the entirety of
Aquinas’ structure of action. True to this context, Kaczor stresses means-end
proportionality as an expression of personal or agent-relative responsibility. furthermore,
Kaczor’s intention!foresight distinction does not serve to limit the scope of absolute norms
but rather, to define the act as this or that type of act, and to differentiate volitional
commitment from the intellectual act of understanding (e.g., foreseeing possible
consequences). Moreoever, it is the elements of volitional commitment as articulated by
Cavanaugh/Bratman, that serve to distinguish terminal sedation from euthanasialPAS. In
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other words, the ends of terminal sedation and euthanasiaiPAS give rise to two different
deliberations about the divergent means to these different ends. The achievement of
terminal sedation versus euthanasia!PAS involves disparate constraints on other volitional
commitments. The ends of terminal sedation and euthanasia!PA$ involve two dissimilar
processes of endeavouring or striving. Finally, the ends of terminal sedation and
euthanasialPAS necessitate two different sets of critena for success.
The benefits of Kaczor’ s approach to double effect reasoning include the facilitation
of an extensive understanding of the specific origin and overail context of this reasoning
within Aquinas’ work. Most importantly, Kaczor’s efforts clarify Aquinas’ notion of
intransitive or seif-detennining action, the crucial connection between understanding and
willing, double effect reasoning as a specification ofthe virtue of commutative justice, and
one way in which Aquinas’ structure of human action can form the basis for an innovative
distinction between terminal sedation and euthanasia. Kaczor’s discussion of the presence
of evil pnor to human choice (i.e., Aquinas’ notion of pumshment or suffenng) is
particularly illuminating, and it reveals that although McCormick’ s notion of pre-moral or
non-moral evil may have its flaws, there is stiil a need to account for this type of evil.
Obviously, Grisez’s basic human goods may be affected by this kind of suffering and
insofar as they are so affected, we must ask (as McCormick and others have asked) in what
way they can be solely human goods. By the same token, we must also raise the question
of how we are to deal with this type of ambiguity within human choosing and use of double
effect reasoning. The problems in Kaczor’s approach include the fact that Aquinas’
metaphysical notions of final end, virtues, etc., are remote to most people today. Therefore,
we must consider how Kaczor’ s interpretation of double effect reasoning, closely tied as it
is to Aquinas’ metaphysics, can stiil be useful within the contemporary context of cultural
diversity and moral conflict. Similarly, although it is useful to know that for Aquinas,
double effect reasomng was a specification of the virtue of commutative justice, we must
consider precisely how and in what way virtues like justice have a role to play in the use of
double effect reasoning today. Not unlike Boyle’s work, Kaczor’s approach also raises
156
questions conceming the meaning of ‘tradition’, its reiationship with ongoing social
change, and the implications for use of double effect reasoning.
McCormick’s interpretation focuses on virtual universals or virtually exceptionless
moral norms that form a kind of horizon for human action. In McCormick’s own words,
norms have “the provisional character ofour ]oumey into the future. They are an orienting
force in a history which is both fulfilment and promise” (McCormick 1984a: 2). In
McCormick’s account, the context of double effect reasoning is neither Thomistic
metaphysics, nor formai logic, but rather, the concrete complexity and fragility of human
life. McCormick’s adoption of Janssens’ notion of ‘the human person integrally and
adequately considered’ places the use of double effect reasoning within an antbropology
that pnontizes relationships -- the human person as a corporeai subject in relationship with
the matenal world of change and growth, the social world of structures and institutions, and
the sacred world of God. Relationai life brings inevitable conflicts and indeed, for
McCormick, double effect reasoning functions within the practical reahty of moral
decision-making that most ofien involves conflicted values and many different types of
uncertainty. Within this context, double effect reasoning is understood as “a set of
exception-making categories” (McCormick 1984a: 10). On the level ofthe first condition --
the notion that the proposed action flot be morally evil -- exception-making relates to the
introduction of the concept of pre-moral or non-moral cvii, the idea that evil is inextricably
part of our world and the effects of ah our actions, and therefore, that the label “moral evil”
should only be affached, if warranted, to freeiy and deiiberately chosen particular acts. In
other words, whether a pre-moral evil becomes a moral evil depends on a complex
proportionality analysis. As aiready indicated, aithough McCormick did not distinguish
between terminal sedation and euthanasia, we can, by extrapolating from his approach,
suggest that his distinction would be based on consideration of ail the empirical details, the
tragic dimensions, the relationship between the proposed sedation and his anthropology, the
implications of integrai intentionality, the necessity of the proposed sedation, and the
proportionality between the applicable pre-moral evil (‘killing’) and the proposed moral
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goods (e.g., pain relief). The most important benefits ofMcCormick’s approacli include bis
relational anthropology, and his willingness to incorporate into the use of double effect
reasoning the very elements missing in Boyle’s approach
-- aspects of the complexity, the
ftagility, the limitations, and the uncertainties involved in contemporary human life.
Wbether or flot one agrees with McCormick’s articulation of the notion of pre-moral evil,
the existence of evil before human choice is, nonetheless, a perpetual force to be reckoned
with as Kaczor’s interpretatïon ofAquinas’s work reveals. The problems in McCormick’s
approach include the fact that the link between lis anthropologically based notion of
integral intentionality and his proportionality assessments is somewhat weak, opening the
door to the ongoing charges that his approach is simply another form of consequentialism.
What is needed is a more robust notion of selfhood that accommodates constant change and
is better integrated with the use of double effect reasoning in the resolution of bioethical
problems.
Both Anscombe and Sulmasy’s interpretations focus on universals made practical,
within an account of practical reason in Mscombe’s case, and within medical practice in
Sulmasy’s case. Both of these thinkers share with McConnick the conviction that double
effect reasoning as it has become known and used (i.e., as a set of four conditions), is flot
sufficient, but requires a moral context influenced by history and practice, and additional
principles that can assist us to respond to contemporary dilemmas. Anscombe’s work on
double effect reasoning developed as a response to three key problems. In the context of
World War II, double effect reasoning in its just war theory garb was abused to justify the
obliteration bombing of German cifies. This problem was the pnmary impetus for
Anscombe’s account of intention that strictly prohibited the temptation of directing
intentions. Although as a Christian, Anscombe believed that there should be certain
prohibited acts and that double effect reasoning was needed to mediate these absolutes so
that they would not become unwieldy, she was also concemed about the inadequacy of law
based accounts of absolutes (i.e., the Judeo-Christian ethos), and the need to retain the
Aristotelian linkage between goods and human desire. Perhaps most importantly, modem
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philosophy with its “incorrigibly contemplative [i.e., Cartesiani conception of knowledge”
(Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 57) misunderstood what the ancient and medieval
philosophers meant by practical knowledge. Again, “There is a difference of form between
reasoning leading to action [i.e., practical reason] and reasoning for the truth of a
conclusion [i.e., speculative reasonJ (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 60). And whereas
speculative reasoning is essentïally concerned with universals, “practical reasonïng [i.e., in
Aristotle’s viewi is essentially concemed with ‘what is capable of tuming out variously’
or what is “the form ofa calculation [of] what to do” (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 60).
Anscombe counters the temptation of directing intentions with an account of
practical reason that stresses important connections between the mmd, intention, acts and
act-descnptions. Countering the Cartesian psychology of mmd, Anscombe emphasizes that
intention is not an intenor event in the mmd about which one can make little speeches to
oneseif and to others. By the same token, acts are not events that can be differentiated one
from the other by fixed criteria. At the same time, act-descriptions are important, however
complicated and tenuous they may be, and the potential for directing intentions is limited
by Anscombe’s assertion that “circumstances, and the immediate facts [i.e., empincal factsJ
about the means you are choosing to your ends, dictate what descriptions of your intention
[i.e., regarding the means you are performingJ you must admit” (Anscombe 1982: 23).
Although Anscombe defines three senses of intention, she stresses intentional actions as
actions “to which a certain sense ofthe question ‘Why?’ is given application; the sense is of
course that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting” (Anscombe 1969
(ong. 1957): 9). Anscombe is not interested in “a reason for acting” in the physical causal
sense as understood by “modems”, but rather, “causalities especially involved in a history
of people’s dealings with one another” (Anscombe 1983: 190). Among these causalities,
desire or wanting is of special interest to Anscombe because her focus is practical rather
than speculative reason. Again, she says, “I am not saying that there cannot be any such
thing as [tmej moral general premises ... obviously there can, but it is clear that such
general premises will only occur as premises of practical reasoning in people who want
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[emphasis mine] to do their duty” (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 78). As we recail,
wanting involves two dimensions: “movement towards a thing and knowledge (or at least
opinion) that the thing is there” (Anscombe 1969 (ong. 1957): 68). For Anscombe, the
lack ofconnection between the occurrence of moral general premises and the capabilities of
knowing and wanting is precisely the inadequacy of law-based accounts of absolutes.
Anscombe’s account of practical reason suggests that double effect reasoning as it
has become known is insufficient in important ways. The connection she makes between
true moral general premises and the capacitïes of knowing and wanting implies that
between the first condition conceming the true ‘goodness’, ‘badness’, or ‘neutrality’ of a
proposed action and the second condition concerning a person’s intention, there is a need to
include and account for the human processes of knowing and wanting ends. In relation to
the second condition, she has illustrated the immense complexities of intention and the need
to avoid directing intentions by means of a relationship between conceptual and empirical
aspects of intentions. In relation to the thind condition conceming the causal relationship
between means and ends, she has highuighted the fact that causation ïs a humanly
constmcted category, that there have been different definitions of causation throughout
history, and that causation is not to be identified with necessitation. Finally, in relation to
the notion of proportionality, Anscombe emphasizes that in cases of murder where death is
a side effect (e.g., the case of doctors giving pain-killing drugs), the central issue is nisk
management. In other words, “it must be possible to have sufficient excuse for nsking or
accepting death as a side-effect” (Gormally 1994 (ong. Book One: 1982): 48). Since
double effect reasoning or ‘the pnnciple of the side effect’ in Mscombe’s words, only
gives possibilities for sufficient excuses, she gives two additional pnnciples whereby the
acceptance of death as a side effect can be judged: the intnnsic certainty or great likelihood
of the death of the victim (i.e., a victim already terminally ill), and the presence of
necessities great enough to justify taking the nsks involved in giving the proposed drugs.
The benefits of Anscombe’s approach to double effect reasoning include lier
constant emphasis on the need to move away from law-based accounts of absolutes or in
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other words, the need to retain the Aristotelian linkage between goods, virtues, and human
desires. Laudatory also are Anscombe’s attempts to avoid the temptation of directing
intentions by moving away from a contemplative, Cartesian conception of knowledge, and
embracing an account of practical reasoning that develops and makes explicit key
connections between the mmd, intention, acts and act-descriptions. The problems in
Anscombe’s account include her almost exclusive stress on intentional actions as those to
which the why question is given application. This empliasis gives undue attention to past
actions and does flot sufficiently explore the linkage between intention and future actions,
or between intention and change. In addition, although Anscombe clarifies the important
difference between speculative and practical reasoning, she leaves hanging the open
question of whetlier there can ever be an integration of these two types of reasoning for the
benefit of clarifying both intentions themselves, and the overali resolution of moral
dilemmas. Finally, although Anscombe’s emphasis is on practical reason, she stHl
presents a highly abstract account of this reason, and one that lacks an anthropology. for
this reason, one wonders whether in lier later work, for instance, in lier account of a
distinction between pain control and euthanasia, she (flot unlike McCormick) has
succumbed to the temptation of empliasizing factors like inevitability and necessity, and
ultimately downplaying the role of personal intention.
Sulmasy’s interpretation focuses primanly on universals as understood within
medical practice. From this perspective, “killing” versus “allowing to die” and “terminal
sedation” versus “euthanasia” are four signs signifying or signalling moral differences in
tlie same way as medical signs signal the differences between normal states and pathology.
In Sulmasy’s account, just as tliere isa system ofpathology underlying the signs ofspecific
pathologies, so too double effect reasoning is transformed from “a very general and purely
formaI moral principle” (Sulmasy 1995: 157) into a system of moral pathology whereby
specific moral pathologies can be isolated and then the above distinctions can be made.
This is all in an effort to create a practical principle, and one tliat “traverse[sJ a via media
between those who would propose tliat an agent intends everything that lie or she foresees
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following upon his or her act, and those who miglit suggest a specious strategy of intention
re-direction such as that satinzed by Pascal” (Sulmasy 1995: 476). SuÏmasy accomplishes
this “via media” by means of a theory of intention that imposes strict limits on what agents
can daim to be inside and outside of their intentions.
As already indicated, Sulmasy attempts to re-invigorate double effect reasoning by
placing it within contexts that can assist us to use it more effectively. Although medical
practice is Sulmasy’s primary contextual focus, he also utilizes Donagan’s work and
selected parts of the action theory of Davidson and Searle. Sulmasy explores Donagan’s
interpretation of Aquinas’ structure of human action and decides that whereas Aristotie and
Aquinas focused on pnor intentions, bis own focus will be intention in acting, that is,
“more or less an ascnption of an acting agent’ s choice of means and ends in bnnging about
a particular event ...“ (Sulmasy 1995: 314). At this early stage in his creation of a
credibility analysis for a claimed intention, Sulmasy brings together Donagan’s notion that
intention is a propositional attitude, Davidson’s view that acts are events, and Searle’s idea
that intentions have conditions of fulfihiment rather than truth conditions per se. In other
words, a claimed intention (as distinct from foresight) is credible if there is a correlation
between the stated propositional attitude, its conditions of fuffiulment (or commitment), and
the actual actlevent.
In the second stage of Sulmasy’s intention theory creation, he connects a credibility
analysis with the medical notion of a pathognomonic sign. In other words, ‘killing’ and
later, ‘euthanasia’ signify acts that are always immoral (or indicative of moral pathology)
because they do flot pass the credibility analysis. By contrast, ‘allowing to die’ and later,
‘terminal sedation’ signify acts that may or may flot be immoral depending upon the resuits
of the credibility analysis. Ibis analysis, representative of the strict limits Sulmasy places
on what an agent can daim to be inside or outside of their intention, involves the question
of whether the claimed intention(s) are coherent, plausible, and morally justifiable.
Coherence and plausibility depend upon an appropnate correlation between the stated
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intention(s) and the cause and effect relationships involved in the act/event. Moral
justification depends upon the beginnings ofa proportionality analysis.
In the latest stage of Sulmasy’s intention theory creation, although he does flot
explicitly use the language of pathognomonic signs and credibility analyses, it would seem
that these underlying concepts stili guide lis distinction between terminal sedation and
euthanasia. Now the relevant signs are ‘neuro-cognitive suffenng’ and ‘agent-narrative
suffering’. In the former case, the suffering has a direct causal relationship to the disease,
whereas in the latter case, the suffering has at best an indirect causal relationship to the
disease, and is largely dependent upon the patient’s beliefs or the meaning the patient
attaches to his or her disease. Accordingly, sedation for ‘agent-narrative suffenng’ or
‘sedation toward death’ signais actions that are almost always immoral (i.e., the “hard
cases” may constitute exceptions) because they do not pass the credibility analysis
involving the appropriate correlation between the stated intention(s) and the cause and
effect relationships involved in the act!event. By contrast, sedation for ‘neuro-cognitive
suffenng’ or ‘sedation ofthe imminently dying’ signais actions that are most likely morally
justifiable because they typically pass the credibility analysis invoiving the appropnate
correlation between the stated intention(s) and the cause and effect relationships involved in
the actievent. In addition, not unlike McCormick’s work and the later work of Anscombe,
Sulmasy’s attention has become increasingly focused on the development ofproportionality
and necessity assessments. In other words, even when faced with “hard cases” that may
involve ‘agent-narrative suffenng’, lansen and Suimasy recommend the giving of high
dose sedatives only in situations of necessity “afier every possible effort lias been made to
restore the patient to a state of psychosocial health” (Jansen and Sulmasy 2002b: 334).
Moreover, in the same article, Quill’s approach to proportionality is countered by Jansen
and Suimasy’s “principle of therapeutic responsiveness”
-- a well-developed
proportionality calculus that is explicitly separate (and defended as such from within the
history ofmedicine) from double effect reasoning.
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The benefits of Sulmasy’s tvork on double effect reasoning include the fact that he
has presented an efficient, consistent, logical and innovative approach, deeply rooted in and
accountable to bis own context -- the profession of medicine. Explicitly influenced by
Anscombe, he has sought to avoid even the remote chance of directing intentions by means
of a theoiy of intention that stresses inter-related types of credibility analyses. To some
degree, Sulmasy accounts for one important element that Boyle leaves hanging
-- the
dependence of double effect reasoning on language and cultural contingencies. In other
words, SuÏmasy realizes that ‘killing’ versus ‘allowing to die’, ‘terminal sedation’ versus
‘euthanasia’, and even ‘intention’ merely represent language signs signifying entities that
must be continually re-evaluated, re-defined, and re-signed within changing cultural
contexts. However, most problematically, Sulmasy seems oblivious to the langer reality of
multiple sign systems and their contested interpretations, and he gives no justification for
his prioritization of the medical system of sïgns in bis construction of a distinction between
‘terminal sedation’ and ‘euthanasia’. His process is simply another form of instantiation,
not based on the signs and significations of logic as is the case in BoyÏe’s account, but
instead, based on the signs and significations ofthe medical system, most notably, ‘cause’,
‘effect’, and suffenng as a ‘pathological’ ‘event’. It is these notions that undergird ‘neuro
cognitive suffenng’ and distinguish it ftom ‘agent-narrative suffering’, or suffenng that
makes sense within the context of patients’ sign systems. We get a taste ofthe larger baffle
between these sign systems in the letters to the Editor (Monta, Tsuneto, and Yasuo 2002;
QuilI 2002; Rousseau 2002; Sasser 2002) that voiced reactions to Sutmasy’s distinction.
No storv is the same to us after û lapse oftime; or rather, we who read it are no longer the sanie interpreters;
(‘Eliot 2002: 532)
Cliapter 3. The Hermeneutical Interpretation of Paul
Ricoeur
3.1. Introduction
In the first chapter, we learned that there are many ‘faces’ or interpretations of
double effect reasoning because tension exists between the idealistluniversalist/normative
aspects of the reasoning and the empirical aspects. The first condition is extremely
problematic because it presumes universally applicable notions of ‘good’, ‘bad’, and
‘neutral’, and there is no consensus regarding the existence of such universals, their
definition if they do exist, and the idea that priority should be given to universals over the
particularities of specific cases. The second condition regardîng intention and the
foresight/intention distinction is also problematic because within the contexts sampled,
there is a tension between intention as a clear and distinct idea and the rnuddy, empirical
reality of intention. The third condition regarding means and ends is no less contentious
because if we take ‘terminal sedation’ cases as our example, there is a conflict between the
conceptualization of means and ends -- causes and effects, and the fact that in many cases
of ‘terminal sedation’, it is impossible to verify that the end (i.e., the patient’s death) was
flot the means to the good effect (i.e., pain relief). The fourth condition regarding
proportionality also presents problems because we have three different definitions of
proportionality (i.e., means/end, end/end, and proportionate reason), and there are many
difficulties involved in putting each ofthe definitions into practice.
In the second chapter, we found five different distinctions between ‘terminal
sedation’ and euthanasia because in this chapter also, the five different authors present five
distinct ‘faces’ or interpretations of double effect reasoning. Despite the fact that these
authors are working within the Catholic tradition and are favourably disposed, generally
speaking, to the first condition, each of them conceives of the universals involved quite
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differently, and each of them has a radically different understanding of the relationship
between the universals in question and the contingencies of particular situations. Given the
goal ofthis thesis, and our comparison ofthe strengths and weaknesses ofthe five positions
in the conclusion of the second chapter, we corne now to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics with
several pressing needs. In other words, although Ricoeur’s hermeneutics can be presented
in many different ways, they will be presented here with a view to meeting the following
needs. In agreement with McCormick and Kaczor that there is a need to explore the
presence of evil before human choice, we need to investigate Ricoeur’s understanding of
evil. As we will discover, Ricoeur’s study of evil led him to one of bis foundational
starting points -- his conviction about the impossibility of absolute knowledge and the
concomitant necessity of hermeneutics. In agreement with Anscombe regarding the
problems associated with the Cartesian view of knowledge and its implications for use of
double effect reasoning, we have a need to understand Ricoeur’s perspective on the
Cartesian cogito and its connection with inevitable and insurmountable confticts of
interpretations. In agreement with Sulmasy that our language-based moral distinctions are
merely signs, we have a need to explore Ricoeur’s understanding of the larger reality of
sign systems, and his understanding of the fact that signs bnng both alienation and the
possibility of appropriation of meamng. Equipped with these insights, we will then be in a
position to understand the entirety of double effect reasoning as a sign system, and in
particular, to understand more fully what Anscombe has already brought to our attention --
the fact that causation is a humanly constructed category or sign (to use Sulmasy’s term),
that it does flot mean necessitation, and that there is a need to explore different
interpretations of causality, especially those involved in the history of people’s dealings
with one another.
Underlying all these requirements, we discover the need to grapple with the diverse
and contested views of the self presented by the five authors in the second chapter. In
particular, given Boyle’s minimalist, logical self, Kaczor’s remote metaphysical self,
Sulmasy’ s divided neuro-cognitive/agent-narrative self, Anscombe ‘s speculative/practical
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self, and McCorrnick’s lack of a tight link between bis portrayal of the self as a historical
subject and his use of double effect reasonin, we wiIl seek to understand Ricoeur’s
dynamic, relational anthropology, and bis process for bringing that anthropologv to bear in
the ethical reaim. In our quest for a reconciliation of universals and particulars, we need to
explore Ricoeur’s primary anthropological insight -- the notion that human beings are both
universal and particular, and most importantly, that their universality and particularity is
lived out through the functioning of various hurnan capabilities that we will investigate. By
“capability,” Ricoeur means “the kind of power that we daim to be able to exercise,” or
“the power to cause something to happen” (Ricoeur 2003). Failibility, speaking, writing,
acting, narrating and imputability are ail important capabilities for Ricoeur. Within
Ricoeur’s framing of the relationship between universals and particulars on the level of
anthropology or in terms of human capabilities, lie advances a dynamic connection between
two modes of intelligibility or between two ways of dealing with othemess, that is, between
pure, universalist reflection and hermeneutics. Since our goal in this thesis is the
reconciliation of universals and particulars to improve use of double effect reasoning, we
wlll emphasize Ricoeur’s articulation and integration of these two approaches throughout
ail three sections. Since Ricoeur’s hermeneutic circles are the vehicles for the integration
of these two approaches, we will present Ricoeur’s hermeneutics in this chapter with a
central focus on the relationship between Ricoeur’s understanding of human capabilities
and the development of his hermeneutical circles.
Although this focus could fuI several dissertations, it will be limited here in the
following ways. The chapter wili be divided into three sections, each of which explore
certain capabilities and the hermeneutic circle(s) ansing out of Ricoeur’s investigation of
these capabilities. Organization of the chapter in this way accords with my perception of
the evolution of Ricoeur’s thought whereby bis reflection on capabilities and othemess, and
his development of hermeneutic circles occurs in tandem. The first section will present
Ricoeur’s interpretation of the capability of fallibility, evii, and his initial hermeneutic
circles. Sources for this section will be limited to faïlÉbte Man, The Symho/isrn offvit, and
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The Conflict ofinterpretutions. The second section wilI feature Ricoeur’s understanding of
the capabilities of speaking, writing, and lis circle of understanding. Sources for this
section will be limited to Interpretation Theory, and Froin Tex! to Action. TIc third section
will explore Ricoeur’s interpretation ofthe capabilities of acting, imputation, and his ethics
circie. Sources for this section will be Iimited to Onese!/As Another, two “exercises” from
Le .Juste 2 (Les trois niveaux du jugement medical and L ‘universel et Ï ‘historique), and
brïef citations from The Jus! and lime and Narraiive. J. In ail three sections of this
chapter, use ofthe selected texts will be limited to what is necessary for meeting the goals
ofthis thesis.
3.2. Fallïbility, Evil and the Emergence of Hermeneutic Circles
In the second chapter, we recali that the work of McCormick and Kaczor’s
interpretation ofAquinas ernphasized in different ways the need to account for the presence
of evil before human choice. In Ricoeur’s eariy work, Fallible Man, we find the same
emphasis. In Ricoeur’s terminology, it is the need to account for “the ridUle of the slave
wiIl, that is, of a free wiÏÏ that ïs bound and alwavs finds ilseif aÏready bounc[’ (Ricoeur
1986: xiv). By the term “slave-will,” Ricoeur means “a certain bondage which the soul
imposes on itself ... This bondage has nothing to do wïth determinism which is only a
necessary rule binding objects together for a theoretical consciousness; the bondage of
passions [e.g., vanity, suspicion, concupiscence, envy, etc.] is something which happens to
a subject, that is to a freedom” (Ricoeur 1966: 23, 277). From Ricoeur’s perspective,
previous attempts to account for this riddle have flot succeeded because overail, they have
substituted “an ethical vision of the world” for a more comprehensive reflection on cvii.
Ricoeur describes the problem in this way:
- we could have chosen Grandeur and Limitation of an Ethical Vïsion of
the World as a subtitie to this book. from one point of view this recoveiy of
the syrnbolics of evii by philosophic reflection indeed tends toward an
ethical V1SIOfl 0f the world in the Hegelian sense of the term. But, on the
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other hand, the more clearly we perceive the requirements and implications
of that ethical vision of the world, the more inescapable seems the
impossibility of encompassing the whole problem of man and evil itseif
within an ethical vision of the world. What do we mean here by an ethical
vision of the world? If we take the problem of evil as the touchstone of the
definition, we may understand by the ethical vision of the world our
continuai effort to understand freedom and evil by each other. The grandeur
of the ethical vision of the world is to take us as far as possible in this
direction
... This vision attained its first maturity with Kant’s Essay on
RadÉcal Evit. Moral formalism, in eliciting a single maxim of good will,
also brings out a single maxim ofbad will. Through formalism, cvii tends
to be reduced to a maxim of free wilI; it is the very essence of the ethicai
vision of cvii [emphasis minel. But the grandeur of this ethical vision is
complete only when, in retum we realize its benefit for the understanding of
fteedom itself Freedom that assumes the responsibility for evil is freedom
that cornes to a self-understanding ftaught with meaning (Ricoeur 1986:
xlvi-xlvii).
It must be emphasized that Ricoeur’s goal in faitible Man is flot to banish formalism from
the quest to understand evil. Rather, Ricoeur’s goal is to reveal the limits offormalism, and
to establish it as merely the first stage in his larger philosophical anthropology (Ricoeur
1986: 46). In other words, the limitations of formalism (e.g., reductiomsm) highlight two
paths of intelligibility: pure or transcendental reflection, and hermeneutics. In ail
Ricoeur’ s hermeneutic circles, these two paths are creatively integrated. In what follows,
we will trace major aspects of the development of these stages in relation to fallibility and
evil, as they lead Ricoeur toward the presentation of his first hermeneutic circles in The
Symbotism ofEvil and The Conflict oflnterpretations.
By “pure or transcendental [e.g., phenomenological] reflection,” Ricoeur means “a
reflection that starts flot with myself but with the object before me, and from there traces
back to its conditions of possibility” (Ricoeur 1986: 5). In other words, “it is a reffection
that begins ... with the thing [emphasis mineJ. It is “upon” the thing that this reflection
discerns ... discovers
... apprehends ... It is reflection upon the object. This is the way in
which it is properly transcendental
... But the limitation of this reflection appears directly
along with its strength: the synthesis that it reveals and inspects will be a synthesis only in
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the object, in the thing; a synthesis that is merely intentïonal, prolected outside, into the
world, into the structure ofthe objectivity it makes possible” (Ricoeur 1986: 18). And what
is “the objectivity it makes possible?” In defrning “the thing,” Ricoeur says, “It is the unity
that is already realized in a correlate of speech and point of view; it is the synthesis as
effected outside. That synthesis, inasmuch as it is in a correlate, bears the name of
objectivity. Indeed, obi ectivity is nothing other than the indivisible unity of an appearance
and an ability to express; the thing [e.g., a concepti shows itself and cari be expressed”
(Ricoeur 1986: 37). At this early stage in his writing, Ricoeur defines “hermeneutics” as
“an exegesis of the fundamental symbols [i.e., signs, symbols and mythsJ in which man
avows the servitude of his free will” (Ricoeur 1986: 6). This exegesis will pre-occupy
Ricoeur in The Symbolism of Evil, whereas his goal in fatÏible Man is transcendental
reflection (Ricoeur 1986: 6).
Taking evil as an object and tracing back to its condition of possibility in faltibte
Man, Ricoeur explains that its condition of possibility is fallibility itse1f, that is, “the
possibitity of [or the capability for] moral evil [that] is inherent in man’s constitution”
(Ricoeur 1986: 133). In other words, human beings are flot inherently evil, but they “can
be evil only in accordance with the lines of force and weakness of [their] functions and
[their] destination” (Ricoeur 1986: 143). for Ricoeur, fallibility “consists in a certain non
coincidence of man with himself: this ‘disproportion’ of self to self would be the ratio of
fallibility” (Ricoeur 1986: 1). Ricoeur also says, “it is a difference ... in the center of an
individual destiny, between its need and its own contingency. The need, in Kantian terms,
is the totality that reason ‘demands’; in Aristotelian terms, it is the happiness mari ‘pursues’
in his action. The contingency of character is what expresses this need” (Ricoeur
1986:138). In fattible Man, Ricoeur explores three types of disproportion, that between
the totality that reason ‘demands’ or understanding in the fullest sense and the limited,
finite understanding that any individual can have; that between happiness as “an idea, a
demand for totality” (Ricoeur 1986: 98), and the finite, existential happiness possible for
any individual given their character (i.e., “the finite openness of [theirJ existence taken as a
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whole (Ricoeur 1986: 58)); and that between finite pleasure and beatitude or “the perfection
ofpleasure, such as Aristotie extolled it in the fthics” (Ricoeur 1986: 93).
As Ricoeur re-iterates, “fallibility [or disproportion] is oniy the possibility of evil: it
indicates the region and the structure of the reaÏity that, through its point of least resistance,
offers a ‘locus’ to evil” (Ricoeur 1986: 143). If we take, as our example, the first type of
disproportion from the three types above, the region involved is the imagination and
structure in question is the power of understanding. Within this locus, Ricoeur describes an
important problem: “It is one thing ... to receive the presence of things, it is another to
determine the meaning ofthings. To receive is to give oneseif intuitively to their existence;
to think is to dominate this presence in a discourse which discnminates by denomination
and connects in articulate phrasing” (Ricoeur 1986: 19). Receiving in this sense is a type of
finitude that “consists in the perspectival limitation of perception. It causes every view of
to be a point of view on ... I must catch sight of the finitude of my point of view”
(Ricoeur 1986: 20-21). The determination of meaning, however, is a different type of
process wherein language permits us to transgress the finitude of receiving. Signification is
the vehicle of this transgression. In other words, “through its signifying function, language
conveys flot my perception’ s finite perspective but the sense that intentionally transgresses
my perspective. Language transmits the intention, flot the perception of what is seen ... To
achieve meaning is flot to bestow it directiy; the word has the admirable property ... of
fading away bodily in giving rise to the act that confers the sense. In short, the word
becomes the sign” (Ricoeur 1986: 27-28). Denomination is an important example of this
process: “Because the name signifies, I can say that one appearance signifies ah the others”
(Ricoeur 1986: 29). As Ricoeur indicates, this is how universals are bom, but the birth is
problematic because it creates an “irreducible” “gap between certainty and truth” (Ricoeur
1986: 30). In other words, and here Ricoeur quotes from Hegel’s, The PhenornenoÏogy of
Mmd, “ ‘ ... since universahity is the real truth of sense-certainty, and language merehy
expresses this truth, then it is not possible at ail for us even to express in words any
sensuous existence which we “mean” ‘ “(Ricoeur 1986: 30). Herein lies the potential for
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brutality within any system of instantiation because as Ricoeur indicates, a dualism is
created -- “at once the duaïity of the understanding and sensibility, in Kantian tenns, and
the duaiïty of the wiiI and the understanding in Cartesian language” (Ricoeur 1986: 37).
Not unlike Boyle, Ricoeur also warns us that “ail the dangers of voluntansm are inscribed
in this dichotomy” (Ricoeur 1986: 36). However, unlike Boyle, Ricoeur unites in a
diaiectical reïationship, willing, understanding or interpretÏng, and the complexities of
language
-- especially signification. As we will discover, Ricoeur’s hermeneutic circles
become the vehicle for this synthesis.
As Ricoeur re-iterates at the end of Faïlibte Man, there is a vast difference between
fallibility or the capacity for evil and the actual reality of evil; in fact, these two entities
“remain externat to each other” (Ricoeur 1986: 143). Indeed, “evil arises from this
weahess only because it is positec?’ (Ricoeur 1986: 146). Hence, in The SyrnboÏisrn of
Evit, Ricoeur tums to hermeneutics or “a new type of reflection beanng on the avowat that
consciousness makes of [evil or fault] and on the symboïs of evil in which this avowal is
expressed” (Ricoeur 1969: 143). Here again at the beginning ofthis text, Ricoeur contrasts
pure reflection or a philosophy of fault with what is involved in a hermeneutics of evil,
nameiy, a “ ‘re-enactment’ of the confession of the evil in man by the religious
consciousness” (Ricoeur 1969: 3). Those interested in developing a philosophy of fault
have often used as the starting place of their critique, the Augustiman notion of original sin.
However, as Ricoeur indicates, this is extremely problematic:
Nothing is less amenable to a direct confrontation with phitosophy than the
concept of original sin, for nothing is more deceptive than its appearance of
rationality. On the contrary, it is to the least elaborate, the most inarticulate
expressions of the confession of evil that philosophic reason must listen.
Therefore we must proceed regressively and revert from the ‘speculative’
expressions to the ‘spontaneous’ ones. In particular, it is essential to be
convinced ftom the start that the concept of original sin is flot at the
beginning but at the end of a cycle of living experience, the Christian
experience of sin. Moreover, the interpretation that [the concept of original
sin] gives of this expenence is only one of the possible rationalizations of
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the root of evil according to Christianity. finally and above ail, this
rationalization
... belongs to a penod of thought marked by Gnostic
pretensions to ‘know’ the mysteries of God and human destiny. Not that
original sin is a Onostic concept ... But it belongs to the age of gnosis in the
sense that it tries to rationalize the Christian experience of radical evil in the
same way as gnosis set up as ‘knowÏedge’ (Ricoeur 1969: 4-5).
“Behind speculation, and beneath gnosis and anti-gnosis constructions,” (Ricoeur
1969: 5), Ricoeur turns our attention to major myths and symbols that have played an
important role in the avowal of “the beginning and the end of’ evil throughout human
history (Ricoeur 1969: 5). By the term “myth,” Ricoeur means “a species of symbois, as
symbols developed in the form of narrations and articulated in a time and a space that
cannot be co-ordinated with the time and space of history and geography according to the
critical method. For example,
... the history of the expulsion of Adam and Eve from
Paradise ïs a mythical narration ... bringing into play fabulous personages, places, times,
and episodes” (Ricoeur 1969: 18). Ricoeur defines six main characteristics of symbols.
f irstly, “symbols are signs ... that communicate a meamng, this meamng is declared in an
intention of signifïing which has speech as its vehicle” (Ricoeur 1969: 14). Secondly,
although “every sign aims at something beyond itself and stands for that something,” the
symbolic sign “conceals in its aim a double intentionality,” or a double meamng (Ricoeur
1969: 15). In other words, “symbolic signs are opaque, because the first, literai, obvious
meaning itself points analogically to a second meaning” (Ricoeur 1969: 15). Furthermore,
although there is an analogical bond between the first and second meaning, Ricoeur
specifies this bond as follows: “While analogy is inconclusive reasoning that proceeds by
fourth proportional
- A is to B as C is to D - in the symbol, I cannot objectify the analogical
relation that connects the second meamng with the first. It is by living in the first meaning
that I am led by it beyond itself’ (Ricoeur 1969: 15). fourthly, there is a difference
between a symbol and an allegory. Whereas in an atlegory, there is a relationship of
translation between the literal and the symbolic meamng such that the allegory becomes
useless after the translation has been made, there is an ongoing “donation of [enigmatic]
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Ricoeur emphasizes also that the symbols that concem him “have nothing w do with” the
symbols uthzed lfl symbolic logic
-- symbols that are essentially “ ‘characters’ in the
Leibnizian sense that is to say, elements ofa calculus (Ricoeur 1969: 17’). Ricoeur is not
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deonto1og’ of reasoning” (Ricoeur 1969: 17’). Finally. symbols and mths can be
differentiated insofar as symbols are more primitive and have “analogical meanings which
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ln The Svmholism fEvil, Ricoeur surveys several myths that have portrayed the
hecirinnina nncf the enH ofevil in tue huirnnn rnre 1-le n1’n nreent nn eytpnçive exnlnrntion
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defilement - conveys the belief that evil touches human beings “in the guise of a stain or
blemish that infects from without” (Ricoeur 1969: 8). Sin is a more developed symbol of
evil insofar as it “indicates the real situation of f aIl men] before God. whether man knows it
or flot. It is this Sin 0f which the myth of the fail recounts the entry into the world and
which speculation on original sin attempts to erect into a doctrine” (Ricoeur 1969: 7). Stiil
more developed is the notion of giiilt, the svmhol of cvii that conveys. “the precise sense of
n feeling of flic imworthiness at the corp ofone’s personal heing” this svrnhol “is onlv the
advanced point of n radicallv individi ied and interio ised experience” (Ricoeir 1969- 7)
Aç nrenarntion for oiw understnndinr of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic circles what is most-
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-
- -
-— — t
—
—
cvi], but rather the fart lhnt these svmhols nnd mvths have existed and that imnorta
conclusions cnn he drawn from explorations of them Refurning to flic contrast hetween
pure reflection and hermene’itics, Ricnenr mkes this conclusion nhouit flic nhulity nf pure
reflection to explore evil; “Pure reflection makes no appeal to anv mvth or svmho]: in this
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sense it is a direct exercise of rationality. But comprehension of evil is a sealed book for it;
the reflection is pure, but it leaves eveiyday reality outside, insofar as man’s everyday
reality is ‘ensiavement to the passions” (Ricoeur 1969: 347). By contrast, the
henneneutical exegesis of the symbolism of evil permits our comprehension of “the enigma
of servile [or bound] freedom [as] avowed by the religious consciousness” (Ricoeur 1969:
347).
As he concitides The SymboÏisrn ofEvil, Ricoeur considers how pure reflection and
hermeneutics can be integrated. He dismisses “two hazards”: “On the one hand, it is flot
possible simply tojuxtapose [pure] reflecrion and confession
... But neither is it possible to
have a direct philosophical transcription of the religious symbolism of evil, for that would
involve going back to an allegorizing interpretation ofthe symbols and the myths” (Ricoeur
1969: 348). Ricoeur expresses his integrative solution in the phrase,” ‘The symbol gives
rise to thought’ “(Ricoeur 1969: 348). Symbols and the language in which they are given
constitute the starting place for thought: “Understanding of symbols can play a part in the
movement towards the point of departure; for, if the beginning is to be reached, it is first
necessary for thought to inhabit the fullness of language” (Ricoettr 1969: 348).
Remembering is an important aspect of the understanding of symbols: “There is no
philosophy without presuppositions. A meditation on symbols starts from speech that has
already taken place ... For it, the first task is flot to begin but, from the midst of speech, to
remember; to remember with a view to beginning ... It is in the age when our language has
become more precise, more univocal, more technical in a word ... it is in this very age of
discourse that we want to recharge our language
... to start again from the fullness of
language” (Ricoeur 1969: 348-349). This connection between symbols, language and
thought leads Ricoeur to the positing ofhis first hermeneutic circle:
What we need is an interpretation that respects the original enigma of the
symbol, that lets itself be taught by them, but that, beginning from there,
promotes the meaning in the full responsibility of autonomous thought ... In
short, it is by interpreting that we can hear again. Thus it is in hermeneutics
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that the symbol’s gift of meaning and the endeavor to understand by
deciphenng are knotted together. How does hermeneutics meet the
probiem? What we have just called a knot
-- the knot where the symbol
gives and criticisrn interprets
-- appears in hermeneutics as a circle. The
circle cari be stated hlunlly: ‘We rntist ttnderstand in order to believe, but we
must believe in order to understand’ The circle is flot a vicious circle, still
less a mortal one; it is a living and stimulating circle. We must believe in
order to understand: neyer, in fact, does the interpreter get near to what bis
text says unless lie lives in the aura of the meaning he is inquiring afier
(Ricoeur 1969: 349-35 1).
fn TÏ?e Conflic! ofinferprelations, Ricoeur reveals more of the etements involved in
lis liermeneuties, a redevelopment of lis initial hermeneutic circle, and fundamental
conclusions regarding the relationship between hermeneutics and evil. We learn that the
maxim, ‘the symbol gives fïse to thought’, applies first and foremost to the self becatise
existence itself is not seif-evident, but must be interpreted. In relation to the self now, the
necessity of hermeneutics in the face of the inadequacies of ptire reflection is stressed, and
Ricoeur’s path to this conclusion ïs inspired by several important considerations. One
factor is the vanity of “the celebrated Cartesian cogito, which grasps itself directly in the
experience of doubt” (Ricoettr 1974: 17). This is flot only “a vain tntth” from Ricoeur’s
perspective, but “it is like an empty place which has, from ah time, been occupied by a
false cogito. We have indeed leamed, from ail the exegetic disciplines and from
psychoanalysis in particular, that so-calied immediate consciousness is first of ail ‘false
consciousness’. Marx, Nietzsdhe, and Freud have taught us to unmask its tricks” (Ricoeur
1974: 17-12). Moreover, although Ricoeur does flot share Reidegger’s direct ontology or
“the short route of tlie Analytic of Dasein,” Ricoeur nonetheless emphasizes the
Heideggerian-inspired notion that the human subject “is a being who discovers, by the
exegesis of lis own life, that lie is placed in being before lie places and possesses himself’
(Ricoeur 1974: 11, 6). Accordingly, hermeneutics is an essential quest for understanding
understood “no longer [as] a mode ofknowledge but [as] a mode ofbeing, the mode oftliat
being which exists through understanding” (Ricoeur 1974: 7). Emphasizing this
fundamental shifi from epistemology to ontologv, Ricoeur has also been influenced by the
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work of the French philosopher, Jean Nabert (1881-1960). In particular, Ricoeur stresses
Nabert’s definition of hermeneutic reflection as “nothing other than the appropriation of our
act of existing by means of a critique applied to the works and the acts which are the signs
of this act of existing. Thus, reflection is a critique ... in the sense that the cogito can be
recovered only by the detour ofa decipherment ofthe documents ofits life” (Ricoeur 1974:
17).
In keeping with the above foundational elements, Ricoeur defines hermeneutics or
interpretation in this way: “Interpretation is the Work of thought which cons ists in
deciphering the Ïiidden rneaning in the apparent meaning, in unfoïding the leveis of
meaning implied in the literai meaning” (Ricoeur 1974: 13). So defined, Ricoeur’s
hermeneutics will from this point on, include several key elements, for instance, “an entire
theory of signs and significations,” “a notion of signification that is much more complex
than the system of so-called umvocal signs required by the logicof argumentation,” and an
emphasis on appropriation
-- the goal of “overcoming distance and cultural differences and
of matching the reader to a text which has become foreign, thereby incorporating its
meaning into the present comprehension a man is able to have of himself’ (Ricoeur 1974:
4). The inevitable conflict of interpretations is itself an integral part of the process. As
Ricoeur says, “it is only in a conflict of rival hermeneutics that we perceive something of
the being to be interpreted: a umfied ontology is as inaccessible to our method as a separate
ontology. Rather, in every instance, each hermeneutics discovers the aspect of existence
which founds it as method” (Ricoeur 1974: 19). Finally, Ricoeur’s defimtion of “symbol”
places the problem of double meamng or intentionality at the foreftont of his henneneutics:
“I define ‘symbol’ as any structure of signification in which a direct, pnmary, literal
meaning designates, in addition, another meamng which is indirect, secondary, and
figurative and which can be apprehended only through the first” (Ricoeur 1974: 12).
At the end of The Confiict oflnterpretations, Ricoeur reconsiders the syrnbolism of
evil and redevelops his first hermeneutic circle. He notes the literal meaning ofthe three
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primary symbols: evil is a stain, a deviation, and a burden of guilt
-- “words which do not
resemble the thing signified” (Ricoeur 1974: 289). At the same time, these symbols have a
secondary, figurative meaning. They “[point] to a certain situation of man in the Sacred
precisely stained, sinful, guiity being. The literai and obvious meamng
... points beyond
itselfto something which is like a stain, flke a deviation, like a burden” (Ricoeur 1974: 289-
290). Together, the three symbols constimte a conflict of interpretations. Ricoeur refers to
“the polarity of the primary symbols, stretched between a schema of extenority, which is
dominant in the magicai conception ofevil as stain [i.e., “evil aiready there” (Ricoeur 1974:
291)], and a schema of interiority, which oniy fully triumphs with the painful experience of
the guiity and scrupulous conscience” (Ricoeur 1974: 294). Ricoeur invites us to move
beyond this conflict of interpretations by means of a redevelopment of his firsi hermeneutic
circle.
Not surprisingly, the first stage is a form of pure reflection -- “a simple
phenomenology [that] remains an understanding of symbol by symbol, by the totality of
symbols” (Ricoeur 1974: 297). Here the goal is to understand the symbols in question as a
symbolic system with internai coherence. The limitation of this stage is that “the question
of truth lias not yet been posed ... it is a truth without belief, truth at a distance, a reduced
truth” (Ricoeur 1974: 297). Certain questions have no place within this first stage, for
example, “Do I myseif believe that? What do I personalÏy make of these symbolic
meanings?” (Ricoeur 1974: 297). The second stage is that of “hermeneutics proper,” in
other words, “interpretation applied in each case to an individual text” (Ricoeur 1974:
298). Within The Symholism ofEvil, Ricoeur’s interpretation of symbois and myths from
specific texts is certainly a good example of this stage. As Ricoeur explains, in the
interpretation of individuai texts, one inevitabiy “[quitsJ the position, or better, the exile, of
the remote and disinterested spectator in order to appropnate in each case an individual
symboiism” (Ricoeur 1974: 298). In other words, “hermeneutics proceeds from the
preunderstanding of the very matter which through interpretation it is trying to understand”
(Ricoeur 1974: 298).
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The third stage “is that of lÏ?ozIght startingfrom svmhot’ (Ricoeur 1974: 298) and
here Ricoeur issues a warning regarding two hazards. The first is the reduction of the
relationship between symbols and meaning b a simple aliegorical tic. In the case ofthe
symboiism of evil, this hazard would be embodied by “the ethical vision of cvii,” in other
words, the prolonging of “the progressive redciction of stain and sin to personal and inner
gttilt” and a fixation on “a simple al)egory of servile wili” (Ricoeur 1974: 300). The second
hazard is “speculative thought [that] wants to save what an ethical vision of evil tends to
eliminate ... [and] to show its necessity. And its specific peril is gnosis” (Ricoeur 1974:
300). Here the resuit is “doamatic mythology” or “reification of cvii in a ‘natttre’, [in other
words,1 the concept of nature is put forth here in order to counterbalance that of
contingence, which ruled the first [hazard]” (Ricoeur 1974: 304). Here too the
aforernentioned schema of exteriority reigns, and we find references to “the idea of a guilt
of nature, effective as an act and punishabie as a crime, though inherited as a sickness”
(Ricoeur 1974: 306). As Ricoeur indicates, “Ibis is an intellectually inconsistent idea
inasmuch as it mixes two universes of discourse -- that of ethics or of right, and that of
bioiogy” (Ricoeur 1974: 306). Ricoeur’s soLution is to advance thought “between the two
chasms ofaliegory and gnosis” (Ricoeur 1974: 310), or in broader terms, “the myths of cvii
have to be taken ail together; it is their very diaiectic that is instntctive” (Ricoeur 1974:
309). Most importantly, Ricoeur concludes, “At its base the symbolism of cvii is neyer
purely and simply the symboiism of subjectivity, of the separated human sttbject, of
interiorised seif-awareness, of man severed from being” (Ricoeur 1974: 309). On the
contrary, “one must corne to the point where one secs cvii as the adventure ofbeing, as part
of the history of being” (Ricoeur 1974: 309). Within this adventure, the tragic symbol of
evil-already-there lias a definite role: “The ftinction of the tragic is to question self-
assurance, self-certitude, one’s critical pretensions, we might even say the presumption of
the moral conscience that is laden with the entire weight of cvii. Much pride is concealed,
perhaps, in this humility” (Ricoeur 1974: 309).
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Near the end of The Conflict ofInterpretu’ioizs, Ricoeur reaches some fundarnental
conclusions regarding the relationship between hermeneutics and evil. One conclusion is
“that whether evil be passively endured or actively committed, whether it be a question of
ethical evil or suffering, the oniy access to the experience of evil itself is through symbolic
expressions” (Ricoeur 1974: 315). Since these expressions have a twofold meaning or
intentionality, Ricoeur concludes, “The existential signification is ... given indirectly,
anaiogically, by means of the prirnary, literai signification. for this reason, to undergo the
experience of cvii is also to express it in a language; but furthermore, to express it is
already to interpret its symbolic expressions” (Ricoeur 1974: 316). Lest we think that there
is no relationship between the symbolism of cvii and the symboiism of goodness, Ricoeur
says, “One can suppose that the symboiism of evil is altvays the contrary of a symboiism of
the good or salvation or that a symbolism of saivation is the counterpart of a symbolism of
cvii: the pure corresponds to the impure, forgiveness to sin, freedom to guiit and bondage”
(Ricoeur 1974: 316). For those who may be tempted to view the symbolism of evil as a
problem oniy for theologians or scholars of religion, Ricoeur makes these conclusions
regarding the problem that evil presents for philosophy:
The philosopher, as philosopher, can have nothing to say with regard to the
daims of the Gospel, according to which these figures are ‘fulfiiled’ with
the coming of Christ; but, as philosopher, he can and must reflect on the
meaning of these symbols insofar as they stand as representations of the End
of Evil ... The hermeneutics of evil appears as a particular domain that lies
at the heart of a general interpretation of religious symbolisrn. for the
moment we shah consider the symbolism of evil only as the inverse of a
religious symbolism. We shaH ultimately see, however, that the
hermeneutics of evil is flot an indifferent domain but the most
significant domain, perhaps the very source of the hermeneutic problem
itself [emphasis mine]. Why, then, is there a problem for the philosopher?
The reason is that there is something astonishing and even scandalous about
the use of symbols. (1) The symbol remains opaque, flot transparent, since it
is given by means of an analogy based on a literai signification. The symbol
is thus endowed with concrete roots and a certain matenal density and
opacity. (2) The symbol is a prisoner of the diversity of languages and
cultures and, for this reason, remains contingent ... (3) The symbol is given
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to thought only by way of an interpretation which remains inherently
problematïcaÏ. There is no myth without exegesis, no exegesis without
contestation. The deciphering of mysteries is flot a science in either the
Platonic or Hegelian sense or in the modem meaning of the word science.
Opacity, cultural contingency, and dependency on a problematical
interpretation
-- such are the three deficiencies ofthe symbol as measured by
the ideal of clarity, necessity, and scientific order in reflection (Ricoeur
1974: 317).
3.3. Speaking, Writing, and the Cïrcle of Understanding
In Interpretat ion Theo,y and From Text to Action, Ricoeur is again focused on the
deficiencies of pure, universalist reflection and the need for hermeneutics. This time, the
problematic pure reflection is semiotics. One articulation of the problem is that whereas
“semiotics, the [disintegrativeJ science of signs, is formai [and virtual] to the extent that it
relies on the dissociation of language into constitutive parts,” “semantics, the [integrative]
science of the sentence, is immediately concemed with the concept of sense [i.e.,
meaning]” (Ricoeur 1976: 8). At the heart of this problem is the fact that whereas the
concem of semiotics is langue, “the code -- or the set of codes -- on the basis of which” a
particular speaker speaks, the concem of semantics is parole or discourse, the “particular
message” given by the speaker (Ricoeur 1976: 3). There are vast differences between the
message and the code. for example, whereas “a message is individual, its code is
collective” or umversal; whereas “a message is intentional -- it is meant by someone[,] the
code is anonymous and flot intended”, whereas “a message is arbitrary and contingent,” “a
code is systematic and compulsory for a given speaking community” (Ricoeur 1976: 3).
The relationship with time is also different for the message and the code: “A message is a
temporal event in the succession of events which constitute the diachronic dimension of
time, while the code is in time as a set of contemporaneous elements, i.e., as a synchronic
system” (Ricoeur 1976: 3).
Another way to frame the problem is to contrast the concem of semiotics with “the
‘objective’ side” of meaning, and the concem of semantics with “the ‘subjective’ side of
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meaning”(Ricoeur 1976: 19). As Ricoeur indicates, the ‘objective side’ of meaning
comprises “what the sentence does” or ‘the utterance meaning -- in the sense of the
propositional content” (Ricoeur 1976: 19). By contrast, the ‘subjective side’ of meaning
encompasses “what the speaker does” or “the utterer’s meaning -- in the threefold sense of
the seif-reference of the sentence, the illocutionary dimension of the speech-act, and the
intention of recognition by the hearer” (Ricoeur 1976: 19). Problematically, there is a
subjective element ofthe ‘objective side’ of meaning. In other words, “the ‘objective’ side
of discourse itself may be taken in two different ways. We may mean ‘the what’ of
discourse or the ‘about what’ ofdiscourse. The ‘what’ ofdiscourse is its ‘sense’, the ‘about
what’ is its ‘reference” (Ricoeur 1976: 19). The difference between ‘sense’ and
‘reference’ compels Ricoeur to emphasize that whereas ‘reference’ is a crucial concem for
semantics, ‘reference’ is a non-issue for semiotics:
[The distinction between sense and reference] can be directly connected with
our initial distinction between semiotics and semantics. Only the sentence
level allows us to distinguish what is said and about what it is said. In the
system of language, say as a lexicon [i.e., the focus of semioticsJ, there is no
problem of reference; signs only refer to other signs within the system.
Wïth the sentence [i.e., the focus of semanticsJ, however, language is
directed beyond itself Whereas the sense is immanent to the discourse, and
objective in the sense of ideal, the reference expresses the movement in
which language transcends itself In other words, the sense correlates the
identification function and the predicative function within the sentence [i.e.,
the concem of semiotics], and the reference relates language to the world
[i.e., the concem of semantics]. It is another name for discourse’s daim to
be true (Ricoeur 1976: 20).
Ricoeur concludes that “semiotics appears as a mere abstraction of semantics,” and that
“the most concrete defimtion of semantics ... is the theoiy that relates the inner or
immanent constitution of the sense to the outer or transcendent intention of the reference”
(Ricoeur 1976: 21-22). As Ricoeur prioritizes the building of a relationship between sense
and reference, he stresses the need to avoid two opposite extremes, the semiotic emphasis
on language as a closed, ‘objective’ system, and hïs predecessors’ emphasis (i.e., that of
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Schleiermacher and Dilthey) on “recognition of the author’s intention from the point of
view of the primitive addressees in the original situation of discourse” (Ricoeur 1976: 22-
23).
From the perspective of reference, understood as above, writing and written texts
are quite problematical, and Ricoeur surveys the difficulties. In writing, we find “the
detachment of meaning from the event [i.e., of speaking] ... The human fact disappears.
Now material ‘marks’ convey the message” (Ricoeur 1976: 25-26). The meaning of the
text is also detached to some extent from the author’s intentions: “The text’s career escapes
the finite horizon lived by its author. What the text means now matters more than what the
author meant when he wrote it ... The authorial meaning becomes properly a dimension of
the text to the extent that the author is flot available for questioning” (Ricoeur 1976: 30).
There is a certain universalization of the audience of a text which has implications:
“Whereas spoken discourse is addressed to someone who is deterrnined in advance by the
dialogical situation
..., a written text is addressed to an unknown reader and potentially to
whoever knows how to read
... A work also creates its public” (Ricoeur 1976: 31). The
implications of this universalization include the fact that “reading is a social phenomenon,
which obeys certain pattems and therefore suffers from specific limitations”; also “ït is the
response of the audience which makes the text important and therefore significant”
(Ricoeur 1976: 31). As we have already discovered in the use of texts concerning double
effect reasoning, the text has “semantic autonomy,” and it presents significant
“opportunit[ies] for multiple readings” (Ricoeur 1976). Consequently, “the problem of the
appropriation of the meamng of the text becomes as paradoxical as that of the authorship.
The right of the reader and the right of the text converge in an important struggie that
generates the whole dynamic of interpretation” (Ricoeur 1976: 32).
Spoken and wrifien discourse present important differences regarding reference. In
a conversation, for example, “the ultimate criterion for the referential scope of what we say
is the possibility of showing the thing referred to as a member of the situation common to
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both speaker and hearer”; in other words, “ail references in the dialogical situation
consequently are situational” (Ricoeur 1976: 34-35). By contrast, in written texts, the
relationship between sense and reference is more complex, and reference is divïded. As
Ricoeur indicates, although “ostensive indicators and definite descriptions continue to
identify singular entities,
... a gap appears between identification and monstration”
(Ricoeur 1976: 35). Moreover, “in the same manner that the text frees its meaning from the
tutelage of the mental intention, it frees its reference from the limits of situational
reference” (Ricoeur 1976: 36). This liberation has both positive and negative implications.
On the one hand, “the effacement of the ostensive and descriptive reference liberates a
power of reference to aspects of our being in the world that cannot be said in a direct
descriptive way
... the world is the ensemble ofreferences opened up by every kind oftext,
that I have read, understood, and loved” (Ricoeur 1976: 37). In this sense, texts, flot
unlike paintings, are iconic (Ricoeur 1976: 40-42). On the other hand, insofar as written
texts divide and liberate reference, “the written word ... scatters and isolates” (Ricoeur
1976: 40). “Alienation” (Ricoeur 1976: 38), or “distantiation” occurs
-- “It is a dialectical
trait, the principie of a struggie between the othemess [e.g., of texts] that transforms ail
spatial and temporal distance into cultural estrangement and the ownness by which ah
understanding aims at the extension of self-understanding” (Ricoeur 1976: 43).
for Ricoeur, this struggie between “othemess” and “ownness is at the heart of
hermeneutics, the goal of which is an enlargement of self-understanding accomplished
through appropriation: “To appropriate is to make ‘one’s own’ what was ‘alien” (Ricoeur
1976: 44). Hermeneutics is also flot just one approach among many, but rather, “the iast
word”: “The diaiectic of distanciation and appropriation is the last word in the absence of
absolute knowledge” (Ricoeur 1976: 44). In the absence of certainty, there is also a vital
relationship between this dialectic and “tradition”:
This diaiectic may also be expressed as that of the tradition as such,
understood as the reception of historicaily transmitted culturai heritages. A
tradition raises no phulosophical problem as long as we live and dweil within
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it in the naiveté of the first certainty. Tradition only becomes problematic
when this first naiveté is lost. Then we have to retneve its meaning through
and beyond estrangement. Henceforth the appropriation of the past proceeds
along an endÏess struggie with distanciation. Interpretation [or
henneneuticsJ, phulosophically understood, is nothing else than an attempt to
make estrangement and distanciation productive (Ricoeur 1976: 44).
Thus far in this section, we have outlined Ricoeur’s understanding of the
problematic dichotomy between universalist codes and particular discourse, between
utterance meaning and the utterer’s meaning, between sense and reference, and between
meaning and event. At the end of Interprelation Theorv, Ricoeur asks, “How do we make
sense of written discourse?” and he presents his process for making distanciation
productive
-- essentiaÏly the first formulation of the circle of understanding. Ricoeur
explains that, “understanding [empliasis mine] is to reading what the event of discourse is
to the utterance of discourse and that explanation [emphasis mine] is to reading what the
verbal and textual autonomy is to the objective meaning of discourse. A dialectical
structure of reading therefore correlates to the dialectical structure of discourse” (Ricoeur
1976: 71-7 1). In his articulation of this dialectical relationship between explanation and
understanding, Ricoeur is reconciling what was “a clearly contrasting duality in
Romanticist hermeneutics”:
Each term of the pair there represents a distinct and irreducible mode of
intelligibility. Explanation [emphasis mine] finds its paradigmatic field of
application in the natural sciences. When there are extemal facts to observe,
hypotheses to be submifted to empirical verification, general laws for
covering such facts ..., and subordination of empirical generalizations to
hypothetic-deductive procedures, then we may say that we ‘explain’. And
the appropriate correlate of explanation is nature understood as the common
horizon of facts, laws and theories, hypotheses, verifications, and
deductions. Understanding [emphasis mineJ, in contrast, finds its onginary
field of application in the human sciences ..., where science has to do with
the experience of other subjects or other minds similar to our own. It relies
on the meamngfulness of such fonns of expression as physiognomic,
gestural, vocal, or written signs, and upon documents and monuments,
which share with writing the general character of inscription ... The
dichotomy between understanding and explanation in Romanticist
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hermeneutics is both epistemological and ontological. It opposes two
methodologies and two spheres ofreality, nature and minU. Interpretation is
flot a third term, nor, as I shaH attempt to demonstrate, the name of the
dialectic bettveen explanation and understanding. It is understanding
applied to the written expressions oflife (Ricoeur 1976: 72-73).
Here again in Ricoeur’s work, we find a contrast between pure reflection and
hermeneutics. Explanation is a mode of intelligibility that begins tvith the thing or the
external object, and produces facts, laws, theones, deductions, etc. Although this type of
intelligibility is important in its own right, it has limitations as we have aÏready indicated:
“The limitation of thÏs reflection appears directly along with its strength: the synthesis that
it reveals and inspects will be a synthesis oniy in the object
... a synthesis that is merely
intentional, projected outside, ... into the structure of objectivity it makes possible”
(Ricoeur 1986: 18). By contrast, understanding (i.e., ultimately self-understanding from
Ricoeur’s perspective) is a process and an end that relies on the exegesis of siglis of life.
To facilitate the integration of these two modes of intelligibility, Ricoeur articulates a
“dynamic of interpretative reading” (Ricoeur 1976: 74), what will later become a more
fully developed circle of understanding. This process has two stages: from guess to
validation and from expÏanation to comprehension or understanding.
The flrst stage involves guessing the meaning of the text, and attempting to validate
or test the guesses that are made. As Ricoeur explains, there is a relationship between
guessing meaning and the semantic autonomy of texts: “The necessity of guessing the
meaning of a text may be related to ... semantic autonomy.... With writing, the verbal
meaning of the text no longer coincides with the ... intention of the text ... In other words,
we have to guess the meaning of the text because the author’s intention is beyond our
reach” (Ricoeur 1976: 75). Initial guesses are then validated to provide the best
explanation ofthe individual text as a whole. Regarding the process for validating guesses,
Ricoeur says: “I agree with E.D. Hirsch that they are doser to a logic ofprobability than to
a Iogic of empirical verification. To show that an interpretation is more probable in the
light of what we know is something other than showing that a conclusion is true
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validation ... is an argumentative discipline comparable to the juridical procedures used in
legal interpretation ... “ (Ricoeur 1976: 78). It must be emphasized that validation takes
place within the larger context of a structural (i.e., semiotïc) analysis of the text: “To read
[in this contextJ means
... to transfer oneself into the ‘place’ where the text stands....
According to this choice, the text no longer has an extenor, it only lias an interior. b
repeat, the very constitution of the text as a text and of the system of texts as literature
justifies this conversion ofthe literary object into a closed system ofsigns” (Ricoeur 1976:
81).
The second stage, from explanation to comprehension, involves the opposite
process, that is, opening up the text to an exterior world, or making the distanciation
produced by explanation productive of new meaning. in this stage, the dichotomy between
sense and reference and between utterance meaning and the utterer’s meaning becomes
reconciled. Ricoeur explains the new understanding that is produced:
Taking the notion of depth semantics as our guideline, we cannot retum to
our initial problem of the reference of the text. We can now give a name to
this non-ostensive reference. It is the kind of world opened up by the depth
semantics of the text, a discovery, which has immense consequences
regarding what is usually called the sense of the text. The sense of a text is
not behind the text, but in front of it. It is not something hidden, but
something disclosed. What has to be understood is flot the initial situation
of discourse, but what points towards a possible world, thanks to the non
ostensive reference of the text. Understanding lias less than ever to do with
the author and bis situation. It seeks to grasp the world-propositions opened
up by the reference of the text. To understand a text is to follow its
movement from sense to reference: from what it says, to what it talks about.
In this process the mediating role played by structural analysis constitutes
botli the justification of the objective approach and the rectification of the
subjective approach to the text. We are definitely enjoined from identifying
understanding with some kind of intuitive grasping of the intention
underlying the text. [However,] what we have said about the depth
semantics that structural analysis yields rather invites us to think of the sense
of the text as an injunction coming from the text, as a new way of looking at
things ... This is the reference borne by the deptli semantics. The text
speaks of a possible world and of a possible way f onentating oneseif
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within it. The dimensions of this world are properly opened up by and
disclosed by the text (Ricoeur 1976: 8788).
In From Texi to Action, Ricoeur reviews why language makes interpretation or
hermeneutics necessaiy: “{The issue] is poÏysemy, that is, the feature by which our words
have more than one meaning when considered outside their use in a determinate context”
(Ricoeur 1991: 54). Again, he emphasizes “the central problem ofhermeneutics,” namely,
“the opposition, disastrous in my view, between explanation and understanding” (Ricoeur
1991: 53). This opposition can be framed in another way as that “between alienating
distanciation and belonging” (Ricoeur 1991: 75). for Ricoeur, this “antimony
establishes an untenable alternative: on the one hand, alienating distanciation is the attitude
that renders possible the objectification that reigns in the human sciences but on the other
hand, this distanciation, which is the condition of the scientific status of the sciences, is at
the same time the fail that destroys the fundamental ... relation whereby we belong to and
participate in the historical reality that we daim to constrnct as an object” (Ricoeur 1991:
75). In an attempt to resolve this problem, Ricoeur adopts a ccworking definition of
hermeneutics”: “hermeneutics is the theory of the operations of understanding in their
relation to the interpretation of texts” (Ricoeur 1991: 53).
Central to the operations of understanding is the role of reference, and in from Text
to Action, Ricoeur reviews the function and importance of reference in relation to both
spoken and written discourse. In the context of spoken discourse or “speech as an event,”
time and place are important references: “Discourse is aiways realized temporally and in
the present” (Ricoeur 1991: 145). There is aiways a subject in spoken discourse:
“discourse refers back to its speaker by means of a complex set of indicators such as the
personal pronouns. We shall say that the ‘instance of discourse’ is seif-referential”
(Ricoeur 1991: 145). Spoken discourse is always related to a world: “discourse is aiways
about something. It refers to a world that it daims to describe, to express, or to represent”
(Ricoeur 1991: 145). Conversation always involves more than one person: “discourse
alone has flot only a world but an other, another person, an interlocutor to whom it is
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addressed” (Ricoeur 1991: 146). Regarding written discourse, reference becomes more
complex, but just as important. A reference to time and place belongs primarily to the
reader because ccthe system of language [of the written text] is virtual and outside of time”
(Ricoeur 1991: 77). A written text is a work or an object made possible by structure: “To
impose a form upon material, to submit production to genres, to produce an individual
[work] ... Discourse thereby becomes the object of a praxis and a techne” (Ricoeur 1991:
$0). In other words, the text lias a reference related to its production that can be analyzed
quite apart from the reference of either the author(s) or the reader(s) of the text. As already
indicated, however, any written text presents a certain autonomy -- “the ‘matter’ ofthe text
may escape from the fimte intentional horizon of its author” (Ricoeur 1991: 83), and its
mode of production. Most importantly, the ‘matter’ of the text opens up a world for the
reader or interpreter
-- ultimately, a world of enlarged self-understanding:
The [proposed world ofthe textJ is flot behind the text, as a hidden intention
would be, but in front of it, as that which the work unfolds, discovers,
reveals. Henceforth, to understand is to ztnderstand oneseif in front of the
text. It is flot a question of imposing upon the text our finite capacity for
understanding, but of exposing ourselves to the text and receiving from it an
enlarged self, which would be the proposed existence corresponding in the
most suitable way to the world proposed. So understanding is quite different
from a constitution of which the subject would possess the key. In this
respect, it would be more correct to say that the self is constituted by the
‘matter’ ofthe text (Ricoeur 1991: 88)
There is a parallel between the distinction between sense and meamng, and the
distinction between explanation and understanding (or interpreting). In both cases, whereas
sense and explanation pertain to the internai structure of a text, meamng and understanding
pertain to the reference of a text. In other words, Ricoeur says, “The ‘actualized’ text finds
a surrounding and an audience; it resumes the referential movement ... toward a world and
toward subjects ... Initiaiiy the text had only a sense [emphasis mine], that is, internai
relations or a structure; now it has a meaning [emphasis mine], that is, a realization in the
discourse of the reading subject” (Ricoeur 1991: 119). Similariy, “to explain [emphasis
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mine] is to bring out the structure, that is, the internai relations of dependence that
constitute the statics of the text, [by contrastJ to interpret [or to understand
- empliasis
mine] is to follow the path of thought opened up by the text, to place oneseif en route
toward the orient of the text” (Ricoeur 1991: 122). As Ricoeur indicates, “the debate
belween explanation and understanding is an old one” (Ricoeur 1991: 125), and he
emphasïzes “that the battle has raged mainly over the use of the word cause. Perhaps
wrongly”:
For it was admitted too hastily that the word cause (causation) had only one
meaning, that given to it by Hume: indeed, for Hume the relation between
cause and effect implïed that antecedents and consequences are logically
independent, that is to say, capable of being identifled separately (if a match
sets fire to an explosive, I can perfectly well describe the match without
describing the explosion). There is thus no iogicai connection of implication
between cause and effect.
Now this is flot the case between intention and action, or between motive
and project. I cannot identify a project without mentioning the action 1 am
going to do: this is a logical and flot a causal connection (in the Humean
sense). In the same way, I cannot state the motives of my action without
relating these motives to the action whose motives they are. There is thus an
implication between motive and project that does not belong to the schema
of the logical heterogeneity of cause and effect.
Consequently, in this language game if I use the same word because -- ‘he
did this because’ -- it is in another sense of because. In one instance I asic
for a cause, in the other a reason. Anscombe strongly contrasted the two
language games, in distinguishing these two uses of the words why and
because of In one, I am in the domain of causation, in the other in that of
motivation.
On another precise point the debate has been just as Iively: the question of
the place ofthe agent in his or lier action. Can one say that the agent is the
cause of his or her acts? No, if by cause we mean a constant antecedent;
yes, if we can say that the relation between the agent and his or her acts
belongs to a non-Humean causai mode!, one more closely resembling the
Aristotelian cause. This, then, is the state of the problem that I am taking as
the initial state in our discussion (Ricoeur 1991: 133).
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Following this statement of the problem, Ricoeur makes a case to illustrate that the
dichotomy between the domain of causation (i.e., explanation) and motivation (i.e.,
understanding or interpretation) is untenable. In other words, lie disagrees with
Anscombe’s emphasis on keeping the two language games separate. Since Ricoeur’s
argument has undergone further deveiopment in Oncself As Another, we will defer our
discussion of this argument until the next section. However, before leaving froiii Text to
Action, there is a need to explain Ricoeur’s renewed presentation of the circle of
understanding whereby explanation and understanding are integrated. Not unlike the initial
presentation in Interpretat ion Theory, here too we begin with a guess, but Ricoeur explains
the rationale behind the guessing: “Why do we need an art of guessing? Why do we have
to ‘construe’ the meaning9 because the double meaning of metaphorical language
requires ... deciphenng
... In more general terms, a text has to be construed because it is
flot a mere sequence of sentences, ail on an equal footing and separately understandable
it is in construing the details that we construe the whole. There is no necessity and no
evidence conceming what is important and what is unimportant, what is essential and what
is unessential. Thejudgment of importance is a guess” (Ricoeur 1991: 158).
Validating the guess is the moment of explanation. This requires various kinds of
structural analyses proceeding on the basis of a logic of probability, and including
“procedures of invalidation similar to the criteria of falsifiability emphasized by Karl
Popper ... The role of falsification is played here by the conflict between competing
interpretations. An interpretation must be flot only probable but more probable than
another” (Ricoeur 1991: 159-160). At this stage, structural literary analysis “proceeds from
the suspension ... of the ostensive reference. b read in this way means to ... transfer
oneself into the ‘place’ where the text stands .... According to this choice, the text no
longer lias an outside{;j it has only an inside ... [i.e.,} a closed system of signs” that one
seeks to explain (Ricoeur 1991: 162-163). This structural analysis is a necessar’’
intermediaiy stage between the guess or the “naïve interpretation,” and the “critical
interpretation” that foWiws (Ricoeur 1991: 164).
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By “critical interpretation,” Ricoeur means the subsequent ‘moment’ of “depth
semantics that constitutes the genuine object of understanding and that requires a specific
affinity between the reader and the kïnd of things the text is about” (Ricoeur 1991: 164).
Again, the goal is to reveal the reference, or “to grasp the proposed worlds opened up by
the references to the text. To understand a text is to follow its movernent from sense to
reference ...“ (Ricoeur 1991: 165). b follow this movement is also to appropriate the text
and ultimately, to appropriate an enlarged self:
By ‘appropriation’, I understand this: that the interpretation of a text
culminates in the seif-interpretation of a subject who thenceforth
understands himself better, understands himself differently, or simply begins
to understand himself This culmination of the understanding of a text in
self-understanding is characteristic of the kind of reflective phulosophy that
I have called ‘concrete reflection’ ... On the one hand, self-understanding
passes through the detour of understanding the cultural signs in which the
self documents and forms itself [i.e., explanationJ. On the other hand,
understanding the text is flot an end in itself; ït mediates the relation to
himself of a subject who, in the short circuit of immediate reflection, does
flot find the meaning ofhis own life ... In short, in hermeneutical reflection
-
- or in reflective hermeneutics -- the constitution of the self is
contemporaneous with the constitution of meaning (Ricoeur 1991: 119).
3.4. Acting, Imputability, and the Ethics Circle
In Oneseifas Anotïier, Ricoeur defines imputability in this way: “Imputability ... is
the ascription of action to its agent, under tÏ2e condition of ethical and moral predicates
which characterize the action as good, just, conforming to duty, done out of duty, ami,
finally, as being the wisest in the case of conflictual situations (Ricoeur 1992: 292). In his
more recent text, The Just, Ricoeur consuits “The Robert dictionaiy” to provide another
definition: “‘to impute an action to someone is to attribute it to him as its actual author, to
put it, ... on bis account and to make him responsible for it’ ... Let me emphasize this
again: to attribute an action to someone as its actual author. We must flot lose sight of this
reference to an agent” (Ricoeur 2000: 14). Not losing sight of “this reference to an agent”
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bas been Ricoeur’s emphasis in ail his books consulted thus far, and flot unlike the overail
structure already discovered in these earlier works, Ricoeur, in Oneself as Another,
contrasts pure reflection on agents and agency with hermeneutic reflection that facilitates
the self-understanding of a subject. Indeed, looking back on Oneseif as Another from his
perspective in 1999, Ricoeur says, “Here is found the rnost decisive step that govems the
whole structure of Oneself as AnotÏzer: namely, the need to articulate at each level an
objective approach with a reflective [or hermeneuticJ one ...“ (Ricoeur 2002a: 281). Not
surpnsingly, Ricoeur also relates the two approaches using the terms he used in his earlier
works -- explanation and understanding: “This correlation between the objective mood of
discourse and the reflective one governs the structure of Oneseifas Another. I can put this
correlation under a precept in the forrn of a slogan: ‘explaining more in order to understand
better” (Ricoeur2002a: 281).
In Oneseif as Another, Ricoeur coimects explanation and understanding on four
main levels or as related to four primary fields: linguistics, action theory, identity theory,
and ethics. In other words, Oneseif as Another “can be read in terms of four verbs [or four
capabilitiesi, which the ‘I can’ modifies: I can speak, I can do things, I can tel! a stor, and
f can be ïrnputed, an action can be imputed to me as its true author” (Ricoeur 2002a: 280).
Ricoeur utilizes the notion of imputability to connect his philosophical anthropology with
his ethics (Ricoeur 2002a: 280). However, as Ricoeur empliasizes, it is his overali stress on
ail the capabilities as modifications of the verb ‘I can’, that bnngs the entirety of bis work
together:
When I try to cast a retrospective glance at my work, I agree that it is -- for
the sake of a discourse of the second order
-- a personal reinterpretation
offered to my readers. And I must say that it is only recently that I feit
allowed to give a name b this overarching problematics. I mean the
problem of human capabïlity, capability as the comerstone of philosophical
anthropology, or, to put it in more simple ternis belonging to ordinary
language, the reaim of the theme expressed by the verb I can ... The
advantage of starting with this model verb I can is to be able to Iink it to a
1 r -,
I
plurality of verbs irnpÏying some kind of actualization, a variety of
potentialities or capabilities
... (Ricoeur 2002a: 280).
OneseIf US Anoiher has a triadic structure that perrnits Ricoeur to focus on three
overarching capabilities: describing action, narrating action, and prescnbing action
(Ricoeur 1992: 20). By means of the first four studies, Ricoeur relates objective and
reflective approaches to describing action within the larger context of rnethods found within
linguistics (i.e., covered in the first two studies), and those situated within Englisli-language
action theory (i.e., the focus of the third and fourth studies). Ricoeur connects objective
and reflective approaches to identity and nanating action in the f;fth and sixth studies.
FinalÏy, in the last three studies, Ricoeur relates objective and reflective approaches to
prescribing action. from the perspective of this author, these last three studies comprise
Ricoeur’s ethics circÏe. Insofar as describing action, narrating action, and prescribing
action are alt involved in Ricoeur’s definitions of imputability, Onese!f as Anoiher
represents an in-depth, cumulative investigation of the problem of imputability, the
implications of which will become clearer as we proceed.
In ()nesel/as Another, Ricoeur makes a fundamental suggestion that has profound
implications for this thesis. Instead ofprioritizing an inquiry conceming how events can be
distinguished one ftom another, in our case for instance, how terminal sedation can be
distinguished from euthanasia, Ricoeur’s inquiry focuses on relationships within and
between selves: “ ... the major issue [resides] less in determinïng what distinguishes
actions from other events occuning in the world than in determining what specifies the
self, implied in the power-to-do, at the junction of acting and the agent” [ernphasis
mine] (Ricoeur 1992: 113). Ricoeur’s exploration ofthe latter determination begins in the
Introduction of Oneseif as Another where he specifies two meanings of identity, the
definition and implications of which he develops throughout the book. Continuing his
preference for hernieneutic or reflective meditation over pure reflection, Ricoeur indicates
that his flrst intention in this text is “to indicate the primacy of reflective meditation over
the immediate positing of the subject, as this is expressed in the first person singular: ‘1
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think,’ ‘I am’. This initial intention draws support from the grammars ofnatural languages
inasmuch as they allow the opposition between ‘self and ‘I” (Ricoeur 1992: 1). Thïs
initial intention is also supported by Ricoeur’s wish to posit a self somewhere between the
exalted cogito of the Cartesian tradition, and the shattered or humiliated cogito of the
tradition culminating with Nietzsche (Ricoeur 1992: 4-16).
Ricoeur’s second intention “is to distinguish two major meanings of ‘identity’,”
identity as sameness or constancy (idem-identity) and identity as ever-changing selfhood
(tpse-identity) (Ricoeur 1992: 2-3). Ricoeur’s third intention is to indicate thal tpse-identity
involves “the dialectic of self and the other than self ... Oneself as Another suggests from
the outset that the selffiood of oneseif implies othemess to such an intimate degree that one
cannot be thought of without the other, that instead one passes into the other, as we might
say in Hegelian terms” (Ricoeur 1992: 3). Ricoeur indicates that fundamentally, the
dialectic of self and the other than self includes complex relationships between the self and
“one’s own body, or the flesh” (Ricoeur 1992: 3 19-329), between the self and “the
othemess of other people” (Ricoeur 1992: 329-341), and between the self and “conscience”
(Ricoeur 1992: 341-355). Thus in Oneseif as Another, Ricoeur’ s henneneutics of the self
involves tracking the complexities of these relationships as they are revealed on the levels
of descnbing action, narrating action and prescribing action. Near the end of the
Introduction, Ricoeur emphasizes two features of this tracking that ment attention. firstly,
the studies in this text have a “fragmentary character” because although they “have as their
thematic unity human action,” this unity “is not the unity that an ultimate foundation would
confer to a series of derivative disciplines” (Ricoeur 1992: 19). Secondly, “the type of
certainty to which [this hermeneutics] may aspire” is not that denved ftom an ultimate
foundation, but rather, “the notion of attestation, by which I intend to characterize the
alethic (or veritative) mode of the style appropnate to the conjunction of analysis [i.e.,
explanation] and reflection [i.e., hermeneuticsJ, to the recognition ofthe difference between
selfhood and sameness, and to the unfolding of the dialectic of the self and the other
(Ricoeur 1992: 21).
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from the previous section conceming the circle of understanding, we recali
Ricoeur’s ernphasis on the problematic dichotomy between universalist codes and
particular discourse, between utterance meaning and the utterer’s meaning, between sense
and reference, and between meaning and event. In the first four studies that constitute
Ricoeur’s exploration of describing action, he again probes these dichotomies on the levels
oflinguistics and action theory. Ris major conclusion applicable on both levels is that ‘the
phenornenon ofascription constitutes, in the final analysis, only a partial and as yet abstract
determination of what is meant by the ipseity (the selfhood) of the self’ (Ricoeur 1992:
111). For example, on the level of linguistics in the first study, Ricoeur stresses that insofar
as persons are identified linguistically as corporal entities, this objective identification or
ascription poses two key problems. Such identification “does flot stress the capacitv
belonging to the person to designate himself or herself in speaking
...,
here, the person is
one of the ‘things’ about which we speak rather than itself a speaking subject’ (Ricoeur
1992: 3 1). Moreover, insofar as language identifies persons as bodies “by means of
spatiotemporal Iocation[,] the thing [j. .e., the body] rernains the sarne in different times and
places ... Yet ..., understanding the way in which our owri body is at once a body like any
other (situated among other bodies) and an aspect of the self (its manner of being in the
world) isa problem ofvast proportions .“ (Ricoeur 1992: 33). A similar ambiguity exists
when identification occurs by means ofthe word ‘I’. As Ricoeur explains,
The expression ‘I’ is fraught with a strange ambiguity; ... On the one hand,
‘I’ as a personat pronoun belonging to the system of language is a member
of the paradigm of personal pronouns. As such, it is an empty term which,
designates in each instance a different person for each new use ... As a
vacant terra of this sort, ‘I’ is a migrating ierm, it is a position with respect
to which several vii-tuaI utterers can be substituted for one another. Whence
the term ‘shifier’ ... On the other hand ... we [can movej from one sense of
the expression ‘I’ to [another]. [In this case,] we are no longer stressing the
.subsiitutuhle aspect of the shifter, but instead the fixation [or “anchoring”]
that resuits from speaking ... by vii-tue of which ‘I’ designates in each case
only one person to the exclusion of any other, the one who is speaking here
and now ... The paradox consists quite precisely in the apparent
contradiction between the substitutable character of the shifler and the
196
nonsubstitutabie character of the phenomenon of anchoring (Ricoeur 1992:
48-49).
Leaving the level of iinguistics behind, Ricoeur says, “the difficuitïes, paradoxes,
and aporias with which the preceding studies ended take on new proportions within the
framework of the theory of action” (Ricoeur 1992: 56). In other words, j ust as universalist
linguistic identifiers conceai selfhood and render seif-designation arnbiguous, if flot
impossible, so too action theory creates similar problems. As Ricoeur notes, action theory
encloses both actions and agents within
the same conceptual schema, containing notions such as circumstances,
intentions, motives, deliberations, voluntary or involuntary motions,
passiveness, constraints, intended or unintended resuits, and so on ... What
is important in estabiishing the range of meaning of each of these terms is
the fact that they ail beiong to the same network; the relations of
intersignification thus guide the respective meanings, so that knowing how
to use one of them is actuaily knowing how to use the entire network in a
meaningful and appropriate manner. This is a coherent language game, in
which the mies goveming the use of one term are systematicaily related to
the mies goveming the use of another term ... the entire network serves to
determine what ‘counts as’ an action (Ricoeur 1992: 57-58).
This conceptual identification schema is extremely problematic because the question
‘who?’ “tends to be relegated to the sidelines to make room for the much more important
question of the relation between the questions ‘what?’ and ‘why?’ (quoi? et pourquoi?)
which ovemdes the relation between the pair of questions ‘what-why?’ and the question
‘who?” (Ricoeur 1992: 59). Problematically, questions such as ‘what?’ and ‘why?’ have
gained prominence insofar as “it is in relation to the notion of somethiizg that occurs [i.e.,
of an event] that one then strives to determine the descriptive status of actions” (Ricoeur
1992: 60). As Ricoeur indicates, events happen and they have observable, explainable
causes, whereas actions create happenings and derive from internai, non-observable, and
sometimes obscure motives (Ricoeur 1992: 61). Not only is the question ‘who?’ sidelined
in the attempt to describe actions as events, but here again, the attempt opens up an abyss
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between the notions of cause and motive. In other words, “the internai, necessary (and in
this sense, logical) connection characteristic of motivation is incompatible with the
extrinsic, contingent (and, in this sense, empirical) connection of causality” (Ricoeur 1992:
63). Insofar as motive is usually associated wïth wanting, a gulfis also created between the
internai, contemplative phenomena of wanting and the external phenomena of causes and
events (Ricoeur 1992: 63-64). Furthermore, the notion of interpretation or understanding is
strictly separated from that of explanation:
To evoke the reason for an action is to try to place the action in a broader
context, generally one composed of mies of interpretat ion and of norms of
execution, which are assumed to be shared by the agent and [his!her
cornmunity] ... [This process strengthensj the opposition between the two
opposing schemata of explanation, to the extent that only one of them can be
considered a form ofinterpretation (Ricoeur 1992: 64).
Although many wouid say, “in Wittgenstein’s sense, that action and its motives on
one side, and the event and its cause on the other, belong to two separate ‘language
games’,” Ricoeur does flot agree with this analysis; in fact, he holds that “the constant
encroachment of one [‘game’J on the other ... [renders] problematic the very principle of
their dissociation” (Ricoeur 1992: 65). For example, “phenomenologically speaking, the
opposition between motive and cause is flot obligatory ... It seems instead that the category
of wanting offers itself as a mixed category” because wanting can simultaneously invoive
both intentionai, reasons-for actions, as weil as compulsive causes (Ricoeur 1992: 66). In
other words, there is a two-sidedness about wanting -- “[wantingJ as a force that compels
and moves and as a reason for acting ... motive is at one and the same time the motion of
wanting and its justification
...“ (Ricoeur 1991: 134). Ontologically, the dichotomy
between actionlmotive and eventlcause is also problematic because “it amounts to opposing
mental predicates to physical predicates,” in relation to one and the same person or agent
(Ricoeur 1991: 66). Regarding this probiem, the salient question remains that asked by
Ricoeur in From Text b Action:
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What is the being that makes possible this double allegiance of motive to
force and to sense, to nature and to culture, to bios and to logos? One would
have to reflect here upon the veiy position ofthe human body in nature: it is
at once one body among others (a thing among things) and a manner of
existing of a being capable of reflecting, of changing its mmd, and of
justifyïng its conduci (Ricoeur 1991: 135).
Ricoeur is critical ofAnscombe’s treatment of actions, intentions, causes and events
in Intention because she priontizes the question ‘why?’: “Employing the cnterion of the
question ‘why?’ and ofthe acceptable answers to this question privileges the objective side
of action, namely the resuit obtained, which is itself an event. As Anscombe states ... , I do
what happens. The obliteration of the agent of action is further reinforced by accentuating
the objective side of the reason for acting” (Ricoeur 1992: 70). Ricoeur is also critical of
Anscombe’s dualistic approach to the relationship between intentional action and
knowledge: “On the one hand, she staunchly asserts that intentional action is the object of
description [i.e., known by observation]; ... On the other hand, intentional actions
constitute a subclass of things known without observation ... This notion of
nonobservational [or practical] knowledge .. incontestably bnngs Anscombe’s position
doser to that of the supporters of the duality of language games” (Ricoeur 1992: 69-70).
Anscombe’s stress on the relationship between descriptions and tmth daims is also
problematic for Ricoeur, and he uses this problem to advance further his notion of
attestation:
In my opinion, it is the exclusive concern with the truth of the description
that tends to overshadow any interest in assigning the action to its agent.
Assigning the action to an agent poses a problem of veracity and no longer a
problem of truth, in the descriptive sense of the term .. the relation of
means to end and the logic that belongs to it does not exhaust the meaning of
the intention with which one acts. The latter, it seems to me, implies in
addition the pure act of intending which has been cast out of first place ... It
is perhaps due to the very style of analytic philosophy and to its almost
exclusive preoccupation with description, as well as with the truth daims
appropriate to description, that it ignores problems pertaimng to attestation
Tests of sincerity ... are flot venfications but trials that finally end in an
act of trust ... Anscombe herseif recognizes that there is a moment when
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only the person concemed can say what bis or her intention is. But this
saying is on the order of an avowal
... when communicated, the avowal is or
is flot accepted. But it is neyer the equivalent of a public description; it is a
shared confession. What Anscombe calis knowledge without observation
belongs, it seems to me -- and this in opposition to the author’s will
-- to the
order of attestation attestation escapes sight, if sight is expressed ïn
propositions held to be true or false. Veracity is flot truth, in the sense ofthe
adequation of knowledge to its object. Because of the inability to thematize
this attestation, Anscombe’s conceptual analysis is unable to account in any
detail for the third use of the tenn ‘intention’: the intention to ... Anscombe
confines herseif to stating that the criterion for the question ‘why?’ and for
the corresponding answers also holds for the intention of a proposed action.
This amounts to saying that the mark of the future ... is flot a distinguishing
factor; only the explanation by reasons counts ... what is eliminated is the
one who, in intending, places this intention on the path of promising, even if
the firm intention lacks the conventional and public framework of explicit
promising (Ricoeur 1992: 72-73).
In the fourth study, from Action to the Agent, Ricoeur attempts to overcome the
“major obstacle” created by action theory, nameÏy, “the attraction exerted on the logical
analysis of action sentences by an ontology of events which blocks the retum path toward
the question ‘who?” (Ricoeur 1992: 88). Again, Ricoeur’s chief concem is imputability
and the fact that personal responsibility for an action cannot be adequately linked with
descriptions or explanations of that action unless the question ‘who?’ has been fully
answered. As already indicated, the movement Ricoeur affempts to facilitate is away from
a distinction between events and toward the “[determination of] what specifies the self,
implied in the power-to-do, at the junction of acting and the agent” (Ricoeur 1992: 113).
Ricoeur acknowledges that “with the notion of power retums the old idea of efficient
causality which the Galilean revolution had cast out of physics” (Ricoeur 1992: 101). He
also acknowledges that a link between “power-to-do” and a restoration of efficient causality
may also require the appeal to “something as a primitive datum (fait primit/),” but he
“[opposes] the modest avowal of a few primitive data, inherent in the construction of a
fundamental anthropology to the Promethean ambition of an ultimate foundation based
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upon the model of the Cartesian cogito and its successively more radical formulations”
(Ricoeur 1992: 101-102).
Ricoeur’s solution seems to be another application ofthe circte ofunderstanding. In
other words, lie does flot take any primitive datum as a given, but oniy as a type of hunch
that is subjected to “a labor of thinking,
... a dialectic ... a conflict of arguments
developed rigorously” (Ricoeur 1992: 102). In this case, the first stage oftlie dialectic is “a
dis]uncl ive stage, at the end of which we observe the necessarily antagonistic character of
the original causality of the agent in relation to the other modes of causaiity” (Ricceur
1992: 102). As Ricoeur reminds us, this antagonism was already recognized by Kant in
The Critique of Pure Reuson: “ ‘Causality in accordance with the law of nature is flot the
only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and ail be derived. To
explain these appearances it is necessaiy to assume that there is also another causality, that
of freedom’ “ (Ricoeur 1992: 102). The second stage of the dialectic is “a eonjunctive
stage, at the end of which we recognize the necessity to coordinate in a synergistic way the
original causaiity of the agent with the other forms of causality. Only then wili the
primitive datum of what we must cali flot simply the power to do but initiative [ernphasis
mineJ, in the strong sense ofthe word, be recognized” (Ricoeur 1992: 102).
Within attempts to link personal responsibility and explanations of actions, defining
and limiting initiative or the power to do is no small feat, as the controversy surrotmding
“terminal sedation” has revealed. In Ricoeur’s discussion of”the open conflict between the
foreseeable and desired intentional effects of an action and ... its ‘side effects’ “ in The
Just, he gives this diagnosis ofthe problem:
The problem stems, in effect, from the fimte character of the subjective wilÏ.
Ibis finitude consists in the fact that the subjective wiIl can become action
only be exteriorizing itself, thus piacing itself under the law of extemal
necessity ... Whence the moral dilemma: on the one hand, one would like to
impute to the agent only what follows from an intention that bears the mark
of the goal in mmd. This intimate connection authonzes extending the
predicate ‘mine’ from the intention to the resuits which, in a way, stem from
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it and thus continue to belong to it. On the other hand, rny effects do flot
exhaust what follows as a consequence of the action. Thanks to the
connection of willed effects with extemal necessity, action has consequences
that we can say escape the circumspection of the intention ... [However, the
question remains:] How far does the ‘my’ character of ‘consequences’
extend, and where does the ‘alien’ begin? (Ricoeur 2000: 32-33).
As Ricoeur says in OneseÏf as Another, “separating what belongs to the agent from
what belongs to the chains of extemal causality proves to be a highly complex operation. It
is necessary to separate the intentional segments ... from those segments which could be
called systemic, to the extent that they express the structure of dynamic physical systems”
(Ricoeur 1992: 106). Kant accomplished this separation in his distinction between “two
types of beginnïng: one which would be the beginning of the world, the other which is a
beginning in the midst of the world ... [i.e.,] the beginning related to freedom ... [or] an
absolute beginning with respect to a particular series of events” (Ricoeur 1992: 105). For
Ricoeur, a beginning in the world has two essential characteristics. Firstly, “determining
the end point where the responsibility of an agent ends is a matter of decision and flot some
fact to be established” (Ricoeur 1992: 107). Secondly, “this notion implies a multiplicity of
agents and of beginnings ... which can be identified only in terms of the distinct series of
actions assigned to each one. Now the conflictual structure of this assigning cannot be
eliminated” (Ricoeur 1992: 107). It is the notion of a begiiming in the world that underlies
Ricoeur’s notion of initiative -- “an intervention of the agent of action in the course of the
world, an intervention which effectively causes changes in the world” (Ricoeur 1992: 109).
Constraint related to the clash of causalities is certainly a dimension of action as initiative:
“If, at the present stage of our investigation, we can represent this grasp of the human agent
on things, within the course of the world, as Kant himself says, only as a conjunction
between several sorts of causality [emphasis mine], this must be ftankly recognized as a
constraint belonging to the structure of action as initiative” (Ricoeur 1992: 109).
Nonetheless, the notion of action as initiative provides an important way to overcome the
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aforementioned limitations of action theory, and to begin the development of a view of
imputability that upholds the ipseity of the self.
In the fifih and sixth studies, Ricoeur compares and integrates views of personal
identity that reify or objectify identity as sameness (i.e., idem-identity), and reflective
approaches that support identity as ever-changing selffiood (i.e., ipse-identity as narrative
identity in this case). Among the examples of the former in the fifih study, we find the
position of Locke and earlier views that Ricoeur himself held. Reminding us of Locke’s,
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Ricoeur explains that within this text, “Locke
introduces the singular idea of the identity of a thing with itself ... It is indeed by
comparing a thing with itself in different times that we form the ideas of identity and
diversity; ‘When therefore we demand whether anything be the same or no, it refers aiways
to something that existed such a time in such a place, which it was certain at that instant,
was the same with itself” (Ricoeur 1992: 125). From Locke, we have also inherited both
the dichotomy of mental and corporeal identity, and the prioritization of structural criteria
of sameness: “The tradition has credited [Locke] with inventing a criterion of identity,
namely, mental identity, to which may henceforth be opposed the criterion of corporeal
identity ... governed by the permanence of an organization observable from outside”
(Ricoeur 1992: 126).
Ricoeur looks back at his work in The Voluntary and the Involuntary (Ricoeur
1966) and in fallible Man in order to specify how bis own views supported the notion of
identity as sameness as it pertains to the notion of character. Ricoeur defines “character” as
“the set of distinctive marks which permit the reidentification of a human individual as
being the same [e.g., the “marks” of “numerical identity and qualitative identity,
uninterrupted continuity and permanence in time”l” (Ricoeur 1992: 119). In what follows,
Ricoeur recalis his earlier positions on the immutability of “character” and his awareness of
the revision being articulated in Oneseif as Another, namely, his new view of character as
the primary locus for the dialectic between identity as sameness and identity as selfhood:
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In the days when I was writing The Voluntaî und the JnvoÏuntwy, I placed
character under the heading of ‘absolute involuntary’ in opposition to the
‘relative involuntary’ of motives in the area of voluntary decision and to
powers in that of voluntaiy motion. As an absolute involuntaiy, I assigned
[characterJ, along with the unconscious and with being alive, symbolized by
birth, to that level of our existence which we cannot change but to which we
must consent. And even then, I underscored the immutable nature of
character as a fimte, unchosen perspective through which we accede to
values and to the use of our powers. Ten years later, I retumed to this
fascinating theme of character in Fallible Mun, but in a somewhat different
context. This time, it was no longer in relation to the polarity of the
voluntary and the involuntary but in connection with the Pascalian theme of
the ‘disproportion’, the noncoincidence between the finite and the infinite.
Here, character appeared to me as my manner of existing in accordance with
a finite perspective affecting my opening to the world of things, ideas
values, and persons. In a certain sense, I am stiil pursuing the investigation
in this direction. Character stili appears to me today as the other pose in a
fundamental, existential polarity. But instead of conceiving of character, in
a framework of perspective and of opening, as the finite pole of existence, I
am interpreting it here in terms of its place in the problematic of identity.
This shift of emphasis has as its principal advantage the fact of putting into
question the immutable status of character, taken for granted in the earlier
analyses (Ricoeur 1992: 119-120).
As part of this inquiry, Ricoeur asks a question that permits him to retain important
elements of identity as sameness (in this case, permanence in time), but at the same time, to
anticipate how such elements could be developed to support ipse identity. He asks: “Is
there a form of permanence in time which is not simply the schema of the category of
substance? ... [or] “Is there a form of permanence in time which can be connected to the
question ‘who7’ inasmuch as it is irreducible to any question of ‘what?” (Ricoeur 1992:
118). Ricoeur answers his own questions in this way: “When we speak of ourselves, we in
fact have available to us two models of permanence in time which can be summed up in
two expressions that are at once descriptive and emblematic: churacter and keeping one ‘s
word [or promising]” (Ricoeur 1992: 118). Although in both of these expressions, Ricoeur
explains, “we easily recognize a permanence which we say belongs to us” (Ricoeur 1992:
118), there is an important difference between the two: “Keeping one’s word expresses a
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self-con sfancy which cannot be ïnscribed, as character was, within the dimension of
something in general but solely within the dimension of ‘who?’ Here, too, common usage
is a good guide. The perseverance of character is one thing, the perseverance of
faithfulness to a word that has been given is something else again” (Ricoeur 1992: 123). In
other words, in our fidelity to a promise, we express self-constancy amidst change: “...
counting on someone is both relying on the stability of a character and expecting that the
other will keep his or her word, regardless of the changes that may affect the lasting
dispositions by which that person is recognized” (Ricoeur 1992: 148). As we recali from
the section on action, Ricoeur integrates self-constancy or sameness and the selfs capacity
to effect change by means of the notion of initiative. Here too in an attempt to integrate
objective and reflective approaches to identity, Ricoeur stresses a special form of initiative
seemingly -- the act ofpromising.
We recali that at the end ofthe section on descnbing action (i.e., the fourth study),
Ricoeur resolves the problems created by pure reflection on action (i.e., action theory) by
means of his dynamic notion of action as initiative. At the end of the fifth study, as above,
we see that Ricoeur seemingly extends his notion of initiative into the realm of identity
with the example of the act of promising, an act that will assume more importance in
relation to the ethics circle. However, in the sixth study, as Ricoeur ends the section on
identity, he extends the notion of initiative in another way. As he explains,” ... narrative
[grants] to the character an initiative -- that is, the power to begin a series of events ... [in
fact, narrative hasj the power of determining the beginning, the middle, and the end of an
action” (Ricoeur 1992: 147). Certainly, this is flot an entirely new idea in Ricoeur’s work.
We remember that in The Svrnbotism ofEviÏ, one of Ricoeur’s central arguments is that
myths, as traditional narratives, permitted people to determine the beginning and the end of
the world, and of the entry of evil into the world. However, in the sixth study of Oneseifas
Another, Ricoeur harnesses this capacity of narrative in order to place it as a mediator
between action theory and the ethical realm, or between describing and prescribing. in
other words, narrative itself and narrative theory (i.e., “the theory of plot and of character”)
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can create “a meaningful transition between the ascription of action to an agent who has the
capacity to act and its imputation to an agent who bas the obligation to act” (Ricoeur 1992:
152). Indeed, “Literature is a vast Ïahoratory in which we experirnent with estimations,
evaluations, and judgments of approval and condemnation through which narrativity serves
as a propaedeutic to ethics” (Ricoeur 1992: 115).
from the first volume of Tirne and Narrative, we recail Ricoeur’s notion of
emplotment, that is, the dynamic mediating or configurating operation of a plot (Ricoeur
1984: 65). Ricoeur explains that emplotment “is a mediation between the individual events
or incidents and a story taken as a whole ... it draws a meaningful story from a diversity of
events or incidents” (Ricoeur 1984: 65). Moreover, “emplotment brings together factors as
heterogeneous as agents, goals, means, interactions, circumstances, unexpected resuits”
(Ricoeur 1984: 65). Emplotment also mediates time (Ricoeur 1984: 66) insofar as it creates
beginnings, middles and endings. Ricoeur’s argument in Oneseif as Another is that just as
emplotiTient functions as a mediator in these ways within narrative, narrative itself, as a
process and/or a product of this medïation, can mediate character involved in the dialectic
between idem-identity and ipse-identity (Ricoeur 1992: 140-141). For example, “the loss
of the identity of [al character [can correspond toi the loss of [ai configuration of [aJ
narrative,” thus enabling an exploration of new relationships between idem-identity and
ipse-identity (Ricoeur 1992: 149). Through emplotment, events become personal; in other
words, “by entenng into the movement of a narrative which relates a chamcter to a plot, the
event loses its impersonal neutrality” (Ricoeur 1992: 142: #1). In the “story chain,”
answers to the question ‘who?’ can take centre stage, and contextual issues such as motives
and frame of mmd can be developed more ffihly than is possible within action theory
(Ricoeur 1992: 146). We recail Sulmasy’s work and his reliance upon the notion of acts as
events ftom the work of Davidson and others. In response to Davidson and Parfit’s notion
ofevent, Ricoeur establishes a dynamic relationship between acts as events and narratives:
206
I am flot contesting what these theories have established, namely, that, as
occurrences, events have the right to an ontological status at least equal to
that of substance, nor do I contest that they can be the object of an
impersonal description. [However,J I am saying that, by entering into the
movernent of a narrative which relates a character to a plot, the event loses
its impersonal neutralïty. By the same token, the narrative status conferred
upon the event averts the drift of the notion of event which would make it
difficuit, if flot impossible, to take the agent into account in the description
ofthe action (Ricoeur 1992: 142: #1).
Between describing and prescnbing, narrative can make helpful connections
between actions or between units of praxis that can then be subject to analysis within the
ethical reaim. For example, narrative can investigate and reveal practices such as
“professions, the arts and games” (Ricoeur 1992: 153). Narrative can also explore second
order “nesting relations” or non-linear relations such as those characteristic ofthe work ofa
farmer: “The work of a farmer, for instance, includes sub-ordinate actions, such as
plowing, planting, harvesting, and so on in descending order, until one reaches basic
actions such as pulling or pushing” (Ricoeur 1992: 154). On the “intermediate level
between practices -- profession, games, arts -- and the global project of an existence[j”
narrative can serve to illuminate life plans; here it can track the “back-and-forth movement
between more or less distant ideals,” and “the weighing of advantages and disadvantages of
the choice of a particular life plan on the level of practices” (Ricoeur 1992: 157-152).
Again, narrative can help us with beginnings and endings: “ ... with the help of the
narrative beginnings ... we stabilize the real beginnings formed by the initiatives ... we
take. And we also have the expenence, however incomplete, of what is meant by ending a
course of action, a slice of life. Literature helps us in a sense to fix the outline of these
provisional ends” (Ricoeur 1992: 162). Also, in the “intertwining” of different types of
narratives and life histories, we can discover helpful “model[sj of intelligibility” and
“model[s] of interaction” (Ricoeur 1992: 162). Above and beyond these general examples,
narrative can explore and expose extremely important ethical issues. For example,
narrative can effectively reveal “humans as acting and suffering,” or participating in the
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“essential dissymmetry between the one who acts and the one who undergoes, dulminating
in the violence of the powerful agent” (Ricoeur 1992: 144-145). As The Symbolism offvil
demonstrated so well, “the thought expenments we conduct in the great laboratoiy of the
imaginary [e.g., through myths], are also explorations in the reaim of good and evil”
(Ricoeur 1992: 164). Most importantly, narrative can close the gap between narrative
identity and moral identity, for instance, in the context of multiple and perhaps, conflicted
moral commitments. Here again, the initiative of promising is important. As the sixth
study ends, Ricoeur asks the key question that has already been asked: “ ‘Who am 1, so
inconstant, that notwithstanding you count on me?’ “ (Ricoeur 1992). The ‘who?’ has
already been revealed as a dialectic between idem-identity (sameness) and ipse-identity
(selffiood). In the next section, we will explore the dimensions of promising within the
“dialectic complementaiy to that of selffiood and sameness, namely, the dialectic of selfand
the other than self’ (Ricoeur 1992: 3).
from his perspective in Le Juste 2, where Ricoeur looks back at “la petite éthique,”
comprised by studies seven-nine in Oneseif as Another, he refers to it as “le cercle le plus
vaste de mon exploration” (Ricoeur 200 la: 8). There are three “moments” in this ethics
circle: ethics, morality and practical wisdom or conviction. As we will see in our
exploration of Les trois niveaza du jugement medical in Le Juste 2, the order of the
“moments” depends on contexts and contents (Ricoeur 200 lb). As was the case in ail the
other parts of Ricoeur’s work consulted thus far, there is a dialectic within this circle
between pure universalist reflection (i.e., explanation) and hermeneutic reflection (i.e.,
understanding), or between the universal and the historic, to use Ricoeur’ s terminology in
Le Juste 2 (Ricoeur 2001c). Regarding the “moment” of ethics, Ricoeur says, “Let us
define ‘ethical intention’ as aiming at the good ifc’ with and for others, in fils!
institutions” (Ricoeur 1992: 172). If we take the first part -- the ‘good tlfe’, here Ricoeur is
making reference to “what Aristotle called ‘living well” -- “it is the very object of the
ethical aim. Whatever the image that each of us has of a full life, this apex is the ultimate
end ofour action” (Ricoeur 1992: 172). from an Aristotelian perspective, “it can only be a
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question of the good for us” (Ricoeur 1992: 172). lndeed, Ricoeur says, “With respect to
its content, the ‘good life’ is, for each of us, the nebulus of ideals and dreams of
achievements with regard to which a life is held to be more or less fulfflled or unfulfihled”
(Ricoeur 1992: 179). By “life,” Rïcoeur does flot mean soleiy biological life, but rather, the
“[designation of] the person as a whole, in opposition to fragmented practices” (Ricoeur
1992: 177). Moreover, “living well” or “the good life” refers to “an accomplished life”
(Ricoeur 1992: 170): “Taken as a singular term, the word ‘life’ receives the appreciative,
evaluative dimension of ergon which is used to qualify man as such. This ergon is to life,
taken in its entirety, as the standard of excellence is to a particular practice” (Ricoeur 1992:
177-17$).
Once again, Ricoeur focuses on the intermediary role of narrative. Contained
within “the good life” is the notion of “the narrative unity of a life” comprised of “the
connection[sJ that narratives [makeJ between estimations applied to actions and the
evaluations of persons themselves”; in other words, “the notion of narrative unity places its
accent on the organization [and assessment] of intention, causes, and chance that we find in
ail stories” (Ricoeur 1992: 178). For example, narratives track relationships between
“internai goods immanent to a practice,” and thus permit us to analyze the connections
between these goods, and overail, to understand “the teleology immanent to the practice”
(Ricoeur 1992: 176). Similarly, “in the relation between practice and life plan the secret of
the nesting of finalities, one inside the other, is to be found” (Ricoeur 1992: 178). Here
again, such secrets must aiways be interpreted:
It is in unending work of interpretation applied to action and to oneself that
we pursue the search for adequation between what seems to us to be best
with regard to our life as a whole and the preferential choices that govern
our practices. There are several ways of introducing the hermeneutical point
of view at this final stage. First, between our aim of a ‘good life’ and our
particular choices a sort of hermeneutical circle is traced by virtue of the
back-and-forth motion between the idea of the ‘good life’ and the most
important decisions of our existence (career, loves, leisure, etc.). This can
be likened to a text in which the whole and the part are to be understood
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each in terms of the other. Next, the idea of interpretation adds to the simple
idea of meaning that of a meaning for someone. for the agent, interpreting
the text of an action is interpreting himseif or herseif ... our concept of the
self is greatly enriched by this relation between interpretation of the text of
action and seif-interpretation. On the ethical plane, seif-interpretation
becomes self-esteem (Ricoeur 1992: 179).
We aim at the ‘good life’ with and for others. This “second component of the
ethical aim,” which Ricoeur catis “solicitude,” catis attention to the dialogicat structure of
self-esteem (Ricoeur 1992: 180) or the fact that for Ricoeur, “self-esteem assumes its
complete sense only at the end of the itinerary of meaning traced out by the three
components ofthe ethical aim” (Ricoeur 1992: 172). At this second level, the relationship
between objective and subjective elements or between the universal and histonc becomes
quite complex because although the universal hope to live weII defines the teleological
character of the ethical aim in general, particular historical contexts define how the aim is
lived out in private and common life (Ricoeur 2001c: 268-270). Again, Ricoeur stresses
the dialectical relationship between idem-identity and ipse-identity and consequently, lis
view that self does flot entai! possession. In other words, “it is flot by chance that we have
continually been speaking ofesteem ofthe self and not esteem ofmyself To say self is flot
to say myself’ (Ricoeur 1992: 180). To say self is also to emphasize capabilities of the self
and their inter-dependence on the capabilities of others: “If one asks by what nght the self
is declared to be worthy of esteem, it must be answered that it is flot principatiy by reason
of its accomplishments but fundamentally by reason of its capacities ... The discourse of ‘I
can’ is, to be sure, a discourse in 1. But the main emphasis is to be placed on the verb, on
being-able-to-do, to which corresponds on the ethical plane, being-able-to-judge. The
question is then whether the mediation of the other is flot required along the route from
capacity to realization” (Ricoeur 1992: 181).
As an example of the way in which the mediation of others and their capabilities is
required in the fulfihiment of the ethical aim, Ricoeur discusses friendship. While
“fnendship ... works toward establishing the conditions for the realization of life,
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considered in its intrinsic goodness and basic pleasure” (Ricoeur 1992: 186), the fact is
that “tack dwelÏs at the heart of the rnost sotidfriendshin” (Ricoeur 1992: 187). In other
words, “The friend, inasmucli as lie is that other self, has the role of providing what one is
incapable of procunng by oneseif’ (Ricoeur 1992: 185). Beyond friendship, the
intermingling of capabilities is also present in the situation of suffering: “Suffering is not
defined solely by physical pain, nor even by mental pain, but by the reduction, even the
destruction, of the capacity for acting, of being-able-to-act, experienced as a violation of
self-integnty ... the other appears to be reduced to the sole condition ofreceiving” (Ricoeur
1992: 190). In this situation, the ethical aim of living the good life with and for others is
tested: “In true sympathy, the self, whose power of acting is at the start greater than that of
its other, finds itself affected by ail that the suffering other offers to it in retum. for from
the suffenng other there cornes a giving that is no longer drawn from the power of acting
and existing but precisely from weakness itself This is perhaps the suprerne test of
solicitude” (Ricoeur 1992: 191).
At the third level of the ethical aim, living well with and for others is extended to
encompass institutions and justice. In other words, “living well is not limited to
interpersonal relations but extends to the life of institutions,” and “justice presents ethical
features that are not contained in solicitude, essentially a requirement of equaÏity” (Ricoeur
1992: 194). By “institution,” Ricoeur means “the structure of living together as this
belongs to a historical cornmunity -- people, nation, region, and so forth -- a structure
irreducible to interpersonal relations and yet bound up with these ... What fundamentally
charactenzes the idea of institution is the bond of common mores and not that of
constraining rules” (Ricoeur 1992: 194). Here again, the universal and the histoncal are
inextricably mixed because although the wish or the hope to live together is a universal
hope, the actual living out of that hope is dependent upon the cooperation of many
contextual elernents, not the least of which is the resolution of this fundamental question:
What is a just institution? (Ricoeur 2001c: 270). For Ricoeur, the just has two faces: “The
just ... faces in two directions: toward the good, with respect to which it marks the
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extension of interpersonal relationships to institutions; and toward the legal, the judicial
system conferring upon the law coherence and the nght of constraint. In this study we shah
remain exclusively on the first side of the issue” (Ricoeur 1992: 197). In this context,
power is defined as a particular type of initiative related to justice: “However illusive
power may be in its fundamental structure, ... it is power, as wanting to live and act
together [emphasis mine], that brings to the ethical aim the point of application of its
indispensable third dimension: justice” (Ricoeur 1992: 197). In the context oftbis type of
power and following Aristotie, Ricoeur stresses proportional as opposed to arithmetic
equality:
On the one hand, Aristotie flnds in the equal the character of
intermediateness between two extremes, which he carnes from virtue to
virtue ... The unjust man is one who takes too much in terms of advantages
or flot enough in terms of burdens. On the other hand, [Aristotie]
carefully marks out the type of intennediateness, namely proportional
equality, that defines distributive justice. Arithmetic equality is not suitable,
he holds, because of the nature of the persons and of the things shared. For
one thing, in a society of antiquity, persons have unequal shares, related to
unequal ments, which ... different constitutions define in different ways; for
another thing, the shares are themselves unequal outside of justice -- one
might say, susceptible to brute division, as in war or pillage. Distributive
justice then consists in equalizing two relations between, in each case, a
person and a ment. It therefore rests on a proportional relation with four
terms: two persons and two shares. Anstotle thus posed the formidable
problem ... of justifying a certain idea of equality without crediting
egalitananism ... Equality... is to lfe in institutions what soÏicitude is to
interpersonal relations the sense of justice presupposes [solicitudeJ, to
the extent that it holds persons to be irreplaceable. Justice in tum adds to
solicitude, to the extent that the field of application of equality is ail of
humanity (Ricoeur 1992: 20 1-202).
In his discussion of the relationship between the “moments” of ethics and morality,
Ricoeur says, “I reserve the term ‘ethics’ for the aim of an accomplished life and the term
‘morality’ for the articulation of this aim in norrns characterized at once by the daim to
universality and by an effect of constraint” (Ricoeur 1992: 170). In other words, “morality
is held to constitute only a limited, although legitimate and even indispensable,
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actualization of the ethical aim, and ethics in this sense would then encornpass rnorality’”
(Ricoeur 1992: 170). There is a need for “the ethical aim to pass through the sieve ofthe
norrn” (Ricoeur 1992: 170) for two overriding reasons. The flrst is the reality of conflict
and violence within society, and the need for credible arbitration of disputes arising from
vastly different expressions ofthe hope to live weli (Ricoeur 2001e: 272). Underlying this
first reason is the reaiity of fallibility and by implication, the limitations of our fteedom.
As Ricoeur expiains, 1t nevertheÏess rernains that the propensitv for cvii uffecis the use of
freedorn, the capacity for acting out of duty -- in short, the capacity for actually being
autonomous. This is the truc problem for us”(Ricoeur 1992: 216).
In view ofthese problems, “the norm puts the wish to live welI to the test” (Ricocur
1992: 204). The test can be articulated in the forrn ofthis question: “Is the maxim ofmy
action universatizable?” (Ricoeur 1992: 207). As Ricoeur recalis, Kant’s formulation of
this inquiry involves the three fonns ofthe categorical imperative. The flrst fonnutation is
“‘Act only on that maxim through tvhich you can at the same time will that it should
becorne a Liniversal law” (Ricoeur 1992: 208), that is, “... a universal law of nature”
[translation minci (Ricoeur 2001e: 273). Kant’s second formulation is “‘Act in such a way
that you aiways treat humanity, whether in your own person or in flic person of any other,
neyer simply as a means, but aiways at the same time as an end” (Ricoeur 1992: 222: #33).
Thirdly, “Act in such a way that in the empire ofends [i.e., within the “rational horizon ofa
state of Iaw” [translation mine] (Ricoeur 200 le: 274)], you are able to behave at one and
the sarne time as subject and as legisiator” [translation mine] (Ricoeur 2001e: 273).
f undamentally, these formulations are prob]ematic for Ricoeur because they create a
dichotomy between duty and human inclinations, and “inclination is then defined by its
power of disobedience” (Ricoeur 1992: 209). Although these formulations certainly
qualify as validation tests of the universality of proposed maxims, Ricoeur rerninds us that
Kant was only interested in the internai logical contradiction that a proposed exception to a
rule rnight represent (Ricoeur 2001e: 273). The first formulation is probiematic because it
parailels moral and physical taws and in so doing, it creates a form of universaÏ
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determinism (Ricoeur 2001c: 273). In the second formulation, “humanity” itself is an
abstract universal without content, and “humanity” is pitted against individuals as ends in
themselves (Ricoeur 1992: 222). Finally, the third formulation is clearly a regulatory idea,
the accompiishment of which depends upon concrete political realities within hïstorical
societies (Ricoeur 2001c: 274). In sum, Kant’s formulations are problematic for Ricoeur
because they represent only pure reflection on universality, or universality as an object
extemal to the dialectic among selves.
In Oneseif as Another, Ricoeur aftempts to overcome the problem involved in the
second formulation by suggestÏng that “the idea of persons as ends in themselves
demands that one take into account the pluraiity [or diversityJ of persons” (Ricoeur 1992:
222). Diversity can be adequately taken into account, he suggests, flot by an abstract notion
of “humanity,” but rather, by the living out of a norm of reciprocity among persons, for
instance, that introduced by the Golden Rule (i.e., “ Treat others as you would like them to
treat you”) (Ricoeur 1992: 219). As Ricoeur concludes L ‘universel et t ‘historique, he
gives more indications of how he views the relationship between umversals and particulars,
and how a norm of reciprocity could be lived out. Basically, although alleged or potential
universals can have an important regulatory and explanatory role, they cannot become
genuine universals for ail without mutual understanding:
(1) L’universalisme peut être tenu comme une idée régulatrice permettant de
reconnaître comme appartenant au domaine de la moralité des attitudes
hétérogènes susceptibles de se reconnaître comme cofondatnces de l’espace
commun déployé par la volonté de vivre ensemble.
(2) Nulle conviction morale n’aurait de force si elle n’élevait une prétention
à l’universalité. Mais on doit se borner à donner le sens d’universel présumé
à ce qui se donne d’abord comme universel prétendu; entendons par
universel présumé la prétention à l’universalité offerte à la discussion
publique en attente de la reconnaissance par tous. Dans cet échange, chaque
protagoniste propose un universel prétendu ou inchoatif en quête de
reconnaissance
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(3) S’il est vrai que l’humanité n’existe que dans des cultures multiples
comme le sont les langues -- en quoi consiste fondamentalement la thèse des
contradicteurs communautaristes de Rawis et Habermas -- les identités
culturelles présumées par ces auteurs ne sont protégées contre le retour de
l’intolérance et du fanatisme que par un travail de compréhension mutuelle
pour lequel la traduction d’une langue dans une autre constitue un
remarquable modèle.
On pourrait rassembler ces trois conclusions sous la déclaration suivante:
l’universalisme et le contextualisme ne s’opposent pas au même plan mais
relève de deux niveaux différents de la moralité, celui de l’obligation
présumée universelle et celui de la sagesse pratique qui prend en charge la
diversité des héritages culturels. Il ne serait pas inexact de dire que la
transition du plan universel de l’obligation au pian historique de
l’application revient à recourir aux ressources de l’éthique du bien vivre
(Ricoeur 2001e : 284-285).
In Les trois niveaux du jugement médical, Ricoeur defines practical wisdom (i.e.,
prudence or phronesis) as “the facutty ofjudgment ... applied to singular situations ... The
judgments rendered in these situations exemplify a practical wisdom of a nature more or
less intuitive as a consequence of teaching and experience [translation mine]” (Ricoeur
2001b: 227). The context of and the need for phronesis is quite complex as Ricoeur
presents it in Oneseif as Another. Most importantly, “practical determination cannot be
reduced to a simple modality of choice and deliberation along the lines described by
Aristotie and Kant” (Ricoeur 1992: 242). In relation to the previous stage of morality, for
example, even the clearest principles require instruction by tragedy -- by “the mysterious
depths of motivations that no analysis of moral intention can plumb,” (Ricoeur 1992: 242),
by “the narrowness of the angle of commitment of each [human being]” (Ricoeur 1992:
243), and by the “ail too human character of every institution” (Ricoeur 1992: 245). There
is also the ever-present reality of conflicts of all kinds: For instance, “medical as well as
juridical practice neyer ceases to place moral judgment in contact with situations in which
the norm and the person cannot be satisfied at the same time” [translation mine] (Ricoeur
2001e: 279). Within the larger public arena, there is ongoing conflict regarding “the
priorities to be established among the primary goods” (Ricoeur 1992: 257). Power itself is
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another problematic factor, and Ricoeur discusses the conflict between the need for power
in-common in the Aristotelian sense, and the reality of domination or political power: “we
can define the political as the set of organized practices relating to the distribution of
political power, better termed domination. These practices concem the vertical relation
between the goveming and the govemed ...“ (Ricoeur 1992: 257).
As the previous discussion of the categorical imperative revealed, although moral
principles are important, they themselves create problems that require recourse to practical
wisdom. For instance, the use of abstract ideals such as “humanity,” “autonomy,” and
“justice” can conceal or obliterate the reality of diversity and conflicts within human
communities. At the most foundational level, as Ricoeur indicates, “the principles of
justification of a moral or legal rule leave intact the problems of application ... This notion
of application cornes from another field than the one of morality or of law, that is, the
dornain of interpretation of texts ... the problem of application of umversal norms brings
into play the histoncal and cultural dimension of mediating traditions in the process of
application” [translation mine] (Ricoeur 2001c: 279-280 ). In other words, practical
wisdom or phronesis functions as a mediator: practical wisdom is entrusted with the task of
“the practical mediation capable of surmounting the antinomy” between “the universalist
daim attached to the rules claiming to belong to the pnnciple of morality and the
recognition of positive values belonging to the historical and commun itarian contexts of
the realization ofthese same rules” (Ricoeur 1992: 274). Again, Ricoeur’s goal is flot to
dismiss formalisrn. In relation to Kantian formalisrn, for example, Ricoeur’s goal is “flot to
refute it but to bare the universalist daim that forrns its hard core” (Ricoeur 1992: 274).
Ricoeur’s examination of the problems involved in the categorical imperative would
constitute one example of his attempt to fulfil that goal.
In response to this type of problem and as a way of implementing the mediation role
of practical wisdom, Ricoeur recommends a thorough revision of Kantian formalism in
three main stages. The first stage involves the “[questioning of] the order or priority
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granted by Kant to the principle of autonomy in relation to respect apphed to the plurality
of persons and to the pnnciple of justice relevant to the plane of institutions” (Ricoeur
1992: 274). An important part ofthis questioning or reprioritizing is acknowledgement of
the fact that “an autonomy that is of a piece with the rule of justice and the mie of
reciprocity can no longer be a seif-sufficient autonomy” (Ricoeur 1992: 275). In other
words, Ricoeur is cailing for a “[reworking of] the opposition between autonomy and
heteronomy” that takes into consideration ail the forms of ‘otherness’ that have been
included thus far, for instance, the otherness ofthe body, the otherness of evil, the otherness
of selfhood, the otherness of other people, etc. (Ricoeur 1992: 275). The second stage
involves “[questioning] the restrictive use Kant makes of the criterion of ziniversatization”
(i.e., the test of internai coherence) (Ricoeur 1992: 276), and combining the need for
coherence between moral pnnciples with the need for productivity of thought ansing from
concrete situations. In other words, “It remains that it is the plea for universali/y that gives
full weight to the problems tied to the historicity ofconcrete morality” (Ricoeur 1992: 280).
Thirdiy, Ricoeur cails for discussion that “will flot simply involve an attempt to found the
requirement of umversaiization along a regressive path [i.e., of justification and ultimate
grounding], but will also involve an examination along a progressive path on the level of
actuai practice” (Ricoeur 1992: 283). Again, Ricoeur emphasizes the role of “potential” or
“inchoate” universals:
One must ... assume the following paradox: on the one hand, one must
maïntain the universal daim attached to a few values where the universal
and the histoncal intersect, and on the other hand, one must submit this
daim to discussion, not on a formai level, but on the level of the convictions
incorporated in concrete forms of life. Nothing can resuit from this
discussion unless every party recognizes that other potential umversals are
contained in so-calied exotic cultures. The path of eventual consensus can
emerge only from mutual recognition on the level of acceptability, that is, by
admitting a possible truth, admitting proposais of meaning that are at first
foreign to us. This notion of universals in context or of potential or inchoate
universais is, in my opinion, the notion that best accounts for the reflective
equilibnum that we are seeking between universaiity and historicity
(Ricoeur 1992: 289).
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As an example of Ricoeur’s attempt to achieve this type of reflective equilibrium,
we recail his consideration ofthe ‘end oflife’ problem of telling the truth to the dying. He
describes the problem in this way: “A breach, indeed, appears to open between two
extreme attitudes. Either that of telling the truth without taking into account the capacity of
the dying to receive it, out of sheer respect for the law, assumed to abide no exceptions or
that of knowingly lying, out of fear, one believes, of weakening the forces in the patient
struggiing against death and of transforming the agony of a loved one into torture” (Ricoeur
1992: 269). Ricoeur rejects both extremes, and again, he substitutes his notion of
promising or fidelity-in-relationship for the autonomous and ahistoncal exercising of the
abstract universalization cntenon of aiways telling the truth no maffer what the cost.
Ricoeur says, “If fidelity consists in responding to the expectation of the other who is
counting on me, I must take this expectation as the measure for applying the rule [i.e, in
this case, the duty of truth-tellingJ” (Ricoeur 1992: 268). In keeping with his notion ofthe
need for productivity of thought along the progressive path of actual practice, Ricoeur
suggests that “practical wisdom consists in inventing conduct that will best satisfy the
exception required by solicitude, by betraying the mie to the smallest extent possible”
(Ricoeur 1992: 269). He also recommends “a search for the [Aristotelian] ‘just mean’
(Ricoeur 1992: 273). For example, Ricoeur says, “What practical wisdom most requires in
these ambiguous cases is a meditation on the relation between happiness and suffering”
(Ricoeur 1992: 269). In the case of teiling the truth to the dying, the resuit of Ricoeur’s
productivity ofthought and application ofthe ‘just mean’ is as foflows:
It is false to say of this meditation on the relation between suffenng and
happiness that the concem, at any pnce, flot to ‘make patients suffer’ at the
end of their Jife leads to establishing as a rule the duty to lie to the dying.
Neyer can practical wisdom consent to transforming into a mie the
exception to the mle. Even less should one legislate in an area where the
responsibility for difficult choices cannot be made casier by laws. In such
cases, one must have compassion for those who are morally or physically
too weak to hear the tmth. In certain other cases, one must know how to
communicate this truth: it is one thing to name an illness, it is another to
reveal the degree of seriousness and the slight chance of suwival, and yet
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another to wield the clinical truth as a death sentence. But there are also
situations, more numerous than is thought, where telling the truth may
become the opportunity for the exchange of giving and receiving under the
sign ofdeath accepted (Ricoeur 1992: 269-270).
In 1992, Ricoeur gave a convocation address at McGill Universïty that vas
published the following year entitled, Responsibitity and fragitity. An Ethical Reflection
(Ricoeur 1993). In this work, he contrasts two types of responsibihty that form a
meaningful reference point for lis reflections in Les trois niveaux du jugement medical
(Ricoeur 200 lb). On the one hand, we have the “more traditional analysis of responsibility
as being able to designate oneseif the author of one’s own acts” (Ricoeur 1993: 9). As a
type of ascription, this analysis suffers from ail the limitations Ricoeur associated with
action theoty in Oneseifas Another, particularly, the fact that it is a retrospective analysis:
“consider how meagre this notion of responsibility is that emerges after the fact of the
action: most significantly it is turned toward the past rather than towards the future”
(Ricoeur 1993: 9). By contrast, Ricoeur advocates a future-oriented view of responsibility
that is “fundamentally related to the fragile”: “The cail, or command, as well as the
confidence that proceeds from someone fragile establishes that il is aiways another who
declares us to be responsible, who makes us responsible ... It is another, in counting on me,
who makes me accountable for my acts” (Ricoeur 1993: 9-10). “By the fragile,” Ricoeur
means, “both those who may pensh by virtue of natural weakness and those who are
endangered by the blows of historical violence which are incorporated in human action”
(Ricoeur 1993: 8). Our relationship with this fragile person or persons is based on trust:
“The fragile someone counts on us, expects our help and our care, has confidence that we
will attend his or her needs. This bond of confidence is fundamental and is intimately
linked to the request, the command, the imperative. It is because of this bond that in our
awareness of responsibility we feel that we have [beenJ made responsible for and by”
(Ricoeur 1993: 9). In Les trois niveaux du jugement médical, Ricoeur is in fact, reflecting
upon the responsibility involved in a particular example of this bond of confidence -- that
between fragile patients and their doctors. Ricoeur’s vital linkage between the physician’s
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responsibility and the cail of the fragile person is reminiscent of a similar linkage made by
the french physician and philosopher of science, Georges Cangufihem (1904-1995) in The
Normal und the Pathologicul:
If today, the physician’s knowledge of disease can anticipate the sick man’s
experience of it, it is because at one time this experience gave rise to,
summoned up, that knowledge. Hence, medicine aiways exists de jure, if
flot de facto, because there are men who feel sick, flot because there are
doctors to teil men of their ilinesses (Canguilhem 1991: 93).
Les trois niveaux du jugement médical is an illustration of the ethics circle at work,
but here as already indicated, Ricoeur has reversed the order of ‘la petite éthique’, such that
we proceed from the prudential ‘moment’ to the deontological ‘moment’ and finally, to the
‘moment’ of ethics. As Ricoeur explains, the reversai is necessary because the overaïl
ethical aim of health (insofar as it is possible) ïs already understood to be in place, and so
are the deontological codes that govem the practice of medicine (summation of (Ricoeur
200 lb: 241-242)). In this revised order, the ‘moment’ of practical wisdom or prudence is
the starting place because of the ovemding influence ofthe singular situation on the other
two ‘moments’. In other words, “c’est la circonstance initiale qui suscite la structuration
propre à l’éthique médicale à savoir la souffrance humaine. C’est le fait de la souffrance et
le souhait d’en être délivré qui motivent l’acte médical de base ... “(Ricoeur 2001b : 241).
In fact, the ‘moment’ of practical wisdom is of special significance to bioethics at-large:
“c’est de la dimension prudentielle de l’éthique médicale que la bioéthique au sens large
emprunte sa signification proprement éthique” (Ricoeur 200 lb : 228).
Here again in this article, Ricoeur’s fragility-based notion of responsibility frames
the content of the ‘moments’ of the ethics circle. For our purposes, we will take as
examples, the ‘moments’ of practical wisdom and ethics. In the ‘moment’ of practical
wisdom, Ricoeur’ s prime concem is the doctor-patient relationship charactenzed by a
fragile dialectic between trust and mistrust (Ricoeur 2001 b: 230-231). In the face of
suffering -- “the ultimate refuge of singularity” (Ricoeur 200 lb: 228-229), the pnmary goal
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of practical wisdorn is [o ensure that a promise is honoured: “Le pacte de soins devient
ainsi une sorte d’alliance scellée entre deux personnes contre l’ennemi commun, la
maladie. L’accord doit son caractère moral à la promesse tacite partagée par les deux
protagonists de remplir fidèlement leurs engagements respectifs” (Ricoeur 2001b 230).
An important part cf [he promise invoives overcoming the initial fragility derived from the
inequality between doctors and patients: “Au début, un fosse et même une dissymétrie
remarquable séparent les deux protagonists: d’un côté celcii qui sait et sait faire, de l’autre
celui qui souffre. Ce fossé est comblé, et les conditions initiales rendues plus égales, par
une série de démarches partant des deux pôles de la relation. Le patient
- ce patient - ‘porte
au langage’ sa souffrance en la prononçant comme plainte ... à son tour la plainte se précise
en demande ... et demande à ... adressée comme un appel à tel médecin. Sur cette
demande se greffe la promesse d’observer, une fois admis, le protocole du traitement
proposé “(Ricoeur 200 lb: 229-230). In the fulfilment of the promise, Ricoeur stresses
severat elements, both as contents cf the ‘moment’ of practical wisdom, and as lenses
through which the deontological codes are to be interpreted he includes the importance of
coniidentiality (Ricoeur 2001b: 229), [he recognition of the singular or non-substitutional
character of the patient’s situation and the care pact (Ricoeur 2001b: 231), the indivisibility
of the person (Ricoeur 2001b: 231), and the importance of self-esteem or “la
reconnaissance de sa valeur propre par le sujet lui-même” (Ricoeur 200 lb: 232).
It is within the ethics ‘moment’ or “au plan réflexif du jugement moraL que se
révèlent les modalités les pius intraitables de la fragilité propre à l’éthique médicale”
(Ricoeur 200 lb: 242). The rnost intractable fragilities that call us te responsibility revolve
around two problems already indicated. One is the fact that although the universal hope to
live welÏ detines the teleologicai character of the ethical aim in general, particular historical
contexts define how [lie aim is lived out in private and common life. In view of this
problem and given the concrete reality of suffering, Ricoeur suggests that these questions
need (o be considered: “Quel lien faisons-nous entre la demande de santé et le souhait de
vivre bien? Comment intégrons-nous la souffrance et l’acceptation de la mortalité à l’idée
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que nous nous faisons du bonheur? Comment une société intègre-t-elle dans sa conception
du bien commun les strates hétérogènes déposées dans la culture présente par l’histoire
sédimentée de la sollicitude?” (Ricoeur 2001b: 243). As a dimension of the above
problem, we also face the additional difficulty of diversity itself and of contested views of
how the hope to live weil should be lived out. In Ricoeur’s words, “l’ultime fragilité de
l’éthique médicale résulte de la structure consensuelle/conllictuelle des ‘sources’ de la
moralité commune” (Ricoeur 200 lb : 243).
35. Conclusion
In the Introduction to this chapter, we stTessed Ricoeur’s pnmary anthropological
insight -- the notion that human beings are both universal and particular, and most
importantly, that their universality and particularity is iived out through the functioning of
vanous human capabilities. In this chapter, we have explored Ricoeur’s understanding of
several capabilities, notably, fallibility
-- the human capability for cvii, speaking, writing,
acting and imputability. It is through the exercising of these capabilities that tve encounter
otherness or altenty -- “the variety of expenences of passivity, intertwined in multiple ways
in human action” (Ricoeur 1992: 318). In response to othemess, Ricoeur has throughout
his works consulted thus far, advanced a dynamic relationship between two contrasting
modes of intelligibility
-- pure, transcendental reflection and hermeneutics. Although each
type of inteiligibility brings with it strengths and weaknesses in tenns of its potential to
mediate othemess, the combination of, or the dialectical relationship between the two
modes within the henneneutic circles has the greatest potential to reconcile universals and
particulars within our experience, and to increase our overali understanding of ourselves as
others. It is with this potential in mmd that we wish to place double effect reasoning within
the context of these henneneutic circles.
In the second section, we have explored Ricoeur’s understanding of fallibility or the
human capabiiity for cvii. As we recali, the othemess of evil functions as a type of
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bondage -- a constraint on our capability for actuaily being autonomous. The othemess of
evil consists in disproportions of ‘my’seif to ‘my’seif that situate me between universalist
needs and particular contingencies. As a human being, although I have universalist needs
for total understanding, total happiness, and total perfection, my non-coincidence with
‘my’seif resuits in the particular contingencies of finite understanding, fmite happiness, and
finite perfection. In this way, my autonomy or freedom is constrained. As divergent
responses to this type of alterity, Ricoeur contrasts pure reflection on failibiiity or an ethicai
vision of the world with a hermeneutics of cvii. Although pure reflection has the potential
to keep the otherness of cvii theoretically and objectively at bay, it carmot authentically
account for the everyday reaiity of bound freedom. In fact, as Ricoeur says, “cvii is a
sealed book for it.” In particular, a phiiosophy of fault cannot describe or account for the
disproportions of (lie self to the self that comprise the loci of cvii. By contrast, these
disproportions can be deait with within an exegesis of the symbols of cvii (e.g., defflement,
sin, guilt) within our lived existence. In terms of Ricoeur’s first hermeneutic circie, the
symbols of cvii give risc to thought, thought distanced from real life compeis us back to an
exploration of the underlying symbols as symbols, and the circular relationship between
these two types of reflection permit us to deepen our interpretation and enlarge our selves
continuously.
In the third section, we have explored Ricoeur’s understanding of the capabilities of
speaking and writing. When we speak in conversation with each other, shared meaning is
created Iargeiy by shared, situational references. However, in writing, the othemess of a
text sets in: human meaning disappears behind the matenal marks or signs of writing,
reference is divided and the audience is universatized, thus setting the stage for the
inevitable conflict of interpretations. Here again, we, as humans, are caught between
universalist needs and particular contingencies
-- this time, between pointing or aiming
beyond ourselves with words and the fact that words themselves are only signs iimited by
particular opacities and particular cuhural contingencies that breed distanciation and
alienation from texts. Here again, Ricoeur contrasts two types ofresponses to alterity, pure
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or transcendental reflection -- in this case, semiotics -- and a hermeneutics of written texts
that includes semantics. On the textual level, although pure reflection or semiotics provides
explanation that mediates alterity to a degree, semïotics analyzes textual signs and symbols
as a closed, virtual system wherein reference outside the system is a non-issue. However,
in the context of real life and time references wherein we are immersed in competing sign
systems, semiotic analysis resuhs in alienation or distanciation that can only be made
productive through the henneneutical process of appropriation, or the fostering of the
fullest understanding in the sense of ongoing enlargement of selves. Ricoeur’s circle of
understanding fosters this ongoing appropriation: semiotic explanation of signs and
symbols gives rise to fuller self-understanding which, over time, requires recourse to
explanation of symbols once again, and the circle keeps turning. Most importantly for
Ricoeur, the circle of i.mderstanding subverts the disastrous opposition between explanation
and understanding.
In the fourth section, we have explored Ricoeur’s understanding of the capabilities
of acting and imputability. In many ways, Ricoeur’s analysis of these capabilities is a
natural extension of his exploration of the othemess of texts. Taking selected texts from
contemporary action theory as examples, Ricoeur concludes that the selected theorists
analyze action and imputability as a closed, virtual system of signs and most
problematically, that reference or the seif-designation of the agent is a non-issue in this
approach. Thus, in these analyses of action and imputability, lived action and imputability
in real time is rendered ‘other’. I can be imputed as the author of action in this textual
system, but in fact, the system creates distanciation and alienation from ownership of action
because it conceals selffiood and renders self-designation ambiguous, if flot impossible. In
other words, the person acting in real time and being imputed is reduced by textual forms of
objective identification that derive from the prioritization of what and why questions over
who questions. For example, action and imputability is largely reduced to a cause and
effect analysis when in fact, as Ricoeur says, there is a need to acknowledge frankly and to
interpret henneneutically the structure of action as consfrained by a conjunction between
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several sorts of causality. Moreover, there are three other forms of othemess flot taken into
account satisfactorily by the action theoiy that Ricoeur bas analyzed. There is the o[hemess
or passivity of our human body that is at once universal or a body like any other, and a
particular part of a particular self. There is the othemess or passivity “implied by the
relation of the self to the foreign, in the precise sense of the other (than) self, and so the
othemess inherent in the relation of intersubjectivity (Ricoeur 1992). finally, there is the
othemcss or passivity of conscience which “projects afler the fact its force of attestation on
ail the experiences ofpassivity placed before it ...“ (Ricoeur 1992).
In response to the othemess of acting and imputability, Ricoeur contrasts
unsatisfactory pure reflection -- in this case, contemporary action theory and its limited
view of imputation
-- withlermeneutic reflection that allows for action and imputability to
be interpreted within the context of the dialectic between idem-identity and ipse-identity,
and between the self and others. In this way, Ricoeur subverts the traditional ethical and
bioethical pnoritization of making distinctions between actions as discrete events. In other
words, “the major issue [resides] less in determining what distinguishes actions from other
events occurring in the world than in determining what specifies the self, implied in the
power-to-do [i.e., in the capabilities], at the junction 0f acting and the agent. Thus liberated
from its initial subservience, the theory of action [assumes] the role of a propaedeutic to the
question of selfhood” (Ricoeur 1992). As we recail, important elements in the process of
specifying the self impiied in the capabilities, include initiative and promising, both of
which arise out of attestation and are embodied by narrative. On the level of Ricoeur’s
hermeneutic circles, lis Ethics Circle is an extremely important vehicle for determining
what specifies the self, implied in the capabilities, at the j unction of acting and the agent.
Not unlïke his other circles, the Ethics Circle combines an emphasis on explanation
with an emphasis on fuller understanding of ourselves-as-others caught between the
demands and constraints of universality and particulanty. Explanation is embodied by the
circle’s ‘moment’ of morality -- the focus on norms or deontological codes and the
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explanatory/speculative power (e.g., the power to arbitrate conflicts and to test our ethical
aims) that they bring to our existence and to our attempts to deal with otherness. Having ail
the limitations of the other types of pure reflection, the deontological codes can only be one
‘moment’ in the larger, ongoing cycle of hermeneutics. We have to keep the codes in
relationship with their reference -- the real persons. the real othemesses, the real diversities,
and the real fragilities that cali us to personal responsibility. By contrast, imputing only on
the basis of explanatory codes (e.g., legal or medical codes) is a minimalist and
retrospective approach to responsibility in Ricoeur’ s view. Also from the perspective of the
larger community, imputation on the basis of codes can create as many conflicts as it
arbitrates.
Keeping pure reflection as only one part of bis larger hermeneutical project yet
again, Ricoeur posits the other two ‘moments’ -- ethics and practical reason. Both of these
‘moments’ explicitly mediate the alterity involved in being selves-as-others caught between
universality and particularity. In the ‘moment’ of ethics, we aim at the good life with and
for others in just institutions, with the understanding that we are caught between the
universality ofour aim to live well and the particularity ofthe contexts in which we aftempt
to live out the aim. This constraint leads Ricoeur to stress the importance of potential or
inchoate universals grounded in an examination of the requirement of umversalization
along a progressive path on the level of actual practice. In the ‘moment’ of practical
wisdom, particularly important for bioethics, there is a “confrontation between the
universuïist daim attached to the rules claiming to belong to the principle of morality and
the recognition of positive values belonging to the historicul and communitariun contexis
(i.e., particular contexts) of the realization of these rules” (Ricoeur 1992). Again, the
central focus of this relationship with morality is determining what specifies selves-as
others, imphed in the capabilities at the junction of acting and the agent. In the healthcare
context, as Ricoeur explains, the most important elements of this determination -- initiative
and promising -- make explicit and facilitate the necessary trust between caregivers and
patients. Especially in the clinical context, trust is an important mediator of ail the various
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forms of alterity that Ricoeur bas explored and that both caregivers and patients experience.
Making use of ail these elements in the next chapter, we wilI discuss the ways in which
double effect reasoning can mediate the othemess involved in being selves-as-others caught
between universality and particuiarity in the case of”terminai sedation”.
we often project ottto others Giose unconscious fears from which we ,ecoil in ourselves. Rather titan
acknowtedge that we are deep dol4’n answerable te an a/terily which imsettles us, we devise ail Idnds of
evasion shategies. Prima,y amongst these is the attempt 10 sinip4fr our existence by scapegoating others as
‘aliens’. So doing we contiive te transmute the sacrificial aileii tub û monster, or mb a fetish—god. But
either way, we refuse to recognize lite stranger before us as a singular other who responds, in turn, to lite
siuigular otherness in eaCl7 ofits. We refuse 10 acknowledge ourseives-as-othe,s” (Kearney 2003: 5.
Chapter 4. Strangers, Gods, Monsters, ‘Terminal
Sedation’ and Double Effect Reasoning
4.1. Introduction
In the Introduction to bis book, Strangers, Gods und Monsters: Interpreting
Otherness (Keurney 2003), Richard Keamey, the above author and a colleague of
Ricoeur’s, says the following:
Strangers, gods and monsters represent expenences of extremity which bring
us to the edge. They subvert our established categories and challenge us to
think again ... Most strangers, gods and monsters
-- along with various
ghosts, phantoms and doubles who bear a family resemblance -- are, deep
down, tokens of fracture within the human psyche. They speak to us of how
we are spiit between conscious and unconscious, familiar and unfamiliar,
same and other. And they remind us that we have a choice: ta) to try to
understand and accommodate our experience of strangeness, or (b) to
repudiate it by projecting it exclusively onto outsiders. Ail too ofien,
humans have chosen the latter option, allowing paranoid illusions to serve
the purpose of making sense of our confused emotions [and thoughtsj by
externalizing them into black-and-white scenarios
-- a strategy found again
and again from ancient tales of knights and demons to contemporary war
rhetorics ofGood versus Evil (Keamey 2003: 3-4).
Along with strangers, gods and monsters, there are two closely related experiences
of extremity that comprise the subject matter of this thesis -- “terminal sedation” and death.
Insofar as “terminal sedation” is a form of sleep, its closeness to death can be explained
from the perspective that “ ‘sleep remains one of the most universal and easily
communicated analogies to death’ “ (Olav and Anders 2004). The origins of this
association are clearly ancient: “In Greek mythology there is an interesting parallel to the
relationship between sleep and death: Nyx, the night, had two sons, the twin brothers --
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Hypnos, the god of sieep, and Thanatos, the god of death” (OIav and Anders 2004). in the
same family as strangers, gods, and monsters, “terminal sedation” definitely invites us to
think again about our es[ablished categories and especially, about “the tokens of fracture
within [our] psyche” (Kearney 2003: 4), for example, good versus evil, self versus other,
body versus mmd versus soul, panicular versus universal, conseious versus unconscicus,
mens rea versus actus reus, etc. As Keamey indicates, we have a choice in dealing with
these tokens of fracture. For each of the examples given above, and there are many others,
we can accept the entity on one side of “versus” and reject the opposite entity, often by
labelling it as “alien” or as “other” and by projecting it onto outsiders. Altematively, we
can “try to understand and accommodate our experience of strangeness” (Keamey 2003: 4)
or othemess. In the case of “terminai sedation.” we can eitlier try to understand and
accommodate the othemess associated with it or we can repudiate [his othemess, using
words such as “cvii”, or “murder” or “euthanasia” or any other pejorative terms that may
accomplish the repudiation. Insofar as double effect reasoning bas long been used to
distinguish discrete acts as “good”, “bad”, or “neutrai”, it is obviously implicated as a
means of accentuating the tokens of fracture. However, we have a choice here too. We can
either use double effect reasoning as a rnechanism for repudiating othemess and
accentuating the tokens of fracture, or we can use it as a vehicle for understanding and
accommodating otherness. In Ricoeurian [erms, we have the option of using double effect
reasoning as a vehicle for understanding and accommodating ourselves-as-other in the case
of “terminal sedation”. It will be the goal of this final chapter to explain and discuss this
option. The chapter will unfold in three parts. The remaining section of this Introduction
wili es[ablish basic assumptions in my use of Ricoeur’s wo[k in the case of “terminal
sedation”. The second part will recali the content of the first two chapters aiid feature an
analysis of that content in the context ofRicoeur’s work. Finaliy, Ricoeur’s hermeneutical
interpretation wiÏl be used to revise and rejuvenate use of double effect reasoning in the
case of “terminal sedation”.
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Several assumptions underlie my use of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics to re-envision
double effect reasoning as a vehicle for understanding and accommodating ourselves-as
others in the case of “terminal sedation”. Firstly, I am in agreement with Ricoeur that the
major issue in ethical reflection is NOT what distinguishes acts from each other, but what
specifies the human self, implied in human capacities, at the junction of acting and the
agent. After ail, it is human seives who engage in ethical reflection, and for whom that
reflection is important. The same cannot be said for sticks and stones, for the elements of
earth, wind, fire and water, and for non-human living beings. Also, my experience as a
clinical ethicist telis me that questions become ethical questions and are pursued as such
because aspects of selffiood (e.g., feelings, thoughts, conscience, relationships, responses to
othemess) compel the questioning and the pursuit. By extension, it is my conviction that
the major issue in ethical reflection conceming “terminal sedation” is flot how, and in what
ways it can or cannot be distinguished from other acts, but rather, what specifies the self,
implied in the capacities, at the j unction of acting and the agent in cases of “terminal
sedation”. By the same token, it is my conviction that the major issue in ethical reflection
concerning “euthanasia” is flot how, and in what ways it can or cannot be distinguished
from other acts, but rather, what specifies the self, implied in the capacities, at the junction
of acting and the agent in cases of “euthanasia”. “Tenninal sedation” and “euthanasia” are
indistinguishable in the generic sense that both are texts, and as such, they embody
othemess and respond to othemess in the ways that Ricoeur has described. However, in
response to Ricoeur’ s work, my fundamental proposai is that we cease the use of these texts
to distinguisli between acts and consider instead how these texts may be used to distinguish
the otherness they each embody for selves and the ways in which these texts facilitate
selves’ responses to othemess for better or for worse, i.e., by facilitating the understanding
and accommodation of othemess, or by facilitating the accentuation of the tokens of
fracture. This thesis begins the consideration necessary for “terminal sedation” as a text.
Another thesis would be required for a full consideration of “euthanasia”. Only after
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significant analysis of this kind wouid we be in a position to know in what ways “terminal
sedation” and “euthanasia” are distinguishable from each other.
My fundamental proposai begs the question of what it rnight mean to use texts such
as ‘terminal sedation’ to facilitate either the understanding and accommodation of
othemess, or the accentuation of the tokens of fracture. On the discipiinaiy level, my
proposai begs the question of what il might mean for a text-based discipline (e.g., clinical
disciplines, iaw, moral pbilosophy and moral theology) to use texts to facilitate either the
understanding and accommodation of othemess, or the accentuation of the tokens of
fracture. In my mi, this is essentially the question of what it might mean for a text-based
discipline to function in an interdisciplinary manner. From my perspective, Ricoeur has
provided an innovative approach to interdisciplinary functioning. As already indicated, he
has thoroughiy discussed various human capabilities (e.g., the capability for cvii, speaking,
writing, acting and imputing). Through the exercise of these capabilities, we encounter
different types of othemess or alterity. In the absence of absolute kaowiedge, Ricoeur
contrasts two divergent modes of intelligibility or two different modes of response to
alterity -- pure, transcendental reflection and hermeneutics. As we recall, by “pure or
transcendentai reflection,” Ricoeur means “a reflection that starts flot with myseif but with
the object before me, and from there traces back to its conditions of possibllity” (Ricoeur
1986: 5). In other words,
it is a reflection that begins with the thing [emphasis mine). It is “upon” the
thing that this reflection discems ... discovers ... apprehends ... It is
reflection upon the object. This is the way in which it is properly
transcendental ... But the limitation ofthis reflection appears directly along
with its strength: the synthesis that it reveals and inspects will be a synthesis
oniy in the object, in the thing, a synthesis that is merely intentional,
projected outside, into the world, into the structure of the objectivity it
makes possible (Ricoeur 1986: 18).
This reflection is limited insofar as its concem is tangue (i.e., a universal code on the basis
of which someone speaks) as opposed to parole (i.e., someone’s particular, intentional,
contingent message). In other words, the ernphasis of pure reflection is on language, signs,
and symbols as a closed, ‘objective’ system of meaning that “becomes the object of a
praxis and a techne” (Ricoeur 1991: 80). Again, this closed, ‘objective’ system of meaning
is itselfthe limitation of pure reflection: it is an ‘objective’ “synthesis only in flic object, in
the thing; [it is] a synthesis that is merely intentional, projected outside, ... into the
structure of the objectivity it makes possible” (Ricocur 1986: 18).
It seems to me that although Ricoeur’s prime example of pure reflection -- semiotics
-- involves a discipline whose sole focus is the closed system of signs in texts, any
discipline can exercise a semiotic approach to its body of knowledge and to its functioning.
In other words, any discipline can treat the texts that comprise its body of knowledge as a
closed system or synthesis of signs and symbols that is the object of a certain praxis and
techne which is closed to outside approaches and practitioners. By contrast, it seems to me
that an interdisciplinary approach requires Ricoeur’s hermeneutic circles because they
embody an optimal approach to interdisciplinanty. Although the hermeneutic circles
include a semiotic or explanatory ‘moment’, it is complemented by a concem for parole or
the referential ‘moment’ that is a non-issue in a semiotic approach. Only a combined
concem for langue and parole facilitates the understanding and accommodation of
othemess in the quest for the self-as-other. Moreover, it is the lack of concem for parole, or
in other words, the incapacity or unwillingness to struggie with reference issues, that
renders interdisciplinarity impossible. A combined concem for tangue and parole is
particularly important in relation to the capability of imputing. As Ricoeur indicates, an
exclusive concern for pure reflection or the explanatory capacity of action theory is
problematic because it tends to relegate the question ‘who?’ (i.e., the pre-eminent reference
question) to the sidelines. By contrast, use ofRicoeur’s henneneutic circles can assist us to
use “terminal sedation” to distinguish the othemess involved in it for selves, and to
facilitate development of the seif-as-other toward the undersianding and accommodation of
othemess.
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From my perspective, double effect reasoning itself developed as a response to a
selves-as-other dilemma (i.e., Christians confronted by the military needs of the State in
Aquinas’ time) and insofar as double effect reasoning had the capacity to respond to this
and other sucli dilemmas over hundreds of years, it stiil has the capacity to resolve self-as
other dilemmas today with some assistance from Ricoeur’s henneneutics. The crucial
adjustment is that whereas in its history, double effect reasoning served first as a means of
specifying the virtue of commutative justice and later, as a means of specifying or
narrowing the scope of absolute prohibitions, it can in a Ricoeurian context, mediate
othemess by assisting us in theory and in practice to specify the human self-- ourselves-as
other
-- implied in human capacities, at the junction of acting and the agent in cases of
“terminal sedation”. Obviously, this Ricoeurian understanding and use of double effect
reasoning is flot completely foreign to the Thomistic origin of double effect reasoning in the
sense that the Thomistic ongin is essentially concemed with actia or the seif-determining
character of personal action. However, whereas the self for Aquinas was defined as part of
a static metaphysical plan, a Ricoeurian understanding and use of double effect reasoning
bnngs to the forefront the fact that we have no absolute knowledge about anything
including the self, and that we only have endless conflicts of interpretation which we have
to interpret continuously in the face ef the otherness of self of texts, of evil, of action and
imputability, etc. As we recali, Boyle explains that double effect reasoning permits us to go
beyond the Kantian concem for non-contradiction and explore non-Kantian questions
regarding whether values that are ordinarily at stake in moral decisions (e.g., a decision 1.0
lie) are aiways at stake in such decisions. It seems to me that a Ricoeurian imderstanding
and use of double effect reasoning could permit us to explore such non-Kantian questions
to the fullest degree possible, for instance and most importantly, the question of whether the
self ordinarily engaged in moral decisions is aiways the same self and if flot, what are the
implications for moral decision making? From a Ricoeurian perspective, I am obviously
committed to fostenng use of double effect reasoning in the context of the fullest possible
exploration of the implications of the evolving seif-as-other in moral decision making.
2.33
Regarding reconciliation of universals and particulars, or universalism and
particulansm, we recail (lie sentiments expressed by American philosopher/bioethicist
Daniel Callahan as quoted in the general introduction to this thesis. In an article entitled,
Universuuisrn und PurticuÏurism: Fighting tu u Druw, he argues that “No decisive choice
should be made between uiiiversalism and particularism. Each will have ïts place in
different situations ... The hard part is to devise a theoty that can readily join universaÏity
and the moral complexity of everyday life” (Callahan 2000: 41). It seems to me that
Ricoeur has accomplished “the hard part.” In theory and in practice from a Ricoeurian
perspective, what joins universality and the moral complexity ofeveryday life is the self-as
other, or the self continuously caught between universalist needs and possibilities, and
particular contingencies. No decisive choice should be made between universalism and
particularism because both are part of the seif-as-other and cadi wiil (and does) have its
place in different situations according to the ways in which the self-as-other is engaged in
the world. for example, different ethical dilemmas engage selves-as-other in different
ways (e.g., different dilemmas confront the seif-as-other with new types of otherness), and
the myriad of ways in which selves-as-other become engaged usually comprise the source
of ethical dilemmas in the first place. But as Ricoeur indicates and Keamey’s work re
affirms, the goal of ethical reflection should not be the polarization of those particularist
and universalist tendencies, nor the banishment of one or the other tendency, but rather, the
integration or reconciliation of them. To do otherwise accentuates the tokens of fracture
within tic human psyche and creates violence within and among human beings.
I am also thoroughly convinced that Ricoeur’s thinking about the seif-as-other
represents flot just arcane philosophical posturing, but rather, an indication of the way in
which concrete bioethics dilemmas should be framed, i.e., as essentially dilemmas
conceming selves-as-other, and that the difficulties resolving them are essentially problems
coping with othemess in human life. This type of framing is certainly flot foreign in
healthcare wherein the paramount ethical consideration -- informed consent -- is already
understood as a quintessentially seif-as-other dilemma, albeit without the enlightenment
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and vocabulary made possible by Ricoeurian reflection. As we recati, for Ricoeur,
othemess refers to the “variety of experiences of passivity [or the capacïty to receive],
intertwined in multiple ways in human action” (Ricoeur 1992: 318). The infonned consent
process explicitly addresses othemess insofar as the first step in the process is an inquiry
into the person’s capacity to receive and process information about proposed treatments. In
Ontario, for example, capacity is defined “as the ability to understand information relevant
to making a decision and the ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences
of a decisien or lack of decision” (Best 199$: 37). As a clinicai ethicist, I have long been
bewildered by the fact that whereas for clinicians (myseif included), informed consent and
a consideration of the patient’s capacity to consent (as well as other relevant capacities) is
at the forefront of discussion of most ethical dilemmas, mainstream bioethics with its
emphasis on ‘autonomy’ has for the most part, ignored the subject of concrete human
capacities. Admittedly in Ontario, the legal definition cf capacity is restricted te mental
capacity in decisionmaking. However, although this emphasis is a far cry from Ricoeur’s
multi-faceted consideration of capabilities, it is at least, a step in the nght direction that
mainstream bioethics has flot embraced for the most part. The relentiess rhetoric on
autonomy within mainstream bioethics ignores the shadow side of autonomy -- the fact that
every autonomous action brings us face to face with the otherness that constrains our action
in sorne way. Ricoeur’s emphasis on specifying the human self, implied in human
capacities, at the junction of acting and the agent is an important corrective for the
autonomy mantra in bioethics. If we can concretize Ricoeur’s emphasis in the way that we
frame ethical dilemmas and seek to resoïve them, we can contribute to the maturation of
bioethics, and at the same time, assist real people to deal with “terminal sedation” in the
face of the stark otherness of death.
0f ail the seif-as-ether experiences we cari have as human beings, it would seem
that the experience of death and dying is a seif-as-other experience par excellence.
Probiematicatiy, death and dying, flot unlike other quintessentiai seif-as-other experiences
(e.g., birthing) are taboo topics in our Western society. By association, the discussion of
-.. .-,
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“terminal sedation” suffers from the same limitation. Perhaps there is a direct relationship
between ouï inability to discuss something anti the degree of otherness which that
something represents for us. Whatever the case, Ricoeur’s hermeneutic circles offer us a
way to understand and accommodate our experiences of othemess (i.e., even the otherness
represented by death) without resorting te silence or te the “black-and-white scenarios” cf
which Keamey speaks. These extremes are avoided by the fact that Ricoeur’s circles
subvert linear thinking and emphasize a dialectical relationship between explaiiation and
understanding, and fundamentally, between the self as sameness (idem) and the becoming
self (ipseity). The reÏationship between these entities is dialectical in the Hegelian sense.
In other words, as part cf a conversation or debate (the original Greek meaning of
dialectic), the movement between the circles’ ‘moments’ goes back and forth between
thesis and antithesis and between partial reality anti greater wholeness until some Sort of
synthesis is formed which in tum, will be open to renewal in the next conversation. As
Ricoeur says, “I would rather speak of an endless spiral that would carry the meditation
past the same point a number oftimes, but at different altitudes” (Ricoeur 1984: 72).
Given our society’s intense discomfort with the othemess cf death anti dying and
the fact that the circles permit us te confront othemess directly but without polemics, I
think we can use Ricoeur’s circles to great benefit in dealing with “terminal sedation”
dilemmas. As we recail from the American Supreme Court’s hearing ofthe assisted suicide
cases, although the Court was willing to hear these cases and hand down judgments, the
judgments themselves contained a clarion cail for experimentation on the part cf State
tegislatures, net j ust because of the structure of federal/state relationships in the American
system, but because the j udges recognized the need for more inquiry, debate, and consensus
gathering doser te the grassroots context of actual “terminal sedation” cases. In
wholehearted agreement with this sentiment, I think there is a need te use Ricoeur’s circles
being mindful 0f the necessity of different kinds of conversation at different levels, and of
the fact that the circles themselves are well suited te meet this need. for example, I think
that the ethics circle is well suited to discussion at the macro level (e.g., a town hall
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meeting) because discussion of the ethical aim, living well with and for others, extends to
encompass institutions or “the structure of living together as this belongs to a historical
community -- people, nation, region, and so forth ...“ (Ricoeur 1992: 194). By contrast,
the basic circle of understanding could be used to promote discussion and consensus
gathering at any level from the micro level (e.g., the bedside) to the macro level and vice
versa. In the case of “terminal sedation”, I think the most beneficiai use of these circles is
exactly what Ricoeur envisions
-- the creation of a spiral that carnes the conversation past
the same point a number of times, but at different altitudes; in other words, the ideal
arrangement would be to altemate the circles to facilitate the fullest possible discussion and
consensus gathering. At times and for some issues, it may be better to begin discussion
with the ethics circle. In other contexts, the optimal process may be the simultaneous
operation of two circles in different places with an integration of the two conversations
when and if the time is right.
No matter which circle is being used and at what level, there is a need to aÏign the
problem for which the circle is being used (in this case, the dilemmas sunounding use of
double effect reasoning in cases of “terminal sedation”) and the functioning of the circles. I
will outiine the practical aspects of this alignment in the final section of this chapter. for
now, it is important to recali that in the context of ail the kinds of otherness that constrain
our capabilities, the circles facilitate a dynamic relationship between two contrasting modes
of intelligibility or forms of response to othemess -- pure, transcendental reflection and
hermeneutics. By way of pure reflection (e.g., the explanation ‘moment’ in the circle of
understanding and the ‘moment’ of norms in the ethics circle), othemess of ail kinds is
contained and minimized by an extemal synthesis, for example, an explanation of
causation, or a moral maxim. Although this reflection can fadilitate mediation of conflict
and the reduction of uncertainty, these are mixed blessings because explanations and nonns
also produce alienation, and they can cover-up conflicts or ambiguities that have yet to be
resolved. By contrast, in the hermeneutic circles, the limitations of pure refiection are
overcome by the referential ‘moments’ of parole. for example, the initial guesses in the
circle of understanding and practical wisdom in the ethics circle acknowledge that aithougli
we can benefit from past explanations and norms, every situation we encotmter brings
unique challenges and newness (e.g., the seif-as-other in new ways) that past explanations
and norms canriot aiways mediate. In this sense, initial guesses and practical wisdom
respond more or less intuitively to the othemess of uncertainty and unknowing in new and
unexpected situations wherein we may flot even know which explanations or norms may
appiy. Likewise, the ‘moment’ of appropriation in the circle of understanding and the
ethics ‘moment’ in the ethics circle acknowledges the distanciation brought about by the
priority of sense over reference in pure reflection. Moreover, the othemess minimized by
pure reflection (e.g., the othemess of evil, texts, action and imputability) is mediated by the
opening up ofthe text in question to a world ofreference in the circle of understanding, and
to the specific referentiai aim of a good life with and for others in j ust institutions in the
ethics circle. In relation to both appropriation and ethics, narrative has an extremely
important role because it permits us to articulate our beginnings, middles, and endings in
the world that conshtute the vital reference missing in pure reflection.
Allied with use of Ricoeur’s henneneutical circles, Ricoeur’s work on death and
dying offers added assistance for our task of understanding and accommodating otherness
in the case of “terminal sedation”. In a brief essay entitled, Temporal Distance and Deuth
in Histoiy (Ricoeur 2002b: 239-255), Ricoeur considers this question: “How do we deal
with death as an extreme form of temporal distance [i.e., othemess]?” (Ricoeur 2002b:
240). In my mmd, his treatment of this question is yet another exampie of his use of the
circle of understanding to make distanciation productive. Initialiy, he contrasts his
approach to death -- “centenng on our potentiality-for-Dying” with Heidegger’s concept of
death “as an intimate possibility of our own most potentiality-for-Being” (Ricoeur 2002b:
241). Not unlike the way in which he has consistently contrasted ah of his approaches with
those of Heidegger, Ricoeur says, “I shah replace the kind of short circuit instituted by
Heidegger between potentiality-for-Being and mortahity with a long detour, the details of
which foilow” (Ricoeur2O02b: 241). In other words, Ricoeur is yet again replacing
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Heïdegger’s short road to a direct ontology with a longer, circular passage in which being is
understood only by degrees, and by interpretation or exegesis of signs. In the case of death,
we receive and are alienated by textual explanations of death, for example, “one leams of
death as an unavoidable fate for the body-as-object,” and “one leams of it through biology,
confirmed by daily experience: biology telis one that mortality constitutes the second haif
ofa pair, the first halfof which is sexual reproduction” (Ricoeur 2002b: 242). For Ricoeur,
the difficuit goal of self-understanding in the context of dying involves movement beyond
“a mere acceptance of having-to-die,” i.e., that which is explained by biology, and the
accomplishment of appropriation of one’s own “potentiality-for-Dying”: “We have to
work on ourselves for a long time before the entirely factual necessity of death [i.e., death
explained] can be converted” into a self-understanding of potentiality-for-Dying (Ricoeur
2002b: 242).
Here again, the process of self-understanding in the case of “potentiality-for-Dying”
involves the self in a relationship with othemess, and Ricoeur explains this relationship
using, as his inspiration, Montaigne’s essay entitled, To Phitosophize is to Learn How to
Die. In this essay, Montaigne (1533-1592) says the following:
To begin depriving death of its greatest advantage over us, let us adopt a
way clean contrary to that common one; let us deprive death of its
strangeness; let us frequent it, let us get used to it; let us have nothing more
often in mmd than death. At every instant let us evoke it in our imagination
under ail its aspects ... we do flot know where death awaits us; so let us wait
for it everywhere. b practice death is to practise freedom. A man who has
leamed how to die has unleamed how to be a slave. Knowing how to die
gives us freedom from subjection and constraint. Life has no evil for him
who has thoroughly understood that loss of life is not an evil (Montaigne
2004: 24).
Toward the achievement of “depriving death of its greatest advantage over us” or the
appropriation of death as “potentiality-for-Dying”, Ricoeur emphasizes the mediating role
of histoncal deaths and most importantly, the mediating role “played by the death of close
relatives” (Ricoeur 2002b: 243). “When viewed in the light of the difficult task of
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appropriating knowledge of death,” Ricoeur believes that there are “resources of veracity”
or “message[s] of authenticity” “contained in the experience of the loss of a beloved
person” (Ricoeur 2002b: 243). In agreement with Montaigne and Ricoeur regarding both
the need for appropriation of death, and the mediating role played by previous losses, I
think that the use of “terminal sedation” can also play a helpful mediating role for both
patients and their significant others. I wifl outiine the practical aspects of this mediation in
the final section of this chapter.
4.2. Looking Back
In the first chapter, we exposed the conflict of interpretations regarding both how
“terminal sedation” is defined and how double effect reasoning is being used in attempts to
distinguish pain control ftom euthanasia in cases of “terminal sedation”. What became
evident in this chapter is that there are many ‘faces’ or interpretations of double effect
reasoning that have evolved out of tensions related to the uneasy relationship between its
particularist and universalist elements. In the second chapter, we discovered that there are
significant conflicts of interpretation regarding use of double effect reasoning in the context
of pain control (and other contexts) even within the Catholic milieu as exemplified by the
work of the five thinkers suweyed. Again, the exposé illustrated distinct and diffenng
perspectives on the universals within double effect reasoning and how they cari be
reconciled with the contingencies or particulanties of action. In the third chapter devoted
to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, we leamed that at the heart of conflicts of interpretation, we find
othemess -- the various kinds of passivities that are part and parcel of human life and that
are mediated or negotiated by way of our human capabilities. Several types of othemess
were explored in this chapter: primarily, the othemess of evil, the othemess of texts and the
othemess of action and imputability. Corresponding to these forms of otherness, we
discovered Ricoeur’s perspective on the ways in which we mediate othemess by means of
our human capabilities for evil, speaking, wnting, acting and imputability. At the heart of
Ricoeur’s view is the conviction that human beïngs are both universal and particular, and
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most importantly, that their universality and particularity is lived out through the
capabilities surveyed. In response to the functioning of the capabilities and the ways in
which they are constrained by othemess, Ricoeur advances a dynamic relationship between
two contrasting modes of intelligibility -- pure, transcendental reflection (e.g., semiotics
and action theory) and hermeneutics. Although each type of intelligibility brings with it
strengths and weaknesses in terms of its potential to mediate othemess, the combination of,
or the dialectical relationship between the two modes within the hermeneutic circles lias the
greatest potential to reconcile universals and particulars within our expenence, and to
increase our overali understanding of ourselves-as-other. It is with this potential in mmd
that we wish to place the conflicts of interpretation surrounding “terminal sedation” and use
of double effect reasoning within the framework of these henneneutic circles. But before
doing that, we need to revisit the content of the first two chapters and place it within the
overali context of Ricoeur’s work. Most importantly, we need to identify the capabilities
and othemess involved in use of “terminal sedation”, and the mynad of ways in which our
understanding of both “terminal sedation” and double effect reasoning have been
minimized by forms of pure, transcendental reflection. Having thus identified in
Ricoeurian terms, the problems presented by use of double effect reasoning in the case of
“terminal sedation”, we can bnng the hermeneutics circles to bear on these problems in the
final section ofthis chapter.
As aÏready indicated, Ricoeur’s hermeneutic circles require the combination of pure
reflection and ‘moments’ whereby this reflection is opened up to various forms ofreference
or parole. Review of my work in chapters one and two leads me to the conclusion that
within the disciplines represented and the work of the selected thinkers, the capacity of
double effect reasoning to reflect or mediate parole is limited in varying degrees, despite
creative and even heroic aftempts to achieve openness to more and more forms of
reference, and ultimately, forms of self-understanding. If we consider again the work of
Boyle, Kaczor and McConnick, within Catholic philosophy, medieval studies and moral
theology respectively, it seems to me that we have two interpietations of double effect
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reasoning minimized by pure reflection (i.e., Boyle and Kaczor’s interpretations) and one
interpretation of double effect reasoning moving toward and to some degree achieving the
incorporation of parole (i.e., McCormick’s interpretation), but being thwarted by
institutional power, and the lack in McCormick’s work, of an adequate connection between
his historical, relational anthropology and lis proportionality assessments. In une with the
emphasis of pure reflection on the outside object as the starting place of consideration and
from there, the tracing back to the object’s conditions of possibility, it seems to me that for
both Boyle and Kaczor, the human person and his/her moral life is an extemal object, the
conditions of possibility of which are traced back to and dependent upon codified
conceptions of Ihomistic natural law with its metaphysical view of personhood and action.
In Ricoeurian terms, both Boyle and Kaczor have substituted a Thomistic ethical vision of
the world for a more comprehensive reflection on free will, on evil, on texts, on action, and
on imputability. Accordingly, the othemess that they are prepared b acknowledge or
accommodate within their systems is quite limited. In a cursory fashion, Boyle
acknowledges the othemess of language; the current state of knowledge and particular,
contextual questions; the inevitability of harmful side effects; ignorance; hard cases; and
variations in actual duties. At the same time, however, Boyle’s pure reflection on double
effect reasoning leads him to downplay otliemess and to overestimate human capabilities,
particularly, free dhoice. For example, he says, “In the choice to act for some goal, namely,
in an intentional action, it always remains in the agent’s power to choose not to do it
choosing to pursue results that involve harming a good is always avoidable -- though often
at a higli price” (Boyle 2004: 56-57). Kaczor’s accommodation of othemess is limited to
his acknowledgement of Aquinas’ metaphysical conceptions of suffenng and evil,
conceptions that are symbolically illuminating, but remote, nonetheless, to most people
today. By the same token, although he acknowledges Aquinas’ emphasis on the fact that
“one cannot choose what one does not know” (Kaczor 1996: 44-45), Kaczor neyer
accommodates the equally important fact that the Thomistic context of double effect
reasoning
-- Aquinas’ structure of human action and choice -- is also remote to most people
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today. Both Boyle and Kaczor have inherited and re-constructed a more or Iess closed,
‘objective’ system of pure reflection on double effect reasoning that is the object cf an
ongoing praxis and a techne. Moreover, it is precisefy because cf this closed system
approach that Boyle can daim that natural law is flot tradition-dependent in the sense cf
being rooted in the lived expenence ofpersons sharing a common life.
By contrast, far ftom the reaim of pure reflection, McCormick’s obvious concem
for parole is passionate and wide ranging. for example, his starting place is the concrete
complexity, ambiguity, ftagiÏity, conflict, and tragedy involved in human personhood and
human life
-- especially human action. Although McCormick does not use the term
‘othemess’ to categonze factors such as these, it seems to me that his work on double effect
reasoning analyzes and accommodates the reality of otherness more extensively than any
other account in this thesis with the obvious exception ofRicoeur’s work. For McCormick,
the human person and his/her moral life does not comprise an external object, but rather,
the human person integrally and adequately considered -- an embodied, histoncal subject in
relationship with the matenal world of change and growth, the social world of structures
(e.g., language) and institutions, the othemess of pre-moral evil or the existence of evil
before human choice, and the othemess of God-with-us. It is on behaif of the embodied,
histoncal subject facing othemess exemplified as above, that McCormick attempts to re
conceive double effect reasoning as a mediator of parole, or as a set of exception-making
categones with which we can negotiate the othemess inherent in our particular human
realities. From the perspective of those who favour the exclusive use of pure reflection,
perhaps it is McCormick’s extensive emphasis on parole that makes his proportionalism so
threatening. Although in my view, McCormick’s work lacks an adequate connection
between his histoncal, relational anthropology and his proportionality assessments, thus
opening the door to the charge of consequentialism, perhaps both my critique and the
charge of consequentialism are more rooted in the requirements of pure reflection.
furthermore, in faimess to McCormick, perhaps his anthropology ami his proportionality
assessments could have been better integrated if he did flot have te spend so much time
A‘flghting fires’. In McCormick’s description ofthe way in which he would be introduced to
visitors at the Kennedy Institute of Bioethics at Georgetown University, he says, “Hellegers
[i.e., Dr. André Hellegers, the founder of the Institute] would say, ‘McCormick and I put
out fires. We respond to probtems. We have no etemally valid ten year schemes or
methodological revolutions. Ail we do is respond to fire alarms” (Odozor 1995: 23).
Perhaps ‘tire fighting’ is an occupationai hazard which accompames the pnontization and
accommodation ofparole within one’s work. However, in my mmd, it is a hazard far more
preferable than the one that plagues the pnontization of pure reflection, namely, the
tendency to assume the perspective of ‘the sun’ or” ‘the mode ofthinking ofthe spectators’
(Schner 2002: 163: for more explanation, see thesis dedication).
1f we recali the survey of pertinent developments in twentieth-century Western
moral phflosophy, it seems to me that from a Ricoeurian perspective, the suwey portrays a
protracted baffle between pure reflection and parole, with two significant skirmishes being
represented by the pnncipalist-contextualist debate in bioethics, and by the way in which
double effect reasomng has become a lightening rod because it combines in one ‘principle’
approaches to ethics that have become radically polanzed. Within the history of this baffle,
it seems to me that the interpretations of Anscombe and Sulmasy represent two similar yet
divergent contributions. Each ofthem in their own way recognizes that parole is necessary,
and that double effect reasoning minimized by pure reflection has become problematic.
Unfortunately, however, both of them perpetuate this problem, albeit in different ways.
Although Anscombe recognizes aspects of the problem (e.g., law-based accounts of
absolutes, the ‘incorrigibly contemplative’ Cartesian view ofknowledge, the need for a new
philosophy ofpsychology, etc.), she nonetheless remains seemingly ambivalent and divided
conceming a solution, as Ricoeur indicates through lis critique of lier dualistic approach to
the relationship between intentional action and knowledge. In other words, her articulation
of an Aristotelian-based, practical account of double effect reasoning (especially intention)
is stili largely dominated by pure reflection, and plagued by the unresolved division
between speculative and practical reason. Similarly, although Sulmasy also recognizes the
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need for a practical account of double effect reasoning, in this case, an account rooted not
within the pure reflection of contemporary action theory, but within the practical context of
medical practice, lie ultimately constructs an account of moral pathology based in the pure
reflection supporting the pathognomic sign, that is, causation as understood and articulated
within medical practice. This pure reflection leads him to construct a strict, but extremely
problematic division between ‘neuîo-cognitive suffenng’ (i.e., suffenng as explained by the
medical view of causation) and ‘agent-narrative suffering’ (i.e., suffenng as understood by
patients within the context of their own systems of meaning).
To some degree, it would seem that double effect reasoning lias more or less
peaceably existed within the Englisli common-law system insofar as it lias been
incorporated into the legal reflection on intention or mens rea, one of the two components
of a criminal act within this context. Moreover, although the judges involved in the
Canadian and American PAS/euthanasia cases were quite divided in their actual
judgements, this case Iaw illustrates the significant degree to which the courts have relied
upon the intentionlforesight distinction within double effect reasoning to sanction ‘terminal
sedation’. At the same time, however, the ‘fit’ between double effect reasoning and
Englisli cnminal law is uncomfortable, and the most controversial issue is yet again the
capacity of double effect reasoning to negotiate reference or parole. As both Cantor and
Huxtable have indicated, there is some dissonance between use of double effect reasoning
within case law and the traditional approach to cnminal law. As we recail, Cantor holds
that there is an inconsistency between what is permifted by means of the intentionlforesight
distinction and the traditional view of what is and is flot excusable in the context of criminal
homicide:
The effort to use the doctrine of double effect, with its focus on a
pliysician’s intention, seems inconsistent witli traditional legal doctrine,
which establishes that it is cnminal homicide to laiowingly cause death,
even if the actor’s motive or intention is to relieve suffenng. Mercy killing
lias aiways been prohibited in the Anglo-American system. Thus, at least if
an analgesic dosage is certain or practically certain to hasten death, the
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physician’s knowing conduct constitutes an unlawful kiliing closely akin to
active euthanasia (Cantor 2001b: 86). Reliefofsuffenng has neyer provided
an adequate justification for killing a human in Anglo-American law.
Traditional criminal taw simply does flot let the presence of extreme
suffenng by the victim and a merciful motive or intention by the perpetrator
serve as a legal excuse or justification for knowingÏy kilhing a person
Administenng a drug dosage that is known to be lethal is an unlawful killing
whether the actor intends to relieve suffenng, intends to cause death, or
intends to cause death in order to relieve suffering (Cantor 2004: 1837-
183 8).
from his perspective in Engiand, Huxtable goes further by noting the same
inconsistency that Cantor has noted, as well as the need for impartiality in the application of
the cnminal Ïaw:
[The] Adams [casel straightforwardly adopts the ethical doctrine [of double
effect], in removing innocent Éntentions from the iaw of murder. This view
is probiematic, however, as it appears inconsistent with pnnciples applied
outside the context of palliation. Perhaps more wonyingly, legai officiais
(pnmanly prosecutors andjudges) appear rareiy to doubt the innocence of a
doctor’s intention where analgesics are used ... in a recent House of Lords
ruling [1998], the Lords again decided that foresight of virtually certain
consequences either amounts to intention or at least provides evidence of
intention, from which a jury may infer that the guiity intention was present.
Although that case did flot concem medical practice, ... the principles set
out should apply to ail murder cases. Judges are prone to pronounce that the
law of murder applies equally to health professionals and laypersons alike.
This cannot be the case, however, when a doctor’s foresight of death can be
innocent and a iayperson’s foresight of death can be culpable. This evinces
ethical inconsistency; if the doctrine of double effect is acceptable, it surely
ought to apply across the board ... (Huxtable 2004: 62, 63, 64).
Whether and to what degree the English common-law tradition will continue to rely upon
double effect reasoning to resolve end-of-life issues is an open question. Huxtable suggests
that double effect reasoning shouÏd be retained, “although its tenns should be clearly stated
(perhaps in an Act ofParliament) and ngorously policed” (Huxtabie 2004: 62). Again, this
suggestion raises the urgent and vexing question of how particular belief systems, pluraiism
and public policy should be related. No matter how this question is resolved, the parole of
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human suffering at the end-of-life is ciearÏy pushing the boundaries of pure reflection
within the law and its incorporation of double effect reasoning.
If we recali the portiEayal of ‘terminal sedation’ and use of double effect reasoning in
the clinical literature, this literature also exposes the tension between double effect
reasoning as a form of pure reflection and as a possible mediator of parole in the climc.
Intention is a particularly difficuit issue, and there is significant tension between ‘intention’
as a ‘clear and distinct’ idea within double effect reasoning as pure reflection (i.e., “the
ethicist’s bnght une between relieving symptoms and hastening death” (Lo and Rubenfeld
2005: 1813)), and the muddy reality of intentions at the bedside of a suffering patient.
Although this tension has been resolved to some degree in the clinical practice guidelines
wherein intention bas been rendered more publicly accessible through titration monitoring
and documentation requirements, there is a need to consider the larger problem. As stated
at the beginning of the first chapter, littie is known about the practice of ‘terminal sedation’
and what we do know denves mostly from quantitative analyses, the vast majonty of which
are retrospective studies reliant upon more or less standardized chart notes, or the memory
of suwey participants. At this point, fourteen years afier the first appearance of ‘terminal
sedation’ in the literature, the key issue is that the literature on this practice is stili largely a
form of empiricalÏy-based, pure reflection. In other words, the literature portrays ‘terminal
sedation’ from within the limited, explanatory categones of medical practice and in
particular, of quantitative research. As a resuit, the ‘what’ and ‘why’ aspects of ‘terminal
sedation’ are emphasized and the ‘who’ aspects are for the most part, conspicuously left
out.
for example, ovemding attention bas been given to the pursuit of the pre-eminent
question of pure reflection, namely, ‘What is it?’ It seems to me that the controversy over
what ‘terminal sedation’ is and the concomitant naming dilemma ultimately reflects a
struggle regarding whether and in what ways ‘terminal sedation’ can be accommodated
within the existing pure reflection on medical practice. In the late 90s, the struggie might
flot have become public at ail had it not been for the intellectual honesty of Dr. David Roy
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in his insistence that Slow Euthanasia should be published thin The Journal ofPalliative
Care (Billings and Block 1996). Apart from defining and naming ‘terminal sedation’ as an
entity becoming gradually more acceptable within medical practice, the other typical pure
reflection issues in the literature include ‘How ofien does the thing occur?’ (i.e., the
prevalence question); ‘What are the medical indications for it?’ (i.e., treatments aiways
have specific indications including target, and in this case, ‘refractoiy’ symptoms); and
‘What are the most typical and most effective drugs to achieve sedation?’. Conceming
medical indications for ‘terminal sedation’, existentiai suffenng is extremely problematic
because it lias neyer fit comfortably into the empirically-based pure reflection on medical
practice. However, existential suffenng is only one of the forms of othemess, the
understanding of which is, for the most part, a sealed book for the empincaily-based pure
reftection on medical practice.
Through my nursing and clinical ethics expenence, I have leamed that there are
several forms of othemess expenenced by patients and their loved ones before andlor
dunng ‘terminal sedation’. The basic form of othemess expenenced by ail patients is their
disease process with the consequent pain, suffenng, and the realities of both the dying
process and death itself. By way ofthese factors, patients as selves become ‘other’ to their
prewous physical form, to their previously lield images of themselves (e.g., as an
independent person), to ail their capabilities as previously known and expenenced, and to
their Joved ones. from the perspective of loved ones, the patient becomes ‘other’ than they
were -- sometimes even unrecognizable -- and loved ones struggie with this reality, as well
the othemess ofthe unfamiliar roles they themseives may have to take on in response to the
patient’s situation. The caregivers, ffie system of care, and the use of invasive technology
together comprise another significant form of othemess experienced by patients and their
ioved ones, and this othemess is largeiy a textual reality insofar as patients and their loved
ones ofien have to endure endless procedures, fonns, mies such as visiting hours, and other
types of regulatory confrois. The sedation itself including the specific drugs, their effect on
consciousness and communication, and ffieir side effects comprise a major othemess for
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patients and their loved ones. Ricoeur speaks of the othemess of conscience, and this is
often a significant factor for patients and loved ones because beliefs previously held in the
context of better health may change radically in a situation where sedation becomes an
option. To my knowledge, there is only one pubhshed article devoted exclusively to the
experience of family members in cases of ‘terminal sedafion’, and this study provides more
insights regarding the othemess of sedation for loved ones. By means of a quantitative
questionnaire survey of 280 bereaved families of cancer patients in Japan, Monta and his
colleagues fouiid that 185 individual family members (i.e., response rate of 73%) agreed or
agreed strongly with the following concems:
Disfressed that they could flot communicate with the patient - 50%; Not
prepared for changes of patient condition - 34%; Burden of responsibility for
the decision - 28%; Feeling they stili had something more to do - 28%; The
treatment might shorten the patient’s life
- 24%; Wish there had been a
chance for the entire family to discuss - 17%; The physicians and nurses
were flot sufficiently compassionate - 15%; The patient status of sleeping
was not digrnfied - 15%; Difficuit to find meaning in being with the patient -
14%; There might be other ways for symptom relief - 11%; The dying
process was unnaturally prolonged - 3.8%; Concems about legal issues -
2.2%; Feeling as thought the patient was forced to sleep - 1.6% (Monta,
Ikenaga, Adachi et al. 2004: 562).
In cases of ‘terminal sedation’, there are forms of otherness also experienced by the
caregivers. To state the obvious, for caregivers, patients and their loved ones are ‘other’ in
the basis sense that they are other unique persons, perhaps from other cultures, with other
unique needs, problems, vaned expenences of disease processes, and so on. As indicated
in the literature, patients’ existential suffenng represents a troublesome kind of othemess
for caregivers, particularly because it challenges established medical categones of
pathology, and it may challenge the personal boundanes that caregivers are expected to
keep between themselves and patients. Unable or unwilling to deal with the othemess of
patients and loved ones, caregivers sometimes label a patient andlor their loved ones as
‘difficuit’, or ‘non-compliant’, and this labelling aggravates the problem ofothemess for ail
concerned. Regarding the drugs used in ‘terminal sedation’, their actions and side effects
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can also become ‘other’ for caregivers insofar as the same drug may act quite differently in
different patients, and drugs may act differentiy than one might expect from textbook
explanations of their actions and effects. Death is also a form of othemess for caregivers,
particularly because each patient’s death and dying process is different, and because the
death of a patient may indeed be experienced as a professional failure, or as an enemy,
depending on the caregiver’s age, life expenence in general, professional training, and
cumulative experience of personal and professional capabilities. In some situations, the
caregiver may become ‘other’ to his/herself in the sense that ‘terminal sedation’ may
precipitate a crisis of conscience. If a caregiver’s peers or colleagues are also experiencing
such a cnsis, the othemess of other caregivers and their divergent stances may complicate
the crisis experienced by any one individual. The law is another form of othemess for
caregivers, particularly law as pure reflection, distanced as it is from bedside realities. By
the same token, double effect reasoning, particularly the emphasis on intention, represents
otherness for caregivers in ail the ways discussed in the first chapter. Although the
literature gives the impression that physicians are the ones pnmanly involved in ‘terminal
sedation’, nurses most ofien give the actual drugs, and spend the most continuous time at
the bedside dunng the sedation and the patient’s actual dying process. Hence, flot
surprisingly, the othemess of ‘terminal sedation’ can present special problems for nurses.
Unfortunately, however, there is, to my knowledge, only one published study of the
“emotional burden of nurses in palliative sedation therapy” (Monta, Miyashita, Kimura et
ai. 2004). By means of a quantitative questionnaire survey of 3187 nurses (i.e., response
rate of 82%) in Japan, Monta and bis coileagues found that nurses agreed or agreed
strongly with the following factors contnbuting to nurse-perceived burden in sedation:
Frequent expenence of unclear patient wishes - 29%; Insufficient time -
27%, Belief that it is difficuit to diagnose refractory symptoms - 27%;
Nurse-perceived inadequate knowledge/skills about sedation practice - 27%;
Nurse-perceived inadequate interpersonal sidils - 26%; Unclear noies of
nurses - 17%; frequent experience of unclear family wishes - 17%; Lack of
respect for nurse opinions - 12%; Belief that patient distress is flot reiieved
by sedation - 12%; Nurse-perceived inadequate coping with own grief -
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11%; Lack of common understanding of sedation among nurses
- 9.1%;
Lack of common understanding of sedation between physicians and nurses -
8.1%; Frequent experience of conflicting wislies between patient and family
- 8.1%; Belief that sedation would hasten death - 7.2%; Supportive
colleagues unavailable - 6.6%; Belief that sedation is indistinguishable ftom
euthanasia
- 5.4%; Team conference unavailable - 5.1%; Nurses’ personal
values contradictoiy to sedation - 4.1% (Monta, Miyashita, Kimura et al.
2004: 552).
4.3. Toward a Rïcoeurian Interpretation of Double Effect
Reasoning in the Case of ‘Terminal Sedatïon’
In the Introduction to this thesis, we identified the fact that since the vast literature
conceming double effect reasoning spans eight centuries and several disciplines, there is no
question that the henneneutical challenge involved in the continued use of this type of
reasoning is quite daunting. Even the henneneuticai challenge invoived in bringing
Ricoeur’s perspective to the limited selection of literature on double effect literature within
this thesis is daunting enough. In the Introduction to this chapter, we identified the
fundamental option open to us in the context of Ricoeur’s work as reinforced by Keamey:
We can either use double effect reasoning as a mechanism for repudiating otherness and
accentuating the tokens of fracture, or we can use it as a vehicle for understanding and
accommodating othemess, specificaliy, understanding and accommodating ourselves-as
other in the case of ‘terminal sedation’. What wouid it mean to use double effect reasoning
in the latter way? Fundamentally, double effect reasoning has been handed down from one
generation to another as a text and as such, it is subject to ail the othemess of texts as
presented by Ricoeur. Therefore, the use of double effect reasoning as a vehicle for
understanding and accommodating ourselves-as-other in the case of ‘terminal sedation’
would mean opemng up this text to a world of reference in the ways that Ricoeur lias
suggested in order to overcome the distanciation or alienation that results when the text is
reduced to forms of pure reflection or explanation. Similarly, since double effect reasoning
is a text that has responded to the otherness of evil with universaily applicable concepts or
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maxims of ‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘neutral’, we need to modi1r this approach in une with
Ricoeur’s hermeneutical response to the othemess of evil. In other words, there is a need
for a comprehensive reflection on ‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘neutrai’ as opposed to the
minimization of evil through pure reflection, or the formalist reduction of ‘good’, ‘bad’,
and ‘neutral’ to maxims of ftee choice. Insofar as double effect reasoning is a code or an
abbreviated version of Aquinas’ action theory as interpreted by vanous commentators, it is
subject to ail the othemess of imputability as presented by Ricoeur. With this in mmd, we
need to replace the use of double effect reasoning as a type of pure reflection on agents and
agency with the utilization of this reasoning as a form of hermeneutic reflection that
facilitates the greater self-understanding of acting subjects who impute and who can be
imputed. Baving now analyzed the content of the first two chapters in order to illuminate
the problematic forms of pure reflection, we are in a position to move toward a Ricoeurian
interpretation of double effect reasoning in the case of ‘terminal sedation’. This
interpretation will move as Ricoeur’s henneneutics moves from a text, namely, the so
called conditions of double effect reasoning, to what is in front of the text -- enlarged
seives-as-other. Our goal is selves-as-other enlarged in two ways. firstly, there is a need
to open up double effect reasoning to wide-ranging parole or reference -- ultimately, to
greater specification of selves, implied in the capacities, at the junction of acting and the
agent in cases of ‘terminal sedation’. Secondly, in relation to dying patients for whom
‘terminal sedation’ is an option, there is a need to use double effect reasoning to facilitate
as much as possible, their ventunng beyond a mere acceptance of having to die to an
appropriation of their own ‘potentiaiity-for-dying’. We tum now to the impiementation of
these goals by means ofthe so-called conditions of double effect reasoning.
The first two chapters revealed a conflict of interpretations regarding the meaning of
proportionality within double effect reasoning. As we recail, the sources revealed a conflict
between three principal meanings: the notion of proportionate reason, the comparison of
outcomes or effects, and means/end proportion, the original meaning of proportionality and
the one often faeilitated today by the proportional titration of dosages to achieve the
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necessary level of sedation. While we cannot hope to solve the inevitable conflict of
interpretations sunounding these meanings, nor can we deny the hefpfulness of these
meanings in discernment conceming ‘terminal sedation’, the fact remains that, from a
Ricoeunan perspective, these meanings are largeÏy forms of pure reflection, and they need
to be supplemented by the injection of more wide-ranging parole or reference fora greater
enlargement of selves-as-other in cases of ‘terminal sedation’. From a practical
perspective, for instance, in the context ofa discussion between patients (if possible), loved
ones and staff at the unit levef, it seems to me that we could assist people to achieve the
goal of selves-as-other enlarged in the aforementioned ways, by using Ricoeur’s circle of
understanding to beller understand the capacities and othemess involved in the situations of
extremity wherein ‘terminal sedation’ becomes an option. In terms ofthe first ‘moment’ of
the circle where we have to guess or follow our hunches regarding the meaning of the
situation in which we find ourselves, we miglit consider the following questions: What
capacities have been and can be exercised in this situation, and what constraints on those
capacities are we facing? In other words, what does othemess consist of in this situation,
and how/in what ways is “terminal sedation” an othemess and!or a possible way to address
the otherness we are facing (e.g., the othemess of suffering and death)? In terms of the
second ‘moment’ where we are concemed with pure reflection or the stmctural
explanations of the situation at hand, we might consider: How has ‘terminal sedation’ been
explained structurally? The literature discussed in this thesis provides a mynad of
structural explanations that could be adapted and incorporated into unit-based discussion of
the basic structural components of ‘terminal sedation’. Finally, in terms of the third
‘moment’ where our goal is to move past the vanous forms of alienation brought about by
structural explanation, we miglit consider the question of how and in what ways it might be
possible for ‘terminal sedation’ to assist people to appropnate the othemess at hand, and to
move toward an appropriation of their own (if possible, in the case of patients themselves),
and!or of their loved one’s ‘potentiality-for-dying’. Achievement of ifiis goal of
appropriation will depend to a great degree on the level of sedation required and its effect
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on consciousness and communication, the time period involved, as welJ as the willingness
of everyone involved to work through the otherness of dying. As already indicated, toward
the appropriation of deatli as ‘potentiality-for-dying’, Ricoeur emphasizes the mediating
role of historical deaths and most importantly, the mediating role “pÏayed by the death of
close relatives” (Ricoeur 20025: 243). In my experience with situations of ‘terminal
sedation’, what is required for this type of mediation is the readiness, willingness, and
creativity involved in working through memones -- memories of the death of close
relatives, and of death in general. In my experience of patients for whom sedation is
indicated andlor their loved ones, the existence or non-existence of these pre-requisites is
affected by many factors including the availability of difference kinds of professional
assistance. However, in situations where these pre-requisites have been or can be achieved,
the appropriation of death as ‘potentiality-for-dying’ is a real possibility, and in some
situations I have witnessed, a real, growthful actuality.
The first two chapters also revealed a confiict of interpretations surrounding the
second condition requiring that the agent intend only good effects even though bad effects
can 5e foreseen. As we recail, the viability and credibility of the intentionlforesight
distinction was questioned from many perspectives, and intention itself was considered
problematic insofar as there was a significant tension between ‘intention’ as a universally
applicable concept (i.e., ‘intention’ as a ‘clear and distinct’ idea), and the muddy reality of
intentions at the besides of suffenng patients. In light of Ricoeur’s work, I think we can
now move toward a solution for these problems and provide at least an outiine of what an
intention for ‘terminal sedation’ would mean in Ricoeunan ternis. It seems to me that the
foresight/intention distinction is in Ricoeurian terms, merely a textual sign that may or may
not assist us to negotiate or mediate two types of othemess
-- the otherness of what I
foresee and the othemess ofwhat I intend. As textual signs, both ‘foresight’ and ‘intention’
bnng inevitable alienation and the need for perpetual interpretation. In other words,
‘intention’ and ‘foresight’ are indisfinguishable insofar as neither one of them can, as
textual signs, overcome the otherness of ah texts. From this perspective, it seems to me
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that the intentionlforesight distinction does flot carry moral weight
-- or it cannot mediate
othemess in a Ricoeurian sense -- except as interpreted, or in other words, except as pan of
the journey towards greater enlargement of seives-as-other in cases of ‘terminal sedation’.
As part of this joumey, both intention and foresight are pre-eminently texts, subject to ail
the othemess of texts that Ricoeur has discussed. As texts, intention and foresight function
authentically as attestations, as initiatives, and in particular, as promises within the context
of Ricoeur’s notion of future-onented and fragility-onented responsibility. If we take the
intention for ‘terminal sedation’ as an example, it is first and foremost, a text (i.e., part cf a
larger narrative) subject to ail the otbemess of texts. In this regard, the problems
surrounding intention in the ducal context are part and parcel of the conflicts of
interpretation plaguing ail texts. The intention for ‘terminal sedation’ ïs also an attestation
charactenzed by a ventative type of certainty rather than that derived from an ultimate
foundation. As Ricoeur explains, “[AttestationJ perfectly expresses the kind of belief
attached to expressions of the type I beÏieve that I can, distinguishing it from belief as a
weak form of theoreticai knowledge” (Ricoeur 2005: 91). The intention for ‘terminal
sedation’ is also a type of action that Ricoeur cails ‘initiative’. As we recail, an initiative is
“an intervention of the agent of action in the course of the world, an intervention which
effectively causes changes in the world” (Ricoeur 1992: 109). Not unlike any other type cf
initiative, the intention for ‘terminal sedation’ is subject to constraint or othemess reiated to
the clash of causalities that piagues ail our initiatives. It seems to me aiso that the intention
for ‘terminal sedation’ is a type of initiative that Ricoeur calis ‘promising’. As he explains,
“When someone says, ‘I promise,’ the speaker effectively commits himself to some future
action. To make a promise is te commit oneself to ‘do’ what the proposition says . . - But
the commitment is first of ail to the other to whom the promise is made ... In other words,
the promise has net simply a receiver, but a beneficiaiy of the promise” (Ricceur 2005:
129). Accordingly, the intention for ‘terminal sedation’ functions ideally within the context
of Ricoeur’s future-oriented and fragility-onented view of responsibility. Within this
context, it is flot merely pure reflection, but the inclusion of parole that undergirds
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responsibihty, combined with the importance of trust as a mediator of othemess, for
example, the othemess of caregivers from patients’ perspectives in cases of ‘terminal
sedation’.
Regarding the third condition of double effect reasoning, the idea that the bad effect
must flot be the cause of the good effect, we have in the first two chapters, identified a key
problem. This condition is difficuit, if flot impossible to apply in cases of ‘terminal
sedation’ because precise cause and effect determinations are often flot possible, or we only
have access to conflictual views of causation and its relationship to cases of ‘terminal
sedation’. Obviously, this is flot a new problem from the perspective of Ricoeur’s work.
As he indicates in many places, there is a long-standing and seemingty intractabte conflict
of interpretations regarding the notion of ‘cause’. Aquinas, like Aristotie, held an
explanation of causes that included the notion that if A is the cause of B, that means that A
is the active initiator of change in B. Accordingly, in the Thomistic framework, intention is
the vehicle for a person’s active initiation of change. By contrast, in what might be called
the post-seventeenth century, scientific conception of “cause”, “causes are the inactive
noUes in u /uw-Iike implication chuin,” i.e., “ ‘A is the cause of B’ means ‘Given the
occurrence of B [e.g., Sulmasy’s pathognomic signJ, A must necessarily have occurred’ “
(Hulswit; 2002: 44). In this context, the role of intention is necessarily more ambiguous.
for example, as we recail, Ricoeur says in Oneseifus Another, “separating what belongs to
the agent from what belongs to the chains of extemal causality proves to be a highly
complex operation” (Ricoeur 1992: 106). As both Anscombe and Ricoeur have indicated,
however, there is a fundamentat need to acknowledge frankly that our actions arise out of a
conjunction between several kinds of causalities. I think this acknowledgement would
clear the way for a substantial reduction of the so-called “cross-cuÏtural dissonance”
produced by the use of double effect reasoning within medical practice. As we recali,
within Ricoeur’s recognition of a conjunction between causalities, he stresses that cause as
a form of explanation, must not be opposed to cause as a form of understanding ourselves
as-other. On the contrary, he places this conjunction of causalities within the context of
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Kant’s distinction between two types of beginning: the begliming of the world and our
beginnings in the midst of the world. Since use of “terminal sedation” graphically
illustrates the clash between these two types of beginnings, it is an ideal example in my
view, of how the conflict of interpretations regarding causation will flot be solved by any
amount of pure reflection on causation, but rather, by acceptance ofthe inevitable conflict
of interpretations, and the need to resolve it hermeneutically via Rïcoeur’s circle of
understanding. It seems to me that this particular conflict of interpretations comprises an
immense interdisciplinary and societal probtem, the symptoms and implications of which
extend far beyond those manifested in the use of double effect reasoning in the case of
‘terminal sedation’. Certainly, although problems and insights surfaced in the
consïderation of this conflict at the bedside level can and should inform the larger
discussion, I think that the conflict of interpretations regarding causation can only be
mediated effectively by use of Ricoeur’s circle of understanding at the level of disciplinaiy,
interdisciplinary and ultimately, societal discussion. An important first step would be the
comprehensive, interdisciplinary and societal identification of the conflict of interpretations
regarding causation as mamfested by pure reflection atone. Within this larger task, the
identification of the conflict regarding causation related to the reduction of double effect
reasoning to forms of pure reflection in the case of ‘terminal sedation’ (i.e., the conflict as
identified in this thesis) forms only a small but important part.
The first two chapters certainly revealed the conflict of interpretations surrounding
the first condition of double effect reasoning and its requirement that an act be ‘good’ or
‘neutral’. Within the first chapter, the first condition was found to be problematic because
it presumes universally applicable notions of ‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘neutral’, and there is no
consensus regarding the existence of such universals, their definition if they do exist, and
the idea that priority should be given to such universals over the particulanties of specific
cases. Also in the second chapter, Boyle and Kaczor’s pure reflection on this condition is
an example from a Ricoeurian perspective, of the othemess of cvii reduced to an ethical
vision ofthe world, i.e., evil reduced through fonnalism to a maxim of ftee will associated
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in the case of double effect reasoning, with underlying definitions of ‘good’, ‘bad’, and
‘neutral’. As we recail, in Ricoeur’s view, two main probiems anse when cvii is reduced
by pure reflection in this way: (1) authority is based along “the regressive patli of
[theoretical] justy’ication” (e.g., the test of internai coherence) rather than along “the
progressive path of actuahzatïon” [i.e., on the level actual practice] (Ricoeur 1992: 279-
283). Secondiy, this type of reduction of cvii is oflen accompanied by “the intermingiing
of relations of domination and violence, themseives institutionalized” (Ricoeur 1992: 279-
2 83). It seems to me that the work of Boyle, Kaczor, and other traditionalists exemplifies
“the regressive path” of which Ricoeur speaks, and institutionaiized “relations of
domination and violence” have certainly charactenzed the reiationship between the
hierarchicai magistenum, traditionalists, and proportionalists like McCormick. As one
Catholic theoiogian has said, “for better or worse, an entire generation of moral
theologians has now been formed and schooled dunng an era of deep theological
piuraÏismldissent (choose one) ... Regardless of where one assigns blame ... the spectacle
of a bickering church acting more like a dysfunctionai family than a holy people is nothing
short oftragic (LoPresti 2003: 176, 186).
In Ricoeunan terms, it seems to me that we have the option of continuing to
interpret the first condition in a reductionistic way, or adopting Ricoeur’s notion of
“potential” or “inchoate” universals which can only become universals for ail persons
through a process that fadilitates mutuai understanding of selves-as-other. In the context of
McCormick’ s thought, we have the option of norms more realistically envisioned as having
“the provisional character of our joumey into the future. They are an orienting force in a
history which is both fulfilment and promise” (McCormick 1984a: 2). I think that
Ricoeur’s ethÏcs circle provides us with an excellent process whereby we can facilitate
mutual understanding of selves-as-other on the way toward the goal of universals for ail
persons. Regarding the ‘moment’ of ethics in the case of discemment regarding use of
‘terminai sedation’, I think we need to change Ricoeur’s wording of this ‘moment’, and
discuss at the societal level, the meaning of the ‘ethical intention’ of aiming at the ‘good
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death’ or our ‘potentiality-for-dying’ with and for others in just institutions. Regarding the
‘moment’ of morality, I think we need to discuss at the societal level, ail the current norms
involved in aiming at the ‘good death’, and consider whether they are stiil serving us well,
particularly the relevant legal norms within the English common-law tradition. As already
indicated, the controversy surrounding ‘terminal sedation’ constitutes a good example of
how the parole of human suffering at the end-of-life is clearly pushing the boundaries of
pure reflection within the law and its incorporation of double effect reasoning. f inally,
regarding the ‘moment’ of practical wisdom or phronesis, we, that is, caregivers in
particular, need to lift up in appropriate ways and for the purpose of greater public
education, what has been ieamed from our use of Ricoeur’s circle of understanding in the
consideration ofproportionality in cases of ‘terminal sedation’.
4.4. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have placed ‘terminal sedation’ in the company of strangers,
gods, and monsters (i.e., other experiences of extremity), in order to illustrate the
fundamental choice we have in relation to our use of double effect reasoning. We can
either use this reasoning as a mechanism for repudiating otherness and accentuating the
tokens of fracture within the human psyche, or we can use it as a vehicle for understanding
and accommodating otherness. In Ricoeurian terms, we have the option of using double
effect reasoning as a vehicle for understanding and accommodating ourselves-as-other in
the case of ‘terminal sedation’. The assumptions in the first section of this chapter provide
the basis for using Ricoeur’s work to improve double effect reasoning for discernment in
the case of ‘terminal sedation’. Inspired by Ricoeur’s work, the most important assumption
is my conviction that the major issue in ethical reflection concerning ‘terminal sedation’ is
flot how, and in what ways it can or cannot be distinguished from other acts, but rather,
what specifies the self, implied in the capacities. at the junction of acting and the agent in
cases of ‘terminal sedation’. AÏthough double effect reasoning has had a long history of
being used to distinguish discrete acts as ‘good’, ‘bad’, or ‘neutral’, and thus, it would not
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be an obviously appropriate candidate for the task of specifying the self, its Thomistic
ongins, as they are concemed with actio, suggested the possibility of adapting double effect
reasoning to accomplish the Ricoeunan task of specifying the self, implied in the
capacities, in cases of ‘terminal sedation’. As indicated within the assumptions, it is
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic circles that have the greatest potential to reconcile universals and
particulars within our experience, and to increase oui overali understanding of ourselves-as
other even within the context of suffering, death and dying. It is with this potential in mmd
that we pÏaced the conflicts of interpretation surrounding ‘terminal sedation’ and use of
double effect reasoning within the framework of the circles.
Using resources from the first two chapters, the second section of this chapter
illustrated a key obstacle that would prevent the effective use of the hermeneutic circles to
facilitate better use of double effect reasoning -- the key obstacle being the exclusive use of
pure reflection. This reflection is extremely problematic because its sole focus ïs tangue or
explanation, a form of knowledge that focuses flot on the understanding of selves-as-other,
but merely on the explication of extemal objects and their conditions of possibility.
Unfortunately, as the examples in the second section indicate, most of the existing literature
on both ‘terminal sedation’ and the use of double effect reasoning for discemment in cases
of ‘terminal sedation’ relies almost exclusively upon the use of pure reflection. Although
pure reflecfion is beneficial in some ways, e.g., we need explanation as a starting point for
all ethical reflection, it is clearly not sufficient for the greater task of understanding and
accommodating ourselves-as-other in the case of ‘terminal sedation’ or any other
phenomena. In recognition of both the need for pure reflection and its limitations,
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic circles reqmre the creative, dialectical combination of both langue
and parole. It is the combined concem for langue and parole within the circles that makes
it advantageous for us to use them to re-construci double effect reasoning as a vehicle for
understanding and accommodating ourselves-as-other in the case of ‘terminal sedation’.
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In the final section ofthis chapter, Ricoeur’s hermeneutic circles were used to revise
and rejuvenate use of double effect reasoning in the case of ‘terminal sedation’.
fundamentally, double effect reasoning as a form of explanation (i.e., the conditions of
double effect reasoning), was opened up to a world of reference in the ways that Ricoeur
has suggested. In the context of suffering and dying, what is needed in relation to the
explanatoiy condition of proportionality, is the accomplishment of the proportïonality cf
selves-as-other towards death, or the achievement of ‘potentiality-for-dying’ as opposed to
the mere acceptance of the factual necessity of dying. Accordingly, in this final section,
discemment on proportionality in cases where ‘terminal sedation’ is indicated was
envisioned as an implementation of the circle of understanding for the facilitation of
‘potentiality-for-dying’ as much as possible. In the context cf suffering and dying, what is
needed in relation to the explanatory or textual condition of intention in the case of
‘terminal sedation’, is an understanding of the otherness of both foresight and intention as
texts, and an enlargement of the functioning of intention to include its authentic existence
as attestation, as a form of initiative that Ricoeur cails ‘promising’, and as a promise
functioning within the context of Ricoeur’ s notion of future-oriented and ftagility-onented
responsibility. In the context of suffering and dying, what is needed in relation to the
explanatory or textual conditions involving ‘cause’ and the concepts of ‘good’, ‘bad’ and
‘neutral’ as related to ‘terminal sedation’, is both a frank acknowledgement ofthe immense
conflicts of interpretation surrounding these concepts, and the urgent need for much more
extensive disciplinary, interdisciplinary, and societal discussion and resolution of these
conflicts. As Ricoeur says in many places, these conflicts are ultimately confticts of
interpretation regarding the sources of the self, and in keeping with his emphasis on the
ongoing enlargement of the self-as-other as a way cf mediating these conflicts, we have
suggested the use cf both his circle of understanding, and his ethics circle to facilitate not
just pure reflection, but comprehensive, hermeneutic refiection on ‘cause’, and on ‘good’,
‘bad’ and ‘neutral’ in the case of ‘terminal sedation’. It is only this type cf hermeneutic
refiection that will allow us to move beyond the exclusive use cf double effect reasoning as
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a form of pure reflection, and to embrace its use as a vehicle for understanding and
accommodating ourselves-as-other in the case of ‘terminal sedation’.
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The normal is 1101 a static or peaceful, but a dynamic andpolemicaÏ concept When we know fluai norma is
the Latin wordfor T-square and that normatis means perpendicutar, we kiiow atmost ail that must be known
about the area in which the meaning of the terms ‘norm and ‘normal originated A florin, or mie, is what
can be used to right, to square, 10 straighten. Ta set a norm (‘normer,), ta normatize, is to impose a
requirement on an existence, a given whose variety, disparity, with regard to the requirement, present
themsetves as a hostile, even more than an unknown, indeterminant. It is, in effect, a potemicat concept
The reasonfor the polemicalfinalpurpose and usage ofthe concept ofnorm must be sought, in the essence
of the normal-abnormat relationship. It is not a question of a retatïonship of contradiction and externaiity
but one of inversion andpotarity. The nom ... creates on its own the possibility of an inversion ofterms. A
nom offers itselfas apossibte mode 0fwufying diversity, resolving a dfference, settiing a disagreement. But
to offer oneself is not to impose oneseif Uniike a lm’ ofnature, a norm does tiot necessitate ils effecl. Ihat is
to say, a norm lias no signficance as norm pitre and simple A norm is in effect the possibitity of a
reference only when it lias been estabtished or choseti as the expression ofa preference and as the instrument
oja wilt ta substitute a satisfuing state ofaffairsfora disappointing one (c’anguithem 1991: 239—240,).
General Conclusion
At the beginning of this thesis, the problem, namely, the controversy surrounding
use of double effect reasoning in the case of ‘terminal sedation’, was established as a
contemporaiy example of the ancient problem of universals, the probtem descnbed in
contemporaiy phulosophical tenns by Schoedinger in the General Introduction. The
probLem of universals is essentially an immense, interdisciplinary and societal problem
about meaning. In the midst of the ‘pluralism’ of Canadian life, for example, what is the
meaning of ‘justice’, ‘goodness’, ‘rightness’, ‘tmth’, ‘beauty’, ‘respect’, ‘autonomy’, ‘evil’,
and so on. Universalists will seek to impose one meamng with an ‘ulfimate’ foundation on
the many. In Canguilhem’s terms, as above, this is ‘to nght’, ‘to square’, ‘to straighten’, or
‘to impose a requirement on an existence’ whose natural plurality responds with hostility.
By contrast, particulansts will seek to uphold as many particular meamngs as there are
particular persons, cultures, commumties, etc. The real possibility of either or both
universalistJparticutarist violence and totalitariarnsm makes the reconciliation of
‘universals’ and ‘particulars’ an urgent individual and communal task.
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If we retum to the case study at the beginning of the first chapter, we realize that it
is a microcosm of the problem of untversals as it relates to the use of double effect
reasoning in the case of ‘terminal sedation’. On the one hand, the physician relies on her
empirical knowledge of drugs and cause and effect relationships to give her distinction
between ‘terminal sedation’ and ‘euthanasia’. By contrast, the ethicïst relies on her
philosophical and theological knowledge of double effect reasoning to offer a very different
distinction between ‘terminal sedation’ and ‘euthanasia’. Both relied on universalist
theories that had an uncomfortable ‘fit’ in this particular situation, particularly because the
family members were bringing entirely different contextual understandings into the
situation. Unknown to both the physician and the ethicist at the time, they were only acting
out a complex conflict of interpretations well-known in the clinical, IegaÏ, phulosophical,
and Catholic theological literature. Based on a review of that literature, the main
dimensions of the conflict of interpretations concerning ‘universals’ and ‘particulars’ were
described in more detail, leading to the conclusion that both ‘terminal sedation’ and double
effect reasoning have flot one ‘face’ but many, resulting in divergent distinctions between
‘terminal sedation’ and euthanasia, some emphasizing ‘imiversals’, and others stressing
particular contingencies. A parallel problem was discovered in the second chapter because
the five selected authors presented five completely different interpretations of double effect
reasoning. Moreover, despite the fact that these authors are working within the Catholic
tradition and are favourably disposed, generally speaking, to the flrst condition, each of
them conceived of the universals involved quite differently, and each of them had a
radically different understanding of the relationship between the universals in question and
the contingencies of particular situations (i.e., including the contingencies of ‘terminal
sedation’ in the case ofthree authors).
In the third chapter, we explored Ricoeur’s herrneneutical response to the conflict of
interpretations conceming ‘universals’ and ‘particulars’. Fundamentally, Ricoeur’s starting
place is an anthropological insight -- the notion that human beings are both universal and
particular, and most importantly, that their universality and particularity is lived out through
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the functiomng of various human capabilities. In this third chapter, we explored Ricoeur’ s
understanding of several capabilities, notably, fallibility
-- the human capability for evil,
speaking, writing, acting and imputabily. It is through the exercising of these capabilities
that we encounter othemess or alterity that constrains our capabilities in their drive toward
universality. In the face of othemess, especially the othemess of evil, Ricoeur stresses the
impossibiÏity of absolute knowledge and the inevitability of conflicts of interpretation. In
response to othemess, Ricoeur has, throughout his works consulted in this thesis, advanced
a dynamic relationship between two contrasting modes of intelligibility
-- pure,
transcendental reflecfion and hermeneufics. Although each type of intelligibility brings
with it strengths and weaknesses in terms of its potential to mediate othemess, or the
constraints on our universality, the combination of, or the dialectical relationship between
the two types of intelligibility within the hermeneutic circles has the greatest potential to
reconcile universals and particulars within our experience, and to increase our overali
understanding of ourselves as others. It is with this potential in mmd that we have placed
the controversy surrounding ‘terminal sedation’ and use of double effect reasomng within
the context ofthese hermeneutic circles.
In the fourth and final chapter, we placed ‘terminal sedation’ in the company of
strangers, gods, and monsters (i.e., other experiences of extremity), in order to illustrate the
fundamental choice we have in relation to our use of double effect reasoning. We can
either use this reasoning as a mechamsm for repudiating othemess and accentuating the
tokens of fracture within the human psyche, or we can use it as a vehicle for understanding
and accommodating othemess. In Ricoeurian terms, we have the option of using double
effect reasoning as a vehicle for understanding and accommodating ourselves-as-other in
the case of ‘terminal sedation’. The assumptions in the first section of the fourth chapter
provide the basis for using Ricoeur’s work to improve double effect reasoning for
discernment in the case of ‘terminal sedation’. Inspired by Ricoeur’s work, the most
important assumption is my conviction that the major issue in ethical reflection conceming
‘terminal sedation’ is not how, and in what ways it can or cannot be distinguished from
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other acts, but rather, what specifies the self, imphed in the capacities, at the junction of
acting and the agent in cases of ‘terminal sedation’. Although double effect reasoning has
had a long history of being used to distinguish discrete acts as ‘good’, ‘bad’, or ‘netural’,
and thus, it would flot be an obviously appropriate candidate for the task of specifying the
self, its Thomistic origins, as they are concemed with actio, suggested the possibilitv of
adapting double effect reasoning to accornplish the Ricoeurian task of specifying the self,
implied in the capacities, in cases of ‘terminal sedation’. As indicated within the
assumptions, it is Ricoeur’s hermeneutic circles that have the greatest potential to reconcile
universals and particulars within our experience, and to increase our overail understandirig
of ourselves-as-other even within the context of suffenng, death and dying. It is with this
potential in mmd that we placed the conflicts of interpretation surrounding ‘terminal
sedation’ and use of double effect reasoning within the framework ofthe circles.
Using resources from the first two chapters, the second section of the fourth chapter
fil ustrated a key obstacle that would prevent the effective use of the hermeneutic circles to
faci]itate better use of double effect reasoning
-- the key obstacle being the exclusive use of
pure reflection. This reflection is extremely problematic because its sole focus is langue or
explanation, a form of knowledge that focuses flot on the understanding of selves-as-other,
but merely on the explication of extemal objects and their conditions of possibility.
Unfortunately, as the examples in the second section indicate, most ofthe existing literature
on both ‘terminal sedation’ and the use of double effect reasoning for discemment in cases
of ‘terminal sedation’ relies almost exclusively upon the use of pure reflection. Although
pure reflection is beneficial in sorne ways, e.g., we need explanation as a starting point for
ail ethical reflection, it is clearly flot sufficient for the greater task of understanding and
accommodating ourselves-as-other in the case of ‘terminal sedation’ or any other
phenomena. In recognition of both the need for pure reflection and its limitations,
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic circles require the creative, dialectical combination of both langue
and parole. it is the combined concem for langue and parole within the circles that makes
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it advantageous for us to use them to re-construct double effect reasoning as a vehicle for
understanding and accommodating ourselves-as-other in the case of ‘terminal sedation’.
in the final section ofthe fourth chapter, Ricoeur’s hermeneutic circles were used to
revise and rejuvenate use of double effect reasoning in the case of ‘terminal sedation’.
fundamentally, double effect reasoning as a form of explanation (i.e., the conditions of
double effect reasoning), was opened up to a world of reference in the ways that Ricoeur
bas suggested. In the context of suffenng and dying, what is needed in relation to the
explanatory condition of proportionality, is the accomplishment of the proportionality of
selves-as-other towards death, or the achievement of ‘potentiality-for-dying’ as opposed to
the mere acceptance of the factual necessity of dying. Accordingly, in this final section,
discernnient on proportionality in cases where ‘terminal sedation’ is ïndicated was
envisioned as an implementation of the circle of understanding for the facilitation of
‘potentiality-for-dying’ as mucli as possible. In the context of suffering and dying, what is
needed in relation to the explanatory or textual condition of intention in the case of
‘terminal sedation’, is an understanding of the othemess of both foresight and intention as
texts, and an enlargement of the functiomng of intention to include its authentic existence
as attestation, as a form of initiative that Ricoeur cails ‘promising’, and as a promise
functioning within the context of Ricoeur’s notion of future-oriented and fragility-oriented
responsibility. In the context of suffenng and dying, what is needed in relation to the
explanatory or textual conditions involving ‘cause’ and the concepts of ‘good’, ‘bac!’ and
‘neutral’ as related to ‘terminal sedation’, is both a frank acknowledgement ofthe immense
conflicts of interpretation surrounding these concepts, and the urgent need for much more
extensive disciplinary, interdisciplinary, and societal discussion and resolution of these
conflicts. As Ricoeur says in many places, these confficts are ultimately conflicts of
interpretation regardïng the sources of the self, and in keeping with bis emphasis on the
ongoing enlargement of the seif-as-other as a way of mediating these conflicts, we have
suggested the use of both his circle of understanding, and his ethics circle to facilitate flot
just pure reflection, but comprehensive, hermeneutic reflection on ‘cause’, and on ‘good’,
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‘bad’ and neutra1’ in the case of ‘terminal sedation’. It is only this type of hermeneutic
reflection that wiIl allow us to move beyond the exclusive use of double effect reasoning as
a form of pure reflection, and to embrace its use as a vehicle for understanding and
accommodating ourselves-as-other in the case of ‘terminal sedation’.
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AAppendu
RELEVANT SECTIONS 0F THE CANADIAN CHARTER 0F RIGIITS AND
FREEDOMS
Section I. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the
rights and freedorns set out in it subject to such reasonable limits prescribed
by law and as can demonstrabiy be justifled in a free and democratic society.
Section 7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundaniental justice.
Section 12. Everyone bas the right flot to be subjected to any cruel and
unusual treatrnent or punishment.
Section 15. Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
FOURTEENTH AMENUMENT 0f TUE US CONSTITUTION
Section 1. Ail persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shah make or enforce any law which shah
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shah any State depnve any person of hife, iiberty, or property, without due
process of Iaw; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection ofthe iaws.
